Spring 1979
Volume 24 no 2 (107)
£3.25 $6.50

SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
MAR 5 1980
Congressional Research Serv.

The Soviet Scene

John Bushnell Betsy Gidwitz

Gulag Yesterday and Today

Varlam Shalamov Yurii Orlov

John Glad

International Communism

G. D. Loescher A. G. Noorani

A. M. Kapcia

Views and Reviews

Alfred Friendly, Jr. Michael Heller

Duncan Wilson

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Editor: Leopold Labedz

International Advisory Board

Enzo Bettiza ..... *Il Giornale, Milan*
François Bourricaud ..... *University of Paris*
Alan Bullock ..... *University of Oxford*
Luciano Cafagna ..... *University of Pisa*
Maurice Cranston ..... *European University Institute, Florence*
Melvin Croan ..... *University of Wisconsin*
Colin Crouch ..... *London School of Economics & Political Science*
François Duchêne ..... *University of Sussex*
Giorgio Galli ..... *Critica Sociale, Milan*
Pierre Hassner ..... *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris*
Masamichi Inoki ..... *Kyoto University*
James Joll ..... *London School of Economics & Political Science*
Karl Kaiser ..... *University of Cologne*
Ivo Lederer ..... *New York*
John Wilson Lewis ..... *Stanford University*
Richard Löwenthal ..... *Free University of Berlin*
Alasdair MacIntyre ..... *Boston University*
Donald MacRae ..... *London School of Economics & Political Science*
Mark Mancall ..... *Stanford University*
Ali Mazrui ..... *University of Michigan*
Ian Nish ..... *London School of Economics & Political Science*
Leonard Schapiro ..... *London School of Economics & Political Science*
Soedjatmoko ..... *Djakarta, Indonesia*
Theo Sommer ..... *Die Zeit, Hamburg*
Leonard Sussman ..... *Freedom House, New York*

Editorial Assistants

Susan MacRae Elizabeth Winter

Editorial Office

Ilford House, 133 Oxford Street, London W1R 1TD (Tel. 01-734 0592)

Subscription Office

Oxford University Press, Subscription Department, Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 0DD (Tel. 01-450 8080)

Subscription Rates

UK £12 or US $24.00. Elsewhere £13. Single copies £3.25 or US $6.50.
Vol. 25: UK £12; US $27; Elsewhere £15. Single copies £3.75 or US $7.25.
Special arrangements for airmail.

Manuscripts

Articles should be submitted in duplicate to the editorial office. They should be typed in double-spacing and, preferably, conform to the house style of *Survey*.

Copyright © *Survey* 1979

ISSN 0039–6192

Survey is published under the auspices of the London School of Economics & Political Science by

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Produced in cooperation with Freedom House (New York)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Spring 1979
Volume 24
no 2 (107)

SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

The Soviet Scene

The New Soviet Man Turns Pessimist ... *John Bushnell* 1
Soviet International Civil Aviation Policy ... *Betsy Gidwitz* 19

Gulag Yesterday and Today

Art out of Hell: Shalamov of Kolyma ... *John Glad* 45
Lend-Lease ... ... *Varlam Shalamov* 51
The Used-Book Dealer ... ... *Varlam Shalamov* 56
On Prisoners in Soviet Camps ... ... *Yurii Orlov et al.* 67
Soviet Juridical Interpretation of International Documents on Human Rights ... ... *Konstantyn Sawczuk* 86

Military Affairs

Finnish Security ... ... *Karen Erickson Örvik* 92
The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex ... *Mikhail Agursky & Hannes Adomeit* 106

International Communism

The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict ... ... *G. D. Loescher* 125
Cuba's African Involvement ... ... *A. M. Kapcia* 142
The Dange Letters ... ... *A. G. Noorani* 160

Lenin

Lenin and the Cheka ... ... *Michael Heller* 175
Lenin's Reported Destruction of the Cheka Archive ... ... *George H. Leggett* 193

Views and Reviews

Ex-cultural Change ... ... *Alfred Friendly, Jr.* 200
How the Soviet Union is Misunderstood ... *Michael Heller* 204
Reformation Manquée ... ... *Duncan Wilson* 210

Letters to the Editor

Igor Mel'čuk 213
Max Hayward Fellowship Appeal 214

Our Contributors 215

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Minerva

A REVIEW OF SCIENCE, LEARNING & POLICY

Editor: EDWARD SHILS

VOLUME XVI NUMBER 4 WINTER 1978

ARTICLES

Academic Autonomy and Governmental Demands: The Case of Malawi *Ian Michael*

A Policy for the Advancement of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation *Robert E. Kohler*

The Diverse and Changing Fortunes of the University of Heidelberg under National Socialism *Arye Carmon*

Struggling to be Born: The Scientific Community in Brazil *Simon Schwartzmann*

DISCUSSION

The Use of the Breeder Reactor *Alvin M. Weinberg*

REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS

Humanism *Paul Oskar Kristeller*

BOOK REVIEWS

George J. Stigler, R. A. Hodgkin

Annual Subscription: £8.00/$18.00. Single Copy: £2.50/$5.00

Minerva, 59 St. Martin's Lane, London WC2N 4JS

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The New Soviet Man Turns Pessimist*

John Bushnell

THIS article is an attempt to explain how and why Soviet middle class attitudes towards the functioning and prospects of the Soviet system have changed since the early 1950s. The attitudes examined are those elicited by such questions as "do you think things are getting better or worse," "are you better or worse off than before," "what is your outlook for the future"—what might loosely be termed the public mood. Since the sources permit neither nuance nor precision, we can do no more than speak in rather general terms about levels of middle class optimism or pessimism.† It is hoped that even an analysis so innocent methodologically may identify important trends.

The argument presented here is that during the 1950s the Soviet middle class became increasingly optimistic about the performance of the Soviet system and about its own prospects for material betterment, that this optimism persisted through the 1960s but has in the 1970s given way to pessimism. The rise and decline of middle class optimism can be linked in part to political developments, but the crucial determinant has been the changing perception of Soviet economic performance. Middle class views on the functioning of the economic and political systems cannot be neatly partitioned, yet the mood of the middle class has been shaped more by the Soviet citizen's position as consumer than by his position within the political system. The degree of the Soviet consumer's present and anticipated future satisfaction has been influenced by the real performance of the consumer sector. However, since at least the early 1960s the perception of Soviet economic perfomance has also been affected by comparisons that the Soviet middle class has been able to make with consumer standards in other, primarily Eastern European, countries. Such comparisons are not to the advantage of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet middle class does not anticipate any narrowing of the consumption gap in the foreseeable future. This pessimistic outlook on future consumption has contributed to mounting scepticism and cynicism about the values and performance of the regime in other areas, as well.

"Middle class" is not a term often employed in discussions of Soviet

* Due to be published in 1980 in *The Soviet Union Under Stalin*, ed. by Stephen F. Cohen, Alexander Rabinowitch and Robert Sharlett, Indiana University Press.

† My own sense of the public mood derives from four years (1972–76) spent in the Soviet Union as exchange student and translator. Though I was based in Moscow, my contacts were not limited to middle class Muscovites. For the sake of stylistic felicity, I refer throughout to the Soviet middle class, but these remarks pertain only to the urban middle class in the RSFSR. This is primarily, but not exclusively, a Russian middle class.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

society. It is used here to refer to what most western studies have called, following Soviet practice, the intelligentsia. My preference for the term middle class is certainly not due to its greater precision. The difficulty with "intelligentsia" is that in addition to its current Soviet use to designate a very large white collar professional group, it carries a heavy freight of historically conditioned connotations—radicalism, dissent, or at the very least the mildly critical or sceptical attitude towards the existing order characteristic of intellectuals. The discussion that follows has to do with those who are not themselves dissidents, have had no contact with dissidents, have not read dissident literature and cannot in their majority be properly classified as intellectuals.

In terms of occupation and education, the Soviet "intelligentsia" is comparable to the white collar middle class in the West. It includes middle level office functionaries, doctors and dentists, engineers, agronomists, and so on, as well as members of the intellectual professions. It is a middle class, too, in that it occupies a position between the small socio-political elite and the very numerous workers, peasants and unskilled white collar employees. In the USSR even more than in the West, the defining trait of the middle class is status rather than income. A doctor earning 110 rubles a month is considered to have a higher social status than a bus driver earning 180 rubles or more a month. While members of the elite enjoy markedly higher incomes and other perquisites denied the middle class, these are the consequences rather than the cause of elite status: as a rule, special privileges are granted those chosen for the elite on political or other grounds.

Because middle class occupations ordinarily entail special educational qualifications, the size of the Soviet middle class may for present purposes be gauged roughly from the number of those classified in the official economic year-books as "specialists with higher or specialized secondary education." Between 1950 and 1974, this group expanded from 3·3 to 21·4 million employed persons (excluding military personnel as well as pensioners and students), or from 5 to 18 per cent of the Soviet work force. Besides providing access to middle class jobs, the educational system lends intergenerational stability to the Soviet middle class. While there is considerable upward mobility into the white collar middle class, middle class children enjoy easier entrance to the higher and special secondary education that ensures access to middle class jobs; there is little downward mobility out of the middle class. The Soviet middle class has been expanding around a core that is by now as hereditary as any western middle class.[1]

[1] The statistics have been calculated from *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v. 1974 g.* (Moscow, 1975), pp. 448, 549, 565. This proportion is approximately the same as that arrived at by Soviet sociologists attempting to delimit the intelligentsia as a social group; the relevant literature is summarized in Mervyn Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia* (London, 1972), pp. 141–8. L. G. Churchward, *The Soviet Intelligentsia* (London, 1973), pp. 3–8, counts as members of the intelligentsia only those with a higher education and arrives at a figure of 10,676,000 (counting students, pensioners and officers) for 1967. My own sense of the situation is that many persons without a higher education do in

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE survey of post-war refugees conducted by the Harvard project found that in Stalin's last years there was a fairly broad acceptance of the Soviet social and economic systems. Soviet citizens—including those in white collar middle class occupations—identified with the Soviet Union's military and industrial achievements. They expected the state to provide a wide range of social benefits and services, as well as job security, and they approved of the regime's stated welfare objectives. While there was pronounced hostility to terror and the methods of Communist Party rule, the regime was judged not so much by its formal and informal political arrangements as by its performance. A major source of low-level but persistent resentment was the regime's failure to deliver on its proclaimed welfare policies. In other words, the middle class was unhappy about its low standard of living. However, it was the leadership, or the regime, rather than the system that was criticized. Indeed, Soviet citizens did not see any acceptable alternative to the Soviet system, and they certainly did not believe that a capitalist system could provide the social benefits they had come to expect. Terror excepted, the existing system was taken for granted. The Harvard project found that acceptance of the institutions of the Soviet system was stronger with each succeeding generation, and there is no evidence that this belief in the legitimacy of the system has lessened since then among any but the relatively small contingent of dissidents and critically-minded intellectuals.[2] Attitudes towards the performance of the system and the leadership have fluctuated, but the system has throughout been judged fundamentally sound in its principles.

Extrapolating from the high level of acceptance of the system found in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Inkeles and Bauer predicted that if terror were reduced and if the system were seen to be meeting welfare expectations, the regime would tap a large reservoir of popular support.[3] This is precisely what happened. The 1950s saw a surge of confidence and optimism stemming from the virtual cessation of Stalinist terror, very real improvements in living standards, symbolic achievements—such as the Soviet space programme—that reinforced patriotic pride, and to a

fact hold junior executive jobs in many institutions, and that they are considered to be members of the "intelligentsia." It is of course also true that many persons with only a specialized secondary education (which anyway covers a very broad range of training) do not hold middle class jobs. My own figures are not meant to be precise, only to establish an order of magnitude. Churchward's different approach stems from the fact that he is really concerned with the role of intellectuals and others with special expertise in the western sense.

The literature on the relationship between the intergenerational stability of the middle class (intelligentsia) and access to education is summarized in Matthews, *Class and Society*, pp. 296–305, and Murray Yanowitch, *Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union. Six Studies* (White Plains, New York, 1977), Chapters Three and Four.

[2] Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), pp. 234–95. Stephen White, "The USSR: Patterns of Autocracy and Industrialization," in Archie Brown and Jack Gray, eds., *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States* (London, 1977), pp. 25–65, provides some data on attitudes towards the system since Stalin's death.

[3] Inkeles and Bauer, *Soviet Citizen*, pp. 293–5.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

certain extent the progress of national liberation in the Third World, which seemed to indicate that Soviet socialism was the high road to the future. The late 1950s were the years in which the Soviet leadership promised that the housing shortage would be eliminated within a decade, that Soviet citizens would by the mid-1960s have a standard of living surpassing the Western European average, and that the younger generation would live to see true communism. Against the background of perceived (and quite real) gains, middle class expectations for the future were fully in accord with official projections.

Alexander Werth, who informally sampled the mood of the middle class in the late 1950s, was so struck by this optimism that he concluded that, yes, there was a New Soviet Man. According to Werth, this New Soviet Man was proud of his country's accomplishments, confident that the Soviet Union was *the* rising power in the world, convinced that the Soviet Union's rapid economic advances were being translated into a rising level of personal well-being, and certain that the Soviet system provided unlimited personal opportunities, especially for the young.[4] Not all observers detected the same degree of middle class optimism as did Werth, himself an inveterate optimist about things Soviet. Nevertheless, almost all reported a widespread middle class conviction that the system worked well, that economic development was yielding tangible personal benefits, and that the sense of well-being was enhanced by the marked relaxation of the political atmosphere.[5] Soviet survey data, such as it is, is congruent with the observations of outsiders. 73 per cent of the respondents to a poll conducted in October 1960 by *Komsomolskaya pravda's* Public Opinion Institute reported that their standard of living had improved in recent years, while only 7 per cent reported a deterioration. (The questionnaire was distributed by conductors to the occupants of a single carriage on each of 65 trains leaving Moscow on a single day. Soviet critics noted that this produced a demographic bias against peasants and towards business travellers, but this would of course weight the results in favour of the middle class.)[6]

The only deviations from this pervasive optimism occurred among intellectuals and university students (the children and future members of the middle class). Even among these groups, however, it is evident that the disaffection that followed hard upon Khrushchev's 1956 " secret

[4] Alexander Werth, *Russia Under Khrushchev* (New York, 1962), pp. 85–6, 92, 98, 133–5.

[5] Louis Fischer, *Russia Revisited* (New York, 1957), pp. 13–18, 62, 81, 107; Markoosha Fischer, *Reunion in Moscow* (New York, 1962), pp. 19, 38, 60–61, 96, 131; Harrison Salisbury, *A New Russia?* (London, 1962), pp. 4–5, 9; Klaus Mehnert, *Soviet Man and His World* (New York, 1961), p. 209; K. C. Mahanta, *Three Years in Soviet Russia* (Hyderabad, 1962), pp. 130, 136; Leonid Vladimirov, *Rossiya bez prikras i umolchanii* (Frankfurt/Main, 1969), p. 288. Louis Fischer and Klaus Mehnert report a mix of scepticism and optimism, but the only informed strong dissent from the view that the late 1950s witnessed a surge of middle class optimism is Isaac Don Levine, *I Rediscover Russia* (New York, 1964), pp. 5, 197 and passim.

[6] Elisabeth Weinberg, *The Development of Sociology in the Soviet Union* (London, 1974), pp. 85–6.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

speech" was for the most part limited to demands for a further rapid reduction of intellectual regimentation. And this was a minority phenomenon. Many intellectuals, for instance, viewed continued limitations on freedom as a necessary trade-off for economic development that would ultimately make greater freedom possible; in any case, an appreciable minority of intellectuals did not view political freedom as a desirable end.[7] Even among students, who in 1956 and the years immediately following were more inclined than any other group to voice dissatisfaction, the majority were pleased with their own prospects and projected their own satisfaction onto society at large.[8] If anything, in the late 1950s the average student was more optimistic than his middle class elders. Asked about their chances of acquiring their own automobiles, 52 of 85 fifth-year students at Moscow University polled by Jerzy Kosinski said they expected to be able to purchase a car within two or three years, another 28 estimated four to six years, while only five believed they would never own an automobile.[9] Given the virtual non-existence of a market in private automobiles at the time, these students' expectations were wildly unrealistic. Yet there does not seem to have been a generational discontinuity in middle class optimism, only a slight difference in degree—excessive optimism was characteristic of all members of the middle class.

MIDDLE class optimism apparently reached a peak by the early 1960s (it could scarcely have mounted higher) and then remained at a constantly high level into the second half of the decade. As before, confidence about future prospects was based on perceptions of present national achievement and personal betterment. What was remarkable was that this attitude persisted despite economic difficulties that in the mid-1960s led the post-Khrushchev leadership to back off publicly from unrealistic promises. Judging by the comments of most observers, even the return of food shortages in 1962 and 1963 barely dented middle class optimism. Exchange students who spent those years in Moscow, for instance, do not mention that difficulties in food supply were a matter of concern to their informants. It may be that students remained more optimistic than the older generation, for whom the food shortages were unpleasantly reminiscent of the bad times of the past and who con-

[7] A. Zr., "The Conscience of a Generation," *Problems of Communism* (May–June 1961), pp. 9, 11, 13–14; Mehnert, *Soviet Man*, pp. 215, 271; Louis Fischer, *Russia Revisited*, p. 51.

[8] Tim Callaghan, "Studying the Students. Between Conformity and Dissent," *Survey* No. 33 (July–Sept., 1960), pp. 16–18. Peter Juviler, "Communist Morality and Soviet Youth," *Problems of Communism* (May–June 1961), p. 18, reports that some youths—not necessarily students—did tend to fault the regime for current shortages.

[9] Jerzy Kosinski ("Joseph Novak"), *The Future is Ours, Comrade* (New York, 1960), pp. 199–201. Interestingly, of 85 workers polled at the same time, only 23 saw a car in prospect within two or three years, 31 believed they would be able to buy a car within four to six years, while 31 believed they would never be able to buy a car. Kosinki, ibid. p. 43, provides some evidence that young people were indeed more optimistic than their elders.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sequently worried that the recovery of 1965 might not be permanent. But again, student attitudes differed from those of their elders only in degree, not in kind. The middle class appreciated the sobriety of the Brezhnev-Kosygin team and became more convinced than ever that the system was in good hands and that the standard of living would continue to improve.[10]

The few available opinion surveys suggest that the bulk of the middle class remained reasonably optimistic about the condition of the Soviet system until the very beginning of the 1970s. In 1968, a sample of 130 students at various Moscow universities was asked unofficially about their attitudes to the future: more than half of the respondents were optimistic, one quarter were " optimistic but had a certain amount of doubt," 11 per cent were " not very optimistic but not pessimistic either," only 2 per cent were " not very optimistic." Asked about their evaluation of life at the moment, 5 per cent said they were perfectly satisfied with life as it was, 47 per cent said it was " good enough though some things need improving," only 11 per cent felt life " should be greatly improved." [11] Jewish émigrés surveyed in Israel (1972) and Detroit (1976) reported relative satisfaction with the material side of life in the USSR. Of the respondents in Israel, 90·2 per cent claimed that there had been material improvements in Soviet society in the last 25 years—perhaps not very meaningful given the length of the time frame, though it does indicate a willingness to recognize the facts. More significant is that 67·2 per cent of the respondents in Israel said that the Soviet regime had the interests of the people at heart.[12] Neither survey breaks the results down by professional background (or year of emigration), but the favourable assessment of material well-being was so preponderant that it must have been typical of middle class émigrés (and non-émigrés) during the late 1960s and very early 1970s.

While what has just been said describes what we know of the attitudes of the great majority of the middle class, by the late 1960s the attitudes of middle class intellectuals had begun to diverge from those of non-intellectuals. The minority of intellectuals had become decidedly pessi-

[10] On student attitudes in the first half of the 1960s see Joel Schwartz, *Soviet Fathers versus Soviet Sons: Is There a Conflict of Generations?* (Pittsburgh, 1966), p. 14; Ernest Simmons, " The New ' New Soviet Man ' " in C. Faust and W. Lerner, eds., *The Soviet World in Flux* (Atlanta, 1967), p. 34; John Gooding, *The Catkin and the Icicle. Aspects of Russia* (London, 1965), p. 40; William Taubman, *The View from Lenin Hills* (London, 1968), pp. 188, 241, 243. That students may have been more optimistic than adults is indicated by Maurice Hindus, *The Kremlin's Human Dilemma* (Garden City, New York, 1967), p. 69, 97.

[11] A picture of continued optimism is presented by the ever optimistic Alexander Werth, *Russia: Hopes and Fears* (New York, 1970), pp. 14, 163, 166, 329. The survey of Moscow students is reported, without a date, in David Lane, *The Socialist Industrial State* (London, 1976), p. 91. Lane has informed the author that the survey was probably conducted in 1968.

[12] Jeffrey Ross, " The Composition and Structure of the Alienation of Jewish Emigrants from the Soviet Union," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Spring–Summer 1974), pp. 110–14; Zvi Gitelman, " Soviet Jewish Emigrants: Why Are They Choosing America," *Soviet Jewish Affairs* (1977, no. 1), pp. 31–46.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mistic. The changed mood of the intellectuals can be attributed in large measure to shifts in the regime's stance on de-Stalinization, the not-so-secret trials of dissident writers and demonstrators, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. While the tightening of domestic political and economic controls obviously had the greatest impact on intellectuals, we may hazard the supposition that symbolically prominent events—trials, the Czechoslovak affair and the concurrent resumption of jamming—caused a quickening of unease in the middle class as a whole. However, for all but intellectuals this apprehension dissipated when it became clear that there was to be no return to pervasive terror, and that there was no political threat to the well-being of those who observed the written and unwritten rules of Soviet society. The political shift of the second half of the 1960s may have left, at the most, a low residual level of uncertainty, but we should be careful not to overstress this. The changes in the political atmosphere were certainly not reflected in the attitudes of the Moscow students surveyed in 1968.

Even in the mid-1970s, when there could be no question about the regime's hard line on open expression of dissent, the bulk of the middle class had no fear of political repression. The September 1974 exhibition of modernist art at Izmailovo Park in Moscow illustrates how selective repression has left the sense of personal security of the average member of the middle class intact. Although an attempt to stage an exhibition two weeks earlier had been broken up by force, when the exhibition did open it was attended—despite the highly visible police presence—by thousands of Muscovites from all (but primarily middle class) walks of life. Even a sprinkling of army officers put in an appearance. Most members of the middle class simply do not share the intellectual's political and cultural distress. While the middle class has little expectation of political liberalization, liberalization that goes beyond assurances of personal security (which they feel they already have) is considered by most to be irrelevant.

Yet after a brief lag the body of the middle class did pick up the intellectuals' pessimism, not because of political developments but because of what they saw as economic decline. It is not surprising that intellectuals were the first to become economic pessimists. By the late 1960s they were speaking of stagnation and even regression not just as a short-term problem but as the long-term outlook for the Soviet economy. For intellectuals, economic pessimism was bound up with their perception of political rigidity: declining growth rates (the extent of the decline was greatly exaggerated) were pointed to as an example of overall systematic stagnation.[13] Since the early 1970s, economic (or consumer) pessimism has spread to the rest of the middle class, and with gathering

[13] Jonathan Harris, "The Dilemma of Dissidence," *Survey*, No. 78 (Winter 1971), pp. 113–14; George Feifer ("An Observer"), *Message from Moscow* (New York, 1971), pp. 314, 321–24; John Dornberg, *The New Tsars. Russia Under Stalin's Heirs* (Garden City, New York, 1972), p. 272; Vladimirov, *Rossiya*, pp. 288, 297, 315–24.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

momentum. By the middle of the decade the Soviet middle class had lost its previous certainty that the economic gap with the West would eventually be closed. Furthermore, the middle class no longer believed that even the slower rate of economic growth was yielding any appreciable improvement in the standard of living. In fact, the middle class was beginning to deny that there had recently been any improvement at all in the standard of living.

It should be emphasized that the drift towards economic pessimism was under way before the agricultural disaster of 1975 threw the Soviet middle class into a state of depression verging on despair. Neither Polish blue jeans nor Japanese umbrellas, then much in evidence, could offset that devastating blow to middle class confidence in Soviet economic performance. Neither the uncertainties of the weather nor the fact that Soviet agriculture had been over-extended by the drive to increase the proportion of meat in the Soviet diet provided solace: these were felt to be poor excuses indeed for a country that claimed to embody "highly developed socialism."

The shock caused by the 1975 crop failure—and the several years' disruption in the food supply that followed—has yet to wear off. Since 1976 pessimism over the state of the Soviet economy has taken on the blackest of hues, and there is now near unanimity that "things are getting worse" and will continue to get worse for the foreseeable future.[14] Exaggerated pessimism might seem a natural response to crop failure and so not particularly significant, but it is worth recalling that nothing similar occurred after the crop failures of the early 1960s. Clearly, the underpinnings of confidence in the performance of the Soviet economy had been eroded prior to 1975. In the early 1960s, consumer difficulties were considered deviations from the overall upwards movement. In the 1970s, they have been viewed as the norm.

Apprehension about Soviet economic performance has done more than anything else to shape the present mood of the middle class, but the malaise extends considerably beyond that. Not only has Soviet economic performance been discredited, the very direction of economic policy is now suspect. Middle class citizens do not now believe that Soviet economic development benefits them; indeed, it is a middle class commonplace that whatever economic growth may now be occurring

[14] It was my own observation of the middle class turn towards pessimism that prompted me to attempt to reconstruct the changes in the mood of the middle class. Others in the Soviet Union at the same time noted the same phenomenon. Increasing dissatisfaction over the standard of living is also noted by the émigré economist, Igor Birman, "From the Achieved Level," *Soviet Studies*, April 1978, pp. 168, 171. An unsystematic survey of 28 recent Jewish émigrés (most of whom left the Soviet Union between 1976 and 1978) in Chicago in early 1978 confirmed my own impressions: 21 of the respondents maintained that conditions would continue to deteriorate; three said that conditions would improve, though not soon; four said conditions would improve soon. (For what it is worth, three of the four relative optimists had left the Soviet Union before 1976, when middle class pessimism had not become as widespread as it has since.)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is at the *expense* of the Soviet public. Scepticism about official economic policy is but one manifestation of middle class disengagement from the regime's goals. Cynicism and alienation are so pervasive that by comparison post-Watergate America seems a hotbed of utopian optimism: few members of the Soviet middle class will admit that they do more than go through the motions of their professional and civic duties. Antipathy to Third World countries (not to mention Third World nationals in the Soviet Union) is universal. Even the space programme, once the object of so much pride, is now met with apathy—perhaps because, as in the United States, it has been playing too long. What was most remarkable about the public reaction to the Apollo-Soyuz mission was not the smallish crowds that gathered in front of TV stores to watch launch, link-up and landing, but the much larger crowds on the streets who paid no attention whatsoever to these much bally-hooed events. It is only a slight overstatement to say that in almost every respect the mood of the middle class in the late 1970s was very nearly the mirror image of the mood 20 years earlier.

Many of the features of the Soviet system that now contribute to middle class pessimism have been around for a long time, but of course it is the altered perception of them that is at issue. The changing middle class attitude towards the black (or multi-coloured) market is of special interest.[15] The black market, and bribery to obtain privileged access to scarce goods, are certainly not of recent origin, though the size of the black market has no doubt increased in proportion to Soviet economic growth: a larger economy provides a larger base for black market operations. But again the crucial change is not in scale but in perception. In the 1950s, participation in the black market was viewed as an unavoidable necessity, but it was a matter of course, not a salient feature of the middle class view of the system. Now corruption is salient, while the formal rules of public life and good citizenship are subordinate and are observed only to the extent necessary for survival. At the least, the middle class is indifferent to rampant petty corruption and pilferage. Increasingly, however, these phenomena meet with positive approval. And this attitude complements the middle class view of official economic policy. " It's a crime not to steal from them, all they do is steal from us," is the watchword of the Soviet middle class in the 1970s.

Of course, middle class pessimism and cynicism are not absolute. Neither attitude is easy to sustain, and the Soviet middle class is anyway not wholly preoccupied with economic and civil life. Furthermore, there are eddies of optimism even within the strong tide of pessimism. Far more significant is the fact that underneath the pervasive pessimism of the middle class there is a residue of optimism about the system: there is still a feeling that in the very long run things will turn out all right,

[15] The best recent surveys of the black market are Hedrick Smith, *The Russians* (New York, 1976), Chapter Three, and Gregory Grossman, " The ' Second Economy ' of the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, Sept.–Oct. 1977, pp. 25–40.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

because the Soviet socialist system is, after all, better than the western capitalist system. The shifting attitudes sketched thus far have to do with the performance of the Soviet system, not with the system in principle. Many intellectuals and most dissidents have bridged the gap by rejecting the system as well as the performance, but for most members of the middle class the implicit contradiction remains for the time being unresolved.

Within the ambivalent majority of the middle class, there are certain generational differences in the strength of this residual optimism. As we have seen, there is some evidence that in the 1950s and 1960s students and junior members of the middle class were less restrained in their optimism than were their seniors, whose expectations were tempered by greater experience of stress and strain in the Soviet work-a-day world. Today it is the older generation that is marginally the more optimistic, worldly experience again making the difference. Those over 40 continue to fall back on the devastation of the war as the explanation of last resort for present deficiencies. This is clutching at straws, but the war is more than a convenient rationale: to this day the older generation has vivid memories of the war, and measured against that low point even the present stagnation marks a significant advance. On the other hand, the memories of young pepole do not extend back to the really bad times. Consequently, younger members of the middle class are less impressed by advances in the standard of living over the last 20 years (those whose civic memories go back no more than 10 years perceive no improvement at all) and so they are more likely to project their present discontent into the future. Some degree of historical optimism is present in all generations, if only because almost all accept the present system in principle. Yet at the same time the distant, optimistic future is abstract; it is the universally perceived stagnation of the present and bleak short-term future that are operative.

THUS far we have been considering the swing from optimism to pessimism without really coming to grips with the reasons for it. Since middle class pessimism is so firmly rooted in the performance of the Soviet economy (above all in the consumer sector) we should note first that there is much to be pessimistic about. Both the overall rate of economic growth and the rate of increase of consumption have been declining since the late 1960s. Furthermore, sudden and mysterious shortages of even the most basic consumer goods are endemic, the quality of goods available is low, and the choice is limited. These problems need not detain us: the catalogue of ills in the consumer industry and retail distribution is voluminous and familiar. Surely shortages are partly to blame for the middle class consumer's excessive pessimism, since it is the unobtainable goods that are uppermost in the consumer's mind. But shortages are nothing new to the Soviet consumer, and in any objective view the Soviet middle class is better off now—

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

allowing for the continuing disruptions caused by the 1975 crop failure —than ever before.

The fact is that the rise and fall of optimism do not match the real performance of the consumer sector with much precision. As per capita consumption increased by 5·3 per cent per year between 1951 and 1955, and by 4·2 per cent between 1956 and 1960, middle class optimism waxed strong. But middle class optimism was not shaken by the precipitous decline in the rate of increase in consumption in the early 1960s—down to an annual rate of 2·5 per cent between 1961 and 1965. The rate of increase in consumption rose to 4·7 per cent per year between 1966 and 1970—yet it was in the immediate aftermath of this rising prosperity that middle class optimism began to be eroded. The plunge into pessimism in the early 1970s runs parallel to a real decline in the rate of increase in consumption (3·2 per cent per year, 1971–75), but there is no basis for the middle class view that the standard of living has not risen at all of late, or has even declined.[16]

Certainly we have to look beyond real economic performance to explain changes in the mood of the middle class. Similarly, neither changes in the regime's allocation policy, nor its failed attempts at economic reform, wholly account for changes in middle class perceptions. Khrushchev's goulash communism did indeed contribute to the optimism of the 1950s, but his successors' proclaimed consumerist policies have not sustained it. Failure to fulfil promises made to consumers has without question contributed to middle class cynicism, as has the collapse of all attempts at structural reform of the economy. Economic slogans are the butt of countless jokes, and over the years the regime's broken promises have tended to produce an effect opposite to that intended. But failures to deliver on promises have not always given rise to cynicism (the early 1960s provide the best case in point) and the middle class lack of interest in politics extends to economic policy: not much attention has been paid to reform programmes or shifts in the regime's economic priorities.

The fact that consumer goods shortages and policy failures are perceived differently now from how they were 20 years ago is due in part—not so paradoxically—to the fact that the middle class is now much better off than before. All observers since the late 1950s have reported that there has been a decline in the Soviet citizen's ideological fervour and an ever more resolute determination to lead at least a moderately comfortable life. Most have located this development in the student population, and regime spokesmen have since 1956 complained repeatedly that students are ideologically flabby, preoccupied with creature comforts and unconscionably indifferent to the past sacrifices that made such self-indulgence possible. Even were it true that material-

[16] Gertrude Schroeder and Barbara Severin, "Soviet Consumption and Income Policies in Perspective," *Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects*, Washington, D.C., 1976, pp. 621–2.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

istic inclinations originated in the student population, so many generations of students have come and gone since the 1950s that the materialistic ex-students of the post-Stalin era now make up a majority of the middle class. But of course the longing to enjoy the fruits of economic development was never confined to the younger generation. The late 1950s saw a sudden upsurge of materialism because it was then that the bulk of the middle class had the first opportunity for material indulgence. As noted, this was largely responsible for the heady optimism of the period: the availability of consumer goods demonstrated how well the Soviet system worked. But over the succeeding decades materialism has become a way of life and it has become increasingly difficult for the regime to meet middle class expectations. Nothing fails like success: the regime's earlier success, its welcome promise to provide the good life, generated ever greater expectations and has contributed to the current view that it has failed.

Yet it is unlikely that the present extreme pessimism of the middle class can be entirely explained by factors internal to the Soviet system. If in some imaginary world the Soviet Union were the most advanced nation, and Soviet middle class consumers better off than their foreign counterparts, expectations would, as we have seen, still be unsatisfied, but consumer dissatisfaction would not be nearly so acute as it is in the real world. What has happened is that the rise in the standard of living and expectations has been accompanied by increasing familiarity with the rest of the world. The Voice of America, the BBC and foreign nationals (tourists and others) have been an important source of information about the West (as well as about the Soviet Union itself). The western information that has had the greatest impact on the USSR has been cultural rather than political. The penetration of the Soviet Union by western fads and fashions is so widely recognized that it requires no elaboration here. It is worth noting, however, that the domestic political consequences of mini-skirts and chewing gum have not been properly assessed. While the demand for chewing gum is entirely apolitical, it has produced a political response by the leadership in the diversion of resources to establish a Soviet chewing gum industry. More generally, the demonstration effect of western standards has helped to shape Soviet consumer expectations. However, it is not the western model by which the average member of the Soviet middle class judges Soviet economic performance. For all the increasing familiarity with western culture and western artifacts, to the overwhelming majority of the Soviet middle class the West remains a never-never land: western material advantages are fabled but dimly perceived, the West is too far removed from ordinary Soviet experience for meaningful comparisons to be made. Moreover, even those most awestruck by what they have heard of the West are ambivalent about the western system. Every American family may own a car (something in itself so incredible by Soviet standards that the middle class cannot come to terms with its

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

implications) and every Soviet middle class family may long for a car, but the price the West pays for opulent self-indulgence is thought, somewhat inconsistently, to be exploitation, unemployment and job insecurity. (Soviet white collar professionals value their own secure inefficiency so highly that they have grossly exaggerated notions of the difficulties of finding and retaining employment in the West.) The West is commonly viewed as an intellectual and cultural wasteland, exciting, perhaps, but spiritually empty. The "materialistic" West is a convenient object onto which the Soviet middle class can project and thereby exorcize its own loss of larger purpose. In short, prosperity within the western system is to the Soviet mind the apple of temptation, succulent but fearful. If this description of the Soviet middle class view of the West seems metaphorically overwrought, it is because for the ordinary Soviet citizen the West *is* largely a metaphor, a symbol to which potent but contradictory meanings have been attached.

OF much more immediate relevance to the Soviet experience is Eastern Europe. Overlooked in the usual "Russia and the West" dichotomy, Eastern Europe is for Soviet citizens an external reference both more meaningful and more accessible than the West. It has often been noted that Eastern European goods are the standard of excellence for Soviet consumers, and that Eastern European magazines (though not the broadcast media) have served as the major source of information on fashion and modern culture.[17] Furthermore, the volume of Eastern European consumer "information"—i.e. goods—flowing into the Soviet Union has been increasing. Between 1960 and 1975 Soviet imports of consumer manufactures from the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary tripled from 631 million rubles to 1,842 million rubles.[18] This sort of consumer and cultural information from Eastern Europe, besides being far more plentiful than similar information from the West, can be evaluated more matter-of-factly because it is not overlaid with symbolic meaning.

For that matter, information about Eastern Europe is not confined to what can be picked up within the borders of the Soviet Union. For Soviet citizens, to arrive in East Berlin, Warsaw, Prague or Budapest

[17] Juviler, "Communist Morality," p. 20; Hindus, *The Kremlin's Human Dilemma*, pp. 52, 64, 66, 87, 385; Dornberg, *The New Tsars*, p. 267; Schwartz, *Soviet Fathers*, p. 6; Mahanta, *Three Years*, p. 130; Mikhailo Mikhailov, *Leto moskovskoe 1964* (Frankfurt/Main, 1966), pp. 6–8.

The interaction of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is not confined to the consumer sector. Zvi Gitelman, *Diffusion of Political Innovation: From Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union* (Beverley Hills-London, 1972), pp. 27, 32, 49–53, suggests some ways in which Eastern Europe has exerted an intellectual and political influence on the Soviet Union, though what really emerges from his study is the Soviet leadership's ability to block substantive political influence.

[18] *Vneshnaya torgovlya SSSR za 1959–1963 gody* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 200–31, 266–79, 304–21; *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR v 1976 g.* (Moscow, 1977), pp. 124–47, 163–72, pp. 193–202.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is to visit their own version of the West, prosperous but prosaic; and in the past two decades millions of Soviet citizens *have* travelled to Eastern Europe.

SOVIET TOURISTS TRAVELLING TO EASTERN EUROPE [19]

1960	112,000	1969	735,000
1961	164,000	1970	838,000
1962	180,000	1971	920,000
1963	204,000	1972	936,000
1964	296,000	1973	1,160,000
1965	422,000	1974	1,056,000
1966	497,000	1975	1,214,000
1967	650,000	1976	1,324,000
1968	668,000		

Between 1960 and 1976, approximately 11,000,000 Soviet tourists made the journey. Assuming (as a former employee of Intourist asserts) that roughly half of all Soviet tourists travel more than once, we are still left with around 5,500,000 different tourists. Data on the number of Soviet citizens who have travelled to Eastern Europe as members of official delegations, athletic teams and the like are available only for the single year 1960, when approximately 480,000 went, but this suggests that the total number of official travellers over the same period was as large as the number of tourists, possibly much larger (though surely with a higher incidence of repeated journeys).[20] To this we should add at least 2,500,000 Soviet soldiers who have been stationed in Eastern Europe.[21]

[19] The figures for 1960–73 are based on data in International Union of Official Tourist Organizations (IUOTO), *International Travel Statistics* (annual). Only for the years 1968–70 did Intourist furnish IUOTO with a breakdown on the number of Soviet tourists travelling to Eastern European countries. For the other years, I have derived the figures from the number of Soviet tourists entering Eastern European countries, as reported by those countries, reduced by 20 per cent to allow for multi-country visits. (The correction is based on a comparison of East European and Soviet reports on Soviet tourists in Eastern Europe for 1968–70, when both sets of data are available, and on a separate calculation of Soviet tourists in 1960 from Soviet sources by Mary Jane Moody, " Tourists in Russia and Russians Abroad," *Problems of Communism*, Nov.–Dec. 1965, p. 4.) Figures for 1974–76 have been calculated from S. S. Nikitin, " Mezhdunarodnyi turizm i svoboda lichnosti," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 25 June 1975 (for 1974), and Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, RL 204/77, 31 Aug. 1977 (for 1975–76), which provide figures on the number of Soviet tourists to the " socialist bloc." These figures have been reduced by 20 per cent to arrive at the East European figure. (This correction is suggested by figures for " socialist bloc " tourism provided by Intourist for 1968 and reported in Zhores Medvedev, *The Medvedev Papers* (London, 1971), p. 267, which can be compared with the figures for East European travel supplied by Intourist to IUOTO for that year.)

[20] Calculated from Intourist figures seen by Moody, " Tourists," pp. 4, 6–7.

[21] Statistics on Soviet unit force levels and deployment in *The Military Balance* (London, annual) indicate a rise from 300,000 Soviet soldiers stationed in Eastern Europe to about 400,000 over the past 10 years. Taking the low figure and multiplying by nine (allowing for a two-year rotation), we get a total of around 2,400,000 soldiers in Eastern Europe (all in the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary) between 1960 and 1976.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While the total number of Soviet citizens who have seen Eastern Europe at first hand can only be estimated, it is likely to be of the order of 12–15,000,000, of which half have been there more than once. And we may presume that the tourists, and especially the official travellers (though obviously not the soldiers) have come disproportionately from urban (and by extension middle class) Russia.

Whatever the precise figure, by the early 1970s so many Soviet citizens had been to Eastern Europe and had related what they had seen to relatives and friends that the Soviet middle class as a whole had a reasonably accurate picture of consumer standards there. For Soviet travellers in Eastern Europe, the key sights are not architectural monuments but department stores and, to a lesser extent, modern cultural attractions. They descend on clothing and shoe stores in packs, wholly displacing native customers. On every train returning from Eastern Europe, Soviet tourists are caught with more goods than they could have obtained with the rubles they were legally permitted to exchange for East European currencies. The aggressive acquisitiveness of Soviet tourists is ample testimony to their appreciation of Eastern Europe's higher standard of living.

The reaction of the middle class to exposure to Eastern Europe—either directly or at second hand—is complex. On the one hand, the superiority of Eastern Europe's consumer standards is unquestioned. On the other hand, the recognition of Soviet inferiority is often accompanied by emotions ranging from anger to depression. Anger stems from injury to Soviet *amour propre*: the Soviet Union, after all, is supposed to be the " elder brother " of the socialist camp. Depression results from the conclusion that the Soviet Union is fated to remain behind, and from the realization that the consumption gap is great indeed. One set of Soviet parents was overwhelmed by their inability to fulfil the parental function of helping out a newly married son living in East Germany because, on visiting him, it turned out that the Germans—and their son —" already had everything." Indeed, the son had a larger apartment and earned more than his parents: the East German minimum wage far surpasses the Soviet average wage.

Equally significant is the way in which Soviet citizens do *not* react to Eastern Europe. While middle class Soviets, except the most sophisticated, exhibit considerable curiosity about life in the West, there is very little overt curiosity about Eastern Europe. This is only partly due to greater familiarity. The entire category of questions aimed at finding out how life is " under capitalism " has no analogue for Eastern Europe. Despite the realization that the Eastern European standard of living is much higher than the Soviet, Eastern Europe is not felt to differ qualitatively from the Soviet Union. Even if they have not been there, Soviet citizens assume they know more or less how the East European system works. Perhaps because of this assumed similarity, the Soviet middle class does not give much thought to the reasons for Eastern

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe's relative prosperity. There is some puzzlement, of course, and when pressed Soviets attribute it either to the greater manageability of smaller economies (a few are familiar with the Eastern European economic reforms) or, more frequently, to the differential consequences of the war and to post-war Soviet "assistance." By and large, however, the Soviet middle class simply accepts Eastern Europe's higher standard of living as a matter of fact, as though it were in the nature of things for the Soviet Union to lag behind.

Eastern Europe, then, is the principal standard against which the Soviet middle class measures the performance of the Soviet system, and it is a standard with which the middle class is quite familiar. It does not appear to be coincidental that increasing familiarity with Eastern Europe—more broadly, the increasing openness of the Soviet system—has been accompanied by a decline in middle class optimism. Obviously there can be no single explanation for a phenomenon as complex as a turnabout in the mood of the middle class Soviet public. Real economic problems, rising consumer expectations and increasing familiarity with the West have all played a part. But Eastern Europe is closer than the West, and its impact has been greater if less remarked. No one believes that the Soviet consumer sector is catching up with its East European counterpart, and this alone must erode Soviet middle class confidence in the long run. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to suppose that the similarity of the two systems is more rather than less likely to undermine confidence in the functioning of the Soviet system. The Soviet middle class is strongly predisposed to accept a centrally managed socialist economy as the norm. That being the case, it is more likely to draw comparisons invidious to the Soviet system from socialist Eastern Europe than from the less acceptable, capitalist West. Since the Soviet middle class will not become less familiar with Eastern Europe, and the Soviet consumer sector will not in the foreseeable future close the gap with Eastern Europe, the current pessimistic mood will almost certainly continue.

PUBLIC opinion in the Soviet Union is not notably volatile. The news media do not focus public attention on persistent inflation (or its Soviet equivalent), corruption, or high taxes; nor is the pulse of public opinion regularly taken and then reported back to the public itself. Certainly the pessimism currently rampant in the Soviet middle class is not a response to events magnified by the media. Whatever its origins, middle class pessimism is the product of convictions arrived at autonomously, in opposition to the image of Soviet society projected by the media, and so evidently held quite tenaciously. And if pessimism has settled in for the duration, how long can it remain predominantly associated, as it is now, with the perception of poor economic performance? [22]

[22] Walter Connor, "Opinion, Reality and the Communist Political Process," in Walter Connor, *et al.*, *Public Opinion in European Socialist Systems* (New York, 1977),

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At present there is no pronounced tendency except among the intellectuals to draw political conclusions from the difference in performance of the East European and Soviet economies. However, because of the apparent similarity of the two systems the logical conclusion to draw is that it is the management of the Soviet system—that is, the leadership—that is at fault. Most members of the middle class believe that, in theory, the USSR's economic ills can be remedied—but not by the present regime. Because the legitimacy of the Soviet regime, in the eyes of the middle class, rests so heavily on the promise and expectation of material betterment, the perception that the economic system is being mismanaged must inevitably erode the regime's political legitimacy. Erosion of legitimacy is a far cry from de-legitimation, and the deep-rooted support for the system provides the regime with political capital on which to draw. But the regime today enjoys nothing like the middle class support that Khrushchev enjoyed in the late 1950s.

This is not meant to suggest that a political crisis looms: the continued existence of the regime would not be directly threatened even by widespread political disaffection. Yet even the presently apolitical disenchantment of the Soviet middle class is politically significant because the middle class occupies a crucial place within Soviet society. Since the 1930s it has been the cement holding Soviet society together. In what Vera Dunham has recently called the "Big Deal," the middle class was then endowed with a system of rewards and privileges. In fact, it was the extension of privileges that produced a distinctively Soviet middle class, whose mission was to halt the social disintegration brought on by collectivization and the industrialization drive. Though of modest proportions for all but the elite, the privileges were nonetheless gratefully received as a modicum of relief from the austerity of of the period. Moreover, as Dunham has demonstrated, by the 1940s materialistic aspirations were being given ideological sanction.[23]

The price that the regime paid for buying the support of the middle class was the gradual alienation of the working class, which was cut out of the Big Deal. The rewards, privileges and public esteem extended to the middle class caused workers to feel slighted in their own proletarian state. Judging by the scanty evidence available, the middle class optimism of the 1950s and 1960s was not shared by the working class. Though the working class in fact benefited from the increasing prosperity, the rising standard of living may have further alienated the workers, who felt that the middle class was receiving a disproportionate share of the benefits. At any rate, all reliable observers have reported that the working class has, since the 1950s, been consistently suspicious of the middle class

pp. 185–6, also suggests that consumer dissatisfaction may become politicized, though he further suggests (ibid. p. 176)—mistakenly in my view—that Soviet consumer expectations have thus far remained within a "domestic-historical" framework and so as yet present no problem for the regime.

[23] Vera Dunham, *In Stalin's Time. Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction* (Cambridge, 1976).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and antagonistic to the " bosses." Furthermore, working class discontent is more volatile than middle class discontent: strikes and other working class disorders, if not massive or numerous by western standards, have been endemic since the early 1960s.[24]

In the past decade or so, then, the regime's base of support in the middle class has been diminishing without compensatory gains in the working class. In the long run, the Big Deal has failed to achieve its purpose: those " dealt out " remain dissatisfied, the expectations of those " dealt in " have not been met. It should be reiterated that discontent is not now political in nature (we have not been examining the attitudes of dissidents) and that public opinion is not the most important factor in Soviet politics. Nevertheless, it is a factor. At a minimum, the leadership would like to retain public support. A step beyond that minimum, the need to cater to middle class and other expectations places constraints on the Soviet leadership. Serious efforts have been made, for instance, to strengthen the consumer sector. The problem for the regime is that the middle class perception of economic stagnation is fundamentally correct: in order to maintain overall growth rates, the promise made in the early 1970s that the consumer sector would henceforth have priority has been deferred, but even renewed emphasis on heavy industry has failed to stem the decline in the rate of growth. Neither in the short nor the long run can middle class expectations be met and the pressure of public dissatisfaction will continue to mount. The pressure will probably not be vented violently, but it is not likely to dissipate entirely without effect.

[24] The most informed account for the 1950s is Jerzy Kosinski, *The Future is Ours, Comrade*, pp. 86–99 (cf. fn. 9 above, which indicates that workers did not share student optimism about the prospects for acquiring an automobile). See also A. Zr., " The Conscience of a Generation," pp. 12–13; Klaus Mehnert, *Soviet Man*, p. 104; Ernest Simmons, " The New ' New Soviet Man '," p. 20; Alexander Werth, *Russia: Hopes and Fears*, p. 113.

There are handy surveys of the known strikes and other worker disturbances in Albert Boiter, " When the Kettle Boils Over . . . ," *Problems of Communism*, Jan.–Feb. 1964, pp. 33–43, and M. Holubenko, " The Soviet Working Class: Discontent and Opposition," *Critique* (Sprink, Glasgow, 1975), pp. 5–25. In addition, I learned in the first half of 1976 of worker protests associated with food shortages in Sverdlovsk, Volgograd and the Siberian coal fields; no doubt there were others as well.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Aspects of Soviet International Civil Aviation Policy

Betsy Gidwitz

MOST citizens of western countries understand the function of commercial civil aviation to be the transport by air of persons and goods at reasonable rates. It is also understood, though perhaps implicitly, that the airlines endeavour to make a profit in a highly regulated industrial setting; government regulatory agencies (in the USA principally the Civil Aeronautics Board) claim that the greater convenience of the public is their major aim. Whatever unpleasant memories an individual may retain of an occasional late flight or diverted piece of luggage, it is unlikely that he ascribes to an air carrier any ulterior motives. As long as he confines his flying to the carriers of most western countries, he may be assured that the airline on which he flies is concerned primarily with commercial and safety factors. It has not always been thus. It is not always thus today.

Historically, international civil aviation is an outgrowth of the First World War. The conflict caused a disruption of surface transportation, left a large quantity of surplus aircraft, and generated a number of post-war conferences for which transportation was required. Surplus warplanes were pressed into service to carry mail and documents to various meetings; because most air carriers were dependent on government-subsidized mail contracts at that time, diplomats and other passengers were viewed as a distinctly secondary market. With the establishment in 1919 and the early 1920s of numerous small airlines, many sponsored by aircraft manufacturers, service for independent passengers grew rapidly. Concurrently, the imperial powers were quick to recognize that air transportation provided a means of rapid and privileged communication between the home countries and the colonies; state-owned carriers were established or existing airlines heavily subsidized to encourage the exploitation of new technology in the service of empires. Imperial Airways, the predecessor of British Airways, was operating scheduled routes to India by 1929 with an extension to Australia by 1934. A route through British Africa to Cape Town was inaugurated in 1932. KLM inaugurated a scheduled service to Batavia (Djarkarta) in the Dutch East Indies in 1931. Sabena was operating flights to the Congo by 1935, and French carriers inaugurated a service to Hanoi in 1931 and to French Africa in 1933. Airlines of colonial powers became "symbols of empire," operating many routes without economic justification.

Today, a number of western carriers operate a few economically unjustified international routes, usually to former colonies or distant territories or states with which there are long standing or important

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political ties. Nonetheless, economic factors and the desire to assert maximum independence from government political interference have made most carriers strongly reluctant to maintain such routes. It is true that the economic penalties of these operations can be overcome by state subsidy if the route is served at government direction,[1] but most airlines appear to prefer that such services simply be discontinued. With few exceptions, the air transport industry in the western world is run by professionals who look upon government political interference, no matter how high the accompanying subsidies, as something to be avoided. Airline management characteristically desires to confine its service to those routes which are commercially viable without subsidy, to those which find an adequate volume of traffic in travel related to business and finance, diplomacy, tourism, ethnic ties, religion and pilgrimages, or "gateway" connexions.

The Aeroflot International Network and Soviet State Interests

Aeroflot, the Soviet state airline, operates international services to major points in East and West Europe, North America, Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia, and the Far East. In the number of foreign destinations served, its international network rivals that of most western carriers, differing principally by its lack of service to Australia and major South American points.

Examination of political and economic ties between the Soviet Union and the various party-states shows a strong correlation between these ties and Aeroflot capacity (determined by the number of seats available, usually on a weekly basis) on routes to these states. For example, Aeroflot capacity is greatest on routes connecting the Soviet Union and East Germany, followed, in order, by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania. Soviet trade turnover is greatest with East Germany, followed, in order, by Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania. A similar correlation can be found between Aeroflot capacity to and Soviet trade ties with Cuba and the Asian communist states.[2]

Far less economic correlation can be found between political and conventional economic ties and airline service capacity in Aeroflot services to the industrialized West and to the developing countries. Opportunism, strategic factors, and the acquisition of hard currency seem to be the motivating factors in Aeroflot expansion in these areas. In both the West and the developing countries the Soviet Union has vigorously sought traffic rights for Aeroflot on routes which hold no reasonable expectation of commercial viability. In the West, such

[1] See, for example, "Government Subsidy for Air France," *Flight*, 110:3525 (2 Oct. 1976), p. 1008.

[2] *The Official Airline Guide, Worldwide Edition*, lists major international flights. See *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR v 1977 g.* (Statistika, Moscow, 1978), pp. 9–10, for trade statistics. A complete correlation of transport volume with political and economic ties would require consideration of surface transport links.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

destinations already served include major cities in Norway and Canada, and secondary cities in other countries. Among the developing states, numerous Aeroflot routes to Africa and Asia are economically unjustified.

That Aeroflot's extensive foreign network does not reflect a large volume of international traffic is seen in statistics published by the International Civil Aviation Organization, a United Nations agency. In 1978 the Soviet Union ranked 15th among all countries in the number of total ton-kilometres (passengers, freight, and mail) performed in scheduled international air services, standing far behind countries whose international airlines had much smaller networks than the Soviet carrier.[3] The picture of low traffic density which emerges from these statistics has not inhibited the Soviet authorities from planning additional international routes; discourse in a variety of Soviet publications (to be cited later) provides ample evidence that continued expansion of the Aeroflot international network remains a goal of the Soviet aviation establishment and other Soviet institutions as well.

EXPANSION of the Aeroflot international network is supported by a number of Soviet state agencies and institutions. The relationship between the Soviet carrier and these agencies differs markedly from that experienced by its western counterparts. To say that Aeroflot receives protection and guidance from the Soviet government or, more specifically, from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is technically correct, yet an understatement. Simply put, Aeroflot is both a part of the Soviet government and completely controlled by it. There is no autonomy for civil aviation interests in a society where all sectors of the economy are centrally regulated. The function of one sector of society may be distorted for the purpose of maintaining or strengthening another sector considered to be more important.

The agency most obviously related to Aeroflot is the Ministry of Aircraft Production, which organizes, administers, and conducts the production of all aircraft, military and civil, in the Soviet Union. For what may be assumed to be reasons of pride, defence, and shortage of hard currency, Aeroflot now uses only Soviet-made aircraft.[4] Were it not a captive market for Soviet aircraft production, Aeroflot would do well to purchase its equipment elsewhere. Operation of Soviet aircraft confronts the airline with numerous diseconomies resulting from high fuel

[3] " International Civil Aviation," *ICAO Bulletin*, 34:6 (June 1979), Table 4, p. 27. Soviet scheduled international air service equalled about 11 per cent of the total ton-kilometres performed by United States carriers in scheduled international air service.

[4] The Soviet Union has purchased some light aircraft—for purposes of training, agricultural spraying, sport flying, and commuter-type routes—from Poland and Czechoslovakia, but it is not dependent upon any foreign aircraft for any major portion of its air transport industry.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consumption, a need for excessively frequent overhaul of both engines and airframes, low quality of metallurgical work causing limited structural life and increased weight, inadequate spare parts support, and various other conditions deriving both from the captive nature of the Soviet market and from the Soviet economic system which allows the accumulation of excess capital, in the form of large numbers of aircraft, without economic penalty.[5] Since Soviet aircraft do not sell well on the international market, the Ministry of Aircraft Production needs Aeroflot (and the carriers of the other Warsaw Pact countries) to absorb its output of transport aircraft.

The Soviet foreign policy apparatus (the Politburo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, KGB) also has a stake in Aeroflot's international operations. It is the belief of many governments that the appearance of aircraft emblazoned with their national flag in airports around the world confers great prestige upon the country owning the airline. The aircraft are considered to be demonstrating the economic power and technological advance of the distant state which possesses the capability to send its airline to faraway capitals. To the Soviet Union, the extension of Aeroflot services to distant lands is also a gesture of Soviet interest in and goodwill towards other countries. This political importance is well illustrated by a statement of an Aeroflot executive in 1958 at the beginning of the first post-war expansionist period of the Soviet carrier:

> The appearance on the civil air fleet lines of large numbers of new, comfortable, large-capacity passenger planes . . . is new and convincing evidence that the Communist Party and the Soviet government, true to their principles of peaceful coexistence among states with different political systems, are devoting an enormous amount of attention to the construction of aircraft for peaceful purposes, for expanding our economic and cultural ties with all states and peoples.[6]

To maximize any political benefits, the relevant Soviet foreign policy agencies exercise great influence over Aeroflot, influence which in western eyes is strongly detrimental to Aeroflot's professed status as a commercial carrier. The most obvious outcome of this influence is a large number of non-commercial political routes operated mainly to developing countries. Implementation of new routes often follows a sudden change in relations between the Soviet Union and a particular country as the result of a change of government (for example, in the case of Libya or Chile), new military aid agreements involving some indebtedness to the Soviet Union (Egypt, for example), Soviet political support in international disputes (Cyprus, for example), or some other foreign policy reason. In none of these cases have the Soviet civil aviation

[5] Numerous references about operating characteristics of Soviet aircraft are available. See, for example, Robert H. Ropelewski, "Egypt to Replace Tu-154s with Boeings," *Aviation Week*, 102:7 (17 Feb. 1975), p. 24, and Mark Lambert, "A Market in Russia," *Flight*, 106:3415 (22 Aug. 1974), p. 21.

[6] Pavel Zhigarev, "SSSR—velikaya aviatsionnaya derzhava," *Izvestiya*, 20 July 1958, p. 2.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

authorities undertaken a market survey prior to commencing Aeroflot operations. Western carriers, including those owned by governments, could not survive the financial losses resulting from so many political operations.

Another peculiar foreign policy aspect of Soviet international civil aviation operations is the use of some East European airlines as surrogates to serve certain points which Aeroflot, for political reasons, cannot serve, but where a privileged means of communication or increased bloc presence is desired. In some cases, foreign countries do not want to be served by Aeroflot because of political differences with the Soviet Union, fear of espionage by Aeroflot personnel, fear of offending an important western aid patron, or some other reason; service by an airline of the East European party-states is considered far less "dangerous" and still provides a link with the Soviet bloc countries. In other instances, the Soviet Union itself may wish to preclude service to a specific country as a means of showing displeasure with certain of that country's policies, but may urge an East European carrier to operate routes to the same country on the premise that some bloc service is desirable and the presence of a small East European airline will not be politically damaging. Among the countries served by East European carriers before Aeroflot could operate similar routes were Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Spain, West Germany, and Libya. Malev of Hungary and Interflug of East Germany currently offer scheduled services to Albania. CSA of Czechoslovakia is active on behalf of the Soviet Union in espionage, an Aeroflot sideline discussed below.

SO strong is the relationship between Aeroflot and the Soviet armed forces that one western authority on Soviet defence refers to the Soviet civil aviation establishment as another arm of the military, with status similar to that of more usual military service groups.[7] In a conversation with the author, an official of a state-owned western airline has described Aeroflot as "the commercial division of the Soviet air force." Not everyone would characterize the relationship with such bluntness, but it is clear that military links with the carrier are more pronounced in the Soviet Union than in most other countries. One aspect of these ties is the presence of high-ranking generals in Soviet civil aviation management. The three men who have headed Soviet civil aviation since Aeroflot began international operations outside the other party-states in the late 1950s have all been marshals of aviation.[8]

[7] John Erickson, "Soviet Military Power," *Strategic Review*, 1:1 (Spring, 1972), pp. 13 and 19.

[8] Pavel Feodorovich Zhigarev, an expert on strategic bombing, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet air force in 1950, Chief Marshal of Aviation in 1955, and head of Aeroflot in 1957. His two chief deputies while head of Aeroflot were also air-force generals. Yevgeny F. Loginov, who was appointed director of the Main Administration of the Civil Air Fleet in 1959 and the Minister of Civil Aviation in 1964 after civil aviation gained ministry status, was a strategic bombing commander during the Second World War, later Commander-in-Chief of Soviet air forces in East Germany,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The use of civil carriers in military airlifts is widely practised and, in its employment of Aeroflot for troop transport, the Soviet Union has much in common with many other countries. The USSR does, however, differ from other countries in using its civil airline for military operations of a more combative nature, a practice dating from the 1920s and 1930s when a predecessor airline was used for bombing headquarters of anti-communist rebel groups during the consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia.[9] The most spectacular use of Aeroflot for military purposes in recent years was during the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. On the night of the invasion, unscheduled Aeroflot aircraft whose pilots claimed either that they carried tourist charter groups or were running out of fuel en route to other places landed at airports in Prague, Brno, Bratislava, and Ostrava. Their passengers were military and intelligence officers, their cargo was electronic equipment comprising self-contained air traffic control facilities. The Soviets had correctly anticipated that the Czechoslovaks would try to shut down the airports so they left nothing to chance, capturing local personnel and securing the airports for the Soviet military airlift.[10] It is, of course, possible that the Aeroflot-marked aircraft used in the invasion were not under Aeroflot control at any time, but were under the permanent control of the Soviet air force and painted in Aeroflot livery for the purpose of deception.

The Soviet Union has long used nominally commercial Soviet representations abroad as concealment or cover for Soviet espionage activity. Many of these representations (in common with Soviet diplomatic

and then Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet air force before moving to civil aviation. Recipient of many military honours, Loginov was promoted from colonel general to marshal while head of Aeroflot. Loginov's senior deputies in the Ministry of Civil Aviation were also air force generals. One of these deputies, the then Major General Boris P. Bugayev, succeeded Loginov shortly before the latter's death in 1970. Although Bugayev had been a leading pilot on Aeroflot international routes for some years after wartime experience in the Soviet air force, he was promoted to the rank of colonel general shortly after becoming Minister, and in 1973 was named Marshal of Aviation. Aleksey N. Katrich, First Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation, was named to that post in the mid-1970s directly from the Soviet air force in whose service he still holds the rank of colonel general.

9 P. S. Nazaroff, " Soviet Aircraft versus Desert Tribesmen," *The Army Quarterly*, XXVI:2 (July 1933), p. 332, and Robert A. Kilmarx, *A History of Soviet Air Power* (Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1962), p. 97.

10 The same tactics failed when the Soviets tried to capture the Czechoslovakian air force headquarters at the Khebly base near Prague; the base commander knew of the Soviet invasion in other parts of the country and had parked every available vehicle on the Khebly runways in order to prevent Soviet aircraft, " Aeroflot " or otherwise, from landing there. Khebly was eventually overrun by Soviet groundforces. See Colin Chapman, *August 21—The Rape of Czechoslovakia* (J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1968), pp. 1–2; Ansel E. Talbert, " Aeroflot, Soviet Conglomerate Airline, Expands Outside USSR, Eyes SST Routes," *Air Transport World*, 6:2 (1 Feb. 1969), p. 17; Robert Jackson, *The Red Falcons* (Clifton Books, London, 1970), pp. 205–9; J. T. Reitz, " Soviet Defense-Associated Activities Outside the Ministry of Defense," *Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union*, United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy, 1970, p. 151; and Alan Levy, *Rowboat to Prague* (Grossman Publishers, New York, 1972), pp. 247, 248, 303–4.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

missions) are extraordinarily overstaffed, and apparently commercially underactive. Between 40 and 75 per cent. of all Soviet citizens stationed abroad are said to be Soviet espionage agents.[11] It is clear from published records that Aeroflot personnel stationed abroad have been engaged in more known espionage activity than have personnel of any major world airline. Considering that the Soviet carrier has been operating international routes outside the party-states only since 1956 and that its route network is still limited in terms of traffic and frequencies (in comparison with the major western carriers), its espionage record is astonishing. Aeroflot personnel have been active in political, economic, industrial, and military espionage in all areas of the Soviet carrier's network. Well-publicized expulsions of Aeroflot personnel have occurred in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Cyprus, and incidents have also been reported in other countries.[12] Personnel of East European carriers, especially CSA of Czechoslovakia, engage in covert activity, on behalf of the Soviet Union, from gun running to aerial photographic surveillance.[13] Aeroflot's espionage record is well known and is doubtless a major factor in preventing or at least delaying Aeroflot services to Mexico, Australia, Hong Kong, and certain countries in South America and Africa. Whereas it cannot be stated that no western carrier has been used as a cover for espionage, it can be said that Aeroflot's involvement in espionage operations is greater than that of any major contemporary western airline. Western airlines are eager to retain their commercial image and even the state-owned carriers would strongly protest against being exploited for espionage or less dramatic intelligence purposes.

AS befits their commercial orientation, western carriers are heavily involved in tourism, promoting both travel to, and travel from and through their countries of registration to various points in their networks. For Aeroflot, however, the connexion with tourism is less elaborate. Because there is no discretionary foreign travel from the Soviet Union for Soviet citizens, there is no need for Aeroflot to promote its services at home. Abroad, most Soviet marketing efforts aimed at encouraging foreign tourism in the Soviet Union are handled by Intourist.

11 In the European NATO countries there are approximately six times as many Soviet representatives, commercial and diplomatic, as there are representatives of the NATO countries in the Soviet Union. See Brian Crozier, ed., *The Peacetime Strategy of the Soviet Union* (Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, 1973), pp. 7–8.

12 See, for example: *The New York Times*, 17 Feb. 1965; "From Scandinavia to Somalia . . . A Soviet Spy Network Crumbles," *U.S. News & World Report*, LXII:17 (24 Apr. 1967), pp. 44–46; "Aeroflot: Soviet 'Spy Line?'," *U.S. News & World Report*, LXII:22 (29 May 1967), p. 64; David Owen, "Eye to Eye in the Stratosphere," *The Observer Magazine* (London), 14 Nov. 1971, p. 33; *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, both 25 Nov. 1976.

13 See Owen; also Richard Deacon, *A History of the Russian Secret Service* (Taplinger Publishing Co., New York, 1972), pp. 466 and 491; "Those Other Embassies," *The Economist* (London), 241:6684 (2 Oct. 1971), p. 18; John Barron, *KGB* (Reader's Digest Press, New York, 1974), pp. 141–63; Ladislav Bittman, *The Deception Game* (Syracuse University Research Corporation, Syracuse, New York, 1972), Chapter 4.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Despite interference from and conflicts with other Soviet state agencies, Aeroflot enjoys enormous commercial protection extended by these very agencies and, as Aeroflot benefits, foreign carriers serving the Soviet Union suffer. Indeed commercial conditions for foreign airlines in the Soviet Union are more restrictive than those prevailing in most other countries in the world. Ground floor office space is, as a matter of Soviet policy, unavailable to most foreign carriers. Also as a matter of policy, Aeroflot reserves for itself the right to sell all airline tickets in the Soviet Union; its role as sales agent on behalf of foreign carriers is performed with the clear intention of blocking, rather than promoting, the sale of tickets on other airlines. Foreigners visiting relatives in the Soviet Union are intimidated into using Aeroflot after suggestions that conditions for their relatives might improve if they do so. Businessmen trying to sell in the Soviet Union face similar pressure. Groundhandling and catering inefficiencies at Soviet airports limit the quality of service western carriers are able to offer. Western airline managers in the Soviet Union are subject to travel restrictions, inordinate bureaucracy, KGB surveillance, inadequate personal housing, conflict with Soviet employees whose loyalties to the airlines are far from absolute, and innumerable other difficulties.[14]

The Soviet Union in the International Air Transport Community

Soviet participation in the organized international air transport community is tentative and insignificant. In self-imposed post-war isolation until the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union played no role in shaping the various institutions which govern international civil air transport today. The USSR joined the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations specialized agency founded in 1947 whose primary task is the establishment of aviation safety and navigation standards, only in 1970. It was the 120th country to do so, hardly a pioneering effort. There are several explanations for the Soviet hesitation. First, it may be assumed that the Soviet Union wished to join the organization only when it perceived its status in aviation to be appropriate to that of a great power. After all, it was only in 1968 that Aeroflot commenced service across the North Atlantic to New York, a route which many carriers had been flying for more than 20 years. Second, the opening of the trans-Siberian and trans-Asian routes to foreign carriers, permitted by Aeroflot to obtain reciprocal rights from Japan and the West European countries, rendered obsolete the total Soviet rejection of an overflight rights provision of the ICAO Convention. Third, in the 25 years before the Soviet Union joined ICAO, the organization had developed numerous technological standards for aircraft navigation systems and other equipment which the Soviet Union could not meet. Time was required to bring

[14] Documentation of these conditions is voluminous. See Chapter IX of the author's *The Political and Economic Implications of the International Routes of Aeroflot.* (M.I.T. Flight Transportation Laboratory, Cambridge, 1976).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet-manufactured equipment up to standard. As the Soviet Union began to press sales of its aircraft in the non-communist market, Soviet representation in the ICAO bodies which formulate accepted international standards became increasingly important. Fourth, the general civil aviation image of the Soviet Union, as it strives to expand the Aeroflot international network and to increase its sales of Soviet-manufactured aircraft, could only be strengthened by membership in international civil aviation organizations.[15]

Soviet participation in ICAO activity is at a low level, perhaps reflecting the ambivalent attitude the USSR has shown toward organizations which it cannot control. Its tendency to politicize various issues, especially the problem of unlawful interference with aircraft, has not been helpful, but politicization of ICAO was well advanced before the Soviets joined the organization and they cannot be held fully responsible for this or other ICAO problems.

Unlike ICAO, whose membership consists of governments, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) is an organization of airlines. Approximately 90 carriers with scheduled international service have joined IATA since its founding in 1945. The organization is best known to the general public for its fare-approving function, but it also determines the standards for first class and tourist class services, cargo carriage, security, commissions to travel agents, and a host of other matters. Member airlines must make their financial records available for inspection by IATA and are subject to heavy fines for violations of IATA policies. (Heavy fines notwithstanding, illegal discounting on ticket fares is a major problem for IATA and the industry as a whole.) A major undertaking of IATA is the maintenance of a financial clearing house in Geneva which settles the monthly accounts of revenue transactions between airlines. Because the organization continues to be dominated by the larger western carriers, the politicization of IATA, while it exists, is not as pronounced as that of ICAO. The Soviet Union has published very little information about IATA, doubtless to avoid mentioning the existence of a major international aviation organization in which the USSR is not represented.[16] Aeroflot is reluctant to join

[15] Soviet press comment about the admission of the USSR to ICAO did not mention these factors. Instead, Soviet writers emphasized both the strength and variety of Soviet civil aviation operations and the unspecified "value" that the Soviet Union would derive from ICAO membership. Although most articles mentioned that ICAO was a worldwide organization and that the USSR was the 120th state to become a contracting member, none offered an explanation of why the Soviet Union, as a country with a strong civil aviation programme, was only the 120th state to join this valuable organization. See, for example: "Sotrudnichestvo na vozdushnykh trassakh," *Ogonek* (9 Jan. 1971), pp. 14–15; B. P. Bugayev, "Na novye rubezhi," *Grazhdanskaya aviatsiya* (April 1971), p. 2; and A. Kotov, "IKAO," *Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika* (December 1972), pp. 43–4.

[16] In one of the most thorough accounts, Zinaida Petrovna Rumyantseva in *Mirovoy vozdushnyi transport* (Izdatel'stvo Znanie, Moscow, 1971), p. 16, devotes several paragraphs to the organization, describing its functions and noting its large membership, but failing to say whether Aeroflot held membership in it.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IATA probably because of its relatively weak ranking among international carriers in terms of traffic and its likely consequent lack of influence in IATA, because it is unwilling to open its financial records for international inspection and because at its current stage of development it does not need IATA services.

No Soviet institution is a member of the Institut du Transport Aerien, an independent Paris-based research organization with worldwide support from airlines, aircraft manufacturers, government regulatory agencies, airport authorities, and other aviation-related institutions. Aeroflot is not a member of the Association of European Airlines, and Soviet participation in the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations and the International Civil Airport Association is of post-1970 origin and small.

The self-imposed 25-year post-war isolation of the Soviet Union from the more important international air transport organizations has been more harmful to the Soviet Union than to any of the boycotted organizations. With each year of Soviet inactivity, western technological, economic, and political standards became more firmly established in the international civil aviation arena. By its late entry into the formal international organizations, the Soviet Union forfeited many opportunities of influencing their development. The Soviet aircraft and airline industries expanded in isolation from world trends and remain behind the pace set by western industries; their backwardness continues to inhibit current Soviet participation in international civil aviation organizations. Further, isolation prevented the Soviet Union from developing a sizeable cadre of competent international aviation specialists.

THE expression "unlawful interference with aircraft" is the air industry's term for all illegal acts committed against civil aircraft, including armed seizure (hijacking) and sabotage. The conflict faced by the Soviet Union on this issue is acute. It has actively supported a number of Arab terrorist groups which have carried out acts of unlawful interference with aircraft. While it may not approve of air terrorism as such, Soviet policy in the Middle East requires that the issue be treated with care. But Aeroflot and other party-state aircraft have been hijacked by people who see such acts as their only way to flee what they consider repressive societies. The Soviets have met this conflict with dissembling and misrepresentation. In 1972, Soviet commentators began to criticize the terrorist actions of individual Arabs, but were careful to allege that these were the actions of isolated fanatics who had nothing in common with the Palestine Liberation Organization or other well-known Palestinian groups.[17] Additionally, the Soviet Union has accused Israel of staging several of the bloodier Arab terrorist

[17] See, for example, P. Demchenko, "Palistinskoe soprotivlenie i proiski reaktsii," *Pravda*, 29 Aug. 1972, p. 4; Y. Kornilov, "Meetings with the Fedayeen," *New Times*, 42 (October 1972), pp. 24–5; "Ubiistvo zalozhnikov," *Pravda*, 4 Mar. 1973, p. 5; and L. Tolkunov, "Tyazholaya sud'ba," *Izvestiya*, 30 July 1974, pp. 2–4.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attacks, such as the attack at Athens airport on 7 August 1973, and the series of events in December 1973, which included terrorism at Rome airport causing the death of 31 people.[18] The Soviet response to the hijacking issue in international forums, particularly in ICAO and the United Nations, has been to support the Arabs and to block the enactment of effective international legislation against air terrorism. Yet the Soviet Union is not alone in its defiance of multilateral attempts to curb incidents of unlawful interference with aircraft; in addition to Arab states, certain western countries such as France have also contributed to the politicization of what is essentially a safety issue. However, although she can hardly be considered to have acted constructively over this, France has not actually armed and trained Arab terrorist groups as have the Soviet Union and other party-states.

Soviet negotiators seeking bilateral air transport agreements with other states enjoy formidable bargaining advantages. First, the superpower status of the USSR is intimidating to many countries and enables the Soviet Union to extract a number of *de jure* or *de facto* concessions. Second, the rigidity of the Soviet political system permits the Soviet Union to deny foreign carriers certain rights normally available to them in other countries. When the Soviet authorities deny foreign carriers the right to sell their own tickets within the Soviet Union, there is little the foreign carriers can do; the foreign government can prohibit Aeroflot from selling tickets in its own country, but this retaliation is seldom effective because Aeroflot flouts such restrictions, not a difficult task in open, western societies, and simultaneously applies pressure to foreign governments for permission to sell its tickets legally. Third, the arbitrary cost and pricing structure employed in the Soviet Union allows Aeroflot to undertake certain operations which no western carrier could justify, thus giving the Soviet Union a broader bargaining position. Also affecting their negotiating position is the absence of compromise in normal Soviet behaviour and the presence of compromise as an essential element of the western commercial tradition. Western negotiators offer proposals containing built-in concessions in advance of actual negotiations; the Soviet " position always represents the actual expectations of the Soviet government, weighted down with additional unrealistic demands to be given up in exchange for the other side's concessions." [19] Fourth, by covering the great expanse of land representing the shortest distance between Europe and the Far East and between northern Europe and southern Asia, the Soviet Union possesses an excellent trump in its relationships

[18] See, for example, Rishat Mamatov, " Kuda vedyot sledi," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 52 (26 Dec. 1973), p. 9, regarding the Rome attack. In a report in Arabic beamed at the Middle East on 7 August 1973, Radio Moscow declared that Israeli intelligence forces " hatched the Athens airport incident [of 7 August 1973, in which five people were killed] and put the blame on the Palestinians."

[19] Richard Pipes, " Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy," *Survey*, No. 87 (Spring 1973), pp. 54–5. On the same subject, see also Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History 1929–1969* (W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1973), pp. 27–8.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with those European and Asian countries whose carriers wish to use the trans-Siberian or trans-Asian routes. Fifth, centralized control of all sectors of the Soviet economy enables Soviet negotiators to offer a dazzling selection of *quid pro quos* and benefits not necessarily related to aviation as a means of supporting their bargaining position. Combined with arrogance, a consuming drive to earn hard currency, and a seeming need to expand the Aeroflot international route system for political reasons, these bargaining advantages make the Soviets a formidable partner in air transport negotiations. In the face of these factors, few foreign carriers have achieved operating conditions in bilateral services even approaching equality with those in Aeroflot.

THE conduct of Aeroflot operations in foreign cities differs from that of most western carriers. The principal differences may be ascribed both to the lack of any commercial orientation of the Soviet airline, a characteristic inspired by and manifested in extraordinarily stringent political control over all Soviet operations, and to the Soviet reliance on unorthodox (and frequently unethical) means of maximizing foreign currency earnings. The absence of traditional commercial orientation in Aeroflot's conduct abroad is seen in the fact that many of its managers speak neither the language of their host country nor any widely used western language. Many seem bored by the airline industry, and few socialize in the airline or travel communities. Subservience to a local Soviet diplomatic mission is obvious. Conventional marketing activity is practised infrequently. The Soviet carrier uses as its major sales tool extensive illegal discounting—or undercutting—of IATA-approved ticket fares. Illegal discounting is, as noted, a major problem throughout the international air transport industry, but Aeroflot's involvement in this malpractice is especially marked. The purpose of discounting is to attract passengers and hence additional (convertible) currency. For the carriers of the party-states which can meet many expenses in their non-convertible currencies, the cost of illegal discounting may be relatively low. While western airlines usually confine their discounting to between 5 and 15 per cent of the agreed fare on most routes and 30 or 35 per cent on a limited number of long routes where expenses are comparatively low, Aeroflot discounting generally ranges from 25 to 65 per cent, with 50 per cent typical in many cities. The discounts on longer routes are even higher: reductions of 60 or 65 per cent are most easily available on the trans-Siberian, trans-Asian, and north Atlantic routes.[20] Their eagerness to obtain the discount traffic combined with an incomplete system of computerized reservations frequently leads to overbooking on some peak-season longer discount routes—often with

[20] For published information about Aeroflot discounting of 65 per cent of the North Atlantic, see Robert Linsey, " Inquiry Finds Corruption in Sale of Airline Tickets," *The New York Times*, 1 Oct. 1972, p. 1; " Concern Over Cheap Aeroflot Far East Fares," *Interavia Air Letter*, 8514 (1 June 1976), pp. 3–4. See also *The New York Times* and *International Herald Tribune*, 5 Sep. 1972.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

very adverse results for passengers. Travellers may be stranded for days in Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport or the Aeroflot hotel, literally under lock and key, until space on other Areoflot flights can be found. Refusing to surrender any hard currency, the Soviets will not transfer passengers to flights of other airlines.[21]

Correct and courteous passenger service from Aeroflot ground and flight personnel is rare. Information about delays, safety measures, and other conditions is infrequently provided. Cabin attendants are often non-communicative, food is of poor quality, and amenities (such as games and toys for children, and stationery) are generally lacking. That senior Soviet civil aviation officials are aware of their poor service is evident from articles in the Soviet press about shortcomings on both domestic and international flights.[22] With the passage of time and the introduction of more modern aircraft, certain material aspects of Aeroflot have improved in the last 10 years. Some problems, however, seem endemic to Soviet society. Aeroflot's monopolistic position in the Soviet economy and the stringent political control over all its operations would appear to preclude the extensive improvement in service required if the Soviet carrier is to conform to international standards.

The nature of Aeroflot's international operations abroad reflects Soviet inexperience in free market economies and its political isolation. Its non-conformist character in the international arena has earned for the Soviet carrier a questionable image within both the airline industry and the travel industry in general, as well as among the public.

Development of the International Network of Aeroflot

The growth of Aeroflot's international network parallels the post-war evolution of Soviet foreign policy. In the immediate post-war period, the Soviet carrier operated services to the various East European capitals without permitting any reciprocal services to the Soviet Union by the East European airlines. Helsinki, used as a "neutral airport" for connecting flights between the Soviet Union and the West, was served by Aeroflot from 1946, but no Finnish carrier was allowed reciprocal flights to Moscow. In late 1954 the Soviets initiated a flurry of diplomatic activity which indicated a major departure in Soviet air transport policy and certainly reflected changes in foreign policy after Stalin's death. Formal bilateral air transport agreements were signed with the other

[21] *The New York Times* and *International Herald Tribune*, 5 Sep. 1972; "Soviet Union: The Unfriendly Skies," *Newsweek*, LXXX:12 (18 Sep. 1972), p. 56; "Down and Out in London or Elsewhere," *Time*, 100:12 (Sep. 18 1972), p. 37; and "Not Taking Good Care of You," *The Economist*, 244:6733 (9 Sep. 1972), pp. 67–8.

It is accepted IATA procedure for airlines unable to accommodate ticket-holders with valid reservations within four hours of scheduled departure to transfer these passengers to other carriers offering a similar service. In specific situations, financial compensation is made in addition to the provision of alternate transportation.

[22] See, for example, Vladimir Samoroukov, "Marketing na vozdushnom transporte," *Grazhdanskaya aviatsiya*, 5 (May 1972), pp. 22–3, and Boris Pavlovich Bugayev, "Aeroflot: 1972," *Grazhdanskaya aviatsiya*, 1 (January 1972), p. 1.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

party-states between 1954 and 1957. Neutral Austria and Finland signed agreements with the Soviet Union in 1955. Afghanistan, a Soviet economic satellite among the developing countries, and the three generally inoffensive SAS (Scandinavian Airlines System) countries signed bilateral air transport agreements with the Soviet Union in 1956. Each of these countries was entitled to operate its own aircraft on routes connecting its capital with the Soviet Union. In 1957 and 1958 reciprocal service agreements were signed with France, Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

The emergence of the Soviet Union into international civil aviation in the mid-1950s was the result both of general changes in the USSR following the death of Stalin and the development of Soviet passenger aircraft considered competitive with those available in the West. Stalin's death meant that prospects for international services by Aeroflot were enhanced by the reduction of Soviet terrorism in and economic exploitation of Eastern Europe, by increased contact with the West through trade and tourism, and by greater tolerance of foreign visitors inside the Soviet Union. The availability of the Tupolev Tu-104 in 1956 provided Aeroflot with aircraft deemed competitive with western equipment. The Tu-104, a civilian version of the Tu-16 medium range jet bomber, was noisy, uneconomic to operate, and of short range. Nonetheless, it was regarded by the Soviet Union as a propaganda success, especially in Britain after the early disasters of the de Havilland Comet I, the aircraft which had ushered in the jet era in 1952.

ITALY and Switzerland signed bilateral air transport agreements with the USSR in the mid-1960s, followed in Europe by West Germany, after heavily politicized negotiations, in 1971. In early 1958, Aeroflot and Lufthansa signed an agreement whereby each carrier would accept the tickets and documentation of the other. Six months later, the then director-general of Aeroflot declared that the Soviet Union hoped to negotiate with West Germany for a direct scheduled air service between Moscow and Frankfurt. Soviet civil aviation officials continued to encourage the conclusion of a bilateral air transport agreement, but only a charter flight agreement was concluded. The barrier to the conclusion of a formal bilateral agreement covering scheduled services was the Soviet insistence on an intermediate stop for Aeroflot in East Berlin (Schönefeld airport) on the Moscow-Frankfurt route. Inasmuch as the Schönefeld stop was unnecessary for any technical reasons, such as refuelling, the Soviet demand was interpreted as a political ploy aimed at forcing implicit West German recognition of East Germany. West Germany's response was to request an intermediate stop in West Berlin for Lufthansa. This suggestion was unacceptable to the Soviets, who have consistently objected to any strengthening of ties between West Germany and West Berlin. The impasse continued until the West German elections in 1969 when Willy Brandt, newly-elected, launched his Ost-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

politik and conditions changed. West German negotiators accepted the Soviet demand for an Aeroflot stop in East Berlin without insisting on a *quid pro quo* for West Germany. Relations between the Soviet Union and the western allies eased somewhat and West German-Soviet trade increased, thus removing political and commercial objections to the route. The two countries signed a bilateral air agreement in 1971, providing a twice-weekly service by each carrier from 1972 onwards. On one of its flights, Aeroflot stopped in East Berlin; the other Aeroflot service was non-stop as were both Lufthansa flights. The West German carrier flew over Czechoslovakia rather than East Germany. Similarly, Aeroflot also made a southern detour over Czechoslovakia; instead of using the Berlin air corridors between East Berlin and Frankfurt, Aeroflot entered and left West German territory over the Czechoslovakian border town of Eger. The stop in East Berlin was made by a detour north from Czechoslovakia, after which the aircraft returned to Czechoslovakian airspace.

In January 1973, the Soviet Union and Greece signed a bilateral air transport agreement, sought by the Soviets since the 1950s. It is believed that Greece finally acquiesced to the repeated Soviet demands in order to placate the Soviets who were protesting against the granting of Greek homeport facilities to the United States Sixth Fleet. Aeroflot inaugurated a Moscow-Athens service in June 1973, but Olympic Airways has not inaugurated a reciprocal route.[23]

Under Soviet pressure exerted since the late 1960s, Luxembourg agreed to sign an air traffic memorandum with the USSR in 1974 and a formal agreement in 1975. Aeroflot has operated a scheduled service between the two countries since 1975; the volume of traffic does not justify these flights. Reflecting political changes in Portugal and Spain, the Soviet Union signed bilateral air transport agreements with these countries in late 1974 and in 1976, and inaugurated scheduled routes to Lisbon and Madrid in 1975 and 1976 respectively.

In 1974 the Soviet Union and Norway concluded an agreement providing for Aeroflot service to Spitzbergen, a Norwegian archipelago in the Arctic Ocean; a weekly Aeroflot flight from Murmansk was inaugurated the following year. According to a 1920 treaty that established Norwegian sovereignty over the islands, military activity is prohibited and all 40 treaty signatories have equal economic rights in the archipelago. Other than Norway, the Soviet Union is the only country to have established a presence there, concentrating its economic activity on coal mining. More important to the Soviet Union than the economic gains to be derived from the islands are their strategic location in relation to the Soviet ice-free port at Murmansk. Over the years the Soviets have tried repeatedly to enhance their position at Spitzbergen, routinely ignoring Norwegian regulations and maintaining personnel there vastly in excess of legitimate needs. In the 1960s the Soviet Union

[23] *Athens News*, 15 Apr. 1972.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

insisted, unsuccessfully, that a Norwegian airport construction plan be a joint Soviet-Norwegian undertaking. The Soviet Union did receive Norwegian permission to maintain a staff of six at the Norwegian-built airport to service their irregular Aeroflot flights; SAS, in contrast, maintains one person at Spitzbergen to service its more frequent flights from Norway.[24]

The signing of a bilateral air transport agreement by the Soviet Union and Canada in 1966 was spurred initially by a Soviet desire to implement a scheduled air service in time to support its large pavilion at the Montreal Expo-67 world fair. Air Canada withdrew its reciprocal service to Moscow in 1977 after years of financial losses on the route; Aeroflot not only continues its service, but has requested an additional route, from Toronto.

NEGOTIATIONS between the Soviet Union and the USA for air services followed a long and tortuous path before culminating in a formal agreement in 1956. While attending a United States government ceremony in 1934 commemorating the Russian-American treaty of 1867 whereby Russia sold Alaska to the USA, Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr A. Troyanovsky predicted that an air route between the United States and the Soviet Union via Alaska would soon be established. Nothing came of Troyanovsky's prediction nor of American requests in 1946 for negotiations on civil air routes between New York and Moscow. The Soviet Union was simply not ready for reciprocal air services, which would mean American aircraft flying over and landing in the USSR.

In 1955, noting the emergence of a more relaxed Soviet approach to international civil aviation, President Eisenhower proposed reciprocal air services between the USA and the Soviet Union as part of his radical "open skies" policy which would also have permitted mutual inspection of each country's military installations from the air. The Soviet Union rejected the proposal; permitting the East European airlines and carriers of several small neutral states to fly into Moscow was in one category, but permitting an American airline to fly over Soviet territory and establish an office in Moscow was in another, still forbidden category; while aerial inspection was unthinkable.[25] By 1958, having concluded bilateral air transport agreements with several West European countries, the Soviet Union agreed to include in its first cultural exchange agreement with the United States a statement approving in principle reciprocal air services.[26] Implementation of such services was long delayed by political crises and misunderstandings: Soviet actions in the Middle East in 1958, Soviet shooting down of an American reconnaisance aircraft

[24] John C. Ausland, "Spitzbergen: Who's in Control?" *Proceedings* (U.S. Naval Institute), 104:11 (November 1978), pp. 63–70, and Anders C. Sjaastad, "Security Problems on the Northern Flank," *The World Today*, 35:4 (April 1979), pp. 137–49.

[25] See Hans Heymann, Jr., *The U.S.-Soviet Civil Air Agreement from Inception to Inauguration: A Case Study* (Rand Corp., Santa Monica, California, 1972), pp. 5, 10, 11.

[26] United States, Department of State, *Department of State Bulletin 38* (1958), p. 246.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over international waters in 1960, erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, an upsurge in Soviet aviation activity in developing countries in 1962 (considered to be dangerous and threatening by some State Department officials), opposition from Congress and the Defence Department in the mid-1960s, uncertainties in Washington about the new post-Khrushchev leadership, tensions over Vietnam, and apparent Soviet sensitivity to Chinese charges that conclusion of an air agreement was tantamount to US-Soviet "collusion." These last factors notwithstanding, a formal air transport agreement was signed in November 1966. Inauguration of scheduled services was delayed until July 1968 because of the Soviet desire to wait for their new long-range Ilyushin Il–62 jet to become available and because of several political problems. The most serious of the latter was a Soviet attempt to use East Berlin as an intermediate stop. With the USA firmly opposing the Soviet effort to force implicit American recognition of East Germany, the Soviets backed down and simply extended their Montreal route to New York.[27] Pan Am used Copenhagen as its intermediate stop when both airlines implemented a twice-weekly service. Although traffic on the route has not been remarkable, the USSR has consistently demanded extra weekly flights, additional United States destinations, and a trans-Pacific route. Clearly the lure of hard currency and political presence, regardless of the expense in rubles, is compelling. Pan Am suspended its Moscow service in 1978.

A RECIPROCAL Moscow-Tokyo service by Aeroflot and Japan Air Lines (JAL) was long delayed by the Soviet refusal to allow foreign aircraft to fly over Siberia. In the early 1960s the Soviets proposed several different shared routes, all of which reserved for Aeroflot the larger trans-Siberian portion and limited JAL to service between Tokyo and Khabarovsk or, after firm Japanese rejection of that route, between Tokyo and Irkutsk. In 1966, realizing that the Soviets were not yet ready to permit independent flights across Siberia by a foreign carrier, the Japanese agreed to a joint Moscow-Tokyo service operated by Aeroflot with Soviet cockpit crews and mixed Soviet and Japanese cabin crews. The route was inaugurated in 1967, using the propeller-driven Tupolev Tu-114, as Aeroflot did not yet have long-range jets in its fleet. In 1970 JAL was allowed to use its own aircraft on the Tokyo-Moscow service. The reasons for the Soviet decision to permit a separate JAL service in 1970 may be summarized as follows:

1. The Soviets wanted Aeroflot to operate in the Europe-Japan market for reasons of prestige and hard currency earning potential, and were thus forced to open Siberian airspace to foreign carriers in order to obtain reciprocal rights in Europe and Japan.
2. In addition to the trans-Siberian routes themselves, the attractiveness of the services to the European carriers would strengthen the Soviet

[27] An account of the evolution of the United States-Soviet agreement can be found in Heymann, op. cit. pp. 39–54.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

negotiating position by enabling the Soviet Union to bargain with these countries for the trans-Siberian route in exchange for further routes to other countries and other privileges.

3. Only in 1969 did the Soviet Union have sufficient numbers of Il–62s to operate its Siberian route and other prestigious routes. The Tu-114 was not competitive with JAL DC-8s.

4. The Soviets wanted to sell or lease Soviet aircraft, especially the Il–62, to the European carriers, as well as JAL, as a condition for the trans-Siberian rights.

5. The Soviets wanted the foreign exchange which would accrue from revenue they would demand from foreign carriers flying the trans-Siberian route.

6. The Soviets wanted the prestige which they thought would result from the addition of route-kilometres and destinations to their network and from the addition of another large airline (JAL) serving Moscow.

7. The Soviets wanted to add new routes around the perimeter of China in order to intimidate that country with "encirclement." They wanted to increase the prestige and power of Japan vis-à-vis China.

8. The Soviets realized that space-age intelligence capabilities rendered their earlier concern about aerial photography over Siberia less relevant.

9. The Soviets wanted to use the Siberian route agreement as pressure on the Japanese to agree to a second route between the Soviet Union and Japan, one connecting Khabarovsk and Tokyo.

Although the Soviet authorities realized that space satellite technology would permit the western nations to obtain far better indications of Soviet strength than would ordinary aerial photography, they "moved" the Moscow-Khabarovsk air route, which formerly had more or less followed the trans-Siberian railway line, to a more northerly course, further away from the Chinese border region, the trans-Siberian railway line, and the important military-industrial complexes at various points along the railway. The route veers sharply to the north immediately after the take-off from Moscow doubtless to avoid the sensitive regions around Gorkii and Sverdlovsk.

From the early days of their negotiations over Tokyo-Moscow rights, Japan and the Soviet Union viewed the trans-Siberian route between Western Europe and Japan as their ultimate objective. The Soviets had hoped to limit the route to their own airline, but changed their stand upon realizing that Japan and the destination countries in Western Europe would not permit Aeroflot to operate trans-Siberian routes without reciprocal routes for their own carriers. The trans-Siberian route, because it comes closest to following the "great circle" around the globe, offers an appreciable time-saving (an average of three and one-half hours) over the polar route via Alaska. Eager to exploit this advantage, France, Great Britain, and West Germany signed trans-Siberian agreements with the Soviet Union and Japan in the early 1970s. In general terms, the Soviet Union has been eager to expand the trans-Siberian service, offering

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

traffic rights to almost any carrier willing to enter into a revenue pool agreement with Aeroflot and JAL that divides hard currency income between the three airlines irrespective of the amount earned by each. The pool agreements amount to tacit Soviet recognition that Aeroflot's marketing and service are inferior and that JAL and the European carriers are able to draw on strong home markets while Aeroflot merely transits its home market. Pooling compensates to some extent for Aeroflot's inability to coerce passengers in foreign countries to fly with the Soviet carrier in the same manner that it coerces travellers in the Soviet Union. Because it has more flights on the trans-Siberian route than any other western carrier, JAL has been hurt most of all by the Soviet-imposed pool agreements and has been most concerned with the possibility of overcapacity. Accordingly, Japan has been conservative in extending trans-Siberian rights in Tokyo to additional European airlines.[28]

As well as lying across the shortest route between Europe and the Far East, Soviet territory lies astride the shortest air route between northern Europe and southern Asia. This route, which has come to be called the trans-Asian route, usually refers to flights between Europe and New Delhi or Bangkok via Tashkent in Soviet Central Asia. The only European carrier to have shown firm interest in the trans-Asian route is SAS, a carrier which prefers to rely on transit traffic from North America, rather than traffic aimed at intermediate points in the Middle East or Asia. Most European carriers, particularly those in southern Europe, prefer to develop the greater traffic generation opportunities on the southern or silk route (over Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, etc.) and are anxious to avoid the harassment encountered in making the stop in the Soviet Union demanded by the USSR of all carriers which fly over its territory. SAS inaugurated trans-Asian service from Copenhagen through Tashkent to Bangkok in 1967, and Aeroflot began a similar route in 1969.

EXCLUDING the Soviet Union for a number of years have been traffic rights to Hong Kong, Australia, and New Zealand. Public Soviet declarations of intent to open a service to Sydney date from 1963, and Soviet pressure on Australia for traffic rights has often been intense. Because of the very long distance between Australia and Europe, Qantas has been highly selective in its European destinations, preferring to concentrate on several key cities and forego service to others. Although the Australian carrier recognizes the savings in distance and time that would be achieved on a trans-Asian route through the Soviet Union, Australian officials also recognize that there are far fewer traffic-generating opportunities on such a route than on the southern route

[28] Documentation of the evolution of Tokyo-Moscow and trans-Siberian routes can be found in the author's *The Political and Economic Implications of the International Routes of Aeroflot*, Chapter XIX.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

through the Middle East, that Aeroflot's insistence on pooling would deprive Qantas of considerable revenue, that Aeroflot's illegal discounting would also limit revenue, that Aeroflot's lack of widebody aircraft would force Qantas to forego use of its 747s on a route for which they might be suitable, and that Aeroflot *quid pro quo* demands (such as beyond rights to South America) might very well be unacceptable. In 1976, the Soviet Union did succeed in arranging an exchange of charter flights between the USSR and New Zealand, but their requests for scheduled service were denied. Trade, tourism and other ties between the Soviet Union and either Australia or New Zealand are so slight that even a unilateral service between the USSR and either or both of the two Pacific countries has little chance of commercial viability in the foreseeable future. The continuing Soviet efforts to implement such a service indicate that the USSR is not concerned with the commercial viability of the route.

Since the mid-1960s the Soviet Union has tried to establish a presence in Hong Kong, seeking permission to open a consulate, trade mission, Intourist office, Aeroflot office, Tass office, almost any representation imaginable. The British government has responded negatively to all such requests. Realizing that Soviet intentions are less concerned with, say, selling Aeroflot tickets than with establishing an espionage base directed at the People's Republic of China, the Chinese government has informed Britain that it desires no sanctioned Soviet presence in Hong Kong. The small amount of Soviet ship repair business in Hong Kong yards has provided proof that Soviet seamen, as well as other Soviet citizens, do not confine themselves to their announced duties.[29]

Soviet attempts to acquire traffic rights in Hong Kong for Aeroflot reached a crescendo in 1971. In that year a number of Soviet writers, discussing the future of Aeroflot, stressed the importance of a circular route encompassing trans-Siberian and trans-Asian services: London-Moscow-Tashkent-Singapore-Hong Kong-Moscow.[30] As such a circular route offers no commercial advantage over more conventional turnaround services, it was widely viewed in Hong Kong that the Soviet Union wanted to "encircle" the People's Republic of China to intimidate that country with Soviet omnipresence. The British response to Soviet requests for traffic rights in the colony has been firm and is unlikely to change.

THE use of air transport as a function of Soviet foreign policy is nowhere more evident than in the evolution of Aeroflot services to developing countries. In 1956, reflecting the post-Stalin demise of the "two-camp theory" and the subsequent Soviet activity in the third world, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Poland presented the heads

[29] See "There's Something About a Soviet Sailor," *The Economist*, 238:6653 (27 Feb. 1971), p. 78, and "British Protest Russian Spy Ring," *The Washington Post*, 26 Aug. 1972, p. 16.

[30] See, for example: Boris P. Bugayev, "V protyazheniyakh pyati okeanov," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 Mar 1972, p. 4; N. A. Semyonkov, "Na sluzhbe naroda," *Grazhdanskaya aviatsiya*, 8 (August 1971), p. 3; and Rumyantseva, op. cit. p. 27.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of state of Afghanistan, Egypt, and India respectively with home-manufactured aircraft.[31] It is, as the Soviets would say, not accidental that Afghanistan in 1954 and India in 1955 were the first developing countries to receive direct Soviet aid and that both countries received additional grants and/or credit in 1956.[32] Egypt, of course, was the recipient in the celebrated "Czech arms deal" of 1955, in which the Soviet Union sold a considerable amount of armaments to Egypt through Czechoslovakia. These same three developing states were the first to sign bilateral air transport agreements with the Soviet Union: Afghanistan in 1956, just after agreements had been signed by the Soviet Union with most of the East European party-states, and India and Egypt in 1958. Consonant with Soviet use of the East European party-states as surrogate donors of aircraft to foreign leaders and as signers of arms agreements, CSA of Czechoslovakia actually implemented an air service to Egypt one month before the USSR and Egypt concluded their bilateral agreement, although Czechoslovakia and Egypt did not sign a formal bilateral air transport agreement until 1959.[33]

No new Soviet air transport agreements were signed in 1959 or 1960, but in the last months of 1961 and in 1962 agreements were concluded with nine developing countries: with Burma and Indonesia in late 1961, and with Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the Sudan, Iraq, and Syria in 1962. Somalia and Pakistan signed air transport agreements with the Soviet Union in 1963, and six more developing countries concluded air pacts with the Soviet Union in 1964 prior to the ousting of Khrushchev in October: Congo-Brazzaville, Tunisia, Algeria, Cyprus, Iran, and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). Most of the African and Asian governments were politically radical and/or recipients of large-scale Soviet economic aid. In the Arab world, too, the inauguration of Aeroflot service during this period usually followed strong Soviet aid commitments. The air transport agreements with the Sudan, Iraq, and Syria all fall into this category.[34] The factors which motivated the Soviet Union to seek an aviation agreement with Algeria may have reflected Soviet concern for: (1) establishing regularly scheduled ostensibly civilian flights to cover their use of Algeria as an intermediate point in Soviet supply of armaments to Congolese rebels in 1964; (2) lending support, by increasing their presence in Algeria, to the new leftist President of that country, Ben Bella; and/or (3) increasing Soviet presence for the specific purpose of countering

[31] King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan received a Soviet Ilyushin 11–14, Nasser a Czechoslovakian Aero-45 four-seat light aircraft, and Nehru a Polish high-performance glider. It does, of course, rather stagger the imagination to envision Nehru soaring around in a high-performance glider, but the East European aircraft industry was rather limited in its output.

[32] James Richard Carter, *The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid* (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1969), p. 109.

[33] ICAO Agreement 1460. Czechoslovakian bilateral air transport agreements with Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Tunisia, Morocco, and India predated those of the Soviet Union, and CSA inaugurated service to most of these countries before Aeroflot did so.

[34] Carter, op. cit.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

feared effects of a visit to Algiers in early 1964 by Chou En-Lai. Algeria was then a major arena of Sino-Soviet rivalry in the developing countries, and the extensive Soviet economic aid and military assistance to Algeria between late 1963, when Ben Bella came to power, and 1965, when he was overthrown, should be viewed with this relationship in mind.[35] The connexion between Soviet aid commitments to Tunisia and the inauguration of an Aeroflot service to Tunis is less clear.

The 1964 agreement with Cyprus was a direct outcome of Soviet support for Archbishop Makarios in the Cyprus crisis of that period, a fact acknowledged by Cyprus during the aviation negotiations.[36] Later in 1964 the Soviet Union supplied armaments to Cyprus, some directly and some through Egypt.

In 1965 the Soviet Union signed bilateral air transport agreements with Lebanon, Senegal, the Central African Republic, and the east African states of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania; in 1967 with Nigeria, Turkey, and both Yemens; in 1969 with Singapore and Malaysia; in 1970 with Libya, Jordan, and Laos; in 1971 with Thailand; in 1972 with Bangladesh and Chile (the latter withdrawn after the fall of Allende); in 1973 with Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Rwanda, and Burundi (the last three not activated); in 1974 with Mauritania, Chad, and Zaire (the last not activated); in 1975 with Benin and Guinea-Bissau; in 1976 with the Cape Verde Islands, Angola and Mozambique; in 1977 with Ethiopia, Malagasy Republic, and Zambia; and in 1978 with Kuwait. For some of these countries, no clear relationship between the signing of agreements and specific Soviet foreign policy actions exists. For others, the relationship is marked. Nigeria, for example, had refused several approaches for sales of Soviet civil aircraft and other aviation-related matters in the early 1960s, but was obliged to honour Soviet requests for air traffic rights after the USSR supplied military equipment (including MIG aircraft) for Nigerian use in the Biafran war. Changes of government which brought to power regimes friendly to the USSR (and sometimes beholden to the USSR) brought in their wake Soviet aviation agreements with Libya, Bangladesh, Chile, Benin, Angola, and Mozambique. Agreements were signed with Rwanda and Burundi, reportedly at the requests of these governments which, because of internal instability or lack of significance in political or economic terms, attract little interest from western carriers although they consider service by any international airline as conferring prestige. In the Central African Republic, President Jean Bedel Bokassa is said to have requested an Aeroflot service for the specific purpose of annoying France, the former colonial power.[37] Few

[35] The Soviet Union extended economic grants and/or credits of $100 million and $130 million to Algeria in 1963 and 1964, and made major arms commitments to the Ben Bella regime in late 1963 and in 1965, the latter just a few weeks before Ben Bella was overthrown. See Carter, op. cit. and Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gibert, *Arms for the Third World* (The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1969), p. 15.

[36] Sources in Cyprus related this information to the author in 1972.

[37] Sources in Africa related this information to the author in 1972.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

western countries would commit themselves to bilateral air transport agreements under such circumstances, even if they did not intend to activate the agreements.

The extent of Aeroflot services to Latin America is markedly lower than that to other lesser-developed regions. The Soviet Union is hampered in its aviation approaches by the vast distance of Latin America from the Soviet Union and the resultant need to acquire intermediate refuelling points, the conservatism of many Latin American governments, and the traditional protectionist attitudes of Latin American governments toward their own flag carriers. Historically, Latin America has been an area of lower priority for Soviet attention than the regions closer to the USSR. Conventional trade and cultural ties are at a low level. Undeterred by these factors, the Soviet Union has made periodic approaches to various Latin American countries for air traffic rights, and in 1970 unsuccessfully attempted to extend an earthquake relief airlift to Peru into a regularly-scheduled Aeroflot service.[38] Aeroflot did operate a scheduled route to Chile via Cuba for four months during the Allende regime and has had a weekly service to Peru since 1974. After numerous approaches over many years, Mexico agreed in 1976 to an air transport agreement with the Soviet Union; Aeroflot service to Mexico City was inaugurated in 1977. In 1979 the Soviet carrier began scheduled service to Jamaica.

Whatever the reason for signing bilateral air transport agreements with specific countries, legitimate commercial traffic on most Aeroflot routes to developing states is minimal, certainly insufficient to support the service according to conventional economic standards. Soviet trade with most developing countries is low,[39] tourist flows in either direction are almost non-existent, and there are no cultural ties such as those between the developing states and former colonial powers. Most military traffic, where it exists, is carried by special flights. The bulk of the commercial traffic consists of illegally discounted transit traffic between developing countries and, usually, points in Western Europe via Moscow. Because this traffic is both highly seasonal and heavily discounted, its revenue-generating potential is limited. The primary function of Aeroflot in most developing countries appears to be that of a ferry service for Soviet diplomats, other Soviet authorities, and official Soviet state freight.

Problems and Prospects of Aeroflot's International Services

Discourse in a variety of organs of the Soviet press provides ample evidence that continued expansion of the international network of Aeroflot remains a goal of both the Soviet aviation establishment and

[38] See "USSR to Use Peru Aid for Proving Flights," *Aviation Week*, 93:2 (13 July 1970), p. 16, and *The New York Times*, 26 July 1970.

[39] Trade figures are published in the Soviet statistical yearbooks entitled *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR*.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other Soviet institutions as well.[40] To planners in the agencies concerned with foreign exchange reserves, the aircraft industry, the military and intelligence services, and the tourist industry, expansion of Aeroflot international services is utilitarian. To planners of Soviet foreign policy, which is expansionist for both national and ideological reasons, Aeroflot's international growth offers the opportunity for the expansion of Soviet presence at low risk to the Soviet Union.

The planning of Aeroflot's international expansion is based on specific goals such as additional destinations, weekly flight frequencies, and more advantageous commercial conditions for their foreign operations. Among the additional destinations sought are leading cities in Australia, New Zealand, and Latin America, and additional points in continents already served, particularly in North America. Most prized of all is a route around the world, preferably through the United States and Japan. It is a measure of Soviet eagerness for the prestige of an around-the-world route that, during the Allende regime, Soviet aviation officials were seriously discussing an alternative route passing through Rabat, Belem and/or Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Easter Island, Sydney, Singapore, New Delhi, and back to Moscow.[41] The Soviets also want to make Moscow a major air hub.

IT is clear that the extent of the present Aeroflot international network, to say nothing of its expansion to around-the-world status, cannot be justified by the amount of traffic carried. If one accepts the premise that the major function of international civil air transport is the satisfaction of commercial supply and demand conditions with regard to international passenger and freight markets, Aeroflot does not fit the image of a conventional international airline. It is not a Soviet version of Pan Am or even of Air France which, like the Soviet carrier, is state-owned. It is not sufficient to say that Aeroflot is doing what every other carrier is doing, but to a greater degree—that Air France has commercially unjustified, politically inspired routes, but Aeroflot has more such routes, or that Sabena engages in moderate illegal discounting of ticket fares while Aeroflot discounting is far more extensive. It is instead proper to ask whether Aeroflot should be considered just another airline which happens to be Soviet or, in another sense, a manifestation of the Soviet system which happens to be an airline. Aeroflot operations are at such variance with the norms of international civil air transport that

[40] See the following: G. Bezborodov, "Kril'ya rodiny," *Pravda*, 22 Jan. 1971, p. 2; "Aeroflot—vchera, segodnya, zavtra," *Izvestiya*, 10 Feb. 1971, p. 4; Bugayev, "V protyazheniyakh pyati okeanov," op. cit.; Semyonkov, op. cit.; Rumyantseva, op. cit., pp. 27, 41; Bugayev, "Gordost' sovetskogo naroda," *Grazhdanskaya aviatsiya*, 2 (February 1973), P. 3; Bugayev, "Moguchie kril'ya," *Pravda*, 9 Feb. 1973, p. 3; "Aeroflot Looks Ahead," *New Times*, 4 January 1977), pp. 14–15; V. A. Sabolin, *Magistraly pyatogo okeana* (Izdatel'stvo Znanie, Moscow, 1978), p. 22.

[41] Sources in government and the air transport industry related this information, apparently widely known, to the author.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it often seems more appropriate to consider it within the context of the specific Soviet polity rather than within the context of conventional international civil aviation operations. However, the Soviet carrier operates in both environments—the international civil aviation environment, which was established without Soviet participation, and the Soviet environment whose characteristics are incompatible with conventional commercial air transport conduct. The conflict is obvious and centres on the inability of the Soviet system to separate commercial airline conduct from its determination to operate a vigorous aircraft industry of impressive dimensions, to broaden and strengthen its strategic military posture, to acquire large amounts of foreign exchange, to control the movements of both its own citizens and foreigners in the Soviet Union, or to augment its power and prestige throughout areas where it considers it important to Soviet influence.

Another compelling factor in Aeroflot expansionism is the superpower relationship between the Soviet Union and the USA. If Pan American World Airways circles the globe each day, it behoves the USSR to have its own flag carrier also crossing the Atlantic and the Pacific. That the total international trade turnover of the Soviet Union is approximately one-third that of the United States and only seventh largest of all the countries of the world [42] suggests that an international airline of smaller proportions than Pan Am would be appropriate to Soviet commercial needs. Since it is intended, however, that Aeroflot should reflect far more than Soviet commercial strength, the prime commercial criterion for judging an airline—traffic carriage—is not a major factor in Soviet international civil aviation planning.

The evolution of Aeroflot into a commercial air carrier would require a profound transformation of Soviet society involving, to mention only three factors, the adoption of a freely convertible currency, a substantial reduction of the power of the secret police and the military establishment, and an enormous increase in the freedom of Soviet citizens to travel abroad. Such a transformation would require no less than the abandonment of the present Soviet system of government.

The particular economic and political characteristics of Aeroflot's operations reflect, as noted, the Soviet system of government and the insecurity of the Soviet Union in the international arena, rather than the international air transport industry. What is remarkable is not that Aeroflot differs from other carriers (surely no one familiar with Soviet society could expect otherwise) but that many foreign governments appear to have accepted it as being similar to other airlines. The willingness of foreign governments to submit to unusual Soviet demands on

[42] United States foreign trade turnover in 1975 was $209·1 million, and Soviet foreign trade turnover in 1975 was $70·3 billion. Between the United States and the Soviet Union in total trade turnover were West Germany, Japan, France, United Kingdom, and Italy. See *Statistical Yearbook 1976* (United Nations New York, 1976), pp. 424–7, 430–1.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

behalf of Aeroflot [43] is evidence not so much of Soviet strength as it is of western weakness since, in virtually all cases, the Soviet Union needs access to non-communist countries for Aeroflot more than non-communist countries require access to the Soviet Union for their carriers. The Soviet Union has achieved for Aeroflot a measure of immunity from reciprocity unusual in dealings between sovereign states. That the Soviet Union intends to exploit and enlarge this immunity is clear.

[43] Particularly unreasonable Soviet demands, in the eyes of the writer, are the Soviet prohibition against foreign carriers selling their tickets in the Soviet Union—especially when the Soviet Union demands that right for Aeroflot in foreign countries, and the apparent agreement of many governments to look the other way in the everyday occurrence of massive illegal discounting by Aeroflot on ticket fares.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Art out of Hell: Shalamov of Kolyma

John Glad

SHALAMOV'S *Kolyma Tales** are stories of the Soviet forced labour camps located in the Kolyma region of north-eastern Siberia. Robert Conquest, in his study of the area,[1] estimates that three million people met their deaths there. As an absolute minimum, he sets the figure at between two and two and a half million. His estimates are based on ships' records, accounts of first-hand witnesses and other reliable, although necessarily incomplete sources. It might seem incredible that the closest estimate the western scholar can produce is "give or take a million," but one must remember that historians have no direct access to the records, that there has been no Nuremberg Trial complete with captured archives, witnesses, etc. In his powerful story, "Lend-Lease," Shalamov writes of having learned of an enormous mass grave:

> With my exhausted, tormented mind I tried to understand: how did there come to be such an enormous grave in this area? . . . I realized that I knew only a small bit of that world, a pitifully small part, that twenty kilometres away there might be a shack for geological explorers looking for uranium or a gold mine with thirty thousand prisoners. Much can be hidden in the folds of the mountain.
>
> And then I remembered the greedy blaze of the fireweed, the furious blossoming of the taiga in summer when it tried to conceal in the grass and foliage any deed of man—good or bad. And if I forget, the grass will forget . . .

Varlam Shalamov, a man with an enormous literary talent and an incredibly tragic life, has not forgotten. His stories and sketches provide no statistical data about the fates of the millions murdered in Kolyma. Rather, they are a vivid account of individual moments in the lives of individual men, for only in the particular can we begin to comprehend the horror of the whole. Even so, it is impossible to appreciate the enormity of this tragedy. It is the proper duty of the historians to discuss events in quantitative terms. Were there two and a half or were there three million victims? Emotionally, however, we can never come to grips with a statistic of that sort any more than we can appreciate that one star is a hundred million light years from us, and another a hundred and fifty million.

* The two stories published below are from a collection of Shalamov's *Kolyma Tales* edited and translated by John Glad. The book is to be published soon by W. W. Norton & Company Inc., New York, whose cooperation we gratefully acknowledge.

[1] *Kolyma: The Arctic Death Camps* (Macmillan London Ltd., and Viking, New York, 1978).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

By his own admission, Solzhenitsyn barely touches upon the Kolyma region in *The Gulag Archipelago.* He writes that when he first came upon an anthology of Shalamov's poetry, he "trembled as if he were meeting a brother." He asked Shalamov to write *The Gulag Archipelago* with him, but Shalamov—already an old, sick man—declined. Nevertheless, Solzhenitsyn writes: "Shalamov's experience in the camps was longer and more bitter than my own, and I respectfully confess that to him and not me was it given to touch those depths of bestiality and despair toward which life in the camps dragged us all."

KOLYMA is an enormous area, with the coldest temperatures in the northern hemisphere. The area is so desolate and isolated that in 1927 there were only 7,580 inhabitants in an area five or six times the size of France! In 1932–33 foundations were laid for a massive forced labour area intended to produce gold for the young Soviet state.

The years 1937–39 were the years of the purges. Millions of people were arrested, held for months in appalling prison conditions, tried under ridiculous charges and either executed or sent in cattle cars to Siberia. Emaciated from hopelessly inadequate diets, denied even sufficient drinking water and toilet facilities, freezing from the cold, they would arrive at the Siberian ports of Vladivostock, Vanino, Nakhodka after a trip that lasted between 30 and 40 days! There they were held in concentration camps for varying periods of time and sent by ship to Kolyma. A prisoner in the camps described the experience:

> When we came out on to the immense field outside the camp I witnessed a spectacle that would have done justice to a Cecil B. DeMille production. As far as the eye could see there were columns of prisoners marching in one direction or another like armies on a battlefield. A huge detachment of security officers, soldiers and signal corpsmen with field telephones and motor-cycles kept in touch with headquarters, arranging the smooth flow of these human rivers. I asked what this giant operation was meant to be. The reply was that each time a transport was sent off, the administration reshuffled the occupants of every cage in camp so that everyone had to be removed with his bundle of rags on his shoulder to the big field and from there directed to his new destination. Only 5,000 were supposed to leave, but 100,000 were part of the scene before us. One could see endless columns of women, of cripples, of old men and even teenagers, all in military formation five in a row, going through the huge field, and directed by whistles or flags.

Conditions on the ships were appalling. The following is a description of the hold of a women's ship:

> We climbed down a very steep, slippery wooden stairway with great difficulty and finally reached the bottom. It took us some time to accustom our eyes to the dim light of the dingy lower deck.
>
> As I began to see where we were, my eyes beheld a scene which neither Goya nor Gustav Doré could ever have imagined. In that

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> immense, cavernous, murky hold were crammed more than 2,000 women. From the floor to the ceiling as in a gigantic poultry farm, they were cooped up in open cages, five of them in each nine-foot-square space. The floor was covered with more women. Because of the heat and humidity most of them were only scantily dressed; some had even stripped down to nothing. The lack of washing facilities and the relentless heat had covered their bodies with ugly red spots, boils, and blisters. The majority were suffering from some form of skin disease or other, apart from stomach ailments and dysentery.
>
> At the bottom of the stairway we had just climbed down stood a giant cask, on the edges of which, in full view of the soldiers standing on guard above, women were perched like birds, and in the most incredible positions. There was no shame, no prudery, as they crouched to urinate or to empty their bowels. One had the impression that they were some half-human, half-bird creatures which belonged to a different world and a different age. Yet seeing a man coming down the stairs, although a mere prisoner like themselves, many of them began to smile and some even tried to comb their hair. Who were these women? And where had they come from? I asked myself. I soon learned that they had been arrested all over Russia and those countries of Europe overrun by Soviet armies. The main accusation against them was collaboration with the enemy.

Although there was some lead-mining, fur-trapping and a fishing industry in Kolyma, the chief occupation of the prisoners was goldmining. At least at first. But after a time gold production was practically subordinated to the task of extermination. Because of the geography of the region—its isolation and the mountains cutting off the only path out by land—there was no real opportunity for escape. It was no secret, therefore, that people were brought there to die, having first produced some gold. The world described in these stories leaves little room for any other conclusion.

The attitude of the West toward this state of affairs has been truly amazing. Ships such as the one used to transport women prisoners, described above, were purchased from England, Holland and Sweden. In the summer of 1944 Professor Owen Lattimore, representing the Office of War Information, and Henry Wallace, Vice-President of the United States, visited Kolyma and wrote glowing accounts of it. Lattimore said the Soviet effort "could roughly be compared to a combination of the Hudson Bay Co. and T.V.A."

SHALAMOV'S stories are in the Chekhovian tradition: a brief plot (less compact at times than Chekhov's) devoted to one incident, the narration of which is objective and impartial, avoiding any obvious show of sympathy with the victim and thereby heightening the horror of the situation; the point of the story is reserved for the end.

However, the affinities with Chekhov's work are not confined to

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

structure. Take Savelov's monologue which could have been taken from a Chekhovian play:

> Just imagine . . . We'll survive, leave for the mainland and quickly become sick old men. We'll have heart pains and rheumatism, and all the sleepless nights, the hunger and long hard work of your youth will leave their mark on us even if we remain alive. We'll be sick without knowing why, groan and drag ourselves from one dispensary to another. This unbearable work will leave us with wounds that can't be healed, and all our later years will lead to lives of physical and psychological pain. And that pain will be endless and assume many different forms. But even among those terrible future days there will be good ones when we'll be almost healthy and we won't think about our sufferings. And the number of those days will be exactly equal to the number of days each of us has been able to loaf in camp.

The figure of the narrator is an unusually passive one. He is always the victim of the action, and almost never initiates any of his own. Rarely does he even speak. His hopes and plans extend no further than a few hours; to getting warm, to receiving an extra piece of bread. He is capable of admiring men of action. The figure of Major Pugachov who leads an escape attempt is lionized, but this path of action remains a fantasy for the author himself. Even so, Pugachov ends his life by committing suicide.

Just as in the camps of Nazi Germany, when resistance was impossible or of no avail, people kept the option of suicide as the last card they could play. Shalamov writes:

> I believed a person could consider himself a human being as long as he felt totally prepared to kill himself, to interfere in his own biography. It was this awareness that provided the will to live.
>
> I checked myself—frequently—and felt I had the strength to die, and thus remained alive.
>
> Much later I realized that I had simply built myself a harbour, avoided the question, for at the critical moment I would not be the same man as I am now when the question of life or death would be an exercise of the will. I would inevitably weaken, become a traitor, betray myself. Instead of thinking of death, I simply felt that my former decision needed some other answer, and my promises to myself, the oaths of youth were naive and very artificial.

SHALAMOV'S biography is largely contained in his stories. He was born in 1907 and first began to publish in 1932. In 1937 he was arrested in one of the great "purges" for the crime of having declared the Nobel Prize laureate, Ivan Bunin, to be a classic writer of Russian literature. He writes that he spent nearly 17 years in the camps, which means that he must have been released sometime in 1954.

At present, only Shalamov's poetry can be published in the USSR; reviewers are forced to write nonsense such as: "He (Shalamov) writes

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

primarily about nature. One gets the impression that his surroundings interest him only on an impressionistic level." Occasionally, however, the careful reader can read between the lines. In one review of Shalamov's work the well-known Soviet writer, Boris Slutsky, quotes a conversation Slutsky once had with the poet, Zabolotsky. Zabolotsky pointed to a house under construction and mentioned that he himself had been a labourer, a mason, a carpenter and a building foreman in his day. The remark, so seemingly irrelevant to a review of a collection of verse, immediately tips off the reader as to Shalamov's fate. Zabolotsky was himself a prisoner in the camps—a fact well known to educated Russians. Thus, the Soviet reader can realize that Shalamov is one of those who survived the camps. In time it became evident to the authorities that Shalamov's prose writings could not be ignored. Even disregarding their artistic merit, they are of major documentary significance. "The Used-Book Dealer," for example, reveals that the State was already experimenting with the misuse of psychiatry and chemical will suppressants at the time of the infamous Zinoviev, Piatakov and Bukharin show trials in 1937–38.

Shalamov's stories were first circulated in manuscript within the USSR and later published in Russian in the émigré journals, *The New Review* and *Grani*. A complete Russian language edition of his work has been published in London.[2] In France three different editions of his work have appeared and editions are being prepared for publication in other languages. All appear with more or less the same publisher's note: "The following stories appear without the knowledge or consent of the author and he should not be held responsible for their publication."

The Soviet government was placed in an embarrassing situation: Shalamov could have been prosecuted and his writings branded with the usual pat formula—"slander of Soviet reality." That, however, would have drawn attention to his case. Western newspapers are largely interested in writers who have already attracted the attention of the public, and the Soviet government by re-attacking its own victims was often acting as press agent for attacked authors. If one examines the cases of the so-called "dissident" authors, one is struck by the fact that many of them are really apolitical and owe their press coverage to government persecution. Pasternak, Akhmatova, Zoshchenko, and Brodsky might serve as examples. In the case of Shalamov it was evident that his stories were a major document of our time and any attempt to discredit them was doomed to failure.

The chroniclers of our times, the Shalamovs and Solzhenitsyns, have drawn a picture of mass terror, in which not only the active opposition to the regime was liquidated, but its potential opponents (and their families, friends and other innocents) were also murdered. Not only were

[2] Varlam Shalamov, *Kolymskie Rasskazy* (Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd., London, 1978).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

executioners executed, but the same fate befell their executioners. Such was the glue of terror that held this enormous structure together.

It is against this background that men like Shalamov testify to a scandal of cruelty and genocide that makes all western sins pitifully insignificant. And the greater their talent, the greater the danger they represent. The " cult of personality " has indeed been renounced—but in a very guarded fashion. As for embarrassing witnesses, a number of solutions have been tried out, ranging from reimprisonment to exile. This approach, however, has often simply provided an additional embarrassment in that the regime appears once more to be espousing Stalinism. Shalamov's case is unusual in that he was forced merely to sign a short statement to the effect that " the thematics of his work were no longer topical " and the authorities now hold their breath, hoping his work will pass unnoticed in the flood of testimony from other victims. This more subtle approach has proved to be an effective tactic in dealing with a sensation-oriented western press, but Shalamov is too major a writer to hide under this bushel. Shalamov's time has come.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lend-Lease

Varlam Shalamov

THE fresh tractor prints in the marsh were tracks of some prehistoric beast that bore little resemblance to an article of American technology delivered under the terms of Lend-Lease.

We convicts had heard of these gifts from beyond the sea and the emotional confusion they had introduced into the minds of the camp bigwigs. Worn knit suits and secondhand pullovers collected for the convicts of Kolyma were snapped up in near fistfights by the wives of the Magadan generals.

As for the magical jars of sausage sent by Lend-Lease, we saw them only at a distance. What we knew and knew well were the chubby tins of Spam. Counted, measured by a very complex table of replacement, stolen by the greedy hands of the camp authorities, counted again and measured a second time before introduction to the kettle, boiled there till transformed into mysterious fibres that smelled like anything in the world except meat—this Spam excited the eye, but not the taste buds. Once tossed in the pot, Spam from Lend-Lease had no taste at all. Convict stomachs preferred something domestic such as old, rotten venison that couldn't be boiled down even in seven camp kettles. Venison doesn't disappear, doesn't become ephemeral like Spam.

Oatmeal from Lend-Lease we relished, but we never got more than two tablespoons per portion.

But the fruits of technology also came from Lend-Lease—fruits that could not be eaten: clumsy tomahawk-like hatchets, handy shovels with un-Russian work-saving handles. The shovel blades were instantaneously affixed to long Russian handles and flattened to make them more capacious.

Barrels of glycerin! Glycerin! The guard dipped out a bucketful with a kitchen pot on the very first night and got rich selling it to the convicts as "American honey."

From Lend-Lease also came enormous black fifty-ton Diamond trucks with trailors and iron sides and five-ton Studebakers that could easily manage any hill. There were no better trucks in all of Kolyma. Day and night Studebakers and Diamonds hauled American wheat along the thousand-mile road. The wheat was in pretty white linen sacks stamped with the American Eagle, and chubby, tasteless bread "rations" were baked from this flour. Bread from Lend-Lease flour possessed an amazing quality: anyone who ate it stopped visiting the toilet; once in five days a bowel movement would be produced that wasn't even worth the name. The stomach and intestines of the convict absorbed without remainder this magnificent white bread with its mixture of corn, bonemeal and something else in addition—perhaps hope. And the time has not yet come to count the lives saved by this wheat from beyond the sea.

The Studebakers and Diamonds ate a lot of gas, but the gas also came from Lend-Lease, a light aviation gas. Russian trucks were adapted

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be heated with wood: two stoves set near the motor were heated with split logs. There arose several Wood Supply Centres headed by Party members working on contract. Technical leadership at these Wood Supply Centres was provided by a chief engineer, a plain engineer, a rate-setter, a planner and bookkeepers. I don't remember whether two or three labourers ran the circular saw at the Wood Processing Plant. There may have been as many as three. The equipment was from Lend-Lease, and when a tractor came to the camp, a new word appeared in our language: "bulldozer."

The prehistoric beast was freed from its chain: an American bulldozer with caterpillar tracks and a wide blade. The vertical metal shield gleamed like a mirror reflecting the sky, the trees, the stars and the dirty faces of the convicts. Even the guard walked up to the foreign monster and said a man could shave himself before such a mirror. But there was no shaving for us; even the thought couldn't have entered our heads.

The sighs and groans of the new American beast could be heard for a long time in the frosty air. The bulldozer coughed angrily in the frost, puffed and then suddenly roared and moved boldly forward, crushing the shrubbery and passing easily over the stumps; this then was the help from beyond the sea.

Everywhere on the slope of the mountain were scattered construction-quality logs and firewood. Now we would not have the unbearable task of hauling and stacking the iron logs of Daurian larch by hand. To drag the logs over the shrubbery, down the narrow paths of the mountain slope, was an impossible job. Before 1938 they used to send horses for the job but horses could not tolerate the North as well as people, were weaker than people, died under the strain of the hauling. Now the vertical knife of the foreign bulldozer had come to help us (us?).

None of us ever imagined that we would be given some light work instead of the unendurable log hauling that was hated by all. They would simply increase our norms and we would be forced to do something else—just as degrading and contemptible as any camp labour. Our frost-bitten toes and fingers would not be cured by the American bulldozer. But there was the American machine grease! Ah yes, the machine grease! The barrel was immediately attacked by a crowd of starving men who knocked out the bottom right on the spot with a stone.

In their hunger, they claimed the machine grease was butter sent by Lend-Lease and there remained less than half a barrel by the time a sentry was sent to guard it, and the camp administration drove off the crowd of starving, exhausted men with rifle shots. The fortunate ones gulped down this Lend-Lease butter, not believing it was simply machine grease. After all, the healing American bread was also tasteless and also had that same metallic flavour. And everyone who had been lucky enough to touch the grease licked his fingers hours later, gulping down the minutest amounts of the foreign joy that tasted like young stone. After all, a stone is not born a stone, but a soft oily creature. A creature, and not a thing. A stone becomes a thing in old age. Young wet lime-stone tuffs in the mountains enchanted the eyes of escaped convicts and workers from the geological surveys. A man had to exert his will to tear himself away from these honeyed shores, these milky rivers of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

flowing young stone. But that was a mountain, a valley, stone; and this was a delivery from Lend-Lease, the creation of human hands. . . .

Nothing terrible happened to those who had dipped their hands into the barrel. Trained in Kolyma, stomach and bowels proved themselves capable of coping with machine grease. A sentry was placed to guard the remainder, for this was food for machines—creatures infinitely more important to the State than people.

And thus from beyond the ocean there had arrived one of those creatures as a symbol of victory, friendship and something else.

Three hundred men felt boundless envy toward the prisoner sitting at the wheel of the American tractor—Grinka Lebedev. There were better tractor operators than Lebedev among the convicts, but they had all been convicted according to Article 58 of the Criminal Code (political prisoners). Grinka Lebedev was a common criminal, a parricide, to be precise. Each of the three hundred witnessed his earthly joy: to roar over to the logging area sitting at the wheel of a well-lubricated tractor.

The logging area kept moving back. Felling of the taller trees suitable for building materials takes place in Kolyma along the stream banks where deep ravines force the trees to reach upward from their wind-protected havens toward the sun. In windy spots, in bright light, on marshy mountain slopes stand dwarfs—broken, twisted, tormented from eternally turning after the sun, from their constant struggle for a piece of thawed ground. The trees on the mountain slopes don't look like trees, but like monsters fit for a sideshow. The felling of trees is similar to the mining of gold in those same streams in that it is just as rushed: the stream, the pan, the launder, the temporary barrack, the hurried predatory leap that leaves the stream and area without forest for three hundred years and without gold—forever.

Somewhere there exists the science of forestry, but what kind of forestry can there be in a three-hundred-year-old larch forest in Kolyma during the War when the response to Lend-Lease is a hurried plunge into gold fever, harnessed, to be sure, by the guard towers of the " zones."

Many tall trees and even prepared, sectioned firelogs were abandoned. Many thick-ended logs disappeared into the snow, falling to the ground as soon as they had been hoisted onto the sharp, brittle shoulders of the prisoners. Weak prisoner hands, tens of hands cannot lift onto a shoulder (there exists no such shoulder!) a two-metre log, drag its iron weight for tens of metres over shrubs, potholes and pits. Many logs had been abandoned because of the impossibility of the job, and the bulldozer was supposed to help us.

But for its first trip in the land of Kolyma, on Russian land, it had been assigned a totally different job.

We watched the chugging bulldozer turn to the left and begin to climb the terrace to where there was a projection of rock and where we had been taken to work hundreds of times along the old road that led past the camp cemetery.

I hadn't given any thought to why we were led to work for the last few weeks along a new road instead of the familiar path indented from the boot heels of the guards and the thick rubber galoshes of the prisoners. The new road was twice as long as the old one. Everywhere

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there were hills and dropoffs, and we exhausted ourselves just getting to the job. But no one asked why we were being taken by a new path.

That was the way it had to be; that was the order; and we crawled on all fours, grabbing at stones that ripped open the skin of the fingers till the blood ran.

Only now did I see and understand the reason for all of this, and I thank God that He gave me the time and strength to witness it.

The logging area was just ahead, the slope of the mountain had been laid bare, and the shallow snow had been blown away by the wind. The stumps had all been rooted out; a charge of ammonal was placed under the larger ones, and the stumps would fly into the air. Smaller stumps were uprooted with long bars. The smallest were simply pulled out by hand like the shrubs of dwarf cedar. . . .

The mountain had been laid bare and transformed into a gigantic stage for a camp mystery play.

A grave, a mass prisoner grave, a stone pit stuffed full with undecaying corpses of 1938 was sliding down the side of the hill, revealing the secret of Kolyma.

In Kolyma, bodies are not given over to earth, but to stone. Stone keeps secrets and reveals them. The permafrost keeps and reveals secrets. All of our loved ones who died in Kolyma, all those who were shot, beaten to death, sucked dry by starvation, can still be recognized even after tens of years. There were no gas furnaces in Kolyma. The corpses wait in stone, in the permafrost.

In 1938 entire work gangs dug such graves, constantly drilling, exploding, deepening the enormous gray, hard, cold stone pits. Digging graves in 1938 was easy work; there was no "assignment," no "norm" calculated to kill a man with a fourteen-hour working day. It was easier to dig graves than to stand in rubber galoshes over bare feet in the icy waters where they mined gold—the "basic unit of production," the "first of all metals."

These graves, enormous stone pits, were filled to the brim with corpses. The bodies had not decayed; they were just bare skeletons over which stretched dirty, scratched skin bitten all over by lice.

Stone, the North resisted with all their strength this work of man, not accepting the corpses into their bowels. Defeated, humbled, retreating, stone promised to forget nothing, to wait and preserve its secret. The severe winters, the hot summers, the winds, the six years of rain had not wrenched the dead men from the stone. The earth opened, baring its subterranean storerooms, for they contained not only gold and lead, tungsten and uranium, but also undecaying human bodies.

These human bodies slid down the slope, perhaps attempting to arise. From a distance, from the other side of the creek, I had previously seen these moving objects that caught up against branches and stones; I had seen them through the few trees still left standing and I thought that they were logs that had not yet been hauled away.

Now the mountain was laid bare, and its secret was revealed. The grave "opened," and the dead men slid down the stony slope. Near the tractor road was dug an enormous new common grave. Who had dug it? No one was taken from the barrack for this work. It was enormous,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and I and my companions knew that if we were to freeze and die, place would be found for us in this new grave, this housewarming for dead men.

The bulldozer scraped up the frozen bodies, thousands of bodies of thousands of skeleton-like corpses. Nothing had decayed: the twisted fingers, the pus-filled toes which were reduced to mere stumps after frostbite, the dry skin scratched bloody and eyes burning with a hungry gleam.

With my exhausted, tormented mind I tried to understand: how did there come to be such an enormous grave in this area? I am an old resident of Kolyma, and there hadn't been any gold mine here as far as I knew. But then I realized that I knew only a fragment of that world surrounded by a barbed wire zone and guard towers that reminded one of the pages of tent-like Moscow architecture. Moscow's taller buildings are guard towers keeping watch over the city's prisoners. That's what those buildings look like. And what served as models for Moscow architecture—the watchful towers of the Moscow Kremlin or the guard towers of the camps? The guard towers of the camp "zone" represent the main concept advanced by their time and brilliantly expressed in the symbolism of architecture.

I realized that I knew only a small bit of that world, a pitifully small part, that twenty kilometres away there might be a shack for geological explorers looking for uranium or a gold mine with thirty thousand prisoners. Much can be hidden in the folds of the mountain.

And then I remembered the greedy blaze of the fireweed, the furious blossoming of the taiga in summer when it tried to hide in the grass and foliage any deed of man—good or bad. And if I forget, the grass will forget. But the permafrost and stone will not forget.

Grinka Lebedev, parricide, was a good tractor driver, and he controlled the well-oiled foreign tractor with ease. Grinka Lebedev carefully carried out his job, scooping the corpses toward the grave with the gleaming bulldozer knife-shield, pushing them into the pit and returning to drag up more.

The camp administration had decided that the first job for the bulldozer received from Lend-Lease should not be work in the forest, but something far more important.

The work was finished. The bulldozer heaped a mound of stones and gravel on the new grave, and the corpses were hidden under stone. But they did not disappear.

The bulldozer approached us. Grinka Lebedev, common criminal and parricide, did not look at us, prisoners of Article 58. Grinka had been entrusted with a task by the government, and he had fulfilled that task. On the stone face of Grinka Lebedev were hewn pride and a sense of having accomplished his duty.

The bulldozer roared past us; on the mirror-like blade there was no scratch, not a single spot.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Used-Book Dealer

Varlam Shalamov

I WAS transferred from night into day—clearly a promotion, a confirmation, a success along the dangerous path to salvation of an orderly recruited from among the patients. I never noticed who took my place, for in those days I lacked the strength necessary for curiosity and I hoarded my movements—spiritual and physical. I'd accomplished resurrections before, and I knew how dearly one paid for unnecessary curiosity.

In a nocturnal half-sleep and out of the corner of my eye, however, I saw a pale dirty face grown over with reddish bristles, cavernous eyes, eyes whose colour I couldn't remember, and hooked frostbitten fingers clutching the handle of the smoky kettle. The barrack's hospital night was so dark and thick that the flame of the kerosene lantern, wavering and flickering as if in the wind, was not enough to light up the corridor, the ceiling, the wall, the door, the floor. The light ripped from the darkness only a piece of the entire night: a corner of the bedside table and the pale face bent over it. The new man on duty was dressed in the same gown that I used to wear. It was a dirty torn gown—an ordinary gown intended for the patients. During the day this filthy garment hung in the hospital ward and at night was donned over the quilt jacket of the orderly on duty who was always chosen from among the patients. The flannel was so extraordinarily thin it was transparent, but nevertheless it didn't tear. Perhaps the patients made no abrupt movements for fear that the gown would disintegrate. Or perhaps they were unable to.

The semicircle of light swayed back and forth, wavered, reached out in sudden movements. It seemed that the cold and not the wind swung the light above the night table of the orderly on duty. It was not the wind, but the cold itself that moved the light. Within the circle of light swung a face twisted with hunger, and hooked fingers searched the kettle's bottom for something no spoon could catch. Even frostbitten, the fingers were more reliable than a spoon; at once I understood the essence of the movement, the language of gesture.

There was no reason for me to know all this; I was only the day orderly.

But, a few days later, fate was unexpectedly prodded by a sudden and hurried departure in the back of a jolting truck. The vehicle crawled south toward Magadan along the bed of a nameless river that served as a winter road through the taiga. In the back of the truck two human beings were repeatedly tossed upward and dropped back onto the floor with a wooden thud as if they were logs. The guard was sitting in the cab, and I couldn't tell if I was being struck by a piece of wood or a man. At one of the feeding stops my neighbour's greedy champing struck me as familiar, and I recognized the hooked fingers and the pale dirty face.

We didn't speak to each other; each feared he might frighten off his happiness, his convict joy. The truck hurried on into the next day, and the road came to an end.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We had both been selected by the camp to take paramedic courses. Magadan, the hospital and the courses were cloaked in fog, a white Kolyma fog. Were there markers, road markers? Would they accept political prisoners convicted under article 58 of the Criminal Code? Only those that came under point 10. And how about my neighbour in the rear of the truck? He too was ASA—Anti-Soviet Agitation. That was considered the same as point 10.

There was an examination on the Russian language. A dictation. The grades were posted the same day. I got an "A." After that came a written examination on mathematics, and I received another "A." It was taken for granted that future students were not required to know the fine points of the Soviet Constitution. . . . I lay on the bunk, dirty and still literally lousy. The job of orderly didn't destroy lice. But maybe it only seemed that way to me; lice infestation is one of the camp neuroses. I didn't have lice any more, but I still couldn't force myself to get used to the thought or, rather, to the feeling that the lice were gone. I had experienced that feeling two or three times. As for the "Constitution" or political economics, such things were no more intended for us than was the luxurious Astoria Hotel. In Butyrki Prison the guard on duty in our cell block shouted at me: "Why do you keep asking about the Constitution? Your Constitution is the Criminal Code!" And he was right. Yes, the Criminal Code was our Constitution. That was a long time ago. A thousand years. The fourth subject was chemistry. My grade was "C."

Oh, how those convict students strove for knowledge when the stakes of the game were life! How former professors of medicine strove to beat their life-saving knowledge into the heads of ignoramuses and idiots. From the storekeeper Silaikin down to the Tartar writer Min-Shabay, none of them had ever shown the slightest interest in medicine.

Twisting his thin lips in a sneer, the surgeon asked:

"Who invented penicillin?"

"Fleming!" The answer was given not by me, but by my neighbour from the district hospital. His red bristles were shaven off, and there remained only an unhealthy pale puffiness in the cheeks. (He had gorged himself on soup, I immediately realized.)

I was amazed at the red-headed student's knowledge. The surgeon sized up the triumphant "Fleming." Who are you, night orderly? Who? Who were you before prison?

"I'm a captain. A captain of the engineering troops. At the beginning of the war I was chief of the fortified area on Dicson Island. We had to put up fortifications in a hurry. In the fall of '41 when the morning fog broke we saw the German raider *Graf von Spee* in the bay. The raider shot up all our fortifications point-blank. And left. And I got ten years. 'If you don't believe it, take it for a fairy tale.'"

All the students studied through the night, passionately absorbing, soaking up knowledge with all the appetite of men condemned to death but suddenly given the chance of a reprieve.

After a meeting with the higher-ups, however, Fleming's spirits lifted and he brought a novel to the barrack where everyone else was studying.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finishing off some boiled fish, the remnants of someone else's feast, he carelessly leafed through the book.

Catching my ironic smile, Fleming said:

"What's the difference? We've been studying for three months now, and anyone who's lasted this long will finish and get his certificate. Why should I go crazy studying? You have to know how to look at things."

"No," I said. "I want to learn to treat people. I want to learn a real skill."

"Knowing how to live is a real skill."

It was then that I learned that Fleming's claim to have been a captain was only a mask, just another mask on that pale prison face. The rank of captain was real; the mask was the engineering troops. Fleming had been in the NKVD—the secret police—with the rank of captain. Information on his past had been accumulating drop by drop for several years. A drop was a measure of time, something like a water clock. This drop fell on the bare skull of a person being interrogated; such was the water clock of the Leningrad prisons of the thirties. Sand clocks measured the time allotted for exercise. Water clocks measured the time of confession, the period of investigation. Clocks of sand drained with fleeting speed; water clocks were tormentingly slow. Water clocks didn't count or measure minutes; they measured the human soul, the will, destroying it drop by drop, eroding it just as water erodes a rock. This piece of folklore about investigations was very popular in the thirties and even in the twenties.

Captain Fleming's words were gathered drop by drop, and the treasure turned out to be priceless. Fleming himself considered it priceless. It could not have been otherwise.

★★★

"Do you know the greatest secret of our time?"

"What?"

"The trials of the thirties. You know how they prepared them? I was in Leningrad at the time. I worked with Zakovsky. The preparation of the trials was all chemistry, medicine, pharmacology. They had more will-suppressants than you could shake a stick at. You don't think that if such suppressants exist, they wouldn't use them? The Geneva Agreement or something like that . . .

"It would have been too human to possess chemical will-suppressants and not use them on the 'internal front.' This and only this is the secret of the trials of the thirties, the open trials, open to foreign correspondents and to any Feuchtwanger. There were no 'doubles' in those trials. The secret of the trials was the secret of pharmacology . . ."

★★★

I lay on the short uncomfortable bunk in the empty student barrack which was shot through with rays of sunshine and listened to these admissions.

★★★

"There were experiments earlier—in the sabotage trials, for example. That comic trial of Ramzin touches on pharmacology very slightly."

★★★

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fleming's story seeped through drop by drop, or was it his own blood that fell on my bare memory? What sort of drops were these—blood, tears, or ink? They weren't ink, and they weren't tears.

"Of course, there are instances when medicine is powerless. Or sometimes the solutions aren't prepared properly. There were rules to double check everything."

"Where are those doctors now?"

"Who knows? On the moon probably . . ."

★★★

"The investigator has all the latest scientific discoveries and technology in his arsenal, the latest in pharmacology."

★★★

"It wasn't cabinet 'A'—venene or poisonous—and not cabinet 'B'—strong effect . . ." It turns out that the Latin word "hero" is translated in Russian as "having a strong effect." And where were Captain Fleming's medications kept? In cabinet "C," the crime cabinet or in cabinet "M"—for magic?

A person who had access to cabinet "C," cabinet "M" and the most advanced scientific discoveries had to take a course for hospital orderlies to learn that man has one liver, that the liver is not a paired organ. He learned about blood circulation three hundred years after Harvey.

★★★

The secret was kept in laboratories, in underground offices, in stinking cages where the animals smelled like convicts in the Magadan transit prison in '38. In comparison with this transit prison Butyrki was a model of surgical immaculateness and smelled more like an operating room than an animal's cage.

All scientific and technological discoveries are checked first of all for any military significance, even to the extent of speculating on their possible future military uses. And only that which has been sifted through by the generals, and found to have no relevance to war, is given over for the common use.

Medicine, chemistry, pharmacology have long since been placed under military control. Throughout the world, institutes for the study of the brain have always accumulated the results of experiments, observations. Borgia's poisons were always a weapon of *Realpolitik*. The twentieth century brought with it an extraordinary tide of pharmacological and chemical preparations for the control of the psyche.

But if it is possible to obliterate fear with medicine, the opposite is true a thousand times—to suppress the human will by injections, by pure pharmacology and chemistry without making use of any "physical" methods such as breaking ribs and knocking out teeth, stubbing out cigarettes on the body of the person under investigation or trampling him with the heels of boots.

★★★

These two schools of investigation were known as physics and chemistry. The physicists regarded purely physical persuasion as the cornerstone of their building and viewed beatings as a means of revealing the moral foundations of the world. Once revealed, how base and worth-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

less were the depths of human essence! Beatings could achieve any testimony. Under the threat of a club, inventors made scientific discoveries, wrote verse and novels. The fear of beating and the stomach's scale for measuring its "ration" worked miracles.

Beating is a sufficiently weighty and effective psychological weapon.

Many useful results were produced by the famous and ubiquitous "conveyor" in which the investigators alternated without giving the arrested person a chance to sleep. After seventeen days without sleep a man loses his sanity. Has this scientific observation been made in the offices of political investigators?

But neither did the Chemical School retreat.

Physics could guarantee material for "Special Councils" and all sorts of "troikas" where a triumvirate of judges would make their decisions behind closed doors. The School of Physical Inducement, however, could not be applied in open trials. The School of Physical Inducement (I believe that's the term used by Stanislavsky) could not publicly present its theatre of blood, could not have prepared the "open trials" that made all mankind tremble. The preparation of such spectacles was within the realm of competency of the chemists.

★★★

Twenty years after that conversation I include in this story lines taken from a newspaper article:

"Through the application of certain psychopharmacological agents it is possible, for example, to remove a human being's sense of fear for a limited time. Of particular importance is the fact that the clarity of his consciousness is not in the least disturbed in the process."

"Later even more unexpected facts came to light. Persons whose 'B phases' of dream were suppressed for a long period of time—in the given instance for seventeen nights in a row—began to experience various disturbances in their psychic condition and conduct."

What is this? Fragments of testimony of some former NKVD officer during the trial of the judges . . . A letter from Vyshinsky or Riumin before their deaths? No, these are paragraphs taken from a scientific article written by a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. But all this—and a hundred times more—was learned, tried and applied in the thirties in the preparation of the "open trials"!

Pharmacology was not the only weapon in the investigator's arsenal of those years. Fleming mentioned a name that I knew well.

Ornaldo!

Of course! Ornaldo was a famous hypnotist who appeared frequently in the twenties in Moscow circuses, and not only in Moscow.

Ornaldo's speciality was mass hypnosis. Books on hypnosis are illustrated with photographs of his famous tours. "Ornaldo," of course, was a pseudonym. His real name was M. A. Smirnov, and he was a Moscow doctor. There were posters pasted all the way around special drums used for theatrical advertisements. Paolo-Svishev had a photograph hanging in the window on Stoleshnikov Lane. It was an enormous photograph of human eyes with the inscription "The Eyes of Ornaldo." Even now I remember those eyes and the emotional confusion that I experienced whenever I heard or saw Ornaldo's circus act. There are

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

photographs of Ornaldo's performances taken in 1929 in Baku. Then he left the stage.

"Beginning in the middle of the thirties Ornaldo was in the secret employment of the NKVD."

The shiver of a revealed secret ran down my back.

Fleming would frequently and for no special reason praise Leningrad. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that he admitted he wasn't a native Leningrader. In fact, he had been recruited from the provinces by the aesthetes of the NKVD in the twenties as their worthy replacement. They grafted onto him tastes much broader than those provided by an ordinary school education. Not just Turgenev and Nekrasov, but Balmont and Sologub, not just Pushkin, but Gumilev as well:

"'And you, watchdogs of the king, pirates guarding gold in the dark port . . .' I'm not quoting the line incorrectly am I?"

"No, that's right."

"I can't remember the rest. Am I a watchdog of the king? Of the state?"

And smiling—both to himself and his past—he told with reverence how he had touched the file of the executed poet Gumilev, calling it the affair of lycée pupils. It was as if a Pushkinist were telling how he had held the goose quill pen with which Pushkin wrote *Poltava*. It was just as if he had touched the Stone of Kaaba, such was the bliss, the purification in every feature of his face. I couldn't help but think that this too was a way of being introduced to poetry, an amazing, extremely rare manner of introduction in the office of the criminal investigator. Of course the moral values of poetry are not transmitted in the process.

"When reading books I would first of all turn to the notes, the comments. Man is a creature of notes and comments."

"How about the text?"

"Not always. There is always time for that."

Obscene as this may sound, Fleming and his co-workers could partake of culture only in their work as investigators. Their familiarity with persons of literary and social circles was distorted but nevertheless real and genuine in a sense, not concealed behind a thousand masks.

Thus the chief informer on the artistic intelligentsia of those years was Major General Ignatiev. To hear the name of this former tsarist diplomat and well-known memoirist was surprising only at first. A steady, thoughtful, and qualified author of all sorts of "memoranda" and surveys of writers' lives; he had served fifty years in the ranks. Forty of those years were spent in the Soviet spy network.

"I'd already read the book, *Fifty Years in the Ranks*, and was familiar with his surveys when they introduced me to him. Or him to me," Fleming mentioned thoughtfully. "Not a bad book, *Fifty Years in the Ranks*."

Fleming didn't care much for newspapers, news or radio programmes. International events interested him little. His emotional life was dominated by a deep resentment for that dark power that had promised the high-school boy he would fathom boundless depths, that had carried him to such heights and that had now shamelessly cast him into the abyss without leaving a trace.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fleming's introduction to culture was peculiar—some sort of brief courses and some excursions to the Hermitage. The boy grew into an investigator-aesthete who was shocked by the crude force that was rushing into the "organs of justice" in the thirties. His type was swept away and destroyed by the "new wave" that placed its faith in crude force and despised not only psychological refinements, but even the "conveyor" and the method of not allowing the prisoner to sit down until he confessed. The new wave simply had no patience for any scientific calculations or lofty psychology. It turned out easier to get results with simple beatings. The slow aesthetes ended up on the moon. Fleming remained alive by quirk. The new wave couldn't wait.

The hungry gleam in Fleming's eyes faded, and professional observativeness again made its voice heard.

"You know, I was watching you during the conference. You had something on your mind."

"I just want to remember everything, remember it and describe it."

Some images swayed in Fleming's already relaxed and calmed brain.

★★★

In the psychological ward where Fleming worked there was an enormous Latvian. Every time the giant sat down to eat, Fleming would sit opposite him, unable to restrain his ecstacy at the sight of such a mountain of food.

Fleming never parted with his pot, the same pot with which he had arrived from the north . . . It was a talisman, a Kolyma talisman.

The criminal element in the psychological ward caught a cat, killed it, cooked it, and gave Fleming a piece as the traditional Kolyma bribe since he was the orderly on duty. Fleming ate the meat and kept silent about the cat. The cat was a pet in the surgical ward.

The students were afraid of Fleming. But whom didn't the students fear? In the hospital Fleming was already working as an orderly, a staff medic. Everyone feared and hated him, sensing in him not only an employee of the secret police but also the master of some unusually important, terrible secret.

The antipathy grew, and the plot thickened after a sudden trip on Fleming's part to meet with a young Spanish woman. She was a real Spaniard, the daughter of one of the members of the government of the Republic of Spain. She'd been a spy, got involved in a web of provocations, was sentenced and cast out onto Kolyma to die. It transpired, however, that Fleming was not forgotten by his old and distant friends, his former colleagues. He had to learn something from the woman, to confirm something. But the patient couldn't wait. She had recovered and was being sent to a woman's mine. Interrupting his work in the hospital, Fleming suddenly travelled to a meeting with the woman, spent two days on the seven-hundred kilometre road with its incessant flow of vehicles and a checkpoint every kilometre. Fleming was lucky, and he returned from the meeting safe and sound. The event could have appeared taken from a novel, a feat of camp love. Alas, Fleming didn't travel or accomplish any feats for the sake of love. His was a passion much stronger than love, the highest passion of all, and it would carry Fleming safely past all the camp checkpoints.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fleming frequently recalled the thirties and the sudden flood of murders and suicides. There was the death of the family of Savinkov, the former revolutionary and terrorist. The son was shot, and the family —the wife, two children and the wife's mother—did not wish to leave Leningrad. All left letters for each other before killing themselves, and Fleming's memory preserved lines of a note from one of the children: " Grandma, we're going to die soon . . ."

★★★

The sentence Fleming had received in connexion with the " NKVD Affair " ended in 1950, but he didn't return to Leningrad. He didn't receive permission. His wife who had retained their room all those years came to Magadan from Leningrad, wasn't able to make any living arrangements and went back. Fleming returned to Leningrad just before the Twentieth Party Congress, to the same room he'd lived in before his disaster . . .

He had to do a lot of running around to get his pension of 1,400 old-style rubles that he had coming to him for his years of service. His camp medical courses notwithstanding, he was not allowed to return to his old " speciality " as an expert on pharmacology. It turned out that all the " former employees," all the veterans of these affairs, all the aesthetes who were still alive had long since been put out to pasture—all of them, right down to the last courier.

Fleming got a job as a book selector in a secondhand bookstore on Liteiny Prospect. Although his relationship and contact with the Russian intelligentsia was such a peculiar one, he considered himself to be of one bone and one flesh with it. To the end he refused to separate his fate from that of the Russian intelligentsia, feeling perhaps, that only contact with books could help him preserve his skills, if only he succeeded in living till better times.

In the nineteenth century a captain in the " engineering troops " would have taken vows and retreated to a monastery, as did the Russian writer Konstantin Leontiev. But the dangerous and lofty world of books was tinted with fanaticism for Fleming, and like any other infatuation with books, it served the function of a moral purge. The former admirer of Gumilev and expert on both Gumilev's fate and his comments on verse could not become a night watchman. Perhaps use his new profession of hospital orderly? No, better to be a used-book dealer.

"I'm constantly running around, filling out forms. Bring us some rum."

" I don't drink."

" How unfortunate, how inconvenient it is that you don't drink. Katya, he doesn't drink! You understand? I'm constantly working at it. I'll return to my old job."

" If you go back," Katya said with her blue lips, " I'll hang myself or drown myself the very next day! "

" I'm just kidding. I'm always kidding . . . I'm constantly presenting applications, running around the courts, travelling to Moscow. After all, they took me back in the Party. But you know how? "

A wad of rumpled paper emerged from Fleming's jacket pocket.

" Read this. This is Drabkina's testimony. She was a prisoner in my

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

camp in Igarka. Later she published her memoirs under the title *Black Toast*. Quickly I read through the woman's extensive testimony:

" As head of the camp he treated the prisoners well and for this reason was soon arrested and convicted . . ."

I leafed through the dirty, sticky testimony of Drabkina which had passed through the careless fingers of government officials . . .

Bending down to my ear, his breath reeking of rum, Fleming explained hoarsely that he had been a " human being " in camp, even Drabkina confirms that.

" Do you really need all this? "

" I need it. It fills my life. Who knows, maybe I'll pull it off. How about a drink? "

" I don't drink."

" For years of service. But that's not what I need . . ."

" Stop it, or I'll hang myself," Katya shouted.

" She's got a heart condition," Fleming explained.

" Take yourself in hand. Write. You have a good style. I know that from your letters. And a story or a novel is, after all, a confidential letter."

" No, I'm not a writer. I'm going to keep on working at what I started . . ."

And slobbering in my ear, he whispered something I could make neither head nor tail of, that supposedly there never was any Kolyma and that he himself had spent seventeen days on the " conveyor " in '37 and that his mind was not what it used to be.

" They're publishing a lot of memoirs now. For example, they just published Yakubovich's *In the World of Outcasts*, his memoirs about his years in a tsarist penal farm. Let them publish that stuff."

" Have you written any memoirs? "

" No, but there is a book I want to recommend for publication. You know which one? I went to the Lenin Publishing House, but they told me to mind my own business . . ."

" What book? "

" The notes of Sanson, the Paris executioner. Now those are memoirs! "

" The Parisian executioner? "

" Yes. Sanson guillotined Charlotte Corday and slapped her cheeks, and the cheeks of the severed head blushed. One other thing: they used to give parties that they called ' The Victims' Ball.' Do we have that kind of ball? "

" The Victim's Ball had nothing to do with the Thermidor Period; it was part of the Post-Thermidor Period. Sanson's notes are a forgery."

" What's the difference if they're a forgery or not? Either there was such a book or there wasn't. Let's have some rum. I've tried a lot of drinks in my time, but there's nothing like rum. Rum. Jamaican rum."

Fleming's wife prepared dinner—mountains of greasy food that was almost instantly devoured by the voracious Fleming. An insatiable gluttony remained forever a part of Fleming, just as thousands of other former convicts retained their psychic traumas for the rest of their lives.

The conversation somehow broke off in the early city twilight; I could

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hear next to me the familiar Kolyma champing and slurping. I thought of life's strength—hidden in a healthy stomach and bowels that were capable of consuming in large quantities. That had been Fleming's defensive reflex on Kolyma—an omnivorous greed. A lack of spiritual fastidiousness acquired behind the desk of a political investigator had also served to prepare him and cushion the shock of his Kolyma fall. As he fell, he perceived no abyss, for he had known all this even earlier and the knowledge saved him by weakening his moral torments, if such torments had even existed. Fleming experienced no additional spiritual traumas; he witnessed the worst and indifferently watched those next to him perish. Prepared to struggle only for his own life, he saved that life, but in his soul there remained a dark footprint that had to be obliterated, purged with penitence. His penitence was a slip of the tongue, a half-hint, a conversation aloud with himself—without regret or condemnation. "The cards just didn't fall my way." Nevertheless Fleming's story was an act of penitence.

★★★

"You see this?"

"Your Party membership card?"

"Right. It's brand new! But it wasn't simple, not at all simple. Six months ago the District Party Committee examined the question of taking me back into the Party. They all sat around, read the materials. The Secretary of the Committee, a Chuvash, announced the decision in a flat sort of way, almost rudely:

"'Well, it's a clear situation. Write up a resolution: Reinstatement with an interruption in membership.'

"It was as if they threw hot coals on me: 'with an interruption in membership.' My first thought was that if I didn't immediately declare I was in disagreement with the resolution, they'd always ask afterwards why I was silent when my case was being examined. I mean, that's why you're called in, so you can speak your piece in time, tell them . . . I raised my hand.

"'What'ya want?' That same dead rude fashion.

"I said: 'I disagree with the resolution. I won't be able to get a job anywhere without being asked to explain the interruption.'

"'You're a quick one,' the First Secretary of the Party District Committee said. 'You're so pushy because you're not hurting for money. How much is your pension?'

"He was right, but I interrupted him and said that I asked for total reinstatement with no interruption in membership.

"And he said: 'What are you pushing for and getting all worked up? You're in blood up to your elbows!'

"There was a roaring in my head. 'How about you,' I said, 'Aren't your hands in blood?'

"The First Secretary said: 'This meeting is cancelled.'

"'And back then, in '37,' I said, 'didn't you bloody your hands then?'

"The First Secretary said: 'Enough of this running off at the mouth. We can vote again. Get out of here.'

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"I went out into the corridor and they brought me the resolution: 'Reinstatement in the Party denied.'

"I ran around Moscow like a crazy man, filling out forms, writing letters. The resolution was cancelled. But the original formulation stayed: 'Reinstatement with interruption of membership.'

"The person who reported my situation at the Party Control Commission said I should have kept my mouth shut at the District Committee Meeting. I'm still working at it, filling out forms, going to Moscow, filing legal suits. Have a drink."

"I don't drink."

"This isn't rum, it's cognac. Five-star cognac! For you."

"Take the bottle away."

"I'll do just that, carry it away, take it with me. You won't be offended?"

"Not in the least."

A year passed and I received a last letter from the used-book dealer: "My wife died suddenly while I was away from Leningrad. I arrived six months later and saw her grave and a snapshot of her in the coffin. Don't condemn me for my weakness; I have all my wits about me, but I can't get anything done. I live as if in a dream and have lost all interest in life. I know this will pass, but I need time. What did she see in her life? Dragged herself from one prison to another with packages and legal certificates. Social contempt, the trip to be with me in Magadan, a life of poverty and now this—the end. Forgive me, I'll write more later. Yes, I'm in good health, but is the society I live in healthy? All the best."

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On Prisoners in Soviet Camps

Yurii Orlov *et al.**

Introductory Note by the Moscow Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Agreement in the USSR

The following Moscow Helsinki Group Document is a report compiled by political prisoners in camps in the Urals, by Yurii Orlov, the founder of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Mikola Matusevich, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, Zinovii Antonyuk and Valerii Marchenko.

Yurii Orlov was arrested in February 1977 and sentenced in July 1978 to seven years deprivation of freedom in a strict regime camp and five years exile. He has been in camp since August 1978; in August and September he was in Camp 35, and then in Camp 37. Orlov declared himself from the outset to be the camp representative of the Helsinki Group.

Mikola Matusevich, who was arrested in April 1977 and sentenced in April 1978 to seven years deprivation of freedom in a strict regime camp and five years exile, is serving his sentence in Camp 35.

Zinovii Antonyuk served seven years deprivation of freedom in strict regime camps in Mordovia and the Urals, and also three years in Vladimir prison; in January 1979, after completing his term of imprisonment, he was sent into exile, where, according to his sentence, he has to spend three years.

Valerii Marchenko was arrested in the summer of 1973 and sentenced, like the other authors of this report, on a charge of " anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," to six years deprivation of freedom and three years exile. He spent most of the time in camps in the Urals. In 1977–78 he spent about six months receiving " treatment " in the Kiev KGB prison, where they tried to get him to renounce his views and make a statement of " repentance." Marchenko is seriously ill and the forthcoming period in exile is a threat to his life.

It is an extraordinarily difficult task to compile a report like this in camp conditions. If those involved are caught, not only does it mean that the work is lost, but also that further repressions will follow. Section V of the present report was lost because of these very difficulties.

This document is based on the first-hand observations of its authors, who have all experienced Soviet " justice " and the Soviet " corrective-labour " system. It contains not just a factual account but also an analysis of several aspects of the Soviet penal system. The Moscow

* Section VII of this report, which apparently reached Moscow later, was written by Pyatras Pluiras-Plumpa. He was sentenced in December 1974 to eight years strict regime and is now in a camp in the Urals. He has already served a previous sentence of seven years (1958–65) on the same charge of anti-Soviet agitation.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Helsinki Group considers it very important and significant, and shares full responsibility for its contents with the authors.

We appeal to the heads of governments of the countries which signed the Helsinki Agreement and also to the public in those countries to distribute the report widely.

Document No. 87 **25 April 1979**

Yelena Bonner **Viktor Nekipelov**
Sofia Kalistratova **Tanya Osopova**
Malva Landa **Yurii Yarym-Agaev**
Naum Meyman

Section I

Introduction

The most important aspect of the problem of prisoners in the USSR is the sheer number of citizens completely or partially deprived of their freedom on a court decision or by administrative means. All of these people are in one form or another enlisted for forced labour. Although the total number is kept secret, it is possible to make an estimate. Prisoners from corrective labour colonies (special regime, strict regime and intensified regime), from deportation colonies, from educational-labour colonies for minors, the so-called "chemists" (prisoners conditionally freed ahead of time and enlisted for work), exiles and deportees—all meet in the transit camps and investigatory "isolation" prisons and compare notes on the numbers of people being subjected to repression. Most agree that the total number of *zeks* (prisoners)—including those in investigatory prisons and in the labour treatment centres (LTPs—*lechebno-trudovoi profilaktorii*) for recognized alcoholics—is no less than 3,000,000, but that the total number of those engaged in forced labour is no less than 5,000,000, in other words, about 2 per cent of the population.

It must be said that if the regular army of the unemployed is the characteristic evil of the capitalist system, then by the same token, the regular, and similarly large, army of those engaged in forced labour is the characteristic evil of "applied socialism" (*realnyi sotsializm*) in the totalitarian sense of the phrase. Soviet propaganda rightly points out that civil rights and liberties are understood in essentially different ways in the Soviet Union and in the West. But it crudely deceives the world community when it asserts that the Soviet concept of civil rights and liberties corresponds automatically to the interests of the majority of the working population. The millions of prisoners and semi-prisoners engaged in forced labour, the millions who have gone through it in the past, and the millions of members of their families represent just as sizeable a proportion of the working population as the unemployed and their families in the West.

When millions of people are summarily forced to abandon their normal livelihoods this must in some way be connected with the economic, social and political features of the social system. Of course

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there are people in all societies who have innate tendencies that exceed established limits. However, it is improbable that there are ten times as many such people in Soviet society as there are in the West, although there is a correlation of that order between the number of *zeks* in the USSR and in the United States—250,000, according to Soviet figures. Moreover, born criminals probably do not account for a significant proportion of western *zeks*. Bearing this in mind, one can say that an overwhelming number of Soviet *zeks* are behind barbed wire as a result of crimes indirectly provoked by the general conditions of existence. Of course, this does not mean that we wish to justify violence or theft. We are merely pointing to the existence of a collective partner-in-crime, the socio-economic and political system. Whether they are of worker or peasant origin, in the camps the majority of *zeks* are *workers*. The majority of criminal offences are hooliganism, theft, armed robbery, robbery with violence, and various degrees of social theft. Many offences are connected with drunkenness; the percentage of drunkards is high, and the LTPs account for an appreciable proportion of the total number of colonies.

These vices are characteristic of any modern industrial society. What is unusual here is not their occurrence but their extraordinarily high incidence. The origins of this phenomenon may be identified as follows:

1. The absence of activities which could divert people, especially the young, from drunkenness and crime: I have in mind participation in the general struggle for a higher standard of living or for one's own rights (through meetings and demonstrations not planned by the government, strikes, etc.).

2. Further, the lack of any opportunity to take personal business initiatives (without exploiting anyone's labour). There are certain areas in the provision of services—supplying the population with various kinds of products, etc.—where private initiative would raise the general standard of living.

3. The unwillingness of some citizens to accept the chronic (illegible word) compared with what they know to be western standards, and with the comfort and security enjoyed by the leadership. We reaffirm that we have no intention of justifying the crimes committed on these grounds; we merely point to the conditions that provoke them. The state declares that its aim is a high standard of living for its people, but in many areas it is in no position actually to secure this.

4. The loss of faith in moral principles among a section of young people, a result both of religious and ethical persecutions and disillusionment with official ideology.

5. The ban on providing information on such matters as the increase in crime figures, the number of *zeks* and the regime in which they are held, the inhumanity of camp conditions, etc.

6. The state's undeniable vested interest in the use of forced labour. The inadequate pay and poor working conditions in some industrial areas lead to a shortage of manpower, and here *zeks* and " chemists " are used as compulsory " strike-breakers " to replace workers.

7. The inhumane concept of " re-education " according to which long periods of imprisonment, harsh conditions of confinement, the widespread

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

use of intimidation and the inevitability of punishment are considered the best ways of saving society from criminality. In fact, as officials sometimes admit in conversation, the "corrective" criminal colonies constitute a real school for criminals. This is where immorality, and man's inhumanity to man flourish, where, because of legalized shortages of food and clothing, speculation is rife, and relationships are based on primitive bestiality and exploitation. These realities of life are more effective than beautiful slogans.

We draw the attention of the trade unions and other workers' organizations to the fact that although the USSR presents itself as an industrially developed country in fact it is a country where the proletariat in the most primitive sense of the word is preserved. The situation of the millions of citizens engaged in forced labour can be compared with that of the Ural serfs of bygone ages.

It is vital to bear in mind that not only the political prisoners but also quite a few of the criminals have been unjustly, or at any rate harshly convicted, even from a formal point of view. This is a result of judicial and in particular investigative arbitrariness.

The regime in which prisoners of all categories are held contains many outright violations of the Soviet Union's international obligations on human rights. Unfortunately, receiving reliable information on violations of human rights in criminal colonies, prisons and "chemists'" places of work (illegible word). Those convicted under Article 190, religious believers and others whose reports one could trust, could provide such information. On the basis of complaints from the many *zeks* whom political prisoners have met, one can speak with confidence of the meagre food rations in prisons and most colonies, of the low wages in many "chemists'" places of work, of the assault and battery that occurs in certain prisons (the Balashovskaya, for example), the difficult conditions of transit, the poor medical care in some colonies (in the Mordovian corrective labour colony 5, for example, prisoners are given time off work only when the temperature reaches 38 degrees C.), the oppressive effect of local camps in which barbed wire surrounds each hut only a few metres from its walls, and so on. Information about the situation of political prisoners is essentially more detailed and, despite the repression, has been coming through from the camps and prisons systematically over many years.

The nationality policy being conducted within the country is reflected in the national composition of the political camps. Of the prisoners in the Mordovian and Ural camps, 30 to 40 per cent, and in some cases a higher percentage, are Ukrainian, about 30 per cent are from the Baltic area and fewer than 30 per cent are Russians and representatives of the other peoples of the USSR. It was the Ukrainians who suffered most from the arbitrariness of the camps in Stalin's time, and they are still suffering most today.

The authors of the United States Congress Committee report on the eve of the Belgrade conference were puzzled by the large number of punishments meted out to *zeks* in the USSR, but it must be remembered that the Soviet prison system is directed at the destruction of the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

personality, and the only way to preserve one's personality is in opposition—in opposition despite the punishments.

We convicted members of the Moscow Group now have the opportunity to observe the situation at first hand, and we are able to confirm that all previous information is correct. Furthermore, the life of political prisoners has proved in many of its detailed aspects to be even more dramatic than the necessarily brief reports from places of detention would suggest: the sick are sicker, the accusations and punishments more senseless and arbitrary.

The report which we are presenting summarizes the general situation in Camp 35, where we have been for close on two years. Its various sections have been written by different political prisoners who, with the exception of Orlov and Matusevich, are not members of the Group but have long been familiar with the problems. They point to an improvement in the situation in the past few weeks and months, but do not indicate whether these changes are permanent or merely a temporary tactic.

Space restrictions and other difficulties have meant that many facts could not be included in the present report.

Yurii Orlov

Section II

The Work Prisoners Do

In the Soviet prison system "socially useful work" is hailed as the cornerstone of re-education. But as the prison system itself is very much a copy of society its vices are characteristic of society as a whole, though in a more vivid form. The idea of education through work, if taken in an intelligent way, contains a positive seed. But as the Soviet way of doing things is so bureaucratic and aggressive, the most intelligent idea can easily be turned on its head.

In the Soviet corrective labour establishments (*ispravitelno-trudovoe uchrezhdenie*: ITU) forced labour is an essential part of punishment; in fact, it is its main feature. Further, in the ITUs, authority for the prisoners is an unscrupulous exploiter seeking to grab more and more and give less and less, using not only force but also deception. Finally, work in the political ITUs is one of the levers used by the KGB and the administration in trying to break a man's independent moral and political will. This applies not just in prison but also after the sentence is completed, for the KGB interprets complete re-education in only one way—as collaboration with the authorities. In these circumstances it would be absurd to speak of work as education.

The social usefulness of prisoners' work also holds little conviction. On the socio-psychological level, society is becoming accustomed to the existence of millions of modern serf workers, as though this were perfectly natural. On the economic level, it is significant that prisoners work on the most obsolete equipment—in many cases long since written off—and with obsolete technology. Consequently, millions of people in camp are trained in technological backwardness, and the engineers and technicians in charge get used to obsolete methods. Thus the low prices for

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the products of forced labour barely cover the losses incurred by retaining archaic technological methods.

Work as punishment causes obvious physical and moral damage; it degrades human dignity, and educates slaves, not citizens. In some cases, prisoners' work is so exhausting that it could be described as torture. For example, work in a PKT (*pomeshchenie kamernovo tipa*: a block of punishment cells) is done on reduced rations which if production targets are not met can be reduced still further. And in a section of Vladimir prison, work is organized according to a system which the *zeks* call "SSSR" (the Russian initial form of "USSR")—*spalnya* (bedroom), *stolovaya* (dining room), *sortir* (lavatory), *rabota* (work)—because all these activities are carried on in the ten-square-metre cell in which two or three prisoners are forced to live and work. The cells are fitted with lamps which are switched on at 5 o'clock in the morning and stay on until 10 o'clock in the evening; in other words, the lights are on for 16 consecutive hours. Exhausted on their meagre rations, the prisoners are compelled to consent to this "service" provided by their employers: they have to earn their prison "geld"—three rubles a month—for, as is well known, they are allowed to buy food products and other basic necessities only with money earned in the ITU. According to prisoners who work in the SSSR system, a man's health rarely holds out for more than six months to the work and constant noise for 16 hours a day; usually it breaks down after three months. They leave these cells only by refusing to work, which means solitary confinement or strict regime. But refusal to work gives the administration formal grounds for taking the cost of his food, clothing and shoes out of whatever money is in the unemployed *zek's* personal account. So, after a year, when they are coming to the end of their earnings, many of the non-political prisoners are once again compelled—unless the administration makes an offer "for a consideration" of work in a prison factory—to go back to the SSSR system, and thus their health is rapidly undermined. In spite of such harsh working conditions, the prison administration always has a "free market in the labour force," since the prisoners (the non-political ones), constantly hungry, are prepared to work under any conditions. The political prisoners endure hunger and punishments with greater determination and refuse to work for reasons of principle, for example when a new movement for the status of political prisoners was launched in 1975.

Of course not all work is so demanding and dangerous, but such work does exist in many criminal and political camps. In a large number of forest camps tree-felling is very onerous, especially the so-called *birzha* (exchange) where very thick logs often have to be dragged by hand under the saw. In the political Camp 36 very dangerous work is done packing TENs (component for electric irons) for which respirators or gauze face masks have to be worn; in order to earn a small amount of money to send to his family, prisoner Zagurskii continually worked overtime at this and in a short time his health was ruined; in September 1978 his condition was declared critical. The main reason for prisoners putting in overtime is their need to help their families. The rates of pay, however, are so low that even by working 12 hours a day prisoners can only manage to send their families 50 or 60 rubles a month. According to the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

corrective labour legislation of the RSFSR and other republics, prisoners' work is paid according to the norms and wage rates operating in the national economy. According to an MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) order, prisoners' wage rates should be about 5 per cent lower than those of free workers. The actual position with regard to wage rates is even worse, since prisoners work with more obsolete equipment and the rates can be set quite arbitrarily within the ITU. Sometimes the norms and wage rates are clearly fixed on an individual basis, according to a political prisoner's behaviour. For example, Simchich only had to take part in defending Marchenko against arbitrariness (in the autumn of 1976 the administration imposed a series of punishments on the ailing Marchenko, forcing him, a sick man, to fulfil his work norms) for the norm in the milling shop where he worked to become simply unfulfillable even with overtime. When a more loyal worker, A. Khokhlov, was brought in to replace Simchich, the previous norms and rates were restored.

Generally speaking, production norms are very high and not easy to fulfil. The norm is often raised arbitrarily, without any technical or organizational innovations, and sometimes the prisoners are merely expected to do more overtime. It should be borne in mind that 50 per cent of a prisoner's real earnings is deducted for the benefit of the MVD, which itself, however, spares no expense on its continually growing staff. For every 1 per cent above 100 per cent of the production norm, however, only 25 per cent is deducted. So, as far as the MVD is concerned, there is no advantage in a prisoner (perhaps by working overtime) producing more than 200 per cent or even 100 per cent of the norm. Hence the constant raising of the norms. Thus, the administration, by manipulating the production norms, perpetrates upon the prisoners frauds similar to those committed by the capitalists of days long ago.

From the money left after the MVD deductions and fines, the cost of food, clothing and shoes is subtracted. Moreover, although the cost of food is set at 12 rubles a month, about twice as much again is taken from the *zek's* account under the guise of overheads.

Prisoners are made to work considerably longer hours than free workers: not a 41-hour week, but a 48-hour week (six eight-hour days) and the two extra hours' community work and the days worked to compensate for time spent on visits with relatives, must also be taken into account. Prisoners do not have any leave, they do not get any bonus for overtime and they can be made to work on public holidays. Thus, on 7–8 November 1977 and 1 January 1978 political prisoner Plumpa was made to work in the boilerhouse without time off in lieu and without the double pay laid down by law. When Plumpa, on another occasion, did not go to work on a Sunday he was deprived of his so-called production bonus (the right to spend two or four rubles more than the monthly five rubles at the camp shop). The production bonus is given for overfulfilment of norms, but in Camp 35, as in other political prisons, it is quickly taken away for non-attendance at political study periods or as the result of a supervisor's report of a violation of discipline, wherever this may have taken place (for example, Lisovoi left the canteen "out of line"). As a rule, reports such as these are produced as a result of shameless accusations made against prisoners who have

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shown an unwillingness to be " re-educated," which means to collaborate, to some degree or other, with the authorities. These reports, these accusations, often rain down on the heads of prisoners who have done nothing more than complain or make statements about violations of legality in the camp to various Soviet organs; this is regarded as disloyalty to the Soviet authorities. Here one can quote an endless list of examples.

The law provides for professional and technical training in the ITU, but not infrequently the authorities try to avoid paying out the money allotted for this, forcing the trainees to fulfil their production norms from the outset and appropriating the extra pay available for training. Marchenko, for example, insisted on his rights as a trainee in all instances. The apprenticeship period, laid down for each colony by order, is withdrawn for no defensible reason, together with the extra payment. This is what happened to Antonyuk, whose apprenticeship as a milling machine operator was cancelled after one week's training at his new place of work. Then the reason for this violation of the order relating to apprenticeship became clear: the KGB had decided to put him through the whole system of punishment from solitary confinement to the PKT (illegible passage) and that was why he was transferred from the production area and made to do maintenance work with Pronyuk in the restricted area. As work is a kind of lever which helps to bring the whole system of punishments into operation, beginning with deprivation of the right to buy goods at the camp shop or deprivation of the right to have visits from relatives, and culminating in solitary confinement, the PKT and imprisonment for up to three years, so the punishments rained down.

It would seem that there is one thing which cannot be taken away from the recalcitrant prisoner, and that is the extra rations for dangerous working conditions (for example, metalworkers in Camp 35 receive a glass of milk a day for this factor). But even here there are cases of " forgetfulness " in not entering special milk on the list, on the pretence of revising the list of jobs according to health risk. For example, in Vladimir prison in 1978 the number of prisoners receiving milk because of health risks was more than halved, despite the fact that there had been no technological or organizational changes in production.

The law says that prisoners' work is to be organized according to the rules governing the protection of labour and safety laid down by labour legislation. In practice, this is completely ignored. Few have escaped being required to work at a lathe before passing examinations, indeed without the minimum of instruction, from Antonyuk in December 1972 to Plumpa in March–April 1978. And any insubordination is punished. In fact, prisoners are being punished for refusing to violate legislation. An impressive example of how the authorities completely ignore not only all the laws and rules on safety but also elementary humanity, is the saga of Svetlichnyi, who, having lost eight fingers, was made to work on a compressor machine. In recent years a ramified network for the legal inspection of work has been established as a result of a resolution of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS). And there is also the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, dated 13 October 1976 " On administrative responsibility

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for the violation of work legislation and the rules on the protection of labour." Without going into an analysis of the effectiveness of these pieces of legislation on non-penal enterprises, let us simply note that the MVD enterprises, in which millions of present-day proletarians are working, have on the whole remained totally unaffected by them.

Generally speaking, the ITU system (through which a very sizeable section of the state's population passes) by maintaining an atmosphere of lawlessness and by making ordinary members of society feel defenceless before the arbitrariness of the authorities is a very important link in the functioning of "applied socialism."

Yurii Orlov, Zinovii Antonyuk

Section III

The Administration and Political Prisoners

The relationship between the administration and the prisoners is based on a single goal—"the re-education and correction of the convicts." This means getting them to renounce their beliefs, by making use, first and foremost, of the corrective labour legislation of the RSFSR and the MVD secret instructions, which can apparently be numbered among the harshest in the world. This aim is served by exhausting work, an inadequate low-calorie diet, a string of punishments doled out for the slightest offence and the strictest isolation from the outside world.

Reveille in Camp 35 is at six o'clock. And if the *zeks* stay in bed only a minute or two longer, the duty officer, who is usually lurking at the door, hurries in to the section and solemnly enters the names of the *shtrafniki* (the penalty boys) on a list. Punishment for not getting up at reveille was particularly common in 1973–74; at that time almost everyone who had not "embarked on a path of correction" would be included. It was easy to see that these punishments were selective, for Captain Polyakov or Lieutenant Chaika would turn a blind eye to *zeks* who were collaborating with the administration but who were still lounging on their beds, but would "book" Prishlyak, Khnokh and Davidenko. The old lags on 25-year sentences say that in the 1950s, prisoners who overslept would get an "alarm call"—men would come round with wooden sticks and beat them over the head; in the 1970s the punishment is to be deprived of the right to get food from the camp shop for a month, which, in retrospect, could be seen as humane.

Roll call is at 6.35. Latecomers, if they belong to the same category of the "incorrigible," are punished.

In Mordovia, the camp administration, obsessed with the need to care for the health of its convicts, compelled everyone to do morning exercises: a depressing sight, with a less than cheerful group of invalids, performing a set of exercises to the tune of "The Slav Girl's Farewell." Failure to take part in this measure was punished.

A line is formed, after roll call, to go to breakfast, and prisoners also have to leave the canteen in line. The guards, however, make most of them wait in the yard, while the invalids on dietary rations eat; it is easier for the guards this way and it also amuses them. At 7.35, in preparation for the beginning of the working day at 8 a.m., the *zeks* form up in front of the production area, and after another roll call, they

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leave for the factory. This is how each day of the 48-hour working week begins here (as yet, the new Constitution has not had any effect on the corrective labour legislation which regulates the work of millions of Soviet *zeks*).

Three times a week after the evening roll call at 18.30 there is a political hour. In the Mordovian camps, the punishment for failure to turn up is quite specifically called "failure to take part in political-educational work." In Camp 35, this specific punishment was finally abolished in 1974 after numerous protests to the Public Prosecutor. The administration then resorted to another method of exerting pressure: not handing out the two to four rubles for overfulfilled norms to be spent at the camp shop. For several years, they have failed to prove that "production" money has nothing to do with attendance at lectures. People holding different, non-Marxist beliefs, naturally boycott political-educational work, which is directed at fostering a communist outlook in the *zeks*. MVD employees, however, cannot allow any freethinking, and even a representative of the humane and neutral profession of medicine, Doctor Solomina, yelled angrily at I. Svetlichnyi, who was suffering from pneumonia: "We're treating you, and you dare to talk like that!" He had been talking about pluralism in the USSR.

The last post at 22.00 hours local time means "quiet time" in the full sense of the word. I. Zalmanson was repeatedly punished for walking about after the last post. D. Verkholyak only just managed to prove, by quoting a diagnosis from his medical card, that his reasons for remaining a long time in the toilet were purely physiological and not anti-Soviet.

To give an appearance of objectivity, people hired to work in the camp on a contract basis are also involved in the re-education of *zeks* who show an unwillingness to renounce their beliefs. As dumb "nodders" on the education committee, they will sign anything. Thus in 1975 a petition came before the administration of Camp 35 for Pronyuk to be put in the PKT. One of the reasons given was that he had reportedly failed to fulfil his production norms. Pronyuk, who has had one lung removed and suffers from tuberculosis, was confined to cells for five months. Thus did the KGB and MVD finally repay the man who had been the initiator of the massive month-long hunger strike and sit-down strike in the summer of 1974.

The administration frequently exploits for its own purposes those amoral people who have already been crushed by the repressive, punitive system. Thus, in 1974, Ostrovskii and Efimov, two *zeks* who were members of the colony's council, went "on their own initiative" to the authorities with a petition that Article 77 (1) of the RSFSR Criminal Code should be strictly applied to offenders. Under this Article, prisoners who intimidate others who "have embarked on the path of correction," prisoners who criticize the administration or organize "criminal groups" for these ends can be convicted to between eight and 15 years deprivation of freedom or sentenced to death. The zeal of these two "exemplary workers and citizens" was soon recognized by all kinds of incentives.

Punishment for "absence from one's place of work" is quite common. In 1974–75 reports were even filed by non-MVD employees—by foreman

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Azarov, safety technician Zhilin and others. These free men justified their actions by saying that *zeks* are obliged to work. And when attempts were made to explain to them that the norms had been set too high and that the food was inadequate, back came the stock reply: "But you're being punished."

The very fact of imprisonment is in itself a cause for punishment. "Grounds" in such a case are found by dint of a sadistically scrupulous compliance with the terms of the regime in which prisoners are held. For example, Podgorodetskii went up to the censor, Lieutenant Kolesnichenko, wearing his barber's jacket. He greeted her and asked if there was a letter for him (the working hours in the barber's shop were the same as the censor's reception hours). The censor demanded that Podgorodetskii should behave correctly and announce himself in the accepted fashion: "Convict so-and-so at your disposal." Podgorodetskii refused to go through this senseless procedure. He was then punished for "non-observance of the correct form of dress and rudeness to a representative of the administration," although during all the 26 years of his imprisonment he had been an example of politeness and decorum. Following a report from Captain Kytmanov, B. Shakhveryan was deprived of the use of the camp shop for "not standing up to greet him."

The sequence of punishments is usually as follows: a verbal warning, a reprimand, deprivation of the use of the shop for a month, solitary confinement, the PKT and prison. Often, though, this order is not observed, deprivation of the use of the shop and solitary confinement being seen as the most effective measures. Since 1977, when new rules were introduced to govern the internal routine of an ITU, it has been possible to put someone in solitary confinement for an indefinite period. The authorities in Vladimir prison have not failed to take advantage of this, keeping Z. Popadyuk inside for 45 days running in June/July 1978. However, this clause in the Regulations, permits *de jure* what was widely made use of before *de facto*. Thus S. Sepelyak (Camp 36) was kept in solitary confinement for the same period of 45 days.

The atmosphere of impunity in which the administration operates turns all the guards, not to mention the officers, into torturers, their professionalism depending on the degree of their malevolence. "Let me have him for my detachment and he'll become as good as gold," said Lieutenant Kuznetsov to the chief officer of another detachment, referring to V. Pavlenkov, and this was no idle boast. Detachment officer Kuznetsov, perpetually drunk, would amuse himself by seeking grounds for punishments. On Christmas Eve S. Soroka put a candle and the branch of a Christmas tree on his bedside table—solitary confinement. A carelessly made bed—solitary confinement. Collar unbuttoned—solitary confinement. What little cause one needs to punish "state criminals."

The broad spectrum of punishments often proves inadequate, and then they resort to compiling false reports. A classic example of this kind of falsification was the document compiled on the orders of Chief of Operational Section Khramushin on Bukovskii and his absence from his place of work. In his complaint to the Public Prosecutor's office, Bukovskii pointed out that on the day in question he could not have

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been either absent from or present at his place of work, as it was his day off, a Sunday. Pronyuk was punished for not going to work although he had been given time off for sickness.

Section IV

Medical Services

The following information deals with the medical services in Camp 35 since the central hospital has been run by Yu. Sh. Shelii, i.e. from September 1976, with additional particularly odious offences from other camps (sufficiently detailed information on the subject up to this date can be found in material already published).

Clearly the seriousness with which the medical service treats the sick is determined by the nature and complexity of the illness. Capacity for work and the extent of possible punishments for *zeks* must be determined by the administration on the basis of decisions made by the VTEK commission (Medical Commission for Determination of Disability) which examines all *zeks* once a year. The decisions of these VTEK commissions are as a rule subject to recommendations by MVD and KGB officials, and often to prejudiced reports from the camp's head physician. I. Svetlichnyi, V. Podgorodetskii, G. Gimpu and V. Filonenko were all at one time declared invalids, but then were deprived of Group 2 disablement status; invalids in this group are only required to work if they feel up to it. The illegality of such decisions is obvious, since Svetlichnyi has not grown eight new fingers, Podgorodetskii's hump has not disappeared, Gimpu has not suddenly acquired a stomach which has been operated on and the progressive deterioration of Filonenko's bone marrow has not been halted. Incidentally, when Filonenko was deprived of Group 2 status, the results of blood tests were entered on his medical card, tests which, for all the years of treatment in clinics, had never been carried out.

Falsifying the results of tests—entering them up as better than they really are—is a widespread phenomenon in the ITU central hospital and in the medical departments of Camps 35, 36 and 37. For example, in the case of Marchenko's illness, facts were entered which did not correspond to the truth. The results of tests carried out in the Kiev Institute for his kidney disease prior to his arrest contrast strikingly with similar ones carried out in the KGB isolation prison in Kiev while he was there for treatment consultations.

Invalids with Group 3 status—normal work with some limitations—are required to fulfil a production norm, and if this is not fulfilled, there are severe punishments. Svetlichnyi, Pronyuk and Marchenko were all punished in this way with the knowledge and approval of their doctors. For refusing to work, Group 3 invalids S. Mamchur (deceased), E. Prishlyak and D. Basarab were subjected to psychological intimidation by threats of further punishments. From this, it can be concluded that not only is the invalidity group not a factor in securing easier conditions for *zeks*, but it does not even protect them from disciplinary persecutions.

The atmosphere of abuses and violations of legality which prevails in the ITK (*ispravitelno-trudovaya koloniya*: corrective labour colony)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bears its own evil fruit. The death of Mamchur is instructive. After being called several times, the guard eventually came to the sick prisoner, then came the duty officer, then the deputy political officer, and after quite a time had passed they found the duty nurse, Kuznetsova. She did not know what to do, and asked *zek* Cherkavskii, "Should we give him a jab of magnesia?" Then, finally, T. A. Solomina appeared (a non-specialist doctor who was in fact a graduate from the faculty of sanitary hygiene) who, seeing the critical condition of Mamchur, managed merely to order "hospitalization." But the patient, who had been suffering from a violent headache, followed by hallucinations and nausea, lost consciousness. . . . He began to have convulsions and his face became distorted. These were clear symptoms of a stroke (for several years, Mamchur had been an invalid due to high blood pressure) but they had remainded undetected by the nurse and the doctor for nearly three hours, until the consultant Utyro arrived. As a result no first aid was given. The post mortem showed a brain haemorrhage.

This is an appropriate point to give a brief account of the contacts which the deceased had had with the representatives of the camp's medical service. Mamchur usually received his monthly diet rations no more than twice or three times a year. In January 1977 he was in hospital and for three months before his death on 10 May 1977 he asked in vain for his diet rations. Authorization came through the day after he died. At the begining of May, hospitalization had again been suggested but Mamchur, accustomed to being patient, was happy to delay it; hospitalization meant being kept in almost prison-like conditions and he found this very oppressive.

The medical staff or ITU VS-389 [1] carry out the administration's most scandalous instructions. In the summer of 1975 Major Varumin personally examined B. Shakhverdyan's anus and rectum before a meeting with relatives. In July 1976 a gynaecological examination of Marchenko's mother was carried out in the presence of a guard by a female medical student, Ermakova. Petrov, a doctor at Camp 36, acts as a distributor of favours and receiver of information from *zeks* collaborating with the KGB (S. Taratukhin's statement in the winter of 1976 exposed this). When he tried to recruit M. Gorbal as a KGB collaborator in November 1974, K. Ismagilov promised that in return he would "get his diet rations without any problem as well as regular rest periods in the hospital." In this way, sick prisoners are deprived and the health of those waiting to go into hospital suffers.

Transport from Camps 36 and 37 to the central hospital in Camp 35 is by ordinary closed van (Pleish's death was hastened precisely because of this), although it is laid down by law that the sick must be transferred in vehicles especially equipped for the purpose.

Diet rations in ITU VS-389 are still at an extremely unsatisfactory level. The allowance always contains stale food, sometimes totally unfit for consumption. From August 1977 to September 1978 meals were prepared from pickled cabbage which by the winter was totally inedible. In the summer and autumn of 1978 the butter in diet rations was

[1] VS-389 is the code for the central administration of camps in the Perm region, including camps 35, 36 and 37.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

replaced by margarine or combined fats. In August and September they used dried potato. In the six years of the camp's existence, the sick in Camp 35 have never had fresh fruit. And the cost of the so-called special diet (about 25 rubles) hardly allows for the minimum number of calories needed by a sick person.

The central hospital is a small, two-storied building which is kept clean by *zeks* and this is where the sick from Camps 35, 36 and 37 are taken. Because of the administration's desire to reduce contacts between the camps to a minimum, these three groups are always kept in closed quarters and the nurse and doctor are always accompanied by a guard. The fact that there is no 24-hour roster of medical staff (the nurse in the central hospital is on duty from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m.) endangers the lives of the seriously ill and the fact that there is no duty orderly causes them additional suffering. Because of the administrative considerations mentioned above—the prevention of contact—prisoners are allowed to go for walks for only two hours a day and in their own separate areas. The central hospital's medical personnel consists of the Chief Physician, Shelii, who is a surgeon, Doctor T. N. Shepkasovoi, a general doctor, and a staff of three to six nurses. The operating theatre, the laboratory and the X-ray department, fitted with equipment which by no stretch of the imagination could be called modern, allow some examinations and operations to be carried out on the spot, depending on the competence of the doctor concerned, but usually only minor ones. Doctors from Chusov hospital are called in for the more difficult operations and for consultations.

Each camp has its own sick bay with, in Camp 37, one doctor and in Camp 36, two, but because of the irregular delivery of medicines and also the lack of specialists (there was no dentist in Camp 36 for nearly 18 months in 1976–77) the situation in the medical service remains unsatisfactory. About 30 per cent of the *zeks* in Camp 35 are seriously ill. Among those who have diseases which are practically incurable under local conditions are Gerovich, who has cancer of the urinary tract, Filonenko, who has inflammation of the marrow, and Marchenko, who has nephritis. Whether any action is taken depends directly on the prisoner's convictions, his behaviour and his position in the camp.

The tragic results of such a medical service can be seen in the following list of people who died prematurely since the summer of 1972: Mityuk died in transit from Mordovia to the Urals (he was not given any treatment for his diabetes), Gantvars (hypertension), Kurkis (perforated ulcer), Kibartas (cancer of the liver), Mishkenis (post-operative complications), Opanasenko (hanged himself in hospital), Rudokas (heart failure), Knavinsh (coronary thrombosis), Pleish (an illness of the digestive organs), Lush (coronary thrombosis), Mamchur (stroke), Mezhals (coronary thrombosis), Stroganov (asthma and weak heart). The last six died while Shelii was in charge. Since diagnoses are carefully kept from patients, and particularly from the other *zeks*, there is a chance that mistakes might have crept in to this list of causes of death. According to *zeks* from Mordovia, the medical situation there is even worse.

One should point out, however, that changes for the better have recently been observed in the medical services of ITU VS-389. The

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hospitals are now supplied without delays with effective medicines for a range of current ailments of the cardio-vascular system, the liver and gall tracts, the digestive organs and tuberculosis, although as before there are no drugs for treating rare diseases, and the administration refuses to accept them when they are posted from a convict's home and addressed to the chief physician. In some cases the medical commission —consisting of Shelii and Chepkasovoi—does allow the seriously ill to receive parcels. Even a year ago it was impossible to get the administration to apply the corrective labour legislation in this respect. Also in the past few months, no *zeks* running high temperatures have been made to work and the seriously ill have not been seen doing forced labour, as was V. Gandzyuk (tuberculosis of the bones, weight 47 kg. height 176 cm.) under Major Yarushin in 1974. There are grounds for saying that this improvement was the authorities' reaction to the massive protests by *zeks* and thanks to the support of world opinion. It is thanks mainly to the second factor, to protests and complaints (initially ineffective and often resulting in further repressions) to the medical department of the GUITU (Chief Administration of the Corrective Labour Institutions), to the Ministry of Health, to the Central Committee of the CPSU and to the Red Cross that we are able to speak of certain improvements.

Valerii Marchenko

Section VI

Transit

We knew that transit was often painful but we had no idea what an ordeal it was for the majority of *zeks*. It takes an absurdly long time, seven to ten times longer than the normal journey. During the transit period *zeks* are usually shunted about several times from their carriage into a closed van, then into one, then another then a third room of the next transit prison, and then back again, "faster, faster . . ." (the dots represent foul language), men with sub-machine guns, dogs, "sit down, stand up," a search, another search and so on. For a *zek* with heavy luggage, it becomes a nightmare, although most of the criminals are able to pack all their belongings into wretched little bundles.

As far as the sick are concerned, the convoy generally shows them no mercy. They have to keep moving like everyone else, to the accompaniment of swearing and showing. It is astonishing, but if a seriously ill *zek* has to be sent to a prison hospital, he is put on an ordinary transit, provided that he can move his legs, or even on a stretcher. In most cases which we and the other political prisoners have observed, they were not accompanied by a doctor or nurse. If the hospital is not far away, the seriously ill are transferred by ordinary closed van. As the roads are full of pot-holes they are shaken body and soul.

According to Marchenko, on 7 April 1978 when prisoners were being transferred from the railway station to Kazan transit prison, 28 people were crammed into a closed van, intended only to carry just a few. They were kept in the van at the prison yard for about an hour in the full heat of the sun, and this is normal practice. People gasping for breath begged the convoy to let them out, but it was futile. Marchenko also reports that on 24 April 1978, three people—Tsios, Zeitunyanin

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and himself—were kept in an isolation compartment which was cramped even for one. They were released after half an hour only after threatening to complain to the State Prosecutor. But the others, in the main compartment who were not politicals, had to wait for several hours more. Someone urinated on the floor. People spend hours in the vans and in the cramped, dirty, toilet-less cells—"cess-pits"—of transit prisons. The tiny and always stinking one-person boxes are even worse. In July 1978 Antonyuk spent a whole day in one of these isolation boxes, while in transit from Vladimir prison to Camp 35. He suffers from tuberculosis of the bones and has a serious liver complaint.

A compartment of a police wagon is the same or half the size of a normal railway carriage compartment, but without a window and with a barred door on to the corridor, which is patrolled by a guard. The toilet windows are painted over and normally closed; the ventilation is switched off. Instead of the 10 (or three) people who can be accommodated in these compartments lying down, they normally cram in between 14 and 18 (or five to six) who are forced to spend anything from one to three days there. Sometimes, for a few hours, up to 25 people can be squeezed in. The toilet has no water, it is impossible to wash and of course there is no bedding.

In the majority of cases the convoy escorts are crude and cynical. They give out water and empty the toilets only when the whole carriage is kicking the barred doors, which sometimes happens twice or even three or four times a day. Each day during transit a *zek* gets about 600 g. of bread, a medium-size pickled herring and 20 g. of sugar. In June 1978, in transit from Moscow to Kirov, Orlov asked the convoy escort for something to drink; the reply: "You'll make do without water." With him in the half-size compartment were two old men suffering from tuberculosis, who had to hold each other up when they walked. Having asked in vain to go to the toilet, one of them urinated into a cellophane bag, half of it spilling on to the floor and lower berth. They were then moved to another compartment, which was already crowded, to isolate them from the political prisoner. When one of them wanted to lie down on the floor, the escort did not let him. Having asked several times to be let out to go to the toilet, V. Lisovoi was forced to urinate in the compartment, into a jar which happened to be there. In August 1977 Z. Popadyuk was held in Penza prison in the same cell as people with tuberculosis and syphilis. In November 1972 Antonyuk saw officers taking women from their compartments to sleep with them; he observed this while in transit from Kharkov to Perm, via Sverdlovsk, and at the Sverdlosk transit station itself.

In June 1978, M. Matusevich, who was on hunger strike, was accompanied by a doctor while in transit from Kiev to Camp 35. But the doctor refused to give any assistance to a criminal prisoner in the next compartment who had a serious internal illness and serious skin disease. A nurse should have been accompanying him, but the transit set off without her. He was damp all over with pus, and the other *zeks* including Matusevich tore up their shirts and foot bindings to make bandages. That, briefly, is what transit conditions are like.

Yurii Orlov

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Section VII

The Clamp-down on Information

The facts we give below on the violation of human rights in connexion with correspondence and the free flow of information cannot possibly give the whole picture because of the extremely difficult circumstances in which this was written.

The possibility of getting this kind of information out of the camp is very limited. We are therefore obliged to restrict ourselves to a few facts from the lives of political prisoners in ITU VS-389.

At a press conference in Moscow in 1974, Academician Sakharov provided western correspondents with hand-written material from Camp 35 written by Z. Antonyuk. As the correspondents then photographed and published these documents, they also became known to the KGB. Several months later, Antonyuk was summoned to appear before a so-called supervisory commission in Camp 35. It was suggested that he should write a letter of recantation to be published in a newspaper, otherwise, he was promised, he would be sentenced to a term in prison.

As Antonyuk rejected this deal, in July 1975 he was sent to Vladimir prison. In 1978, S. Gluzman and S. Kovalev in Camp 35 were confined to cells in the punishment block for six months for collecting and storing information on the situation of prisoners in the camp. In order to prevent such information getting out of the camp, the administration interferes in the most barbarous fashion in prisoners' meetings with their relatives. Yu. Khvedko, for instance, has seen his mother only twice (in 1969 and 1974) in the eleven years he has been in prison. As soon as one of his relatives wrote that he was coming to visit him, the administration replied that Khvedko had been deprived of the right to have meetings.

In May 1978, the mother of Z. Popadyuk arrived in Vladimir to see her son. On the grounds of some triviality, the prison administration deprived Popadyuk of the right to see her. It was only several weeks later that Captain Doinikov revealed the real reason for preventing the meeting: " On her way to Vladimir, she had visited the homes of various anti-Soviet people in Moscow and had gathered news. She'll go on being deprived of the right to see her son."

G. Superfin believes that his mother's stroke and subsequent death were brought on by the perpetual confiscation of letters and prevention of meetings with her son.

If a prisoner is allowed a prolonged visit, the women and children who arrive to see him are frequently stripped naked, searched and subjected to the most humiliating examinations. Before one such visit on 22 September 1977, P. Plumpa was taken by four supervisors to a separate room and stripped. The camp doctor, Petrov, then inserted fingers into his rectum and poked around, searching for some sort of " information." There were no grounds whatsoever for believing that Plumpa was carrying such " information " in his body.

In 1976, Plumpa's nine-year-old son and five-year-old daughter were taken away from their mother, taken to a separate room, stripped and their clothes searched before a meeting.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In May 1978, R. Marksonyan had a two-hour meeting with his brother, but was not allowed to shake his hand. They were also forbidden to speak in their native Armenian. The supervisor present at the meeting continually warned them that if they uttered even one word of Armenian, the meeting would immediately be cut short.

As a rule, during short meetings, only Russian is allowed to be spoken. If the children or relatives of a non-Russian prisoner cannot speak Russian, there is no way for them to take part in a conversation.

The prison administration frequently uses national or religious pretexts for confiscating or withholding correspondence. A letter from Antonyuk, dated 1 September 1976, to his wife was confiscated by the administration of Vladimir prison, because it contained a quotation in Ukrainian from Herodotus. As a result of this patent Ukrainophobia, Antonyuk's correspondence was interrupted for a whole year. His letter of 2 January 1978 was simply stolen on the pretext that it had to be translated. All enquiries concerning this letter remained unanswered.

When Marchenko was held by the KGB in Kiev (autumn and winter 1977–78), a considerable quantity of letters including registered letters arrived for him at Camp 36. But when Marchenko returned to the camp the administration refused to give him these letters and greetings, including those congratulating him on his 30th birthday.

The camp administration holds back letters to non-Russian prisoners for several weeks. In 1976, M. Kiirend complained to the Chusovsk Public Prosecutor: "I should like to draw your attention to the outright violation of the law concerning the delivery of personal correspondence. Letters are given to me one month after they arrive in the camp: I received a letter dated 23 April on 3 June, one dated 12 May on 10 June. The same delay occurs with the letters I send. I protest against the arbitrary and groundless withholding of my correspondence."

As his complaint gave no results, and the camp KGB representative said that letters written in languages other than Russian were sent to the KGB, Kiirend wrote to the head of the Skalisnk KGB, Degtyannikov, saying: "According to the present law, letters should take three days to reach me and my correspondents, but because the letters I send and receive are written in Estonian the administration of Camp 35 automatically delays delivery for more than one month. I consider this to be a manifestation of chauvinism." Anyone who writes this kind of complaint to the camp administration in Camp 35 or 36 is encouraged by the censor or his representative to cease writing letters in his native tongue. For example, Plumpa sent 15 registered letters from 4 December 1977 to Lithuania, but not once did he receive confirmation that they had been posted.

When, on 5 September 1978, Plumpa asked the censor why the registered letters never reached their destination and why receipts are not issued on dispatch, the censor replied that if receipts were to be issued letters written in Lithuanian would take three months, whereas at present they only take five weeks.

Religious books or letters on religious themes come into the category of hostile and slanderous information which is liable to confiscation. In May 1977, I. Ogurtsov (Camp 36) was sent an Easter parcel. Among

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other things, it contained a Bible. Camp officials opened the parcel, confiscated the Bible and then returned the parcel to the sender.

P. Plumpa in Camp 36 was sent letters with extracts quoted from the Bible. On 17 January 1977, he was told that these excerpts had been confiscated as religious and tendentious.

Prisoners hardly ever receive letters from abroad, with the exception of letters from Israel, which are confiscated slightly less frequently. The whole of the time they were in camp, the following received not one letter from abroad: Kiirend, Marchenko, Antonyuk, Grabans. Ogurtsov occasionally received a letter from Poland. Plumpa received only one letter from abroad in all those years, dated 6 February 1976, from Switzerland.

In Camps 35 and 36, complaints sent by political prisoners to state bodies are also classified as forbidden information. On 1 April 1977, Marchenko was searched and a complaint he had written to the Prosecutor General, Rudenko, was confiscated. In this complaint, Marchenko had written about several illegalities which had occurred during his investigation and trial.

In Camp 35, an appeal by V. Lisovoi dated 31 December 1978 to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Shitikov, for more fresh fruit in the camp canteen, was confiscated.

In March 1978, I. Grabans addressed a complaint to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in connexion with the fact that letters from Latvia took two-three months to reach him. Shortly afterwards, his correspondence was completely interrupted and for five months he did not receive a single letter.

These facts, although they represent a tiny part of the whole story, demonstrate that the administration of ITU VS-389 has extensive power to violate human rights and state laws in connection with political prisoners. It has the power to block any information concerning these violations even to the extent of confiscating complaints by prisoners to superior bodies.

In strict regime camps, television and radio sets are forbidden. A prisoner is allowed to send two letters, postcards or telegrams to private citizens per month. It is absolutely forbidden to use the telephone. It is forbidden to send appeals, complaints or other correspondence of this nature to non-state organizations.

A prisoner is not allowed to complain on behalf of another prisoner, and collective complaints are not allowed. Representatives of the Red Cross, foreign correspondents and other foreigners have never talked to prisoners in Soviet political camps. It has to be said that when Soviet prisoners read in the Soviet press about the restrictions of the rights of political prisoners in the West or even in camps in Chile, they shed no tears. These restrictions cannot be compared in any way with those encountered in Soviet camps.

Pyatras Pluiras-Plumpa, September 1978

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Juridical Interpretation of International Documents on Human Rights

Konstantyn Sawczuk

THE Charter of the United Nations, which was signed and ratified in 1945 by the Soviet Union and also by the Ukrainian SSR and the Belorussian SSR, contains several statements about human rights. The Preamble of the Charter states that "We the peoples of the United Nations determined . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small . . .", while Article 55 announces that "the United Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."

The Economic and Social Council, at its first meeting in February 1946, set up the Commission on Human Rights, whose members included representatives of the Soviet Union. In June 1948 this Commission prepared a draft of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which was approved by 12 votes; although there were no opposing votes, the Soviet Union, Ukraine and Belorussia abstained from the voting. The final text of the Declaration was approved by the General Assembly in December 1948 by 48 votes; again, there were no opposing votes, but there were eight abstentions, among them the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian SSR and the Belorussian SSR. "It is undoubtedly true" states James Frederick Greene "that the adoption of the Universal Declaration without a dissenting vote marked a notable event in history, but it is too early to determine the place of this international document among the great national statements of the rights of man." [1]

What are the contents of the Declaration? In short, the Declaration of Human Rights proclaims human and civil rights often found in the laws and constitutions of some countries. Civil rights include the right of life, liberty and security, freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment, protection against illegal arrest, detention and exile, freedom of movement, thought, conscience, religion, speech and assembly, etc. The political rights enumerated in the Declaration include the right to take part in one's country's government either directly or through duly elected representatives and equality of opportunity in public service. In this portion of the Declaration one also finds the famous statement: "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government."

The Universal Declaration devotes much attention to economic, social and cultural rights. Included among these is the right to own property, the right to social security, the right to work, the right to membership of trade unions, the right to rest and leisure, the right to education, etc.

[1] James Frederick Greene, *The United Nations and Human Rights* (The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1958), p. 675.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not an international pact and did not require ratification by states. It was and has remained a proclamation of principles.

Another document which could translate principles into realities was needed. "We must go on with the drafting of a Covenant which will seek to translate human rights into law." [2] After much debate in the United Nations the consensus was reached that two, not one, Covenants were necessary to deal with the issue. The Soviet international jurist, H. I. Tunkin, stated that "the drafts of the Covenants, as opposed to the Declaration of Human Rights, which is only a recommendation, should become international treaties, which will be juridically binding on the signatories after ratification." [3]

In December 1966 the General Assembly passed two international Covenants dealing with human rights and an Optional Protocol. Both Covenants needed ratification by at least 35 governments in order to become binding. The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights became binding in January 1976, while the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (together with its Optional Protocol) went into effect in March 1976. The Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which needs only 10 ratifications to become binding, was drawn up with the aim of providing additional implementation of the Covenant; it permits the Committee on Human Rights (created by the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) to hear and discuss complaints of violations of civil and political rights brought by individuals against states which have ratified the Protocol.

Almost 30 years passed from the Declaration of Human Rights to the time the two Covenants came into force. The debates over human rights in the United Nations (which are sometimes more disunited than united) have lasted longer than both world wars. The Soviet Union, regardless of the fact that it abstained from voting on the Declaration, signed both Covenants on 18 March 1968; the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was ratified by the USSR on 12 November 1973, and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 16 November of the same year. The Ukrainian and Belorussian SSRs also signed and ratified the Covenants.[4] However, the Optional Protocol was not signed either by the Soviet Union or by the above mentioned Republics.

In general, the texts of the two Covenants contain the same provisions about human rights as the Universal Declaration, but there is also one article not included in the Declaration. Paragraph 1 of Article 1 in both Covenants states that "all the people have the right of self determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."

[2] Ibid. p. 677, footnote 20.

[3] A. P. Movchan, *Mezhdunarodnaya zashchita prav cheloveka* (Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo yuridicheskoi literatury, Moscow, 1958), p. 3.

[4] The Ukrainian SSR signed the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on 20 March 1968 and ratified it on 16 October 1973, that is about a month before the Covenant was ratified by the USSR. The Belorussian SSR signed the above mentioned Covenant on 19 March 1968 and ratified it on 12 November 1973. The Covenant on Human and Political Rights was also signed by the Ukrainian SSR on 20 March 1968 but ratified on 12 November 1973. The Belorussian SSR signed this Covenant on 19 March 1968 and ratified it on 12 November 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Besides the above documents dealing with human rights, which were all promulgated by the United Nations, with the active participation of the Soviet Union, one must not forget the existence of the Final Act of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, signed in Helsinki in August 1975 by 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. The Final Act was also signed by the USSR, but not by the Ukrainian or Belorussian SSRs.[5] This document notes that the states that have signed the Final Act will " respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." This sentence closely follows Article 18 of the Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. In the text of the Final Act we also read that the states participating in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation " confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties " in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and will act in this area in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights. The Final Act also reminds the participant states about their obligations in regard to human rights as enumerated in international declarations and agreements, including the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

THE international documents dealing with human rights, like many other important and basic documents, are controversial and open to interpretation. In general, the controversy is not about human rights *per se*, since these are enumerated in the Charter, the Declaration and the Covenants; the problem begins to arise when one starts to deal with human rights in the practical, rather than theoretical sphere. Who is supposed to transform into reality all the high-sounding phrases about human rights: the state, some supra-national organization or an organ or organs of the United Nations? Who, in the final analysis can decide whether human rights have been or are being violated? In a system of international law based on primacy of state sovereignty can an individual successfully defend human rights? Is not the state, for all practical purposes, the only subject of international law? Although international jurists are also willing to grant subjectivity to international organizations, how many of them will grant the individual the right to be a subject of international law? Under these circumstances, can all the documentation of human rights violations [6] in the Soviet Union help an individual who has become a victim of the high-handedness of this state which is a founding member of the United Nations and a signatory of almost all the documents dealing with human rights?

These questions hardly seem to trouble Soviet jurists, whose inter-

[5] The two Soviet Republics, the Ukrainian SSR and the Belorussian SSR, founding members of the United Nations, did not sign the Final Act of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, for undisclosed reasons, despite the fact that Soviet constitutional law and the opinion of Soviet international jurists consider these republics " sovereign states." It seems that the fictitious nature of this sovereignty cannot be disguised by the most widespread Soviet juridical and political propaganda.

[6] The documentation on this matter is extensive and easily available. For this reason no specific works are cited.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pretations of international documents on human rights is simple and consistent. In essence, it states that human rights and basic freedoms fall into the sphere of internal affairs of the state and do not exist outside the boundaries of the state. In his book *International Defence of Human Rights*, A. P. Movchan writes: "Human rights are unthinkable outside the state. An individual obeys the internal laws of the country in which he resides. The legal status of an individual to the state manifests itself in citizenship. A citizen is entitled to the rights and freedoms which are enumerated in the constitution and laws of the country of his citizenship." [7] The Soviet doctrine of human rights is tied to constitutional rights, that is to the rights enumerated in the fundamental law of the state. In their turn, the constitutional rights of an individual cannot be separated from his duties towards the state. "Constitutional rights and obligations," writes L. D. Voyevodin, "in principle define the content and the basic direction and special purpose of all other rights and duties." [8] The author draws attention to the fact that in the Soviet state "the highest juridical power rests in constitutional rights and obligations." [9]

Soviet authors contend that "the linkage of rights and duties [is] the special quality of socialist law, whose aim is the creation of true equality in society." [10] To bolster their argument they cite Karl Marx, who allegedly said that "there are no rights without obligations and no obligations without rights." [11]

Tunkin writes that "the legal position of individuals is determined by the internal law of the state and not by international law," and that the "Soviet science of international law unanimously asserts that individuals are not subjects of international law." [12]

Writing about the defence of human rights, Krylov notes that "the individual is not defined directly through international law, but through the intercession of internal state law." [13] It seems that most Western jurists share the opinion of Soviet jurists on this matter.

Although Soviet juridical doctrine takes the position that human rights depend upon the state, this, however, does not prevent the Soviet Union from supporting United Nations' declarations regarding human rights. The reason for this lies in Paragraph 7, Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, which states that this Charter does not "authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter."

Since the Soviets consider human rights to lie within the domestic jurisdiction of the state, it follows that other states have no right to interfere in these matters. This interpretation is used by Soviet jurists when they are dealing with international documents on human rights. No matter what these documents or even the United Nations Charter

[7] Movchan, p. 18.
[8] L. D. Voyevodin, *Konstitutsionnye prava i obyazannosti sovetskiykh grazhdan* (Izdatel'stvo moskovskogo universiteta, Moscow, 1972), p. 48.
[9] Ibid. p. 49.
[10] *Sotsialisticheskoe pravo* (Yuridicheskaya Literatura, Moscow, 1973), p. 56.
[11] Ibid. p. 56.
[12] Movchan, p. 19.
[13] Ibid. p. 19.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

say about human rights, the already mentioned Paragraph 7 of Article 2 forbids other states to interfere in the internal affairs of the USSR; for this reason the Soviets feel that they can calmly discuss the issue of human rights.

THE Universal Declaration is not a legally binding document but carries only a moral obligation. The two Covenants on human rights, as has already been mentioned, had to be ratified and can, therefore, be considered as legally binding. But is this really so? Article 102, Paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter states that "every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it." However, neither of the two Covenants contains an article referring to Article 102, Paragraph 1 of the Charter. The text of the Covenants only states that "instruments of ratification shall be *deposited* (italics mine) with the Secretary-General of the United Nations" and does not mention anything about the registration of the Covenants with the Secretary-General.

If the Covenants are neither treaties nor international agreements, then what are they? In my opinion they are documents which are binding only on the states that have ratified them. Since the Soviet Union has ratified both Covenants, one assumes that they are binding upon the USSR; however, how can one prove that the Soviet Union is not fulfilling its obligations regarding human rights when the Soviet position is that these rights fall within the domestic jurisdiction of the state, and interference by other states, according to Article 2 of the Charter, will not be allowed or tolerated.

There is no need to discuss the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights since neither the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR nor the Belorussian SSR signed it. What is interesting in connexion with the Protocol is the Soviet argument against signing it. Soviet jurists claim that in principle individuals have no right to lodge a complaint against a state.[14] Y. A. Ostrovsky writes that "the Soviet delegation was opposed to the very idea of individuals being able to initiate international complaints against a state, since this could be an opportunity to circumvent Paragraph 7, Article 2 of the United Nations Charter and interfere in the internal affairs of the state."[15] The author goes on to say that this could be especially dangerous to newly emerging states, since it would erode their national sovereignty, which is so important to their development.[16] Once again, with a slightly different emphasis, we are confronted with the Soviet juridical interpretation of human rights.

In the text of the Final Act of the Conference on European Peace and Security we find a clause that specifically does not allow for its registration according to Article 102 of the Charter; therefore, the Final Act is neither a treaty nor an international agreement. Although the text

[14] Y. A. Ostrovsky, *OON i prava cheloveka* (Izdatel'stvo "Mezhdunarodnie otnoshenya," Moscow, 1968), p. 112.
[15] Ibid. p. 111.
[16] Ibid. p. 111

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Final Act refers to all the international documents on human rights and calls upon the states participating in the Conference to adhere to them and fulfil the obligations enumerated in the Universal Declaration or in the Covenants, how can the Soviet Union adhere to the resolutions on human rights in the Final Act when the Soviet juridical interpretation of international documents on human rights does not permit this?

THE WORLD TODAY

The monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs provides the general reader with up-to-date and authoritative information on current world problems.

Recent issues include:

Lawrence L. Whetten	The lessons of Iran
Roger Morgan	New tasks for the European Parliament
K. F. Cviic	The politics of the World Council of Churches
Roy Dean	Disarmament and the Soviet Union
Tom Gallagher	Portugal's Atlantic territories: the separatist challenge
James Manor	A new political order for Sri Lanka

Annual subscription (including postage):

1979 (Vol. 35)	*1980* (Vol. 36)
UK £7	UK £8
US $20	US $22
Elsewhere £9	Elsewhere £10

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents, or to the **Oxford University Press,** Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 0DD (Tel. 01-450 8080)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Limits of Security: Defence and Foreign Trade in Finland

Karen Erikson Örvik

SECURITY is a measure of a nation's independent, or dependent status. It can be defined in military, economic, political, psychological, and cultural terms. For the small state, security is the safeguarding of its very existence. Security for the large state means the safety of its territory and that of allied or neighbouring borders. The small state, however, must not only contend with possible threats to its borders but with the more general threat to its political independence. It is continually called upon to deal with varying forms of intervention in its internal affairs by the great powers.[1] The focus of the following article is on defence and foreign trade as military and economic indicators of Finland's independence. What pressures are raised against the small nation in (firstly) defence and (secondly) trade? What are the prospects for Finland to enhance its independent status in these areas?

THE small state, by definition, does not have the resources to provide for its own defence. The expense of maintaining a modern and well-equipped military establishment is beyond the means of the small power. Some have expressed a conviction that the increasing costs of a deterrent capability are eroding the "last autonomous basis of the independence of the small states" and solidifying the asymmetry in relations between them and the major powers.[2] Cost alone makes the large armies and the sophisticated defence systems painstakingly constructed by Sweden and Switzerland, for example, a less probable pattern for the future than the efficient, but understocked and highly disadvantaged military defences of Finland.

1 For a discussion of the relative meaning of security to large and small powers, see Erling Bjöl, "The Small State in International Politics," August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland (eds.), *Small States in International Relations* (Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971), p. 31. The case of the small state in international politics has been succinctly made:

> The capacity of a small power to withstand pressure—military in the first instance, but economic, political and psychological too—must be seen as the acid test of its viability as an independent state.

David Vital, *The Inequality of States* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 120.

2 Ibid. p. 156. Vital raises the question of how valuable a defensive military option is to the small state. It is hardly a rational possibility if considered in terms of the economic sacrifices the defence effort requires of the small state and the "slender underpinning for national security it provides even in the best circumstances." If the small state cannot afford the acquisition of nuclear weapons, Vital holds out as an alternative to defence spending a political solution which would involve the "tacit recognition that in a crisis the condition of non-alignment must be abandoned and accommodation sought with a protecting power." Ibid. pp. 157–8.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is also, however, a certain futility about the Finns' maintenance of a military establishment when one considers that the Finnish defence budget in absolute figures is less than 1/300 of that of the Soviet Union. According to the terms of the 1947 Peace Treaty, the number of active defence forces may not exceed 41,900 (34,400 army; 4,500 navy; and 3,000 air force). Since 1956, Finland has devoted, on average, 1·5 per cent of its gross national product to defence. Nevertheless, the Finns have built and maintained a defence network which they believe has a considerable measure of deterrence value.

Finnish defence is based on a number of assumptions that are relevant for small states in general. The first assumption is that Finland's defence begins at the country's own borders. A small nation cannot extend the perimeters of its defence beyond its own sovereign edge. A defence in depth must be considered a preserve of the great powers alone. Finland's defence capability presupposes that Finland be able to control its land and air space, and the Finnish territorial seas. Accordingly, the Finns have a network of radar surveillance, underwater detection systems, coastal patrols, and land frontier guards. The focal points of Finnish surveillance and protection measures are Lapland and the southern coast including the Aaland Islands.[3] Lapland, however, has been singled out for special attention by the Second Parliamentary Committee on Defence whose recommendations of 1976 form the basis of Finnish defence plans for the period 1977–81. According to the committee report, "the increased strategic significance of the northern parts of Fenno-Scandinavia underlines the importance of defence preparedness in northern Finland."[4]

A second assumption of the Finnish defence is also common to many small states: defence is geared toward the most dire eventuality, a surprise attack. Thus, a capability for immediate action is more essential than the development of a promising potential. To this end, a defence reorganizaton in 1966 integrated the seven regional military commands with the organizations of peacetime forces so that the regional commanders took charge of conscription, the reserves, peacetime training and liaison with civilian authorities, as well as all defensive preparations for the region. The regional commands are at Oulu, Vaasa, Jyväskylä, Turku, Hämeenlinna, and Kouvola. In the event of a local surprise attack, the region concerned could be activated immediately under the leadership of the regional commander.

The pattern of mobilization within Finland's forces is also aimed at repelling a surprise attack. In the first instance, a mobile, elite cadre of troops is available at all times; it is highly trained, well-equipped and ready for immediate action. Second, support troops from all branches of the service can be equipped and available within a short time from the

[3] Finland, Statsråd, *Andra Parlamentariska Försvarkskommitténs Betänkande*, Kommittébetänkande Nr. 37 (1976), p. 49.
[4] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

beginning of an attack. A third level of mobilization is the whole of Finland's trained reserve—a force of 690,000 (1978).[5] Compared with the United State's reserves of only 820,000 in 1978, the Finnish figure is substantial. According to the defence plan of 1976, Finland's reserve forces are being expanded at a rate of 3,000 per year. By 1981, they should stand at 702,000 men. Finland maintains the largest reserve force of any Scandinavian country. It is, in fact, rivalled only by Switzerland among the nations of the world for the highest ratio of reserve to active forces. In 1978, Finland had 17 reservists to every man in active service. (The Swiss have nearly double that figure, with a ratio of reserve to standing army of 33:1.) In contrast, Sweden, which is known for maintaining a large reserve force, had only 10 trained reserves for every man on active duty in 1978. Comparable figures, reserve to active force ratios, for Norway and Denmark in 1978 were 6:1 and 4:1, respectively. Reserve training in Finland in the period 1977–81 is to be intensified, and more efficient, systematic procedures adopted.

In addition to the three waves of mobilization which should theoretically inundate a surprise attacker, the Finns have made it clear in their defence requirements that they are prepared to continue any war operations through to guerrilla warfare conditions.

The third assumption of Finnish defence is that severe initial losses inflicted on the enemy will lead a potential aggressor to consider the price of an attack disproportional to the gains.[6] The difficulties of acting upon this assumption create some doubts about its validity. The small state's military capabilities must be sufficient to make credible its claims of the losses an aggressor is bound to suffer in the initial phase of entanglements with the small state. It is illusory to consider the small power as representing a " threat " to a potential great power aggressor. On the other hand, one analyst of small state affairs has noted that " any military effort, even if limited, which expresses national cohesion, increases the military and above all the political price which any adversary will have to pay, and help deter him from a possibly risky venture." [7] The Finnish leadership believes that Finland can parry an attack for a limited period, with " limited " interpreted as days, not weeks or months.

In accordance with the second and third assumptions underlying Finland's defence posture, the Finns have paced their programme to

[5] The figures on reserve force levels are according to the estimates of *The Military Balance 1976–1977* and *The Military Balance 1978–1979*.

[6] *Andra Parlamentariska Försvarskommitténs Betänkande*, p. 49. The Swiss doctrine of defence is based on the notion that the armed forces will not only " hit back at an invader," but will strike " ' such crippling blows, inflicting such heavy casualties, and shake his morale to such a degree that he may decide to abandon his purpose.' " Vital, p. 154.

[7] Jacques Freymond, " How the Small Countries Can Contribute to Peace," Schou and Brundtland (eds.), *Small States in International Relations*, p. 179. Freymond observes that the historical record proves that " the assertion of a determination to exist as a nation, expressing itself in the form of active resistance, even if conducted with primitive means of defence, is alone enough to create a political fact which the powers must take into account." Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

retard the advance of an aggressor in the first place, and then to cause him the maximum losses. The concern over preparation for a surprise attack and the emphasis on the need to develop a capacity to inflict maximum initial losses indicate that deterrence is as important as protection in the Finnish defence scheme.[8] This position is reinforced by the pattern of procurements that has been adopted. The means of defence which have formed the core of Finland's defence policy are: jet fighters, anti-aircraft missiles, fast coastal boats (gun boats, escort vessels), coastal artillery, underwater mining, and surveillance systems. For the period 1977–81, particular importance is attributed to increasing the operational capacity of Finnish forces in Lapland and to acquiring anti-aircraft guided missiles for training purposes.[9]

The increased significance of air defence is reflected in the shifting proportions of the procurements budget. In the current period, air defence is allotted 45 per cent of the total procurements compared with only 36 per cent for the previous five-year period. On the other hand, procurements for the army and naval defence fall below previous allotments. The army share is down 27 per cent from 32 per cent in the 1972–76 period and the naval procurements down 14 per cent from 18 per cent. The most urgent needs of Finland's air defence are for radar and early warning equipment, especially low level detection systems. Further, the report of the Parliamentary Defence Committee of 1976 stressed the acquisition of jet fighters to replace the present ones used in their fighter plane divisions, mobile anti-aircraft missiles, and "a lesser number of missiles for low-flying targets."[10]

The effort to meet competing expenditures is compounded by a certain futility in defence spending for small states. Although the small state is devoted to the task of maintaining as credible a self-defence as possible, it faces the reality that the larger the defence machine, the more resources required for its operation. The inevitable consequence is the growth of dependence on others to meet military requirements.[11] The dilemma of the small state is this: independence and freedom of action require an effective military defence which, in turn, is likely to involve the imposition of limits on freedom and independence. Finland has neither escaped nor solved the problem. From the modest scale of importing almost no arms from the Soviet Union before 1960, Finland began buying from the Soviets over the next decade at an average of 26·5 million Finnmarks (approximately eight million US dollars) of arms per year. This represented on average six times the annual value of arms imports from all

8 In discussing the effective development of the defence forces, the report of the Second Parliamentary Defence Committee states: "The objective is to uphold a sufficient defence capacity that it would preclude beforehand military operations against our nation's territory." *Andra Parlamentariska Försvarskommitténs Betänkande*, p. 49.

9 Ibid. p. 50.

10 Ibid. p. 39.

11 The small state sooner or later is forced to recognize that "the greater success in satisfying its purely military requirements the greater will be its subsequent dependence on foreign sources of equipment and technology." Vital, p. 62.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Finland's western trade partners together, including Sweden. In 1975, Soviet arms imports totalled 43·7 million Finnmarks (12·5 million US dollars), an amount 2·7 times the value of western arms sent to Finland.[12]

Thus, the Finns, who seek to follow a rule of "neutrality buying" to match their political position, have obviously not made balanced purchases from East and West but have simply acquired from both sides. Since the great leap forward in Soviet arms imports in 1960, the procurement from East and West was nearly in balance only once, in 1963. In that year the Finns announced the acquisition of Vigilante-type anti-tank missiles from Great Britain and 26 MIG-21 planes from the Soviet Union. At present the MIG-21 division, as well as Soviet Ilyushins and French Fouga Magister planes are slated for retirement. In its report in 1976, the Parliamentary Defence Committee emphasized that the acquisition of new types of aircraft to replace those being retired must "satisfy our security policy which is based on neutrality."[13] British Hawk fighters are on order for 1980 to replace the MIG-21s but the highest expenditure continues to be on defence purchases from the Soviet Union.[14]

When all the figures are in on the sources of Finnish weapons buying, there are further difficulties to be faced. Foreign-made material often requires parts and technical maintenance from an external source. Previous experience might have prompted the Finns to emphasize in their recent defence plan that, with special respect to purchases of planes and air defence equipment, the domestic aircraft industry should be prepared to handle the service, repairs and maintenance of all equipment.[15]

A summary outlook on Finland's efforts at self-defence, thus, would tend to confirm the theoretical doubts expressed in the literature on the status of small powers: a modern military establishment is beyond the means of the small state. In trying to keep up with technological developments, as well as maintaining its weaponry in sufficient number, the small power is forced to rely on one or other great power. This, it appears, is the case with Finland.

THE economic measure of a small nation's independence centres on its foreign trade. Since the limited resources of a small state compel it to develop economies of scale in production, it will tend to rely heavily on imports, and to be highly specialized in its exports. A survey of the

12 Finland, Valtiovarainministeriö, Tilastokeskus, *Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja*, 1957-76. The portion of civilian arms ranged between 1 and 10 per cent of Finland's annual arms imports for the years 1960–74. Assuming that this trend continued, one can conclude that the arms imports figures mentioned in this article are not unduly inflated by the inclusion of civilian weapons. The figures on civilian arms imports for the years after 1974 do not appear in Finland's statistical yearbook.

13 *Andra Parlamentariska Försvarskommitténs Betänkande*, p. 50.

14 "Finsk våbenko i Sovjet," *Berlingske Tidende* (Copenhagen), 16 Nov. 1978.

15 *Andra Parlamentariska Försvarskommitténs Betänkande*, p. 39.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

years 1956–76 reveals that Finland's average propensity to import is extremely high, that is, the total spent on imports is a high percentage of the total income. Large countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union probably spend less than 3 per cent of their national income on imports. A figure between 20 and 40 per cent indicates a high average propensity to import, and hence, a low level of self-sufficiency. The figures for Finland over the 20-year period 1956–76 reveal a trend, more steady in the recent decade, towards an increase in the average propensity to import. Before 1970, imports averaged 25·5 per cent of the national income annually, while over the next seven years the rate increased to 32 per cent, as Table 1 illustrates. Nonetheless, Finland's average propensity to import remains considerably lower than that of Norway or Denmark.[16]

The dependence of national economies on foreign resources might also be demonstrated by the ratio of imports surplus to total resources, an index used by David Vital in his study of small state capacity.[17] A high ratio is presumed to be an indicator of a country's high rate of dependency on imports. According to Vital, a " high " rate is 1 per cent or more. Finland's share of imports surplus to total resources between 1957 and 1970 was, on the average, 1·36 per cent a year, but jumped to 4 per cent between 1970 and 1976. This figure indicates a considerably higher rate of dependency on imports than Sweden, although lower than Denmark and Norway.[18] (See Table 2.)

In the cases discussed above, the indicators of economic dependency reveal a steady trend: the increasing reliance on imports. The critical issue is the degree of concentration of the imports in terms of sources. What nation is the greatest single supplier of Finnish imports, and what proportion of imports does it supply to Finland? Finland's largest source of imports continues to be Western Europe. The nations of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) account for more than twice the share of imports from Europe's Eastern bloc countries, including the Soviet Union. For 15 years EEC-EFTA sources made up approximately two-thirds of Finland's imports. In 1974, however, Finland began importing less than 60 per cent from the EEC-EFTA nations, and more than 20 per cent from the Eastern bloc. The trend is further underscored by an examination of individual nations as sources of Finnish imports. West Germany became the largest single source of imports for Finland in 1959. However, in 1974, German imports were surpassed by Soviet imports and the Soviet Union is now

16 All statistics on trade are derived and collated from the following sources: *Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja*, 1956–76; Finland, Valtiovarainministeriö, Tullihallitus, *Ulkomaankauppa*, Suomen virallinen tilasto, 1 A:96 (1976), 1 A (1977); and Nordic Council and Nordic Statistical Secretariat, *Yearbook of Nordic Statistics*, 1972-77.

17 Vital, pp. 49–53.

18 As Tables 1 and 2 illustrate, the comparisons between Finland and the other Scandinavian countries are made only for the period 1970-76. However, in both cases, there are sufficiently observable trends to make the comparisons valid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finland's largest single-nation supplier of goods. Table 3 illustrates the two trends in Finland's import trade.

Finland's position in import trade is complicated by the types of commodities involved in its purchases from the Soviets. Beginning in 1960, a noticeable change in the pattern of trade between Finland and the Soviet Union began to develop. The change was marked by the predominant position which the Soviet Union gained as a source of arms and munitions for Finland as well as fuel. Added to this list were minerals, aluminium, lead and certain kinds of wood by-products. The advances made as a supplier of arms to Finland gave the Soviet Union an unquestionably preponderant position in relation to western sources. As a source of fuel, the Soviet Union, by 1965, was irretrievably ahead of all other competitors for the Finnish market. In 1976 fuel imports from the Soviet Union were eight times those from EEC and EFTA nations, and by October of 1977 they were 12 times the fuel imports from Western European sources. Enhancing the Soviet position were the sale of a Soviet-built and supplied atomic energy plant to Finland (the Soviet bid won over the British offer) and the contract, signed with the Trade Agreement of 1971, for the purchase of natural gas from the Soviet Union. That nation thus became the sole major supplier of natural gas to Finland. The importance of fuel as a commodity in the Finnish economy is underlined by the fact that accessible sources of water power in Finland are limited.

Dependence in foreign trade is also a function of the patterns of export for a nation. To what extent do a few exports account for the bulk of Finland's export trade, and to what extent are Finnish exports concentrated in a few markets? Forestry products and the paper industry, together with the output of the metal industry, accounted for about 90 per cent of Finland's total exports from 1955–67. That proportion declined in the following decade. In 1976, wood and paper products totalled 43·9 per cent of Finland's exports, and the metal industries, including basic processing such as iron and steel production, accounted for 33·8 per cent of Finland's export trade. Together, the wood, paper and metal industries made up 77·7 per cent of Finnish exports. The fastest growing export industry has been metal and machine production, which increased its total share of Finnish exports from 13·7 per cent in 1955, to 20·7 per cent in 1967, and by 1977, to 26 per cent. There appears a slowly developing trend away from the previous concentration of the woodworking and metals exports as Table 4 reveals.

Finland's export trade is mainly with the West, with approximately two-thirds going to markets of the EEC and EFTA nations. Although there is a less marked change in Finland's export patterns than in its import trade, there is nonetheless a noticeable increase in the proportion of exports sent to the Eastern bloc countries after 1974. (See Table 5.) In sales to the Soviet Union alone, Finland's share of total exports jumped from an annual average of 11·8 per cent between 1970 and 1974

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to 20 per cent for the next three years. There has not been a corresponding increase in export sales to a single nation in Finland's West European market. Moreover, since Finland's trade in Western Europe is divided among many nations, Finland is not so dependent on any one country as in the case of trade with the Eastern bloc where the Soviet Union remains the dominant trading partner.

The West European nations are almost the only customers for Finland's raw materials from the woodworking industry. The United Kingdom is Finland's largest customer and the Soviet Union buys only a minor share of the raw forestry products. More than 60 per cent of the refined wood and paper manufacturers go to EEC and EFTA countries. Finland's largest buyer in the West for these products is the UK whose purchases roughly equal those made by the Soviet Union.

The case is different for Finland's metal industry. In the first post-war decade the Soviet Union was virtually the only market for Finland's developing metal production. The Finns nevertheless managed to reduce gradually the share of metal and machine exports to the Soviet Union. While over 90 per cent of these products went to the Soviet Union in 1956, the trade was nearly balanced in 1976 between Western Europe and the Soviet bloc. However, within the metal and machine export trade, Finland's sale of ships and small craft to the Soviet Union was two and one-half times the combined sales to the West European nations in 1976. (Ship-building accounts for roughly 30 per cent of the exports of Finland's metal industry.) General industrial machines are another heavy export of the metal industry to the Soviet Union. In 1976 the Soviet Union bought over twice the machines bought by the EEC and EFTA countries combined.

At first glance, the overall analysis of Finland's foreign trade relations would place the nation in a comparatively independent position, considering the handicaps that the small nation must adapt to, or overcome. The statistical measures of the degree of dependence, however, are inadequate when one considers the basic change in the pattern of vital imports from the Soviet Union and, since 1975, the recent jump in Finnish exports to the Soviet Union. Although the Finns have managed to maintain a reasonably low level of total volume in trade with the Soviet Union, the type of commodity exchange that has developed has increased Finnish reliance on the USSR both as a supplier and a market.[19]

[19] Somewhat prophetically, Trygve Mathisen writes, " It may, however, be assumed that the Soviet Union will gradually strengthen its relations with Finnish production and trade." Trygve Mathisen, *The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers* (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1971), p. 249. Mathisen outlines the concept of a " rimstate " position, that is, " minor powers located along the borders of great powers and coming within their defence perimeter, but they are not situated between two great powers." Canada, Finland and the Irish Republic are listed as examples. The economic relations between rimstates and great powers are " comprehensive." He cites as an example the overwhelming importance of the USA in the foreign trade of Canada and Mexico. The Soviet Union, however, holds a less predominant position in volume of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

Finland's Average Propensity to Import (M/Y) Since 1956 Compared to Scandinavian Countries Since 1970
(in millions of national currency units)

	Total value of imports (M)				National income (Y)				M/Y (%)			
Year	Finland	Sweden	Denmark	Norway	Finland	Sweden	Denmark	Norway	Finland	Sweden	Denmark	Norway
1956	2,036				8,703				23·4			
1960	3,403				12,447				27·3			
1962	3,929				14,821				26·5			
1964	4,816				18,771				25·7			
1966	5,524				22,029				25·1			
1968	6,711				26,670				25·2			
Annual Av.									25·5			
1970	11,071	36,235	33,054	26,443	33,996	134,982	89,435	59,972	32·6	26·8	37·0	44·0
1971	11,734	36,181	34,177	28,715	37,200	153,429	109,860	71,146	31·5	23·6	31·1	40·4
1972	13,107	38,618	35,326	28,808	43,021	153,560	110,081	71.953	30·5	25·1	32·1	40·0
1973	16,601	46,336	46,969	36,041	52,142	168,893	126,584	82,042	31·8	27·4	37·1	43·9
1974	25,666	69,950	60,480	46,556	66,986	193,103	142,697	95,541	37·3	36·2	42·4	48·7
1975	28,002	74,865	59,708	50,545	79,444	221,511	155,505	110,049	28·4	33·8	38·4	45·9
1976	28,555	83,226	75,011	60,533	88,554	250,307	177,069	126,408	32·2	33·2	42·4	47·9
Annual Av.									32·0	29·4	37·2	44·4

TABLE 2

Finland's Dependence on Imports (S/R) Since 1957 Compared to Scandinavian Countries Since 1970
(in millions of national currency units)

Year	Imports surplus (S)				Total resources: GNP + (S) = (R)				S/R (%)			
	Finland	Sweden	Denmark	Norway	Finland	Sweden	Denmark	Norway	Finland	Sweden	Denmark	Norway
1957	155				12,180				1·28			
1958	.....*				.....				.....			
1959	.....				.....				.....			
1960	238				16,062				1·48			
1961	316				17,942				1·76			
1962	395				19,252				2·05			
1963	189				20,730				·91			
1964	685				24,238				2·82			
1965	699				26,527				2·63			
1966	707				28,484				2·48			
1967	563				30,676				1·84			
1968	.....				.....				.....			
1969	160				39,173				·41			
Annual Av.									1·36			
1970	1,385	1,098	7,841	8,894	44,977	171,981	124,642	88,588	3·1	·64	6·3	10·0
1971	1,837	.....	3,414	10,712	49,498	.....	131,270	99,778	3·7	.....	2·6	10·7
1972	1,025	.....	4,493	7,183	55,933	.....	149,925	105,580	1·8	.....	3·0	6·8
1973	1,996	.....	9,420	8,956	68,742	.....	174,351	120,729	2·9	.....	5·4	7·4
1974	4,980	.....	13,558	11,824	89,154	.....	197,412	141,983	5·6	.....	6·9	8·4
1975	7,754	2,853	9,677	12,623	105,715	289,330	213,458	160,860	7·3	·99	4·5	7·8
1976	4,050	3,031	19,977	17,203	112,804	326,309	252,871	188,014	3·6	·93	7·9	9·1
Annual Av.									4·0	·85	5·2	8·6

* Indicates no imports surplus.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 3

Percentage of Finland's Total Imports by Group and Country of Origin

Year	EFTA	EEC	EFTA+EEC	East Bloc inc. Soviet Union	Soviet Union	Fed. Rep. of Germany
1965	34	31	65	19	14·3	19·0
1970	39	27	66	16	12·4	17·0
1971	41	26	67	18	13·8	16·8
1972	40	27	67	16	11·6	18·0
1973	26	41	67	16	12·1	18·5
1974	23	37	60	22	18·1	15·4
1975	23	37	60	21	16·9	15·8
1976	23	36	59	22	18·5	14·6
1977	21	35	56	23	19·4	13·7

TABLE 4

Concentration of Finland's Export Trade

	Percentage of total exports accounted for by				
Year	(a) Wood and wood products	(b) Paper and paper products	(c) Basic metal production	(d) Metal manufactures and machinery	(a)+(b)+(c)+(d)
1970	16	40	6	19	81
1971	17	39	6	18	80
1972	15	36	6	21	78
1973	17	36	6	20	79
1974	15	38	5	21	79
1975	11	36	6	26	79
1976	11·8	32·1	5.7	28·1	77·7
1977*	12	27·9	9	26·2	75·1

* Figures are for January-October 1977.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 5

Percentage of Finland's Total Exports by Group and Country of Consumption

Year	EFTA	EEC	EFTA + EEC	East bloc inc. Soviet Union	Soviet Union	Fed. Rep. of Germany
1965	33	28	61	21	15·9	11·2
1970	43	23	66	16	11·9	10·6
1971	46	22	68	14	10·6	10·4
1972	47	21	68	16	12·3	10·3
1973	23	46	69	15	11·7	10·3
1974	22	43	65	17	13·8	8·6
1975	26	35	61	24	20·1	8·6
1976	23	39	62	23	20·2	9·3
1977	24	37	61	22	19·2	10·2

FINLAND'S efforts to secure a maximium level of independence in defence and foreign trade have given the nation a certain holding power in the past. However, the trends which became evident in the 1960s reveal that increasing limitations are imposed on Finland's efforts. The leadership has continually stressed the vital importance of building a credible defence of the nation. The organization of its defences, and the resources allocated to the military establishment reflect the expressed determination of the leadership to render Finland's borders unattractive to would-be attackers. But the effort to secure the wherewithal of defence from East and West alike has been steadily impeded. It is difficult to keep up with modern advances in military technology, and the accessibility of arms from the Soviet Union coincides with Finland's need to minimize the disadvantages caused by a small armed force using different types of equipment. As a small nation, the Finns do not have the resources to buy what they want from whomsoever they want.

In the sphere of foreign trade, the Finns' position, on balance, is similar to that in the matter of defence. The Paasikivi* dictum that Finnish trade with the Soviet Union should never be more than one-fifth of Finland's total has been scrupulously upheld. But the course of events has overtaken the earlier concern over volume of trade with the East. The level of trade with the Soviets remains steady, while the commodities involved have triggered vast changes. In its need to acquire arms and fuel, Finland seemed unable to turn the Soviets down as the latter became the unquestionably leading source of Finnish imports of arms and ammunition, coal, oil and natural gas. Although Finland was able to pull back in its concentration of metal and machine exports to the Soviet Union, the latter remains a major contending market for these wares. The Soviet Union also provides the largest outlet for an increasing variety of the products of light industry, including precision instruments and such consumer items as furniture, clothing, and textiles.

The analysis of military and economic factors of Finnish security reveals a number of small state dependencies that appear inevitable. The supplies from external sources that the small nation secures to increase its viability tend to enhance its vulnerability. A kind of " reliance dynamic " is created. Drawing from the coffers abroad at an increasing rate raises the standards as to the type and quantity of goods and technology a people expects; in turn, the society sees itself as less able to fulfil its needs, and is impelled to seek still further external help. Finland is caught in this circular pattern of seeking fulfilment. Its leadership's perceptions of the need for more efficient means of defence extends to plans for acquiring the most sophisticated surveillance, detection and anti-missile systems.

trade with Eastern Europe; and the border areas of Finland, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey maintain a relatively low level of trade with the Soviets. Nonetheless, Mathisen believes that the trade with rimstates is bound to increase. Cf. Ibid. p. 84.

* J. K. Paasikivi was the President of Finland, 1946–56.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The "reliance dynamic," however, is affected by the political and psychological factors in the relations between small and great powers. If Finland, for example, were to revamp the political premises of its national security, it might be able to reduce the degree of vulnerability that the constantly increasing levels of defence imply. Rather than preparing for the worst, but least probable eventuality (an armed incursion into its territory) by seeking advanced deterrence systems and a credible holding capability, the Finns might place greater emphasis on the security of their national institutions and the likely possibility that external influence by political means will grow. While military defence remains vital it need not represent the paramount protection of the Finnish nation. It is in the realm of the political and psychological relationships with the large states that the small nation must seek the opportunities to increase its autonomy; it cannot, as shown in Finland's case, enlarge these opportunities in the military and economic dimensions.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex

Mikhail Agursky and Hannes Adomeit

THOSE who had come to rely on the CIA estimates of Soviet military spending received a rude shock in 1976. Until then the estimates were that the share of total military outlays in the Soviet gross national product had declined from 11 per cent in 1955 to about 6·5 per cent in 1970, and to between 4 and 6 per cent in the mid-1970s (or a mere 25 to 28 billion rubles). It was also believed that although marginal productivity in Soviet military industry was negative and declining—because each year since 1960 it had had to employ more labour, capital and materials at higher levels of technology in order to produce essentially the same total value of output—it was nevertheless by far the most efficient sector of the Soviet economy; and that, consequently, the burden of defence spending on the Soviet economy was light.[1]

Assumptions of this kind were successfully nourished by the low official figures of the "defence" and "science" items in the Soviet budget and by Brezhnev who stated at the 24th Party Congress that "In view of the high scientific and technical level of the defence industry, the transmission of its experience, inventions, and discoveries to all spheres of the economy assumes paramount importance."[2]

In April 1976 the CIA more than doubled its previous estimates of Soviet defence spending and now assumes that between 11 and 13 per cent of the Soviet GNP is spent on defence (i.e. 55 to 60 million rubles in absolute terms). (In May 1976 the British Ministry of Defence followed suit and revised its estimates also, although by a smaller margin, from earlier estimates of about 7 per cent to between 11 and 12 per cent of the GNP for 1975.[3]) As it is difficult to see how in an era of satellite reconnaissance large gaps in information about weapons procurement and construction of military installations could have occurred, it is more likely that the previous estimates grossly underrated the costs of military operations and maintenance, the resources devoted to research and development and, most important, the inefficiency in military industry. The present article underlines the point that the Soviet military-industrial complex operates much more inefficiently and at a lower scientific and technological level than previously assumed in the West, and argues that Brezhnev's hope for a transmission of the defence industry's experience

1 This summary draws on William T. Lee, *The Estimation of Soviet Defence Expenditures, 1955–75: An Unconventional Approach* (Praeger, New York and London, 1977), pp. 133–38.

2 *Pravda*, 31 Mar. 1971.

3 Roy Mason, the then British Defence Minister, in a written answer to Parliament (*The Times*, 19 May 1976).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and methods to the Soviet economy as a whole is not feasible because military industry enjoys a unique and privileged position in the Soviet economy.

The reconsideration of the efficiency of Soviet military industry has led to conclusions of tremendous political significance. It has become clear that the Soviet leadership places a much higher value on military power than many Western observers had previously thought. As SALT and the negotiations on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments have so far failed to slow down the growth of Soviet military power, and as some observers now fear that the USSR is bent on achieving military "superiority" (however measured), it is appropriate to shift the emphasis in the explanation of the dynamics of the Soviet-American arms competition away from the traditional action-reaction models to closer examination of the *internal* mechanisms of defence policy and armament programmes in the USSR. Unfortunately, little is known about this important aspect of Soviet domestic politics and economics and it raises difficult methodological problems.

First, analysis of the military output itself does not help very much with regard to measuring the efficiency of Soviet military industry and its organization: weapons even of the highest quality can be produced by obsolete equipment, large-scale use of labour and cumbersome organizational methods.

Secondly, although it is useful to apply the results of Western studies on US decision-making in defence to the study of similar processes in the Soviet Union, it is necessary to balance the supposedly universal features of the "bureaucratic politics paradigm" and "disjointed incrementalism" in decision-making against the specific characteristics of the Soviet system, above all, the high degree of centralization and the limited autonomy of "interest groups."

Thirdly, although it is important to take into account Western studies of decision-making in Soviet civilian industry, in this field, too, there are limits to the insights that can be won. Although relative inefficiency and low productivity is a feature common to both sectors of the Soviet economy, the processes and procedures in military industry differ to a significant extent from those governing the rest of Soviet industry.

In short, in studying the internal mechanism of the Soviet military-industrial complex there is no substitute for information relating specifically and directly to the military sector. This article meets this requirement inasmuch as it is based largely on Dr Agursky's personal experience in Soviet military industry and his familiarity with three basic types of Soviet R&D institutions, namely, those engaged in non-military industrial research, institutions of the Academy of Sciences and institutions handling military-industrial R&D.

A final word concerning the definition and scope of the term "military-industrial complex." The authors think that there is a core of truth in the aphorism that "the USA *has* a military-industrial complex, the USSR *is*

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a military-industrial complex." In the USA pressures may be exerted on the government from interests outside the government, acting in conjunction (or "collusion") with groups inside the government, and hence form a "complex" of common purpose. In the USSR, however, the "complex" is to be found within the political structure itself. The use of the term "military-industrial complex" in the American context implies conflict between civilian and military priorities. In the USSR military and civilian values overlap considerably, and—despite the reality of bureaucratic conflict—there is a high degree of consensus between those who set the priorities of foreign and defence policy (the Politburo), those who conduct military R&D and produce the weapons (the military-industrial ministries) and those who receive the weapons (the military).

Nevertheless, to consider the whole of the Soviet Union as one military-industrial complex is far too broad to be meaningful. For this reason, and also for the reason of avoiding value judgments at the very beginning of analysis, rather than the end, the term as used here shall refer more specifically to the organizations and institutions engaged in Military R&D and production, and the Party, military and Party-military organs which control them.

"Consumer Monopoly"

An outstanding feature of Soviet military industry is what might be called the "consumer monopoly," or "consumer sovereignty" of the military, namely, the ability of the Defence Ministry to determine and control military production from the earliest stages of the design of new equipment, by laying down specifications and guidelines for prototypes, by testing and inspecting prototypes, and by controlling the production process itself. This can be illustrated in detail at the various stages of development.

1. Guidelines for the design of new military equipment are usually issued under the supervision of a specialized body, centrally controlled by the Defence Ministry. All guidelines must be approved by the Ministry and are subject to specifications which are often extremely detailed.

2. The inspection of prototypes of military equipment by state commissions or committees (*gosudarstvennye kommissii*) is much more stringent than it is in civilian industry. The commissions are headed by the military, generally by a representative of the above-mentioned Defence Ministry body who checks meticulously that all the items in the guidelines are thoroughly tested. A commission of this kind is generally made up of many people, for certain products dozens and sometimes hundreds of people.

3. The relationship between the design bureaux and production (the plant) in military industry differs substantially from that in civilian industry, where, in principle at least, every plant can manufacture products that have been designed externally. In military industry all plants are strictly assigned to various design bureaux; where plants manu-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

facture products developed by several design bureaux, this too is laid down clearly and unambiguously.[4]

The design bureau in military industry fully dominates production, and a plant can be transferred from one military-industrial design bureau to another only by top level decision. The documentation which the design bureau hands down to the plant assumes the force of law: mistakes of the designers often take a heavy toll of production and greatly raise the cost of products.

The chief designers of military design bureaux often do not adhere to "state standards" and demand the use of parts which may differ from the normal ones. It may then happen that different systems of standards are operative at the same plant. Thus, for example, at the Moscow aircraft factory *Znamya truda* (Banner of Labour), two standards were used simultaneously, one of them as required by the Ilyushin Design Bureau. Nothing of that sort can be imagined in civilian industry where a product will immediately be rejected by a plant if it provides for non-standard parts where standard ones can be used.

Whereas in civilian industry quality control is effected by the Department for Quality Control (*Otdel tekhnischeskogo kontrolya*—OTK,[5] in military industry inspection by the OTK is followed by inspection by the military, by the so-called military representatives (*voennye predstaviteli*, or *voenpredy* for short). The military inspectors are permanently attached to the plant but are entirely independent of its management, and are paid not by the plant, as the OTK inspectors are, but by the Defence Ministry. Endowed with a veto right, the *voenpredy* have instructions to inspect production in strict accordance with the specifications. No replacement of materials is permitted, and no consideration whatever is given to plan schedules. The military inspectors are fully aware that any lack of strictness on their part, if discovered, can be severely punished by the Defence Ministry, and tend, therefore, to be liberal in their rejection of products.

Priorities

In the system of priorities of the Soviet leadership, military requirements are satisfied first of all. Military industry has greater funds for the acquisition of new equipment and for wages than civilian industries have. Military industry receives materials of the highest quality and, moreover, it receives scarce and expensive parts, the use of which has been prohibited by special regulation in civilian production. Such factors account

[4] For example, in the aircraft industry every design bureau commands several plants in different parts of the country. One of them is attached directly to the design bureau and functions as a pilot plant, another produces serial products, etc. The design bureau headed by Antonov has at its command plants in Kiev, Voronezh, Ulan-Ude and Tashkent (the last-named plant also produces planes of Sukhoi's design bureau). Tupolev's design bureau, in addition to the pilot plant in Moscow and Zhukovskii, has plants producing serial products in Kharkov, Kuibyshev, Kazan and Ufa.

[5] Literally, "Department of Technical Control."

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for inefficiency in military industry and hence for its generous share of the Soviet GNP. The plentiful supply of materials and funds tends to discourage the search for a more rational organization of production and for ways of economizing on capital, equipment and labour. According to official Soviet data, the number of machine tools in the USSR is several times bigger than that of the USA but the gross output of Soviet machine building is considerably lower. This is indicative of the poor utilization of equipment in the Soviet Union in general, but the situation is worse in military industry.

The system of priorities finds its reflection in the production process. It is not at all rare that plants produce three different categories of product, with different assembly lines and different work brigades, earning different levels of pay but producing basically the same or similar items. The first, with the highest quality specifications and pay levels, is the military category; the second category of production is destined for export; the third and last category of product is for " common " domestic use.

Secrecy

Excessive secrecy reigns in the Soviet military-industrial complex, greatly impeding efficiency and, more importantly, contributing both to a serious lack of " spillover " from the military to the civilian sphere and to technological inferiority to the USA. Secrecy greatly complicates all communications, affecting all sectors of the Soviet military-industrial complex. This is because communications are organized and controlled not by the military-industrial ministries but by the KGB.

All information is divided into five categories: open, confidential, secret, top secret and top-top secret. The last three forms are correspondingly considered categories of secrecy of the third, second and first degree. However, as there is no single criterion for the secrecy of information, information of the same kind may in different sectors and plants be given entirely different value.

Every person working in military industry has the right of access to information of a specific degree of secrecy. This right of access (*dopusk*) is officially issued by the KGB when a person is taken on the staff. A person given access signs a commitment not to disseminate state secrets, including the content of his work, information he obtains in the course of his work, and the very fact that he is working for military industry.

All information classified as secret—beginning with the third degree of secrecy—is kept in the archives of the First Department, which controls the secrecy regime in every sector. Publications and documents are numbered and issued only at the end of the working day, the permit to the place of work being left behind as security. There is a card for every title of that type of material in which the name of the reader is entered and which is signed by him. Such material must not be left to lie

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the table when the reader leaves for any length of time. It should always be kept under lock and key. Moreover it must not be carried openly from the First Department to the work room.

All the notes made by people working in a secret organization are also divided into open and secret ones. Notes relating to secret information must be made in special notebooks, issued in return for the work pass in another section of the First Department. Every page of that notebook is numbered and cannot be arbitrarily destroyed. In every such notebook entries are made either by the same person (when it bears that person's name), or by several persons carrying out a job jointly. Every office also has two typing pools, an "open" and a "secret" one, the latter being required to retype the entries made in the above-mentioned notebooks.

All this greatly impedes efficient work. It often leads to absurd situations which are exacerbated by the zeal of the KGB to guard state secrets (or information, however irrelevant, that is considered to be of that nature). Perhaps, needless to say, KGB activity often runs counter to the interest of the Chief Designer to get on with the work. To take but one example, in the summer of 1969 an international machine-tool exhibition took place in Paris. A major report on the exhibition was rendered by the delegation of the military-industrial Research Institute for Machine-building Technology (NIITM) after its return to the Soviet Union. When retyped in the open typing pool the report numbered between about 300 to 350 typewritten pages. When the report had already been typed, it suddenly appeared that an order had been issued shortly prior to that, applying to the whole USSR, that all reports on foreign trips made by Soviet experts were to be considered secret. In this particular instance, the First Department demanded that the author rewrite all the pages of the report by hand into his notebook, which was then to be retyped in the secret typing pool. Only after intervention by the Chief Designer and negotiations with the First Department which lasted several days did the First Department finally make a concession and only demand that the back of every page of the already typed report bear a number and a "secret" stamp, which was to imply that the report had been typed in the secret typing pool.

Secrecy also requires that the true names of military products are not entered anywhere in writing, not even in documentation stored in the First Department, and that they are not mentioned orally, even at closed meetings. Generally the word "product" (*izdelie*) or some such code description is used for this purpose. Employment in some plant or office does not entitle an employee to visit other departments without specific need; admission to some departments requires a special permit. The idea is to prevent the employees of one department from knowing what other departments are doing. This limits necessary and useful exchange of information and leads to misunderstanding and overlap.

Information exchange is limited also by the fact that there are

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

no open meetings in military-industrial organizations and that the participants in such meetings are invited according to a list. No one not on that list is admitted. In theory, the exchange of information and experience could be helped along by exhibitions, and in fact some exhibitions, including inter-ministerial ones, are sometimes held. However, these exhibitions do not at all indicate that any of the plants in question produce military hardware. This applied unambiguously to three exhibitions held in 1969 and 1970—an exhibition of industrial equipment used in the aircraft industry; an exhibition of consumer goods produced by the aircraft industry; and an exhibition of means of automation organized by six military-industrial ministries. It is perhaps to compensate somewhat for the limits on the exchange of information that every military-industrial ministry distributes its own secret monthly journal. In addition, it distributes various information materials, one of them a bulletin indicating what organizations in the USSR are testing Western military equipment.

It is extremely difficult for employees in military industry to have something published openly, even if the general difficulty of publishing articles and books in the USSR (censorship) is taken into account. Every Soviet scientific and technical journal requires from every author (1) a certificate issued by experts of his organization that the publication does not reveal any secrets, including patented information; (2) a note from the author himself guaranteeing that no secrets are contained in his article. In military industry the issue of an assessment of secrecy is a complex procedure going through two stages and lasting several months. An assessment is first made by the expert commission of the department (which is headed by the chief of the department, who is always able to reject an article even because he considers it somehow to infringe on his personal interest) which, if it endorses publication, passes it on to the expert committee of the higher level, which is also able to reject the article for various reasons. Not only are articles in journals or manuscripts of books considered publications, but also the texts and even the résumés of reports made at conferences.

Many a prospective author is discouraged by these bureaucratic difficulties and therefore prefers to publish his articles in secret editions, accessible only to very few persons, rather than in the open press. All this makes many dynamic creative people leave military industry altogether, while evoking a sense of dissatisfaction in others.

IN general, it would be fair to say that employees in military industry receive far less information about foreign technology than those in civilian industry. This is due, first, to the lower qualifications and education of the employees in military industry, and, secondly, to the general isolation of that industry in society and the economy.

Admittedly, the information services of the Defence Ministry are numerous and include the dissemination of Soviet as well as foreign

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

experience. The libraries of the military-industrial organizations receive a great number of Soviet and foreign journals. However, it is a distinct disadvantage that the latter are usually photocopies and arrive with much delay.

In order to inform the personnel of military industry about innovations in Western technical literature a large staff of translators is used. But these are extremely incompetent, they do not know the foreign language well and know even less about the special field. The work of a rank-and-file technical translator in the USSR is badly paid. Hence, translations of technical literature are often entrusted to outsiders, or to young people who are taken on the staff after they have taken very simplified foreign language courses. Neither the former nor the latter have a technical education and do not understand the text they are translating. Yet even such transactions are valued by the employees for they have no other means at their disposal to understand foreign texts even approximately. The difficulties of getting first-hand information on foreign technical innovations in the military sector make it necessary to look for such information in secondary sources, namely in books or articles by such Soviet scientists as are generally sufficiently qualified to understand foreign literature. All this results in a major information lag.

In order to appreciate the differences with regard to this problem in the military and civilian sectors of industry it is instructive to consider the following comparisons between the academic Institute of Control Problems (IPU) at the Academy of Sciences, the civilian Machine-tool Research Institute (ENIMS) and the military-industrial Research Institute for Machine-building Technology (NIITM). At the Institute for Control Problems, practically all the scientists were able to read foreign technical literature without the help of a translator. Many knew two or more foreign languages. Most of them did freelance work for the abstracting journals of the Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of the Academy of Sciences, which provided them with an additional income and fresh information. In the Machine-tool Research Institute many knew English well enough to be able to read technical literature (although very few were able to speak the language). There were far fewer people in ENIMS than in IPU who knew two languages, even though there were some. Many of the ENIMS employees also worked for abstracting journals. But at the Research Institute for Machine-building Technology (NIITM) knowledge of English, sufficient for reading, was rare. In the department of the Chief Designer, which employed about 600 people, perhaps only six or eight of them were able to read English, and that only with difficulty. Only two scientists of NIITM worked for abstracting journals.

Every person given access to secret work has to sign—in addition to the other things mentioned above—a commitment not to enter into any contacts with foreigners without prior permission. ("Foreigners" in this context, as elsewhere, include the nationals of the "socialist

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

community.") Permission to enter into such contacts is occasionally given. This concerns first and foremost Western exhibitions in the USSR, which are generally visited by a large number of employees in military industry. There they are allowed to ask technical questions but are categorically prohibited to give their own names or the name of the organization employing them.

Secondly, some people from the military industry are permitted to go abroad and to visit exhibitions or attend scientific conferences there. However, the practical value of such trips from the point of view of information exchange is relatively low, for one, because the competent scientists are rarely sent abroad, the privilege of going abroad being used primarily by the managers and administrators; secondly, even when scientists employed in the military-industrial complex are allowed to go abroad there remains the language problem, as noted above. Although the offices in charge of such trips consider knowledge of the foreign language in question an essential condition for the trip, this condition is easily by-passed because the office at which the person concerned is working always issues its employee with a certificate testifying to his proficiency in the language. This applies equally to managers, administrators and scientists. Finally, authorization by the appropriate offices for trips abroad is subject to caprice and circumstance. Defections sporadically dampen any inclination by Soviet authorities to loosen the strict regime in international contacts.

Personnel

In Western opinion, it is taken for granted that " most MR&D [military research and development] activities enjoy a much better scientific infrastructure in terms of facilities, materials, and working conditions," and that, for this reason alone, any senior Soviet scientist " will prefer to work in such an environment even without any salary advantage." But since, in addition to that, the pay in the military sector is higher than in the civilian sector, it lends even more support to the thesis that " The Soviet Union can . . . very likely concentrate its highly qualified scientists in MR&D " and that the personnel working there shows " greater motivation " than personnel in civilian research and development.[6] Serious reservations must be expressed with this view.

Formerly, it is true, the various institutes and plants of the Soviet military-industrial sector did provide the personnel working in them with a high degree of prestige and managed to attract the best and the brightest. Housing was provided and there was freedom from military service, even during the war. Finally, even today, the average wage in the military industry is still higher than in civilian industry: wage

[6] This is a conclusion reached by Gur Ofer, *The Opportunity Cost of the Nonmonetary Advantages of the Soviet Military R&D Effort*, Rand Paper R-1741-DDRE, August 1975, pp. 7–8 and p. 25.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

differentials are in the range of 20 to 25 per cent and can be even higher, although they never exceed 40 to 50 per cent.

However, many of the advantages of working in the military-industrial complex have become eroded. Soviet society today is much more open than in Stalin's time, and the economy has moved away from the concentration on a few high-priority tasks in the early stages of industrialization to much more complex and differentiated functions. The housing situation has improved also for workers in civilian industry in Moscow. Personnel working in military industry can no longer expect to be exempted from military service. Contacts with foreigners in the USSR and abroad have increased. Yet, as contacts with foreigners and international exchanges are highly desired by academic people in the USSR, and as such contacts and exchanges in general have become more acceptable from the regime's point of view (certainly as regards contacts with the countries of Comecon and the Warsaw Pact), the restrictions applied to personnel working in the military-industrial complex remain as severe as ever.

The salary advantage of 20 to 25 per cent for work in the military-industrial complex has to be measured against the more open and more competitive atmosphere in the civilian sector and the better possibilities for advancement and additional income (from writing and publishing, translating, tutoring of students, lecturing) in that sector.

In view of these conditions, efforts are being made by the Soviet regime to guarantee a steady influx into military industry of young experts graduating from special institutes, or departments, exclusively devoted to military research and development. Among these institutes and departments are the Moscow Bauman Higher Technical School (MVTU), the Moscow Aircraft Institute (MAI), the Moscow Aircraft Technological Institute (MATI), the Moscow Physical Engineering Institute (MIFI), the Moscow Electronic Machine Building Institute (MIEM) and several departments of the Moscow Power Engineering Institute (MEI). Students of these higher educational institutions and departments are given "access" to secret work already during their training and undergo their course or diploma practice in the military industry. This also predetermines their future appointment. Neither greater ability for problems of military industry nor higher qualification is the selection criterion for these institutes and departments. Educational institutions of that type have never enjoyed particularly high prestige.

Military industry also hires graduates from ordinary higher technical educational institutions. In this case, hiring is strictly impersonal since the arrangements are made by the personnel department of some ministry, without any preliminary contacts between the experts of the employer and the students.

There is a third avenue of recruitment open to military industry—the graduates of correspondence courses or out-students departments. However, the levels of ability and qualification of the people trained in

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

them are very low, a general phenomenon in the USSR not only in military industry.

There are other factors reflecting negatively on the qualifications and the motivation of the personnel employed in the military-industrial complex. People who wish to be awarded academic degrees—and thus raise their status and salaries—while not possessing the necessary qualifications to attain that objective in normal circumstances, do have a chance to do so in the institutions for military research and development. As authors working in military industry are obliged to publish in a form inaccessible to most people, the standard of theses and scientific publications is understandably lower than in open institutions. In secret institutions all theses are presented at closed meetings of the scientific councils. Normally, about a hundred copies of an author's summary of an open thesis are printed, and the thesis itself is accessible to anyone wishing to peruse it; however, only some 15 copies are printed of the author's summary of a secret thesis, and those are distributed by secret mail in keeping with a special list. No one outside the complex has access to the author's thesis, or a summary of it, and even many of the people working in the same department as the candidate are not allowed to attend the presentation of the thesis.

Similarly, organizations of the military industry, such as the military-industrial ministries, the Defence Ministry and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, recommend that individuals, and even whole teams of people responsible for some development or another be awarded academic degrees without the presentation of a thesis. Some are even appointed to the Academy of Sciences in that manner. The Supreme Certifying Committee (*Vysshaya attestatsionnaya komissiya*=VAK) or the Academy of Sciences are not informed about the nature of the work carried out by these people. Such awards are generally a privilege of the management, i.e. of a body of people who are not scientists themselves.

The practice of promoting industrial and scientific managers to the Academy of Sciences began at the end of the 1920s, when it was used to abolish the old traditions of the scientific world and to curtail the relative independence of the Academy of Sciences. Later this became a system. As a short cut to academic "success" and even political influence this practice of striving for and accepting honours where none are deserved creates resentment in the scientific community and produces the very opposite effect of what was originally intended—it lowers rather than increases the prestige of work in military research and development.

One should add a word here about the nationality composition of the scientific personnel working in military industry. There are virtually no military-industrial plants in the Baltic states, the Caucasus or Central Asia; correspondingly, there are virtually no Latvians, Lithuanians, or Estonians and (because of the low educational level in the respective republics) hardly any Central Asians working in military industry. The

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vast majority of the scientific and engineering personnel is composed of Russians and Ukrainians. As for Jews, their recruitment for work at military plants was stopped almost completely in 1969, but those already working there were not dismissed. There are still many Jews working in the older branches of the Defence Ministry, such as the aircraft, ammunition, and weapons industries, but far fewer in the new sectors, such as electronics and missile development. These conditions are disadvantageous for Soviet military R&D because Jews hold 14 per cent of the doctorates in science in the USSR but account for only one per cent of the population.

The question arising from all this is as follows: if it is true, as argued here, that the scientists engaged in military research and development are not—contrary to what is commonly assumed in the West—the "cream of the crop," always better paid (even when opportunities in the civilian sphere for extra income are taken into account) and more highly regarded and motivated than their colleagues in the civilian sphere, but that they are often less qualified, dynamic and original, and more isolated, does it at all matter? Is it not true that the deficiences in military R&D can easily be remedied by "raiding" civilian R&D? Undoubtedly, this is true up to a point. Yet, the adaptation of ideas, discoveries, inventions and developments to military requirements, in fact, even the very appreciation of its importance, needs top-class scientists; in any case, as noted, information exchange is limited, hence there must always be considerable delay in transferring the results of R&D from the civilian sphere to the military.

ON the face of it, employment in military industry is more enticing for workers than for scientists since limitations placed on the creativity of the former play a lesser role. However, given the freedom of choice even skilled workers show a preference for civilian industry. In order to appreciate this point it is useful to look at the problem in historical perspective.

It should be remembered that in 1940 the unauthorized transition from one place of employment to another was prohibited. This limitation remained in force until 1955. After that the government for some time was able to preserve, and even increase, substantial differences in labour conditions and pay in military as against civilian industry, thus bringing about an influx of workers from the latter to the former industry. However, as a consequence of steady industrial development, growth in the number of plants, low productivity and extensive use of increasingly short manpower, civilian industry began to raise wages systematically. These increases were carried out upon initiative at lower levels, without central regulation. By the 1960s the growth in real wages in civilian industry was substantial and compared very favourably with what was paid in the military industry. These trends have continued in the 1970s.

In conditions of a generally tight labour market and *de facto* com-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

petition between civilian and military industries, managers at military-industrial plants (as their counterparts in the civilian sphere) are more than ever aware that they have to pay very high wages to skilled workers in order to entice them to work for their plants or to stop them from leaving.

Certainly, one of the major reasons making work at civilian factories more attractive is the less strict discipline enforced there in general, and the less strict system of passes and permits in particular. Many workers in civilian industry in the USSR use their work time and equipment to produce articles for the free market. As any student of the Soviet Union knows, this practice is very widespread in the USSR, and the workers' earnings from such work often far exceed their nominal wages. For instance, in a Moscow research institute a group of workers was producing short-wave blocks for mass radio receivers, which enabled the listener to receive broadcasts in the range from 11 to 19 metres—a range which is not provided for in state standards and cannot be found in radio receivers produced for the market. These blocks were easily and profitably sold on the black market since they permitted tuning in to Western broadcasts on a range that was more difficult to jam. The group producing these blocks included a turner, a miller, a grinder and an electrician. Skilled workers at workshops of another research institute were producing expensive professional tape recorders for the black market. The shops were not guarded and it was easy to smuggle such articles out. At military-industrial plants such activity is extremely difficult (although apparently not impossible as it has been reported that at one time one could buy firearms on the black market in Tula).

Another problem of recruiting workers for military industry is connected with the fact that young people generally are unwilling to operate machine tools. For example, the Deputy Manager of the Production Department of the "Progress" missile plant in Kuibyshev reported that he found it difficult to find highly skilled workers for the laying-out of aluminium sheets for missiles because the name of the trade was that of *zhestyanshchik* (tinsmith), which in the Russian language has a very humble connotation. The same applied also at the Kiev aircraft plant. Young workers did not wish to work as millers even though they were offered high wages, instead they preferred to operate milling machines even though that work was lower paid; however, in the latter case they were called *naladchiki po obsluzhivaniyu elektronnoi apparatury* (electronics maintenance staff). Attitudes of this kind may account for the fact that at the Kirov aircraft plant, which produces air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, there has been a significant shortage of skilled workers and especially of turners.

The service industry, and not military industry offers the most prestigious and potentially most lucrative jobs. On top of the list are the services involving contact with foreigners; next are the jobs for Russian customers where some technical skill but no great physical labour is

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

required (for instance, the servicing of refrigerators, television sets, cameras, the driving of taxis and official cars) and where additional money *na levo* ("on the side" or "under the table") can be made. Furthermore, medical care, rest homes and sanatoriums in civilian industry are frequently better than those in military industry.

On the whole, then, the situation as regards labour, and skilled labour in particular, greatly resembles that described for the researchers and scientists. Despite persistent official efforts to the contrary, it is the less dynamic and those possessing on average lower skills who prefer to work in military industry. Despite the higher pay offered, military industry —like civilian industry—suffers from a chronic shortage of workers, skilled and unskilled. This can largely be explained by a process whereby many of the competitive advantages enjoyed by the military-industrial sector in the Stalinist period increasingly came to be eroded by greater openness and flexibility (or laxity, if one prefers) in civilian industry and by the greater opportunities to which this gave rise.

Technological Progress

In present conditions in the Soviet Union, where R&D has become a phenomenon involving a huge number of scientists, engineers and facilities, the practical realization of projects generally is not a major problem once priorities have been decided upon. What *is* a major problem, however, is which projects are to receive priority, which ideas are likely to lead to significant technological innovations and which design concepts appear most promising. This choice is at present the main art of military R&D and poses the greatest risk for the chief designer, who assumes responsibility.

It is precisely in the field of new concepts and ideas where Soviet military designers can and do "borrow" extensively from the West, and where they sometimes go ahead with implementation even before the West does. This is helped by the fact that the USSR operates a giant intelligence system informing it about the Western military industry and its technological plans. In addition, an enormous amount of data which would be considered top secret in the USSR is openly published and discussed in the Western technical literature.[7] Essentially, these publications tell Soviet weapons designers everything they need to know about basic concepts and lead-times.

This process of "borrowing" Western military technology is well known in the USSR, particularly from the time of the development of nuclear weapons and missiles, where information obtained by Soviet

[7] This lack of secrecy often comes as a surprise to Russian visitors in the West. For instance, in 1966, Professor A. Letov of the Institute for Control Problems (later an Associate Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR), who had just returned from a trip to the USA, told his colleagues at the Institute that he was present at a discussion of the NASA budget for the next 15 years. Everybody in the audience laughed in disbelief when they heard this, knowing that everything connected with the Soviet space programme is "top-top secret."

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intelligence played a major role in arms production. In fact, a thorough analysis of Soviet military technology would probably show that in general the USSR has implemented Western conceptual ideas by introducing only marginal changes in design so as to meet (1) the specific requirements of the Soviet force posture or (2) constraints in engineering. It seems that no fundamentally new conceptual ideas have emerged in the field of military technology in the Soviet Union since the Second World War, the pace and direction of military technological innovation being set primarily in the Western countries, notably the United States.[8]

Some Western analysts still erroneously ascribe to Soviet military industry a very high level of production management and production technology (as distinct from output). These analysts assume that the main source of progress in Soviet civilian industry is the superior know-how in Soviet military industry, which gradually, though with delay, spills over to civilian industry. An example of such opinion is Robert Campbell's article on the spillover of production management methods.[9] Campbell's article, though based on a thorough analysis of Soviet technical literature, arrives at erroneous conclusions because it projects from the American experience, namely from the fact that in the USA production management methods developed by military industry are transferred rather quickly to civilian industry. But this projection of the American example fails to take into account the "spillover" (if this is the right term to use) from Western technology to Soviet civilian industry via the technical literature.

Under the assumption that management of military industry in the USSR is guided by the same requirements as in the USA, and that the success of the Soviet Union in satisfying these requirements is astounding as compared with the inefficiency in the economy as a whole, Campbell lists the following examples of successful spillover from military to civilian industry: (1) the systems concept, (2) quality control programmes, (3) reliability assurance and (4) network methods. The problem with this enumeration is that the author, as mentioned, uses official Soviet technical literature as source material, which, naturally, does not state where the above-mentioned methods originated. However, it can be stated with confidence that they were borrowed from Western technical literature. Even more to the point, the new methods were introduced into civilian industry first, and only later into military industry. The pioneers in this field were scholars of various institutes of the Academy of Sciences and higher

[8] More broadly, in the opinion of Andrei Sakharov, "It is no accident that all the great scientific and technological discoveries of recent times—quantum mechanics, new elementary particles, uranium fission, antibiotics and most of the new, highly effective drugs, transistors, electronic computers, the development of highly productive strains in agriculture, the discovery of other components of the "Green Revolution," and the creation of new technologies in agriculture, industry, and construction—all of them happened outside our country." Andrei D. Sakharov, *My Country and The World* (Knopf, New York, 1975), p. 31.

[9] Robert Campbell, "Management Spillovers from Soviet Space and Military Programmes," *Soviet Studies*, XXIII, 4 (April 1972), pp. 587–607.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

educational institutes, for whom it was much easier to contact civilian industry rather than military industry for the testing of production and management methods. To take one example, the network method in construction industry was more effective and profitable than in any military–industrial sector because the press was able to write about it, success was easily demonstrated and it promised greater social and economic advantages than the introduction of these methods would have brought in military industry.

Campbell himself notes that the Saratov zero defects system of production greatly resembles the quality control method developed by the US aerospace firm Martin. He also refers to B. Dubovikov's book, which repeats some of the statements on that subject in a book which had appeared in the USA roughly at the same time, in 1966. Campbell seems to consider this a simple coincidence, but it can be stated with near certainty that Dubovikov was able to publish his book almost simultaneously with the American author because he had learned about that method from American technical journals. A substantial number of technical books published in the USSR—with or without attribution—are a compilation of Western material.

If there is an exchange of know-how in production technology between civilian and military industry this is generally a one-way traffic leading from civilian to military industry. The establishment of ties by military organizations with civilian ones poses no problem since civilian products are freely advertised in technical literature and at conferences, and can therefore be easily inspected. Thus, for example, the civilian Machine-tool Research Institute (ENIMS) developed a stepping motor, which was more advanced that its counterparts produced in the West (the relative position later changed). The relevant ENIMS laboratory quickly became a place of pilgrimage for numerous emissaries of military R&D organizations, who wanted to use that motor in military equipment. Another ENIMS laboratory developed a small specialized numerical control director required for machine tools and attracted the attention of military cartographers, who used that equipment. To take yet another example, for many years (until the 1960s) the All-Union Research Institute for Sound Recording supplied military industry with high quality magnetic recording heads, for only that institute had a special furnace for the treatment of permalloy, a material required for the screening of these heads.

One more remark on the important subject of the direction of "spillover": one reason why there is no question of genuine mutual exchange between military and civilian industry is that it is extremely difficult to use in civilian industry materials, parts and devices developed for military industry; in fact, such utilization is formally prohibited unless special approval is given. Although a civilian organization or plant may be able to obtain a catalogue of new materials, parts, etc., used by military industry and apply for special approval, such approval

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is hardly ever granted, and consequently nobody seems to bother very much to apply.

Finally, the production equipment used by civilian industry is sometimes better than that used by military industry. Some of the most advanced Soviet plants are civilian ones—to which foreign visitors are admitted in order to impress them with the Soviet industrial achievements. Such show-case plants are the "Red Proletarian" machine-tool building plant, the Likhachev Motor Works, the Gorky Motor Works, the factories of heavy engineering and machine-building, tractor plants, and the clock and watch factories. These plants quickly replace their machine tools. As they are exporting a good part of their production they are entitled to imported equipment, paid out of certain currency deductions in their favour. Virtually all new management methods are introduced first at these plants, with rare exceptions. Party regional or city committees will, for reasons of prestige, prefer to propagate new management or production innovations there, and as these plants form the vanguard of Soviet industry, their experience is adopted also in military industry.

IN their quest to prove that Soviet defence expenditures as a proportion of GNP are relatively low, many Western analysts have argued that efficiency in the Soviet military-industrial complex is far superior to that in the rest of the Soviet economy and, some have even maintained, superior to that in the USA. To believe *that* would require assuming a fantastic qualitative jump in efficiency in Soviet military as compared to the rest of Soviet industry. One has to remember that labour productivity in the whole of the Soviet economy, according to Western estimates, is ranked 25th in global comparison, and declining. Soviet estimates admit to trailing behind at 15th place in 1973, and the Soviet economic yearbok for that year rated Soviet industry as just about as efficient as American industry, construction industry about two-thirds as efficient and agriculture about one quarter. Hence, if one rejects the notion of "other things being about equal," i.e. if one assumes efficiency in Soviet military industry to be *higher* than in its American counterpart, one has to assume improvements over the performance of the rest of the Soviet economy by a (highly unlikely) factor of between two and four.

An argument used to support the main theme is the assertion that the materials destined for use in the military industry are superior to those used in civilian industry (which is true), that pay scales in military industry are higher (which is also true) and that, consequently, efficiency of organization and management, and the quality, qualification and motivation of the scientists, engineers and labour employed in it, are superior (which is not true). Certainly, the Soviet leadership makes vigorous attempts to achieve such a situation but these attempts on the whole are not successful.

This is so, among other things, because the restrictions in the flow of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

information and (despite some limited improvements) the curtailment of international exchanges which constitute major impediments to the advancement of science in the USSR in general are even more severe in the military sector. R&D in that sector is even more compartmentalized, bureaucratized and isolated than activity elsewhere in Soviet society. This, in turn, is one of the reasons why many of the most competent and ambitious young scientists and engineers prefer to work elsewhere. As a reflection on inefficiency, from observations on the spot it would seem to be a reasonable estimate that research conducted in the military-industrial Ministry of General Machine-building costs perhaps from between seven to ten times as much as similar or identical research in the primarily civilian Ministry for Machine-tool Building. Also, as innovations are more often than not the result of research conducted in the civilian sphere it is likely that the demands made by the military-industrial complex on the various institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR are likely to grow. This is an indication also of pressures in general to blur the borders between the civilian and the military spheres of activity for the benefit of the latter. Finally, as far as the labour supply is concerned, the shortages which for various reasons affect the Soviet economy as a whole are also a problem for military industry: both sectors of the economy compete for qualified labour with bonuses and benefits of various types, but it is to certain types of job in civilian industry to which young people aspire most of all.

Another argument to be challenged is the thesis that Soviet military industry is not only more efficient but that it is an entirely separate sector of the Soviet economy (or, in other versions, that it is efficient *because* it is separate). Whereas it is true to say that the Soviet military-industrial complex is organizationally and administratively separate, it is not and cannot possibly be economically separate. Soviet military industry is organically linked to the rest of the Soviet economy. Mr Brezhnev has stated that 42 per cent of the total volume of military industry's production is for civilian purposes. Although there is no comparable figure as to how much of the total output of the Soviet economy goes into the military sphere, Soviet economists with access to secret statistics estimate that 60 per cent of Soviet enterprises are to a greater or lesser degree engaged in production for the armed forces. Economic separateness of such vast proportions simply cannot exist: military industry produces for civilian industry and civilian industry produces for the armed forces. The steel that is manufactured by the Soviet economy goes into tanks as well as into tractors, and so do the motors for military or civilian trucks and the fuel for military or civilian aircraft. As mentioned, most of the production equipment is "civilian." This general picture of interrelationships and the dependence of military industry on the Soviet economy is not substantially changed by the *voenpredy* whose job it is to check only the quality of the output, not the cost and efficiency with which this output is produced.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What is possible under such a system of organizational centralization (" separateness ") and economic dependency is the concentration of the military effort on a few top priority projects. This would conform to the view expressed by Andrei Sakharov that the significant Soviet achievements in the first decade of the space race " and certain successes in military technology are the result of a monstrous concentration of resources in that sphere." [10]

However, even those achievements in the military and space spheres are rarely of the same technological sophistication as those in the United States and other Western countries. American astronauts and officials involved in the Apollo-Soyuz space link-up were amazed at the relative lack of refinement and miniaturization of some of the Soviet systems and expressed serious doubts as to their reliability (not surprisingly, most of the more complicated manoeuvres involved in the link-up were carried out by the US space vehicle).

Having said all that, one crucial point still needs to be made. To say that there is a relative lack of technological sophistication and that the military-industrial effort in general is as inefficient as civilian industry is not to argue that Soviet military power is politically and militarily ineffective. Often what cannot be achieved by sophistication is compensated by sheer numbers. Proven designs are retained and improved as much as possible, and rather than designing weapons systems for multiple roles (as often required in the West to meet all arguments from all sides) such systems are often limited to one or two specific purposes. The MIG-25 *Foxbat* is a case in point. The plane did not show many of the complex design features incorporated in advanced Western aircraft, including long range, high turning speed, ground-target acquisition, look-down radar and large ordnance payload, but it turned out to be a superb aircraft for the limited purposes for which it was built, i.e. interception of high-altitude bombers and reconnaissance.

To sum up, the relationship between military and civilian industry in the Soviet system is an organic one but it is useful to see military industry as a form of parasite or malignant growth, seriously affecting the well-being of the whole economy. It can thrive only because of its special position. It is in many ways different from the main body but it depends on it. What is *not* possible in such a relationship is the " transfer," or " spillover," of the experience and methods of the parasite to the tree trunk. In theory the relationship could be transformed from a parasitic into a symbiotic, mutually beneficial one but this would require drastic curtailment of the privileged position of the military-industrial complex. There is no indication that this will happen soon.

[10] Sakharov, *My Country and the World*, p. 31.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict in Recent Historical Perspective

G. D. Loescher

THE Sino-Vietnamese conflict should have come as no surprise to anyone acquainted with the history of relations between the two states. The rapid disintegration of relations between China and Vietnam in 1978 and the outbreak of war between the two states in early 1979 resulted from serious differences of policy and perception between Peking and Hanoi that date back at least two and a half decades. These differences have centred on conflicting and contending pressures, calculations, and objectives in Indochina and more recently on contrasting views of the role of the Soviet Union in Indochina and in the international system.

Historically, Sino-Vietnamese relations have been characterized by both traditional distrust and territorial competition as well as by long periods of Vietnamese tutelage and cultural affinity. With the coming to power of communist parties in North Vietnam and China, the two states became closely allied not only as a result of their common ideological outlook and practice but also in response to a common enemy that, temporarily, was perceived as the greatest threat to the security of the region—the United States. Despite their common interest in eliminating the American presence in Indochina, the trends in North Vietnamese-Chinese relations during the Vietnam War suggest that both sides had different and sometimes conflicting national interests at stake. While North Vietnam's primary national objective in the Vietnam conflict was to bring about a rapid and total American withdrawal in order to achieve reunification, China's primary aim was to keep American troops off the mainland of South-east Asia and to ensure that "non-hostile" (i.e. not necessarily communist) states protected its Southeast Asian borders.

These different objectives and national interests were reflected in the different attitudes of China and North Vietnam towards settling the war and date back to at least 1954. At Geneva, the Vietminh sought to maximize their control of Vietnam and their basic position was that a military solution (i.e. a cease-fire) had to follow a prior political solution (i.e. the establishment of conditions for a Vietnamese settlement that were most likely to produce a Vietnam united under Ho Chi Minh). On the other hand, China's overriding concern at Geneva was that the USA be kept out of Indochina. Chou En-lai, therefore, worked independently of Pham Van Dong, initiated many of the vital concessions for a settlement, and intervened more than once to soften the Vietminh's demands. China's preference for

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

neutralization in Indochina, as against revolutionary triumph which might have brought American retaliation and direct military intervention, was clearly demonstrated by Peking's attempts to urge the Vietminh to withdraw from Laos and Cambodia and by Chou En-lai's readiness to recognize the Royal Governments of Laos and Cambodia on condition that no American bases be established in either of the two countries. Under both Chinese and Russian pressure, the Vietminh became convinced of the possibility of American intervention as well as the serious risk of general war and agreed to accept the Geneva Agreements under terms which denied them the more complete victory in Vietnam they might have won had the war continued with the full support of the communist camp.[1]

Throughout the Vietnam War, China's principal aim was to ensure its own national security. Peking did not become especially interested in the situation in South Vietnam until 1959, and even then generally ignored the National Liberation Front and the revolutionary conflict. The establishment of a Military Assistance Command in Vietnam at the beginning of 1962, which unlike the then existing Military Assistance and Advisory Group was an embryonic command headquarters for American combat troops, was an important factor in attracting more Chinese attention to South Vietnam. By mid-1962, the Chinese had also become disillusioned with seeking a diplomatic solution because the USA had rejected a Laos-type settlement for Vietnam.[2] Nevertheless, the Chinese were reluctant to risk provoking American intervention in Vietnam and gave no material support to the Vietcong before mid-1963 and no large-scale aid until after the American escalation of the war in 1965. Until then, Peking made repeated attempts to salvage the Geneva formulae for demilitarization and neutralization in Indochina. Despite repeated emphasis on wars of national liberation in its polemics with Russia, China consistently called for a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict on the basis of an independent, neutral South Vietnam, as well as offering declaratory support for a military solution to the conflict.

With the military intervention of American forces in Vietnam in 1965, Peking gave up hope that effective results might be achieved through diplomacy and compromise, and favoured an acceleration of the revolutionary war in Indochina. Peking's attitudes towards the Vietnamese conflict, however, continued to be determined as much

[1] For a treatment of the several factors which influenced China and Vietnam to seek a peaceful settlement, see Melvin Gurtov, *The First Vietnam Crisis* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1967), pp. 149–55; King C. Chen, *Vietnam and China, 1938–1954* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1969); Allen W. Cameron, ed., *Vietnam Crisis: A Documentary History, Vol. I; 1940–1956* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1971); and Philippe Devillers and Jean Lacouture, *End of a War* (Praeger, New York, 1969).

[2] For evidence of the Chinese desire for a Laos-type settlement in South Vietnam, see Arthur Lall, *How Communist China Negotiates* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1968), p. 180.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by national security considerations as by the revolutionary aspirations of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). China's support for the national liberation war in South Vietnam following the American intervention was influenced largely by the exigencies of defending itself against perceived American encirclement, by its rivalry with the Soviet Union, and by the extreme forms which Chinese diplomacy adopted during the Cultural Revolution.

Chinese policy after 1965 was to provide as much aid as possible to North Vietnam and to act as its rear area of support but to avoid any involvement which could lead to direct military confrontation with the USA or any actions that might provoke American attacks on China. In a situation in which the Chinese felt that the danger of imperialist intervention was high, Peking adopted a low risk strategy and encouraged the Vietnamese communists to wage a long, arduous protracted war with no settlement until the Americans were frustrated on all fronts and, at length, completely defeated. While a low-scale, limited war reduced the danger of expansion of the conflict to China, it was also viewed as a way of harassing and tying down an already over-extended American military force in Vietnam to the detriment of American strategic interests elsewhere.[3] The enthusiastic support for national liberation movements and the revolutionary orthodoxy which Chinese diplomacy adopted during the Cultural Revolution were in large part a reflection of the political style of the mass movement in China and served to legitimize and reinforce Mao's political authority in domestic affairs. The growing importance of national liberation wars to China's foreign policy during this period and the insistence by Peking that foreign revolutionaries emulate and adhere to the Maoist line of revolutionary warfare brought into focus the difference between the DRV and China over the question of military and political strategy in the war.

North Vietnamese strategy, on the other hand, related to the paramount objective of bringing about a rapid and total American withdrawal and completing the communist revolution in Vietnam. Although the Vietminh did subscribe to the Maoist approach to revolutionary warfare in the early stages of the First Indochina War, Maoist influence is notably absent from post-1954 writings. North Vietnamese military writings during the period of large-scale American intervention stressed the "special characteristics" of people's war in Vietnam and the inappropriateness of applying a foreign model to Vietnamese conditions. Although Vietnamese documents almost always discussed their military strategy within the framework of protracted warfare, Hanoi's support for the war gave preference to achieving a rapid and decisive military victory. North Vietnam's

[3] See Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," *Peking Review*, 3 September 1965, and David Mozingo and T. W. Robinson, *Lin Piao on "People's War": China Takes a Second Look at Vietnam* (The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, November 1965), RM-4814.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

objective was to force the United States out of Vietnam as soon as possible and accordingly, Hanoi de-emphasized the Maoist three-stage or phased development of people's warfare. The main strategic frame of reference used by the Vietnamese consisted of an analysis of the American options in imposing their preferred political solution on Vietnam and the ways in which the USA could be made to see that none of these options could work.[4] The greater Vietnamese emphasis on a denial strategy helps to explain the contrasting Sino-Vietnamese interpretations of such later major turning points in the war as the Tet Offensive and the Spring Offensive of 1972 and why the two countries then viewed the negotiations with the United States differently.

ALTHOUGH differing interpretations of war strategy and negotiations were important in governing Sino-Vietnamese relations, a more important long-term factor was their conflicting views of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Following Geneva, Hanoi depended both on China and the Soviet Union for military, economic, and technological aid though in different proportions. During the 1950s, the American containment policy in Asia prevented or delayed the rise of open tensions among the members of the Soviet camp. In any case, Hanoi could ill afford to offend either sponsor unduly and therefore attempted to steer an independent course with regard to incipient Sino-Soviet rivalry.

As the Sino-Soviet rift became public in the early 1960s, Vietnam's ties to the Soviet Union became suspect in Peking's eyes. As early as 1963, the Chinese warned Vietnam not to "look on with folded arms or follow a middle course" in the Sino-Soviet dispute.[5] By the mid-1960s, both China and Russia were making great efforts to woo North Vietnam to their respective sides in the dispute, but as long as Hanoi did not alienate either of its allies, it was able to resist successfully such overtures for an exclusive relationship and at the same time request and receive large-scale assistance. With a view to protecting its own interests and independence in policy-making, the North Vietnamese took a position of non-alignment in the international communist movement and were able to capitalize on Sino-Soviet differences to meet their aid requirements. The political and ideological competition between Moscow and Peking, the Vietnamese communists' cohesion and tenacity on internal matters, and the DRV's practice of maintaining neutrality in the Sino-Soviet rift accounted for the ability of the North Vietnamese to exert a measure

[4] See P. J. McGarvey, *Visions of Victory* (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, 1969), and the writings of Vo Nguyen Giap, such as "The Big Victory, The Great Task," *Nhan Dan* and *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, 14–16 September 1967.

[5] Speech by Liu Shao-Chi at the Higher Party School in Hanoi on 15 May 1963. See *Joint Statement of Liu Shao-Chi and President Ho Chi Minh* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Peking, 1963), p. 33.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of leverage over their patrons while being dependent on them for material assistance.[6]

Vietnam considered support and cooperation from Moscow and Peking to be essential to their national defence and war effort. However, China and the Soviet Union were unwilling to settle their differences even temporarily in order to coordinate their efforts to aid Vietnam. Hanoi believed this to be a serious impediment to the war effort. The Vietnamese were reportedly upset at this lack of unity and attributed the American decision to introduce ground troops into South Vietnam and initiate the bombing of North Vietnam at least in part to the disunity in the communist camp. According to Vietnamese leader Le Duan in a letter written in 1966 to Viet Cong cadres:

> In the face of a situation where our camp's unity was seriously impaired, the U.S. imperialists gradually realized that even with the introduction of a few hundred thousand expeditionary troops into the South the foreseeable situation would not drive them into being involved in a major limited war which required that they cope with the strong reaction of the entire socialist bloc.[7]

It soon became clear to Hanoi that it was China who was the more obstinate of its two major patrons. In 1966 China refused to accept a joint action proposal backed by a number of Asian communist parties that would have temporarily halted their dispute with the Soviet Union so that military and economic aid to Vietnam could be coordinated and expedited.[8] Hanoi and the Asian parties argued that China's refusal to join in aided the American war effort in that, in the face of a disunited communist front, it was easier for the USA to continue to escalate the conflict. However, China was in the initial stages of the Cultural Revolution, and Peking adopted the policy of making formal political relations with communist parties dependent solely on the local party's attitude toward the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Chinese took the position that communist parties which cooperated with the USSR were to be treated as enemies. Thus the Chinese refused joint action in Vietnam but continued their own separate aid programme. They permitted transport of Soviet supplies to Vietnam by rail through China, but only if Vietnamese delegations went to meet them at the Soviet border. China's uncompromising

[6] See Donald Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle* (Pegasus, New York, 1967), Melvin Gurtov, *Hanoi on War and Peace* (The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, December 1967), P–4605, and John C. Donnell and Melvin Gurtov, *North Vietnam: Left of Moscow, Right of Peking* (The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1968), P–3794.

[7] See the collection of captured war documents entitled " Working Paper on the North Vietnamese Role in the War in South Vietnam," *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, No. 35* (U.S. Department of State, Saigon, May 1968), item 302, p. 5.

[8] For discussion of the issue of joint action in Vietnam, see John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: 1963–1967* (Oxford University Press, 1968), and Michael Yahuda, " Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate," *The China Quarterly*, No. 49, January-March 1972, and Harry Harding and Melvin Gurtov, *The Purge of Lo Jui Ching: The Politics of Chinese Strategic Planning* (The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, February 1971), R–548.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stand on the Sino-Soviet dispute during the Cultural Revolution not only alienated its former Asian allies and intensified the antagonism between Peking and Moscow but it also marked the deepening divisions between China and the DRV.

Although the DRV continued to view neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute as crucial to its prosecution of the war and remained interested in maintaining working relations with Peking, particularly on the question of aid, the degree and warmth of friendship towards the Chinese expressed by Hanoi generally paralleled the amount of aid given to Vietnam by China. As American bombing of North Vietnam intensified, Chinese aid shipments to the DRV gradually declined. It was reported, for example, that the number of Chinese ships calling at North Vietnamese ports declined from 138 in 1966 to 93 in 1967.[9] The situation worsened in late 1967 and 1968 when chaos resulting from the Cultural Revolution in China, in particular in Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung provinces, was reported to have disrupted and curtailed shipments of aid to the DRV. Transport lines were occasionally cut for brief periods of time by the activities of warring Red Guard factions who sought to procure arms for their own struggle.[10]

The Vietnamese were upset by these developments and it is no wonder that they responded by criticizing China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In their messages and statements during this period, the North Vietnamese avoided endorsing the aims of the Cultural Revolution and restricted themselves mainly to supporting Chinese economic and technical achievements, such as the explosion of China's first H-bomb.[11] Hanoi also differed with Peking over interpretations of Marxist-Leninist ideology and its meaning and practice in China and North Vietnam. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, when Chinese party leaders such as Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-p'ing were under fierce attack for "taking the capitalist road" in China, the Lao Dong Party pointedly upheld the importance of communist party leadership in socialist societies. In December 1966, in an address to an enlarged conference of the executive committee of the General Federation of Trade Unions in North Vietnam, Party First Secretary Le Duan stated his conviction that the working class, and not the peasantry, had to lead the revolution and that the communist party was "the staff, the intelligence, the vanguard team" of the revolution.[12]

[9] *New York Times*, 9 January 1968, p. 86C.

[10] See Jon M. Van Dyke, *North Vietnam's Strategy for Survival* (Pacific Books, Palo Alto, California, 1972), pp. 222–23.

[11] See for example, "Congratulations on China's First H-Bomb Explosion," *Peking Review*, 23 June 1967. While the North Vietnamese congratulated the Chinese on having increased their national defence capabilities and their ability to support wars of national liberation, the Albanians credited this achievement to the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

[12] Le Duan, "The Role of the Vietnamese Working Class and the Duties of the Labour Union in the Near Future," *Hanoi Radio*, 30 April 1967.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moreover, at the time when the cult of Mao Tse-tung was reaching unprecedented heights in China and all progress in the Proletarian Cultural Revolution was attributed by the Chinese to the thought of Mao, Hanoi indirectly attacked Mao Tse-tung and his personality cult. Hong Chuong, a Lao Dong Party editorial writer, in an article in *Hoc Tap*[13] commemorating Ho Chi Minh's 77th birthday, made numerous pointed references comparing Mao unfavourably with Ho as a communist leader. Hong noted that "the history of society is primarily the history of the labouring people, not of outstanding personalities," and that "a leader of the working class does not separate the working class from its vanguard, the communist party." Hong warned, moreover, that:

> If a certain leader, at a certain time, regardless of the objective rules and the objective situation, acts in accordance with his subjective wishes, he will not be able to avoid failing or falling into a situation in which every move will be in vain, like Don Quixote struggling against the windmill.[14]

Arguing that the Vietnamese respected and loved Ho Chi Minh but did not deify him, Hong also emphasized the importance of collective leadership:

> To ensure correct leadership and prevent and restrict errors, the Marxist-Leninist parties set forth the principle of collective leadership. Only by exerting collective leadership can one-sided and erroneous decisions be prevented.
>
> If a leader commits errors, yet refuses to correct them, he cannot keep his leadership role forever.[15]

The cooling of relations between Hanoi and Peking during the Cultural Revolution was paralleled by the warming-up of relations between the DRV and the USSR. Hanoi's respect for the Soviet Union rose in proportion to the increase of Russian commitment to the DRV, and North Vietnam adopted a position that favoured the USSR in the international communist movement. Furthermore, the North Vietnamese rejected Chinese advice to give up large-scale battles and to rely on small-unit warfare. Rather, the Vietnamese communist leadership accepted the need for sophisticated Russian weapons and throughout the war waged large-scale offensives, most notably during the 1968 Tet Offensive and 1972 Spring Offensive.

SINO-VIETNAMESE relations worsened when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968. Hanoi supported the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia[16] while China condemned the action as "social imperialism."[17] Most importantly, the Warsaw Pact

[13] Hong Chuong, "Leaders and the Masses," *Hoc Tap* (Studies), May 1967.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] *Vietnam News Agency*, 22 August 1968.
[17] *New China News Agency*, 2 September 1968.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

invasion of Czechoslovakia affected Peking's view of and response to the war in Vietnam. The inference drawn by the Chinese from the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia was that the USSR, and not the USA, now constituted the chief external threat to China. Chinese policy focused on the problem of how to limit the American threat in Southeast Asia in order to be able to counter the Soviet threat from the north effectively. The communiqué of the CCP 12th Plenum in October 1968 called for an international united front directed against American imperialism and Soviet revisionism. From this period on, the Chinese placed the Russians, as "social imperialists," firmly in the enemy camp. This development led to a dramatic turn in the polemical war in the Sino-Soviet dispute and paved the way, in the Chinese view, for the exclusion of the USSR from the socialist camp. This trend in Chinese thinking culminated in Lin Piao's report to the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969, when foreign policy goals and a redefinition of the major contradictions in the international system were put forward.[18]

North Vietnam, for its part, continued to view American imperialism as the chief threat to world peace and Vietnam as the focus of the anti-imperialist struggle. For many years, the Sino-Soviet rift had given Hanoi great leverage in its relations with Peking and Moscow and the DRV had used the schism to gain a special position for itself in the international communist movement as an independent power centre in Southeast Asia. While seizing every opportunity to demonstrate the independent nature of its policies, North Vietnam had also tried to retain the maximum degree of support from the Soviet Union and China. As long as the world anti-imperialist struggle had been centred in Vietnam and the Vietnamese communists had been at the forefront of the battle against the USA, "international proletarian solidarity" required Moscow and Peking, despite the Sino-Soviet rift, to rally around Hanoi and pledge their moral and material support. Throughout the war, Hanoi, by maintaining independence in diplomatic and military strategy, had been able to determine policy matters of war and peace in its own councils according to its own national interests.

By 1969, however, China had shifted its world view and accorded the Vietnamese a lower order of priority in its calculations. In the wake of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the huge build-up of Russian conventional and nuclear armed forces in the Soviet Far East and in the People's Republic of Mongolia, the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969, and the Russian collective security proposal in Asia, the Soviet threat as perceived in Peking became the major foreign policy preoccupation of the Chinese leadership. At the same

[18] Lin Piao, "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China." *Peking Review* (Special Issue), 28 April 1969. The contradiction between oppressed nations and imperialism was joined by social imperialism.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

time that Peking was alerted to the imminent danger which the USSR posed to its national security, the United States had begun a major readjustment of its Vietnam policy. The progressive halt in American bombing of Vietnam, the emphasis on Vietnamization of the conflict, the enunciation of the Guam Doctrine, and the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam were seen by Peking as a slow but steady and irreversible disengagement from the area and represented a new general trend toward reducing rather than increasing the American military position in Asia. Peking reasoned that American military power in Asia was on the wane, that the imperialist thrust in the third world, particularly in Vietnam, had been contained and that the USA was on the defensive. Thus, in the eyes of the Chinese, as American influence decreased in the region, the Soviet Union increased its activities in much of Asia in order to compete against the Chinese and attempted to extend its power and presence through a broadening of its trade and diplomatic contacts, its growing naval role, and initiatives such as Brezhnev's proposal for an Asian collective security pact.

With the lessening of the American threat to China and the growing danger of confrontation with the Soviet Union, Peking faced a changed strategic situation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The implication of this new situation was that it was the Soviet Union, rather than the United States, which posed the greatest immediate security problems for China, and that, in order to limit the growing power and influence of the USSR, Chinese policy had to be adapted to enable a tactical accommodation to be made with the USA and Japan.[19] It was apparent, moreover, that China was no longer concerned about whether the Indochina war would turn into a Sino-American war but was beginning to focus its attention on how the Indochina war would be settled.[20]

The Vietnamese communists, on the other hand, still considered that the principal contradiction in the world was between American imperialism and the socialist camp allied with the peoples of the third world. Vietnam constituting the focal point of this struggle. The DRV did not share the Chinese view that the threat posed by the USSR was more dangerous than that of the USA and argued that the USA was still the main enemy against whom the Soviet Union and China should be allied. Nor did the North Vietnamese share the Chinese confidence that American power in Southeast Asia was on a downward

[19] The ideological explanation for the Sino-American rapprochement was contained in the Maoist document *On Policy* which argued that at certain times it was necessary to ally oneself with a subsidiary enemy in order to limit the relative power and influence of the main enemy. *Red Flag*, No. 9, 1971, and the accompanying article, "Powerful Weapon for Uniting the People and Defeating the Enemy."

[20] In December 1970, China for the first time officially came out in support of the May 1969 NLF ten-point and "supplemental" eight-point peace proposals, terming them "the correct way for the settlement of the Vietnam question." Prior to this time, Peking had been adamantly opposed to the Vietnam peace negotiations.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

course, but viewed the Nixon Administration as still intent on achieving its political aims in Vietnam. The major initiatives of the Nixon Administration such as Vietnamization and the strengthening of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, Pacification and Rural Development, and the Guam Doctrine were perceived by Hanoi to be part of a long-term, low-cost strategy which the Americans hoped would strengthen the political control, governmental authority, and defence capabilities of the Saigon government. It was the view of the DRV that Nixon sought to deal with the costly and frustrating war in Vietnam by reshaping the form of American involvement without changing in any significant way the earlier American commitments and interests in Indochina.

Improved Sino-American relations in 1971–72 strained China's relationship with North Vietnam almost to breaking point. Following the announcement of President Nixon's proposed visit to China, North Vietnam published a number of editorials which were indirectly critical of China's new diplomatic initiatives and were assertive of Vietnam's independence. Hanoi seemed anxious about the speed and scope of the normalization of Sino-American relations and questioned whether this development would weaken the struggle in Vietnam. While expressing concern that the United States would try to influence China to bring pressure to bear on North Vietnam to negotiate an end to the war, Hanoi remained insistent that matters of war and peace be decided in its own councils.

For China, the American withdrawal from Vietnam and the American move towards accommodation with China enabled Peking to play a role in international affairs which was commensurate both with its power and its ambitions. China's desire to achieve a settlement in Indochina was linked to its policy of developing an adversary relationship with the USA in such a way as to counterbalance the Soviet Union and create new constraints on Moscow in Southeast Asia. Although Sino-Soviet rivalry over comparative influence in North Vietnam continued to be a significant factor in their policies toward the area, by 1972 both of the DRV's patron states had a substantial stake in détente with the United States and had an incentive to assist the Americans in persuading the North Vietnamese to negotiate a compromise settlement. In the process, Hanoi which for many years had benefited from Sino-Soviet competition for assistance and support against the USA was under pressure to reach a settlement which would be acceptable to the Americans but would enable the communists to continue their political struggle in South Vietnam under propitious conditions.

WITH the Vietnamese communist victory in 1975, there occurred a clear realignment in the international relations of Southeast Asia. The ending of the military conflict removed any remaining restraints on the communist powers imposed by the need for solidarity with

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the North Vietnamese during the war. " US imperialism " was no longer enemy number one of Hanoi, Peking and Moscow, and rivalry for power and influence in Indochina among the three communist states became more pronounced. Although Vietnam's post-war objectives of economic development and reunification required harmony and close cooperation with both the Soviet Union and China, the policies and perceptions of Hanoi and Peking continued to differ, particularly where the role of the USSR in the region was concerned.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the main anxiety in Peking appeared to be the fear that the Russians would drastically increase their involvement in Southeast Asia in order to limit the growth of Chinese influence in the region. Evidence of Chinese concern was expressed at a banquet for Thailand's Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj in Peking on 30 June 1975, when Teng Hsiao-p'ing declared that " the other superpower " was replacing the USA as a threat to the peace and security of Southeast Asia and that " it insatiably seeks new military bases in Asia." [21] Later, on Kukrit's trip, Mao Tse-tung reportedly warned that the Vietnamese had plans for conquest in the region as the " cutting edge of Soviet imperialism in Asia." [22]

The extent of acrimony between Peking and Hanoi became evident during Vietnamese Party Secretary Le Duan's visit to Peking in September 1975.[23] The Chinese pressed the Vietnamese to drop their close relations with the Russians and to acknowledge the danger of Soviet " hegemony." The Vietnamese disagreed that the USSR should be labelled the main enemy, particularly since Moscow had been its major source of support during the war. Unlike China, Vietnam still saw the United States as the primary threat to security and cooperation in the Southeast Asian region, especially in light of Secretary Henry Kissinger's refusal to discuss reconstruction aid or the normalization of relations. When Le Duan refused to agree to sign a statement with an " anti-hegemony " clause, the atmosphere soured and the Vietnamese left China earlier than scheduled and without issuing a joint communiqué. Le Duan travelled on to Moscow where he signed an economic aid agreement with the Soviet Union which provided for " the coordination of the national economic plans of the DRV and the USSR during the 1976–1980 period." In retaliation to this unprecedented collaboration between Hanoi and Moscow, the Chinese ended their grant aid programme to Vietnam, despite Chou En-lai's 1973 pledge to the Vietnamese to continue grant aid at the 1973 level for five more years. In November, China heated things up still further by publicly warning Hanoi that it would not

[21] *Peking Review*, 4 July 1975, p. 11.

[22] Joseph Alsop, " Showdown Over Southeast Asia?" *Readers Digest*, December 1975, p. 128.

[23] See: Sheldon Simon, " Peking and Indochina: The Perplexity of Victory," *Asian Survey*, May 1976, pp. 402–3, and Gareth Porter, " Asia's New Cold War," *The Nation*. 9 September 1978, pp. 209–12.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

permit the Vietnamese to occupy any of the Spratly Islands which are claimed by China, Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan.[24]

Perhaps the most significant development in Southeast Asia during the post-Vietnam War years was that China and Vietnam began to view each other as the primary obstacle to peace in the region.[25] Vietnam found itself not at peace but in a hot war with neighbouring Cambodia and in a name-calling match with China. The Khmer Rouge, anxious to avoid domination by Hanoi in the period after 1975, adopted an openly pro-Chinese and anti-Vietnamese international line. Within a few months after their victory, Cambodia was receiving substantial military aid from Peking and in August 1975, Khieu Samphan signed an agreement on economic cooperation with China. Thus, despite serious differences between the two countries on the party-to-party level, government-to-government relations between China and Cambodia solidified by mid-1975. China provided material and technical support to Cambodia primarily out of a desire to block what it viewed as the desire of Vietnam to dominate all Indochina and indirectly, as a Soviet client, to encircle China.

During the months following the communist victories in Indochina, Cambodia and Vietnam engaged in armed skirmishes along their common border. Cambodian Premier Pol Pot refused to negotiate the problem with the Vietnamese and in 1977 the low-level friction between the two states rapidly escalated into full-scale border incursions. In mid-1977, the Khmer Rouge attacked Vietnamese border villages, killing hundreds of their inhabitants. Shortly thereafter, Pol Pot triumphantly toured China where he openly accused Vietnam of expansionism, thus signalling to Hanoi that China had abandoned any pretence of neutrality in the dispute between Vietnam and Cambodia.

The Vietnamese responded to the war with Cambodia and pressure from China by seeking to improve relations with the western world. In the initial years after 1975, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) sought to broaden its contacts with the non-communist industrial world in order to obtain economic and technical aid from the USA, Japan, and Western Europe. The SRV adopted new trade and investment codes[26] and its leaders stressed the need for economic assistance and cooperation from countries with differing social systems.[27] To this end, Hanoi also sought to normalize relations with

[24] Shih-Ti-tsu, "The South China Sea Islands Have Been China's Territory Since Ancient Times," *Kwangming Daily*, reprinted in *New China News Agency*, 26 November 1975.

[25] See Gareth Porter, "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict in Southeast Asia," and Carlyle A. Thayer, "Dilemmas of Development in Vietnam," both in *Current History*, Vol. 75, No. 442, December 1978.

[26] "Regulations on Foreign Investment in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam," *Vietnam Courier*, No. 62, July 1977, pp. 6–8 and 28, and "Vietnam's Investment Code," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 11 July 1977.

[27] Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh indicated at the Fourth Party Congress that the SRV also had to look for aid from sources other than just socialist countries. See the text of his speech in *Nhan Dan*, 28 December 1976.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the United States. Although the Carter Administration was generally receptive, the Vietnamese-American talks initially foundered over the Vietnamese demand for reparations before establishing diplomatic ties, and the American demands for a full accounting of American soldiers missing in action and normalization of diplomatic relations in advance of trade or aid. In July 1978, the SRV dropped all preconditions to the normalization process and American-Vietnamese talks, broken off in 1977, resumed in September 1978. However, the American Congress remained steadfastly opposed to the opening of trade, aid, and diplomatic relations with the SRV.

To avoid diplomatic isolation which might prove advantageous to its adversaries, the SRV also sought friendly ties with all non-communist Southeast Asian countries. Stressing its independence and non-alignment, Hanoi adopted a conciliatory stance towards ASEAN nations and, like their Chinese counterparts, Vietnamese leaders toured Southeast Asian capitals in search of support. The SRV's primary fear was of collaboration between the USA, China, Cambodia and Thailand, directed against Vietnam. In this context, Hanoi made a major effort to improve relations with Thailand and the Philippines which had been military allies of the USA during the Vietnam War. In 1978, for example, Pham Van Dong pledged that Vietnam would not assist the communist party of Thailand, and in talks with President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Pham Van Dong did not raise the contentious issues of American bases or the Spratly Islands. Pham Van Dong also repeated Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's earlier pledge to move Vietnam closer to the ASEAN concept of peace and neutrality for Southeast Asia.[28]

China, on the other hand, tried to encourage Southeast Asian states to collaborate with each other and with the USA to oppose Soviet and Vietnamese influence. Above all, Peking was interested in keeping a ring of friendly buffer states around its boundaries. The Chinese adopted a diplomatic strategy in which they subordinated party-to-party relations to state-to-state ties with any government willing to agree with Peking on the overriding priority of opposing the Soviet Union and Vietnam in Southeast Asia. Thus China opened diplomatic relations with Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines and subscribed to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each country, particularly with reference to indigenous liberation movements in these countries. China also encouraged Cambodia to open relations with its neighbours, in particular Thailand, for it was Peking's view that a unified Vietnam led by a cohesive elite backed by proven military power was determined to establish "regional hegemony" at the expense of smaller and

[28] See the four points laid down by the Vietnamese as governing their relations with other Southeast Asian states as stated by Nguyen Duy Trinh, 5 July 1976 in an interview with *Vietnam News Agency*.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weaker states such as Cambodia and Laos and thus play a Soviet role by proxy in encircling China.[29] For this reason, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and others called for the continued presence of American military power in the Pacific as a necessary deterrent to the Soviet Union.

THE increase in the frequency and intensity of the Khmer attacks in 1977 led the Vietnamese to wage a counter-offensive in late 1977 and early 1978. The Vietnamese thrust deep into Cambodian territory in order to punish the Khmer Rouge and to force a negotiated settlement. Phnom Penh responded to the Vietnamese attack by accusing the SRV of aggression and breaking off official relations. In February 1978, Hanoi issued a three-point peace proposal which suggested that all troops be withdrawn five kilometres from the frontier; that Vietnam and Cambodia discuss and resolve their differences; and that there be an international inspection of the cease-fire. Pol Pot refused to discuss the peace plan, and China continued to provide material and technical support (including 10,000 Chinese military personnel) for Cambodia's war effort. With Chinese encouragement, Cambodia prepared for a long war with its communist neighbour.

Immediately following Cambodia's rejection of Vietnam's peace proposal, the Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee held its fourth session and reportedly decided to back a rebel movement in Cambodia with military assistance and work for the forcible removal of the Pol Pot regime.[30] The Vietnamese held Peking responsible for Cambodia's continued belligerence and were concerned that China might succeed in isolating the SRV and debilitate long-term economic development by forcing on her a slow and costly war with Cambodia.[31]

Hand in hand with the outbreak of fighting between Cambodia and Vietnam there occurred a marked deterioration in relations between Peking and Hanoi. Within weeks of the February 1978 peace offer, the Vietnamese communists nationalized the vital rice trade of the South and closed over 30,000 private businesses in southern Vietnam. Only merchants who sold goods not under state control were allowed to continue. These measures were followed by the introduction of a new national currency system in May. These government directives mainly affected the Chinese bourgeoisie of Cholon and northern Sino-Vietnamese and created fears among them of anti-Chinese persecution

[29] The establishment of the Laotian People's Democratic Republic against a background of physical intimidation and threatened Vietnamese military intervention and the subsequent July 1977 Lao-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation left no doubt in Chinese minds about Vietnam's intentions in regard to the future of Indochina.

[30] See Nayan Chanda, "The Timetable for a Takeover," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 February 1979.

[31] Vietnamese Central Committee member, Hoang Tung declared in an interview in Tokyo on 27 May 1978 that the Chinese wanted to "provoke a disease which is not fatal but (which would) keep us always sick." Cited in Gareth Porter, "Asia's New Cold War," op. cit. p. 212.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by the Vietnamese. The nationalization measures also greatly angered China and signalled to Peking Vietnam's determination to adopt an anti-China stance. China publicly accused Vietnam of systematically persecuting and expelling Chinese residents in Vietnam. Hanoi, for its part, viewed its Chinese residents as a potential tool of sabotage and subversion for Peking and as an obstacle to the development of a fully socialist economy. Peking chose to vent its full fury over the issue, and as tension between Vietnam and China's ally, Cambodia, increased tens of thousands of Chinese began to flee from Vietnam, creating an exodus of refugees.[32] In May 1978, China terminated all economic aid to Vietnam, withdrew its advisers, and closed several Vietnamese consulates in China, thereby reducing Sino-Vietnamese relations to the bare minimum.

Following this open break in relations, the SRV concluded that the main threat to Vietnam was now China and it altered its international alignment accordingly. In May 1978, after it became clear that China intended to halt all economic aid and, frustrated by its lack of progress in attracting monetary investment, technological aid, and a trading relationship with the western world, Vietnam joined the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). This move was taken by China as further proof that Vietnam had sided irrevocably with the Soviet Union, and in turn, China publicly accused Vietnam of pursuing "regional hegemonism" and serving as the "Cuba of the East," and "junior partner" in a Soviet attempt to gain control of Southeast Asia.[33] In talks with Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser, Teng Hsiao-p'ing argued forcefully that the Soviet Union supported Hanoi in order to reduce Chinese and American influence in Southeast Asia and to gain a foothold for itself in the region. Moscow's real purpose, according to Teng, was to obtain use of the naval bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Haiphong in return for providing military assistance and economic aid to replace recently terminated Chinese projects.[34] In November 1978, Peking's fears were confirmed when the SRV signed a 25-year treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow. The treaty has a military clause obliging the parties to consult each other in the event of a threat or attack against one of them aimed at eliminating any such threat. The Chinese became convinced that the Vietnamese were on the warpath, and the fact that the Soviet Union was willing to back Vietnam's vanguard role in Indochina made Vietnam all the more dangerous an enemy for the

[32] In Cambodia, by contrast, China was willing to turn a blind eye to the estimated 500,000 overseas Chinese who were driven out of the cities with other urban residents after the Khmer Rouge victory in 1975.

[33] Hsu-Hsiang-chen, "Heighten Vigilance, Be Ready to Fight," *Red Flag*, No. 8, 1978, and "Why Vietnamese Authorities Provoked Vietnam-Kampuchea Border Conflict," *Peking Review*, 21 July 1978.

[34] David Bonavia, "Straight Talk from Peking," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 9 June 1978.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chinese. One month after the signing of the friendship treaty, the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation was formed with open Vietnamese support and evident Soviet endorsement. In late December 1978, Vietnam waged a lightning offensive against Cambodia which ousted the Pol Pot regime and seemed to achieve the goal of a Hanoi-dominated Indochina.

The decision by the Vietnamese to exploit their military position in Indochina by exerting armed pressure against Cambodia naturally created great difficulties for China.[35] Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia was viewed by Peking as a challenge to Chinese claims to influence in the region. In particular, a united Vietnam with strong links to Laos and Cambodia which encouraged close ties to the Soviet Union posed grave risks to China's security and led Hanoi into direct and open conflict with Peking. In accordance with its broader objective of achieving a non-hostile, neutralized belt of states along its southern flank, Peking has been interested for decades in the fragmentation of Indochina and in the achievement of political and diplomatic independence by all the Indochina states. During the Vietnam War, the Chinese had paid deference to the Provisional Revolutionary Government in South Vietnam, supported the coalition government in Laos, and sought to increase its influence in Cambodia by upholding the legitimacy of the Sihanouk government and by receiving the Khmer Rouge leadership in Peking. After the communist victories in 1975, China cautioned against the rapid reunification of North and South Vietnam, opposed the deposition of Souvanna Phouma in Laos, and gave material and technical support for the Khmer Rouge's war with Vietnam in order to block what it saw as the threatening spread of Vietnamese influence in Southeast Asia. China's major concern continued to be the avoidance of foreign military bases and intervention in the region and the Chinese felt especially threatened if those activities or military alliances were directed against Peking. It is for these reasons that China decided to "punish" Vietnam in February 1979.

In the future, the degree of Chinese involvement in Indochina is likely to continue to be governed by considerations of national security and will depend on the behaviour of other states, principally the Soviet Union and its junior partner, the SRV. China will not easily be reconciled to Vietnamese domination in Indochina. Peking foresees a long war in Cambodia and continues to support the guerrillas of the ousted government of Pol Pot with arms shipments channelled through Thailand.[36] In April 1979, Chinese Deputy Foreign

[35] For two accounts of the contending objectives of China and Vietnam during this recent phase of the Indochina conflict, see Michael Leifer, "Post-mortem on the Third Indochina War," *The World Today*, June 1979 and Michael Yahuda, "China's New Outlook: The End of Isolationism?" *The World Today*, May 1979, esp. 183–6.

[36] See Nayan Chanda, "Sihanouk's Intriguing Indiscretions," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 April 1979, pp. 10–11.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Minister Han Nianlong stated Peking's terms for a settlement of the Sino-Vietnamese border issue and demanded that Vietnam withdraw its troops from Cambodia and Laos and oppose Soviet hegemony in Asia. Since the SRV views these terms as unacceptable and is determined to hold on to its asserted position in Indochina, it seems that Vietnam has little choice but to face the threat of a prolonged two-border war. The continuing conflict in Cambodia and Vietnam's preparation for further attacks from China have not only strained the country's already meagre resources, but have also diverted manpower and capital from reconstruction and economic activities to military tasks. As a result of the current state of hostilities in Indochina, western sources of credit and aid have diminished considerably and the Vietnamese have become increasingly dependent on the Soviet bloc for assistance. At the same time, Southeast Asian nations now regard Vietnam as the main threat to regional stability and are greatly discomforted by the tens of thousands of Vietnamese boat people who are landing on their shores. Thus, Vietnam, which for so long had preserved a balance between competing pressures from Moscow and Peking, found itself in 1979 in serious conflict with China and in danger of becoming locked in the Soviet camp by economic and military dependency and diplomatic expediency. If the USSR has to be kept in the area as an effective deterrent to China, it will become increasingly difficult for the SRV to resist Soviet pressure for a permanent base for its Pacific fleet. The granting of important military facilities to Peking's major global adversary will pose a significant security threat to China and would certainly ensure the continuation of Sino-Vietnamese tensions. It is clear that the conflict between Vietnam and China has taken on the same fundamental character as the Sino-Soviet conflict and is likely to continue to be a major factor in the international politics of East Asia for years to come.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cuba's African Involvement: A New Perspective

A. M. Kapcia

TODAY, 20 years after the Cuban Revolution first hit the world's headlines, with the victory of Fidel Castro's guerrillas over Batista's bedraggled army, and nearly 17 years after Cuba held the centre of the world stage during the "dark days" of the missile crisis, Cuba is once again very much at the centre of the world's attention—but, this time, in a manner and to an extent that few could seriously have expected 20 or even 10 years ago. For, who, in the early 1960s, would have predicted that in 1979 Cuba would be committing large numbers of its troops in different parts of the African continent, not in any covert guerrilla campaign but in full-scale conventional military actions?

Even 10 years ago, in the late 1960s, at the height of Cuba's "ultra-revolutionary" phase, little had been heard of any Cuban interest in Africa; even close observers of the Revolution saw Africa as peripheral to Cuba's "revolutionary" Third World strategy (Latin America being the main area of activity). The fullest extent of any active Cuban involvement in the African continent was limited to a minor role in the Congo and the training of various guerrilla groups. Even as late as the early 1970s, Cuba's military presence overseas amounted to a mere 600–700 military personnel in South Yemen and 500–750 tank troops in Syria, with small military missions to Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, Somalia and Algeria.[1]

Yet, in a matter of only a few years, Cuba's involvement in African affairs has mushroomed at an astonishing rate, so that today the Cubans are actively involved militarily on what in relative terms is a vast scale—with their commitment rising to 5,000 in a total of 10 countries in December 1975,[2] to over 12,000 in mid-1977,[3] and, even, according to some (probably exaggerated) estimates, to 40,000 in the whole continent in mid-1978.[4] Quite apart from this extensive military commitment, the Cubans have also despatched numbers of civilian advisers and technicians to various parts of the continent—Castro himself admitted a

1 Edward Gonzalez, "Complexities of Cuban Foreign Policy," in *Problems of Communism*, Nov.–Dec. 1977, p. 6.

2 Edward Gonzalez, "Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy," in *Problems of Communism*, Jan.–Feb. 1976, p. 1.

3 According to *The Economist* ("Pax Cubana," 7 May 1977, p. 13), Cuba had 12,000 troops in Angola (with 3,000 advisers and technicians), 300 military advisers in the Congo People's Republic, 500 instructors in Mozambique (with more in Tanzania) training the Mozambican army and Rhodesian guerrillas, a military team training Somali guerrillas for the Ogaden, 300 instructors training the Guinean army, 100 advisers in Guinea-Bissau, and 300–400 military personnel in Equatorial Guinea.

4 *The Guardian*, 22 June 1978.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

figure of 4,100 civilians working abroad in 1977,[5] and one observer gives a figure of no less than 15 African countries receiving this sort of aid.[6] Finally, to complete the picture, the last few years have seen a flurry of diplomatic activity by the Cubans, with two African tours by Castro, in 1972 and 1977,[7] and a diplomatic offensive to establish relations with African countries (10 countries between 1974 and 1977).[8]

The speed and scale of these developments have confused not a few students of Cuban politics, and have led to a crop of theories to explain the sudden change. Leaving aside the more fanciful theories, we can effectively reduce to four the different explanations that have been put forward in print or in public speeches: the "Soviet pawn" thesis (of which there is a corollary, i.e. that economic necessity forced the latest development), the "resources" thesis, the "internal politics" thesis,[9] and the "Third World strategy" thesis (with several variations). The problem with these explanations is that, while each may have an element of truth, it leaves several nagging doubts, questions unanswered, and fails to provide a complete answer to the basic question. Of course, it would be wrong to imagine that, given the complexities of both global politics and Cuban motives, any one explanation could pretend to provide such a complete answer. Hence, the purpose of this article: to put forward a fifth thesis that may perhaps go some way towards filling gaps left by all those theories proposed to date.

BUT first, to examine the four theses referred to. The "resources" thesis can be quickly disposed of, since it is the one with the least substance to it and one that has never been put forward coherently, but only referred to incidentally. The explanation runs thus: that Cuba's interest in Africa generally, and in Angola specifically, is economic, inasmuch as the Cubans are seeking access to African resources, notably Angola's oil and fish.[10] Whatever the merits of this explanation—and those who adhere to it might perhaps find fuel for their arguments in a recent decision by the Angolans to allow the Cubans to fish in Angolan waters[11]—it can only at best be a partial, supplementary, explanation, for, however true it might have been in the case of Angola,

[5] *The Guardian*, 28 July 1977. Castro also indicated that, by the end of 1977, there would be some 6,000, with a 400-strong medical team going to Ethiopia.

[6] Gérard Chaliand, "Cubans' Dubious Battles," in *The Guardian*, 28 Apr. 1978, p. 7.

[7] On the 1972 tour he visited Guinea, Sierra Leone and Algeria; in 1977 his itinerary included Libya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola and Algeria.

[8] The 10 countries were Malagasy Republic, Senegal, Zaire, Cameroun (all in 1974), Mozambique (in 1975), Upper Volta, Ghana, Chad and Mauritius (all in 1976), and Benin (in 1977).

[9] This refers specifically to Gonzalez's article ("Complexities"), in which, after identifying three distinct interpretations of Cuban foreign policy, he outlines this fourth one. The article is a particularly revealing study of the intricacies of internal Cuban politics.

[10] Sir Herbert Marchant, "Castro's Cuba and the Soviet Union" (in *World Survey*, Nos. 91–2 July–Aug. 1976, p. 12), mentions this possibility.

[11] *Latin America Economic Report*, 24 Mar. 1978, p. 93.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it hardly applies to Ethiopia or to the several other African states with which Cuba enjoys a close relationship.

The " Soviet pawn " thesis obviously deserves greater attention, if only because it is largely the thesis adopted, implicitly, if not explicitly, by Britain—both government and opposition—by various United States government officials, although, perhaps predictably, not by Andrew Young, and by a great many other observers. This view maintains that Cuba's African policy is basically, if not totally, determined and directed by the Soviet Union, which is either using the Cubans to implement, vicariously, an " alternative " Third World strategy or forcing some kind of political blackmail on the Cubans, as a price for " stabilization " of the Cuban economy after 1970.

Substance for this argument is to be found, to a large extent, in the evidence of increased Soviet influence in Cuba since 1970 (" Sovietization " to some minds) or since 1968, if one takes Castro's apparent endorsement of the Czechoslovakian invasion as the turning-point.[12] Whatever the different views on the extent and nature of this increased influence, it is certainly true that the failure to achieve the Ten Million Ton Harvest in 1970, and the economic disruption that this caused within Cuba, were followed rapidly by a drive to stabilize, rationalize and reorganize the Cuban economy, mostly along the lines of the Soviet and East European economies, and to downgrade some of the more " heretical " Cuban ideas in the economy and the political structure, in favour of a more orthodox approach.[13] However much this " re-think " may have been the result of an autonomous decision by the Cubans, there can be no doubt that both circumstances (e.g. the economic and structural " malfunction " of the " fidelista " system) and Soviet pressure must have played a part. Thus, the resulting increased economic dependence on the Soviet Union—and the indications are that, from 1972, with Cuba's admission into Comecon, the extent of Cuban trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has increased considerably [14]—provides a logical basis for this thesis, stressing, as it does, that the new Cuban orthodoxy and the synchronization of Cuban policies with those of the Soviet Union were a *quid pro quo* for the Soviet " bailing out " of the Cuban economy.

Thus, in June 1976, Kissinger declared that Cuba was acting on the Soviet Union's behalf in Africa,[15] and other observers have seen Cuba's Angolan involvement as illustrating that Cuba " has conformed with

[12] This is, however, a more complex issue, since Castro's speech on the invasion was characteristically ambiguous, and his motives for endorsing the Soviet action probably had as much to do with the Cuban opinion of Czechoslovakian economic " revisionism " (being, in Cuban eyes, almost akin to capitalism) as with any desire to placate the Soviet Union.

[13] Gonzalez's article, " New Orthodoxy," is a full and astute assessment of this whole process of change.

[14] Gonzalez, " New Orthodoxy," p. 11.

[15] *Latin America*, 18 June 1976 (Vol. X, No. 24), p. 192.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet policy," [16] or that it " illustrated the extent to which Cuban policy has become synchronized with, and supportive of, Soviet foreign policy." [17] Further evidence is provided for this argument by the apparent conformity of the Cubans in Algiers, in September 1973, when, at the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, Fidel Castro, stressing the close relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union, defended its ally against accusations of imperialism. Such a stand seemed at the time so totally at variance with the line adopted by the Cubans during the more unorthodox days of the 1960s,[18] that it could perhaps only be explained by some new, external, pressures on the Cuban leaders.

The value of the whole thesis, as one observer has noted, is that it points out that Cuba is not acting in the world in a vacuum, but within " the parameters set by the superpowers." [19] Yet, despite a great deal of supporting evidence, it ignores many points: for example, the long history of Cuban relations with African liberation movements, in general, and with the Angolan MPLA, in particular; the further Cuban involvement after Angola, where there is, according to some, evidence that Cuba " preceded the Soviet Union in shifting from the backing of both Somalia and Ethiopia to concentrated support of the latter country alone " [20]; any internal motives and pressures; and Cuba's persistently independent approach throughout the 1960s, which leads many, the author included, to find it difficult to accept that Castro, having survived Soviet pressure and having stressed Cuban independence and nationalism for so long, would, overnight, allow the Russians to dictate that Cuban soldiers should fight, and die, for purely Soviet objectives.

In view of these doubts, and even accepting perhaps some elements in both these theses, we may be forced to conclude that, rather than being the result of Soviet pressures to conform, Cuba's involvement in Africa resulted from a convergence of Soviet and Cuban interests. As one observer has noted, it certainly must have suited Soviet purposes for Cuba to become involved in Angola, but it also suited Cuba's purposes—in earning " political credits against past debts to the Soviet Union," [21] for example. It is also true that the Cubans could not have acted on the scale they did without Soviet assistance, although one report of the

[16] Marchant, " Castro's Cuba," p. 11.

[17] Gonzalez, " New Orthodoxy," p. 1. Irving Louis Horowitz, in " Military Outcomes of the Cuban Revolution," in Horowitz (ed.), *Cuban Communism* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1977), p. 94, maintains that Cuba was forced to act in Angola by Soviet pressure; he also sees Cuban involvement in Syria as " unquestionably under Soviet instructions, since the Syrians only had Soviet tanks " (p. 94).

[18] I refer, for example, to Guevara's criticism of Soviet aid policies (in Algeria in February 1965, in K. S. Karol, *Guerrillas in Power*, New York, 1970, p. 298), and to Cuba's snub to the Soviet celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution in 1967.

[19] Gonzalez, " Complexities," p. 2.

[20] Ibid. p. 2.

[21] Gregory F. Treverton, " Cuba after Angola," in *The World Today*, Jan. 1977, p. 19.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

operation indicated a low level of Soviet involvement and a high degree of Cuban improvisation.[22]

THEREFORE, we are forced to turn to more "Cuba-centric" explanations. The first of these is that proposed by Edward Gonzalez, an explanation that concentrates on "perspectives of three distinct elite groups discernible within Cuba's newly enlarged ruling coalition."[23] This thesis identifies three factions vying for authority within the Cuban Revolution: the "pragmatic tendency," led by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez and Osvaldo Dorticós and backed by "technocratic and managerial elites,"[24] advocating close economic ties with the Soviet Union, trade diversification—especially with the West, in order to obtain technology—and an altogether more stable, orthodox approach to policy in general; the "revolutionary tendency"—basically the "fidelista" faction, advocating revolutionary anti-imperialism, although without jeopardising good trade and credit relations with the West; and the "'military mission' tendency," headed by Raul Castro and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR), strengthened by the post-1970 involvement of the FAP in decision-making, and seeing its role as being no longer defensive but in "overseas activity in support of other Cuban foreign policy objectives."[25] Gonzalez, with ample evidence to support his argument, sees the wrangling between these three factions as responsible for complexities and contradictions in recent Cuban foreign policy (e.g. the contradiction between Cuba's search for détente with the USA and her involvement in Angola); in this light, he also sees the African involvement as the result of the victory of two of these factions—the "fidelista" faction, seeing it as an opportunity to gain international leverage for Cuba, and the "military mission" faction, seeing it as an opportunity to gain prestige, equipment for the FAR from the Soviet Union, and political strength within Cuba, in addition to valuable combat experience. Thus, the Angolan episode is seen mostly as a weapon in internal struggles, which will produce a "more volatile foreign policy" in the future.[26]

The value of this argument is clear: it changes the emphasis from the more simplistic approach of the "Soviet pawn" thesis towards an area relatively unexplored—the internal (and certainly not monolithic) politics of the Cuban Revolution; given the evidence that Gonzalez produces, his thesis is certainly far more convincing than many other explanations of Cuban policy. Yet, in emphasizing the internal "machinations" of the Revolution, it perhaps lays too much stress on the day-to-day complexities of the Cuban political scene and draws attention away from an important area of Cuban policy—the history of Cuban commitment to the Third World.

[22] Gabriel García Márquez's account, discussed in more detail later in the article.
[23] Gonzalez, "Complexities," p. 3.
[24] Ibid. p. 8.
[25] Ibid. p. 9.
[26] Gonzalez, "New Orthodoxy," p. 18.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THIS, then, introduces the fourth thesis to be examined: that of "Third World strategy." There are several variations to this argument, depending on emphasis and even the political attitude of the exponents. The first of these is a natural development of Gonzalez's thesis, and refers to the attempt to gain international leverage in the global power struggle—an explanation based on Castro's long, skilful balancing-act throughout the 1960s—between the Soviet Union and China from 1960 to 1966, and between Soviet embarrassment at the cost of supporting Cuba and the need to ensure Cuba's survival, as a part of its Third World image. This view of events sees much of Cuba's Latin American policy in the 1960s and, latterly, its African interest, as part of an attempt to win Cuba prestige in the Third World, perhaps in order to force the Soviet Union to support the Revolution economically, without any *quid pro quo*.

A second variation of this argument is that the whole strategy of revolution abroad was designed to break Cuba's isolation and the American blockade (an up-dated version of Trotsky's justification for "permanent revolution"). Certainly Cuba's trade relations with Africa improved enormously after 1959 [27] and diplomatic relations were established early on with two of the more radical African governments—Guinea and Congo (Brazzaville).[28]

Both variants of this thesis would probably explain the switch from Latin America to Africa as a practical response: that Cuba was forced to abandon the idea of revolution in the former—because of economic considerations (the growing likelihood of a rupture of the blockade by diplomatic recognitions), the growth of nationalism in the continent (that took some of the wind out of Cuba's sails), and the failure of the guerrilla strategy and Guevara's death in 1967—but able to maintain the idea, at little cost, in the new situation in Africa. To this effect, it has been reported that Castro has seen Africa as providing better opportunities than Latin America "for establishing links of cooperation and friendship of the kind that will enable Cuba to escape from its Caribbean isolation." [29]

Yet another variant of the thesis stresses the Cuban need to reaffirm its commitment to the Third World and to the idea of revolution, in view of Castro's apparent backpedalling on Latin America (his approval of the Peruvian junta and his less prominent support for guerrilla warfare), his defence of the Soviet Union in 1973 in Algiers, and the apparent "Sovietization" of Cuba since 1970. In this respect, the Cubans were able to act as they did and when they did by taking advantage of post-Vietnam isolationism and post-Watergate demoralization in the

[27] Edward Boorstein, *The Economic Transformation of Cuba* (New York, 1969), p. 73. He cites, for example, trade with Egypt, with exports rising from a 1958 figure of $1,000 to a 1962 figure of $9·9 million, and imports for the same period from $18,000 to $9·5 million.

[28] Relations with Guinea were established in May 1960 and with the Congo in 1964.

[29] *Latin America*, 19 Mar. 1976 (Vol. X, No. 12), p. 89.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

USA, the discrediting of the CIA, and the inevitable lull in activity in election year in the USA.

A fourth version of this thesis stresses the purely ideological element in Cuba's commitment to the Third World, by which "Angola and other large-scale Cuban operations can be viewed as simply further manifestations of Cuba's long-standing internationalism."[30] Whatever the drawbacks of such a view (it could, for example, be accused of adopting an unrealistic vision of international politics), it clearly merits attention if only for the simple reason that it is by and large the explanation put forward by the Cubans themselves. Castro, for example, in December 1975, defended Cuban involvement in Angola by stressing that Cuba had never disguised that its foreign policy was "subordinated to the international needs of the struggle for socialism and the national liberation of peoples,"[31] and justified the Angolan aspect of this involvement by pointing out that Cubans were "not Latin Americans but Latin Africans as well. The blood of Africa flows abundantly in our veins, and from Africa many of our ancestors came as slaves to this land, and many of them fought in the independence struggle."[32]

This explanation is also one supported by several non-Cuban observers[33]; many stress the importance of nationalism, for example, in the "foreign policy formulation process"[34] and of ideology which "provides a plan of action to change present Cuban society and also underdeveloped societies outside Cuba."[35] Moreover, the Cubans have been consistent in presenting their Revolution as a possible model for Latin America and the underdeveloped world in general, underlining the "Third World" aspect of Cuba's problems and solution. Gabriel García Márquez, one of Latin America's most widely respected writers, has also emphasized internationalism as an element in Cuban political thinking even before the Revolution—dating from José Martí in the late nineteenth century and recognized by most as a genuine and profound influence on Castro's revolutionary movement.[36]

WHETHER one accepts any one or all of these variants of the thesis, there is clearly ample substance to support the idea. For a start, there is indeed a long tradition of official declarations by the Cubans on

[30] Gonzalez, "Complexities," p. 3.

[31] Speech to the PCC (Cuban Communist Party) Congress on 16 December 1975, quoted in *Latin America*, 2 Jan. 1976 (Vol. X, No. 1), p. 5.

[32] Ibid. p. 5.

[33] *Latin American Political Report*, 3 Feb. 1978, Vol. XII, No. 5, p. 36, for example, supports this view.

[34] W. Raymond Duncan, "Problems of Cuban Foreign Policy," in Horowitz (ed.), *Cuban Communism*, p. 485.

[35] Ibid. p. 485.

[36] Gabriel García Márquez, "Operation Carlota," in *New Left Review*, Nos. 101–2, Feb.–Apr. 1977, p. 126. This article was first published in the Mexican weekly *Proceso*, and has been much cited because of the author's renown and known closeness to the Cuban leadership.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the importance of solidarity. Castro's "Second Declaration of Havana" in February 1962, asked:

> What is the history of Cuba but the history of Latin America? And what is the history of Latin America but the history of Asia, Africa and Oceania? And what is the history of all these peoples but the history of the most pitiless and cruel exploitation by imperialism throughout the world? [37]

Four years later, at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in 1966, which Cuba won over to its revolutionary line, Castro promised that any revolutionary movement anywhere in the world could count on Cuba's unconditional support.[38] The OLAS (Organization of Latin American Solidarity) final declaration in 1967 also stressed this solidarity: "The struggle in Latin America strengthens its bond of solidarity with the peoples of Asia and Africa." [39]

Furthermore, Cuban declarations of solidarity did actually become realized, specifically in the case of Vietnam, with which Cuba identified completely—because of the belief that Vietnam's resistance guaranteed Cuba's survival,[40] and also because the Cubans saw Vietnam as a clear parallel to their own situation, a revolution in a small Third World country, successfully resisting the United States and effectively abandoned by both the Soviet Union and China.

However, Vietnam was the exception rather than the rule, for, mostly, "solidarity" for the Cubans in the 1960s meant solidarity in the Latin American context. Yet Africa was not ignored, and, indeed, was very much a part of this Third World strategy:

> In fact, no contemporary African liberation movement has been unable to count on Cuban solidarity, whether expressed in material and arms or in the training of military and civil technicians and specialists.[41]

Moreover, Cuba's interest in Africa dated from very early on in the revolutionary process. In 1960, for example, Castro equated Cuba's situation with that of Algeria or the Congo,[42] and in October 1961, Dr. Núñez Jiménez pledged "fraternal solidarity" to Algeria's FLN,

[37] Fidel Castro, "Second Declaration of Havana" (speech made on 4 Feb. 1962), cited in M. Kenner & J. Petras, *Fidel Castro Speaks* (Penguin, 1972), p. 138.

[38] Hugh Thomas, *Cuba, or the Pursuit of Freedom* (London, 1971), p. 1477. It is, perhaps, relevant to point out here that this declaration may have had, at the time, more to do with Cuba's dispute with the Soviet Union, with the failure of the "peaceful road" in Chile (with Allende's defeat by Frei in the 1964 elections), and with the deepening war in Vietnam, than with any serious intention to become actively involved.

[39] Quoted by Herbert L. Matthews, *Castro. A Political Biography* (Penguin, 1970), p. 286.

[40] Karol, *Guerrillas*, p. 292. In fact, 1967 was declared the Year of Heroic Vietnam.

[41] García Márquez, p. 126. The Tricontinental delegates included representatives from the South African ANC, the United Arab Republic, Algeria, Guinea and Congo (Brazzaville). García Márquez also cites Mozambique (since 1963), Guinea-Bissau (since 1965), Cameroun, and Sierra Leone as countries that have at some time or other requested and received "forms of solidarity aid" (p. 126).

[42] Karol, *Guerrillas*, p. 8.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

following this up with aid to the movement, aid which, significantly, predated Castro's declaration of Marxism-Leninism.[43]

The Congo was another area of Cuban interest. In mid-1965, the 200 Cubans already in the Congo to train guerrillas for the anti-Tshombe National Council of the Revolution, were joined by Guevara, and then participated in the fighting until December 1965, when the contingent went on to Brazzaville to train the national militia there and the guerrillas of both the PAIGC and the MPLA, one of whose columns entered Angola clandestinely under the name of the Camilo Cienfuegos Column.[44] In Brazzaville, the Cubans were, besides, involved with the defeat of an anti-government revolt in 1966.[45]

Other notable areas of interest at this stage included Ghana, where aid was given to the deposed Nkrumah,[46] Portuguese Guinea, where four Cubans were captured,[47] Zanzibar, where Cuban involvement in the overthrow of the Sultan was rumoured, and Jordan, where the Cubans advised El Fatah.[48]

In all this involvement, one of the longest links (and, clearly, the most relevant for this article) was that with the Angolan MPLA. First contacts were made in 1965, and 1966 saw Agostinho Neto, the leader of the MPLA, in Havana. From then on, the links between the Cubans and the MPLA were close, with many Angolans both studying and training in Cuba, several of whom were later to become prominent in the army and the Party after independence.[49]

In view of this, Cuba's response to the Angolan request for aid in 1975 could be seen as part of a long and close relationship. Moreover, the timetable of events in 1975 would seem to bear this out, with Neto making the first moves, requesting aid, arms shipments and possible wider aid, in May 1975,[50] and again in August requesting instructors to set up and run military training centres.[51] These requests were in response to the invasions of Angola by Holden Roberto's FNLA from Zaire in March and by the South Africans from Namibia in August.[52] The Cuban response was not as speedy as might have been expected, but in August, at the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Lima, Raúl Roa prepared the ground by declaring that the non-aligned states ought to act " in whatever manner required "[53] to hasten the decolonization process in Angola and Southern Africa. Thus far there had been

43 Guevara also followed this up by visiting Algeria in 1963.
44 García Márquez, p. 127.
45 *Keasing's Contemporary Archives*, 6–13 Apr. 1968, Vol. XVI, p. 22633.
46 Matthews, *Castro*, p. 274, and *Keasing's*, 27 Sept. 1966, Vol. XV, p. 21644.
47 *Latin America*, 12 Jan. 1968, Vol. II, p. 13.
48 Thomas, *Cuba*, p. 1479.
49 Thus the 2,000 Mozambican and Angolan children brought to study in Cuba (*The Guardian*, 22 June 1978) were very much part of a long-standing relationship.
50 García Márquez, p. 124.
51 Ibid. p. 124.
52 According to García Márquez (Ibid. p. 124), on 5 Aug., South African regulars crossed to protect the dams of the Raucana-Caluaqua hydro-electric complex.
53 Gonzalez, " Complexities," p. 10.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

little to support the accusations (made later) of Cuban haste to get involved in Africa or of the Cuban presence being unwelcome. The final decision to send troops was taken at a meeting of the PCC, on 5 November, apparently without any Soviet collaboration.[54] These troops were sent immediately to reinforce MPLA positions, and were backed up on 27 November by an artillery regiment and motorized field troops; but it was not until 22 December that Cuba officially recognized that it did indeed have combat troops in Angola.[55]

The whole episode, then, it would seem, represented no aberration or sudden change of policy, but, rather, a logical development of existing Cuban policy. But can the same be said of subsequent involvement elsewhere?

To take Shaba first. Despite wild accusations, common sense and a study of Cuban revolutionary policies and the repeated Cuban denials [56] all seem to indicate that there never was any real Cuban involvement in the invasion by Shaba rebels in May 1978. As Castro pointed out, such involvement would make little sense for Cuba, since it would provide the West with the perfect pretext for intervention and would also distract attention from the more important events in Southern Africa.[57]

However, the Cuban role in the Ethiopian-Somali conflict was real enough. In March 1977, while on his tour of Africa, Castro had attempted to mediate between the two; Cuba, in response to western and Somali claims, had then denied any involvement in November 1977, a denial confirmed by the Ethiopians themselves in the following January. But by February 1978 there were, according to western intelligence sources, some 2,000–2,500 troops in Ethiopia,[58] by April an estimated 15,000,[59] and by May, according to State Department officials, 17,000.[60]

Whatever justification there had been for Cuba's Angolan involvement, the same, apparently, was not the case with this latest episode; for Cuba had switched support, according to one observer, from one regime achieving reforms without bloodshed to a much more reprehensible regime,[61] and had begun to support actively a regime that was fighting to suppress the same Eritrean guerrillas that Cuba itself had supported only recently. Another observer had predicted that the Angolan affair

54 García Márquez, p. 128. *Latin American Political Report*, 24 Feb. 1978, Vol. XII, p. 62 also indicated reports that Cuba pushed the Soviet Union to give aid to the MPLA —the complete reverse of Horowitz's assertion (see earlier, footnote 17).

55 García Márquez, p. 135.

56 For example, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez in the United Nations General Assembly, on 29 May 1978.

57 In a conversation with New York Congressman S. Solarz, reported in *The Guardian*, 19 June 1978. Perhaps in view of Cuba's past willingness to admit any involvement, these denials have a certain credibility.

58 *Latin America Political Report*, 3 Feb. 1978, Vol. XII, No. 5, p. 36.

59 *The Guardian*, 28 Apr. 1978. This figure, in fact, referred to the whole Horn of Africa.

60 *The Guardian*, 17 May 1978.

61 Chiliand, " Cubans' Dubious Battles," p. 7.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was not a precedent for further African involvement, but had been proved wrong.[62] Yet this intervention seemed to lack the logic of the Angolan situation: there was no long history of support for the Dergue, no linguistic and cultural affinity, as there had been to some extent with the MPLA, and there was no world-wide support for the Dergue, as there had been for Neto's government—indeed, instead, it was the object of much criticism. So why the apparently incongruous intervention?

While admitting that wider global considerations must have played their part, there was a certain consistency in this latest involvement. For one thing, the Angolan campaign had caught Cuba in something of a trap, for having been seen once to be ready to intervene to aid an African government against western intervention (and the CIA role in the Angolan war was later proved to be real enough[63]), there was always the danger that any other country could point to a similar threat and request Cuban aid, a request that the Cubans might have difficulty in refusing. In this respect, while Angola may have represented a bonus for Cuba, Ethiopia may prove to be a millstone.

Secondly, Cuba's justification for coming to the aid of the Dergue (and one perhaps given credence by the Cubans' refusal to participate in any invasion of Somalia after the victory) was to protect Ethiopia's territorial integrity and to defeat Somalia's territorial ambitions—"The mad idea of a greater Somalia," said Castro, "carried them into the arms of the imperialist camp."[64] In this, of course, the Cubans were doing no more than upholding one of the basic tenets of the OAU: that of the inviolability of the colonial frontiers, something that, in fact, led Senegal—not known as a pro-Cuban nation—to support the Cuban role. It was also this principle of territorial integrity that led to Cuban readiness to aid the Ethiopians in their fight to prevent an Eritrean secession (which Castro, in fact, compared to Abraham Lincoln's defence of the American Union a century earlier[65]), although the Cubans' reluctance to get entangled in a potentially controversial and unpopular activity was also clear—indeed, they have tended to concentrate their energies in this respect on attempts to reach a political, rather than military, solution to the Eritrean dispute.

SO much, then, for the past and the present. What, though, of the future? What of the bugbear—presented by many western, Rhodesian and South African politicians—of a possible Cuban intervention in Southern Africa?

[62] Treverton, "Cuba after Angola," p. 21.

[63] I refer to, for example, John Stockwell's revelations in his book "In Search of Enemies," in which he disclosed the CIA's link with South Africa, its manufacture of "Cuban atrocity" stories and its support for both Unita and FNLA.

[64] Castro, speech delivered on 26 April 1978, reported in *Granma Weekly Review*, 7 May 1978, p. 2.

[65] Ibid. p. 2.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cuban links with various liberation movements in the area are certainly well known and well documented. In March 1977, for example, Castro met Nkomo (of the Patriotic Front), Nujoma (of SWAPO) and Tambo (of the ANC), while on his tour of Africa, and reaffirmed his support for the struggle "against imperialism" in the area.[66] There is, however, a world of difference between declarations of support and solidarity and actual physical commitment. Thus, on the same 1977 tour, Castro made clear that "the task of liberating white-ruled Africa was that of its inhabitants"[67]; thus, on another occasion, Cuban diplomatic officials assured the United States that Cuba would not send troops to Rhodesia, even if requested to do so by the Patriotic Front, although it was stressed that material support would be forthcoming.[68] The justification for this posture was simply that there was a clear difference between the situations in both Angola and Ethiopia, where aid for the purpose of defence had been requested by the respective governments, and that in Rhodesia. Moreover, this denial of intention seemed to be more than simply an obligatory public disclaimer, for it is clear that involvement in Southern Africa would be altogether a different matter from any African role to date—with the western powers already fully forewarned by Angola and Ethiopia, with the enemy vastly more capable and more determined than before, and with the clear prospect of a total polarization of world opinion and the possible loss of valuable economic links with the West—whatever kudos the Cubans might gain in the Third World for such involvement.

However, in spite of this improbability, the chances of a Cuban role in Southern Africa cannot be totally ruled out. Certainly, all the explanations so far offered for Cuban interest in Africa would seem to preclude any Cuban entanglement in the area—it would seem to be inconsistent with existing policy, it would involve the Cubans in a dangerous situation, and so on. But there is a further possible explanation of Cuba's African behaviour that may, perhaps, better illuminate the apparently incongruous Ethiopian episode and that may also point to the possibility of further Cuban intervention in the politics of Southern Africa. For this, I now turn to my fifth thesis—the "mobilization" thesis.

FROM the outset, one of the most essential—and many would say attractive—characteristics of the Cuban Revolution has been its heterodox, flexible, unstructured nature; it was certainly this aspect that made the Revolution so heretical to orthodox communism and so appealing to many in the West in the 1960s. In part, this reflected the essentially reactive and eclectic nature of the Revolution in the first 10 years—and the political and ideological vacuum—with an absence of plans, ideology and a strong movement to provide a structure and to

[66] *Keasing's*, 17 June 1977, Vol. XXIII, p. 28402.
[67] Ibid. p. 28402.
[68] *The Guardian*, 14 Apr. 1978.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

implement the reforms: in short, what has been described as a "revolution without a blueprint."[69] Instead, what kept the process moving and what determined its course were such factors as Castro's personality, the force of nationalism and the enthusiasm of the popular support for the Revolution. In part, though, this flexibility represented a deliberate policy on the part of the leadership, arising from a fear of institutionalization and bureaucratization of the revolutionary process, either because of the rise of a potential new power base (the growth of a self-sustaining bureaucratic and technocratic elite that might decelerate and redirect the process of radical change), or because of the ideological standpoint of the leaders—the attitude born out of the insurrection in the Sierra, the "guerrilla mentality" that had become the guiding light of both leadership and population, a faith in action rather than words, in the "foco" principle to be applied to all aspects of the Revolution, in instant decision-making and even improvisation, rather than in the steady construction of an apparatus that might well prove to be too unwieldy and slow.

Such an approach may have been attractive, but it provided no real answer to the problem of actually running a revolution that would survive economically and militarily, and of maintaining a means of communication between leaders and led, to prevent the rise of discontent and to adjust to popular demands. A proper structure might have provided such a means; the lack of a structure was, on the other hand, potentially dangerous. But the danger was averted already by the development of a typically unique and "fidelista" solution to the problem—the mechanism of mobilization.

Mobilization has, all along, made an essential contribution to Cuba's survival as a revolutionary society; it has indeed created an "alternative" structure, a means of communication, a form of democracy and a solid and genuine power base. It has taken four forms throughout the two decades of the Revolution: the various revolutionary organizations, the personal relationship between Castro and the population, the whole mythology of the Revolution, and the many mass mobilization campaigns.

The revolutionary organizations are many and, between them all, must encompass just about the whole Cuban population; the CTC (Cuban Workers' Confederation) included 1·5 million Cubans in 1966, the FMC (Federation of Cuban Women) some 1·3 million in 1969,[70] and the innumerable other organizations—UJC (Union of Cuban Youth), FAR, militias, ANAP (National Association of Small Farmers), etc.—leave few Cubans untouched by the revolutionary process. Of all these, the CDRs (Committees for the Defence of the Revolution) are undoubtedly the most uniquely Cuban and the most important in this overall mobilization, with duties ranging from vigilance and defence (at the

[69] Maurice Zeitlin, "Cuba: Revolution without a Blueprint," in Horowitz (ed.), *Cuban Communism*, p. 199.
[70] Edward Gonzalez, *The Limits of Charisma* (Boston, 1974), pp. 164–5.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

time of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961) to a whole number of other tasks, such as publicity, discussion of policy, community, health and educational activities, etc., all at the lowest, grass-roots level. Being the most basic element in the whole mobilization structure, with the biggest active membership (some 3·2 million in 1970[71]), the CDRs obviously cannot be overemphasized.

The second medium of mobilization is the special relationship that has grown up and, many would say, has been deliberately cultivated, between Fidel Castro, the "máximo líder," and the mass of the population, based on the obvious personal appeal and charisma of the former. This identification has been achieved over the years (although it was clearly strong in the earliest days of the Revolution) by way of the mass media, by Castro's regular, informal, "meet the people" involvement with the ordinary Cubans, and by the huge and impressive rallies in the Plaza de la Revolución in Havana, with, by all accounts, genuine and spontaneous—although some might say orchestrated—expressions of enthusiasm by the tens of thousands present. Whether such an identification is deliberate (and there is, it ought to be said, evidence to the contrary, evidence of Castro's dislike of any "personality cult"), it is certain that Castro's charisma and dynamism have maintained and even increased his undoubted personal popularity since 1959, and also that they have steered the Revolution through several crises of confidence and through several periods of demoralization.

MYTHOLOGY too is essential to the whole process,[72] for it has depended throughout on a whole series of myths—the myth of youth (the youth of the leaders in 1959 and the emphasis on youth in later years, culminating in the recent Festival of Youth in Havana), the myth of newness (especially in the earliest days, as a clear contrast to the stagnation, venality and corruption of the old, then discredited structure), the myth of nationalism and of Cuba's essentially syncretic (and not *Latin*) culture, the myth of morality (contrasted to both the materialism of the "corrupt" West and the "state capitalism" of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe), etc.

Lastly, mobilization has been effected, beyond all these media (although often with their collaboration), by way of the series of "one-off" campaigns, guerrilla-style in their conception and their execution, that involve, arouse, raise the morale of and politicize the population, either in response to a national need or to an economic or political crisis. The revolutionary process has seen a string of such campaigns: the Literacy Campaign of 1961,[73] the Bay of Pigs invasion, the two

[71] Ibid. p. 165.

[72] It should be emphasized that what is meant here by mythology is not myth in the sense of illusion, but a whole set of images and beliefs that, together, express and reflect the basic reason for being of a group.

[73] For a study of the impact of this particular campaign, Richard R. Fagen's *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba* (Stanford, 1969), is especially instructive.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agrarian reforms of 1959 and 1963, the industrialization drive of 1960–63, the Escambray campaign against the counter-revolutionary "bandidos," the campaign against both "sectarianism" and bureaucracy, the "Revolutionary Offensive" of 1968 (the attempt to drive for communism in one leap—without passing through the theoretically requisite phase of socialism—by nationalizing all remaining private enterprise, except in agriculture, by abolishing wage differentials, by stressing moral over material incentives, voluntary labour, etc.), projects such as the Havana Green Belt and Schools to the Countryside, and, in 1970, the biggest of all, the Ten Million Ton Harvest. In addition to these single campaigns, moreover, is the whole atmosphere of readiness and mobilization that pervades the daily life of most Cubans:

> The victory at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and, paradoxically, the blockade itself, gave the Cubans a sense of achievement and independence which has not been allowed to die. The Government, conscious of the need to maintain the spirit of alertness that the close geographic presence of the United States helped to create, has kept the country in a state of constant mobilisation.[74]

In the early days of the Revolution, such mobilization was relatively easy—indeed, most of the "campaigns" mentioned above took place in the first few years—with a genuine and not imagined external threat, realized in the Bay of Pigs and Escambray conflicts, with Cuba's isolation and the resultant hardship creating a sort of Cuban "Dunkirk spirit," with the enthusiasm of a society striving to break with the old and to forge a totally new structure, and with genuine support for Castro and the early reforms. In the mid-1960s, however, such enthusiasm showed signs of waning; economic hardship, with the imposition of rationing; increasing demands on labour, which led to growing absenteeism; a decline in the external threat, effectively after the 1962 missile crisis; and the failure of the Latin American guerrilla strategy, symbolized by the death of the popular Guevara—all took their toll of morale and increased discontent. What had been acceptable, and even welcome, in the early days, was now a burden. To some extent, the offensive of 1968 was a response to this "low," although there were, obviously, other, more compelling, reasons—notably the dispute with the Soviet Union and the internal struggle of the "fidelistas" with the pro-Moscow Escalante faction.

However, the failure of the Offensive (leading to even greater disruption and even more discontent) created an even greater need for new enthusiasm and, so, made the 1970 harvest, the culmination of the Offensive, even more critical. It was seen to be vital to the economy, to economic and political independence from the Soviet Union (providing

[74] Nissa Torrents, "Why the United States is eyeing the Cuban showcase," in *The Guardian*, 10 July 1978, p. 16. Such a "spirit of alertness" is also sustained by the continual guarding of buildings, the wearing and presence of uniforms, military service and the whole language of struggle.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the wherewithal for "take-off"), to public morale, to Castro's personal prestige and "personal charismatic authority,"[75] and to the prestige also of a uniquely Cuban definition of revolution. Since everything was staked on the harvest, the failure to achieve the target, despite a new record of 8·5 million tons, became especially damaging.

The economic failure—the neglect of everything to achieve the target—was soon remedied by better planning, rationalization of the economy and by Soviet aid, so that by the mid-1970s, the Cuban economy was flourishing more than it had ever done. The blow to popular morale was, however, less easily repaired, and enthusiasm, already dampened by this failure, was then reduced still more by some of the latest developments, notably the new orthodoxy, the lack of an external threat and the end of the blockade. There was a clear danger that those on whose enthusiasm the Revolution had depended for so long might not be able to react so fully to the new situation, devoid of all the emotive pressures of the early years. Moreover, many Cubans could no longer be so readily inspired by memories of the deprivation of the pre-1959 period or by the heroism of the first flush of revolution, quite simply because they were too young to remember them.

IN this situation, the development of a new campaign, in Africa—while being undertaken for a variety of other reasons, not least of them Cuba's commitment to revolution in the Third World—must have come as a godsend, providing the prospect of a totally new and exciting mobilization, a new danger to which to react and a new boost for Cuban pride, and a new set of myths created:

> The Cuban Revolution is 19 years old, and the African initiative has involved a whole generation of young Cubans who are not old enough to remember the Missile Crisis, the Bay of Pigs, or the literacy campaigns. No social process, least of all one which proclaims revolutionary change, can afford to stand still. More than 700 young schoolteachers are now flying out to Angola, and it is no accident that *Granma*, the Communist Party daily, is comparing them to the literacy campaigners who worked in the Escambray mountains and some of whom fell victim to the anti-Castro resistance of the 1960s.[76]

In this context, talk of Cuba's African origins and the image of the "return of the slaves"[77] are important myths to add to the others accumulated over two decades.[78]

[75] Gonzalez, "New Orthodoxy," p. 5.
[76] *Latin America Political Report*, 14 Apr. 1978, Vol. X, No. 14, p. 110.
[77] Marchant, "Castro's Cuba," p. 12.
[78] It should be emphasized at this stage that it is by no means my intention to maintain that the sole purpose of the African (or Angolan) campaign—or even one of the purposes—was to drum up enthusiasm and create a new mass mobilization; such a view would be simplistic in the extreme, ignoring the complexities of political reality and of Cuban political thinking, and denying the Cubans any credit for an ideological commitment to the Third World and to Angola (which I find, singly, the most

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The effectiveness of the campaign in this respect is something that has been confirmed by many observers. García Márquez, for example, has laid stress on the voluntary nature of the commitment, individually, of the Cuban soldiers (although, as with other voluntary activities in Cuba in the past, social pressures were strong), mobilized through the CDRs, and has stressed the high degree of political awareness of the volunteers:

> But there can be no doubt that the immense majority left for Angola filled with the conviction that they were performing an act of political solidarity, and with the same consciousness and bravery that marked the rout of the Bay of Pigs landing fifteen years earlier. That is why Operation Carlota was not a simple expedition by professional soldiers, but a genuine people's war.[79]

His description of the popularity of the campaign and the enthusiasm aroused among both participants and non-participants have been confirmed by other sources, which also stress the importance of the mobilization for Cuban pride.[80] This reversal of the decline ought not to be underestimated:

> Since the victory at the Bay of Pigs fifteen years ago, they have had to swallow with gritted teeth the murder of Che Guevara in Bolivia and of President Salvador Allende during the Chilean catastrophe; they have suffered the liquidation of the guerrilla struggle in Latin America, the endless night of blockade, and the hidden and implacable gnawing of those numerous past mistakes that have at times brought them to the brink of disaster. All these experiences, flanking the irreversible but slow and arduous successes of the revolution, must have built up in the Cubans the feeling that they were being subjected to an undeserved penance. Angola finally gave them the satisfaction of the great victory that they so badly needed.[81]

Moreover, if the concept and the myths of the campaign were not enough to arouse the population, the manner of the mobilization itself must have contributed. For, as García Márquez has noted, the scale of the operation, the speed and the improvisation (e.g. the use of patched-up Britannia aircraft to transport troops), the obstacles faced, especially those created by the United States, all add up to an operation reminiscent of the first, heroic, Cuban expedition—the landing of Castro and his force in Cuba in 1956—and, certainly, seem a far cry from the western-created image of a smooth, well-oiled and well-supplied, Soviet-backed operation. Instead, the image conveyed (which may well, of course, be the image that the Cubans themselves would prefer to project) is that

convincing explanation of the whole involvement). My purpose here is simply to indicate that *after* the intervention in Angola the aspect of mobilization may well have become a contributory factor in the determination of further African policy.

79 García Márquez, p. 129.

80 Ibid. p. 129 *passim*. *Latin America Political Report*, 24 Feb. 1978, Vol. XII, No. 8, p. 62, and 14 Apr. 1978, Vol. XII, No. 14, p. 110, confirms this impression.

81 García Márquez, p. 137.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of a small country, struggling against all the odds and at considerable personal cost to come to the aid of a political *confrère*.[82]

The similarity to the 1956 *Granma* expedition introduces another, perhaps important element—that of the effect on the leaders themselves. For the Angolan campaign may have given them a sort of vicarious echo of the Sierra days. García Márquez cites Castro's personal involvement and "absorption" in the campaign, even to the extent of directing operations from Havana.[83] Such an involvement, no doubt genuine and no mere image-building (Castro must have shared Guevara's impatience with the routine of administration and must have envied those participating in this new revolutionary conflict), also served another purpose—that of putting Castro back firmly into the centre of things in Cuban eyes.

For, as Gonzalez has noted, the post-1970 institutionalization of Cuban structures has involved a conflict between collective and individual authority,[84] between the "Sovietization" of institutions and Castro's attempts to maintain a personal role in the direction of the whole process. The Constitution of 1976 actually reflected the strength of Castro's position, by recognizing his central role (specifying a Head of State to preside over the organs of government), and the whole institutionalization process was actually turned to Castro's advantage, strengthening his following in the ruling echelons and winning him the Presidency and the control of the FAR.[85]

Seen in this light, the whole African intiative may well represent a reaffirmation of Castro's personal direction of the Revolution. Indeed, far from being a reflection of Cuban subservience to Soviet dictates, it may well, paradoxically, be the expression of Cuban nationalism (as both Gonzalez's "elite groups" thesis and my own comments would seem to suggest); for, just as there was a clear attempt to give the "nationalist imprimatur" to the post-1970 changes,[86] so too was the Angolan campaign a declaration of independence, pride and nationalism.

Thus, Ethiopia was a logical development of the Angolan campaign. Whatever the reasons for the initiation of that campaign, the enthusiasm that it created and the mobilization that it brought in its wake were clear bonuses for the Revolution that needed to be sustained, perhaps in new campaigns (that would give the FAR more experience and prestige) and new outlets for enthusiasm. By the same token, though, this may well lead to otherwise unlikely and unwise involvements in other parts of the African continent—whenever a government calls for aid while raising the spectre of western intervention—something that would, on the evidence of the Ethiopian campaign, find considerable support in the Cuban population—or whenever Cuban successes, Angola and Ethiopia, are threatened externally or internally.

82 Ibid. pp. 130–1.
83 Ibid. pp. 134–5.
84 Gonzalez, "New Orthodoxy," p. 1 *passim*.
85 Ibid. p. 8.
86 Ibid. p. 2.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rises and Falls of a CPI Leader

The Dange Letters

A. G. Noorani

THE Dange letters form a most interesting though strangely unnoticed episode in the history of the international communist movement in Asia. They throw much light on the personality of Shripad Amrit Dange, for 50 years one of its leading figures, on the techniques of the Communist Party of India and on the " revolutionary integrity of the Party."

Dange has received less attention from students of the communist movement in India than is his due. The 80-year-old Chairman has been one of Moscow's most consistent and trusted supporters in Asia. He enjoys a recognized position in the World Federation of Trade Unions which, in turn, enables him to influence the CPI.

In 1977 Dange resigned from the Secretariat, from the Central Executive Committee and from the Chairmanship of the National Council of the CPI " on grounds of health." [1] However, the 11th Party Congress held in April 1978 at Bhatinda re-elected him Chairman and he continues to occupy this post, despite the fact that on 4 April his basic formulation that the Party's support of the Emergency and of Indira Gandhi was " correct " was defeated at the Congress. " The isolation of the Party Chairman, Mr. Dange, in the Party plenum was complete." [2]

It is a measure of his enormous self-confidence that in November 1978 he flouted the Party line of equidistance between the Janata and Congress (I) parties and congratulated Indira Gandhi on her victory in the Chickmagalur by-election. On 27 November the Central Executive Committee took the unprecedented step of censuring the Party Chairman. After seeking clarification from him, it expressed its " strong disapproval of his statement as being in clear violation of the position of the Party. . . ." [3]

THE CPI might well have split, in any event, in 1964 on the pattern of the splits in the other communist parties in the wake of the Sino-Soviet schism. But the publication in March 1964 of Dange's compromising letters to the British authorities in India 40 years earlier " placed the kiss of death on all efforts to paper over the differences and avoid a split " as one writer put it.

Most revealing and instructive were the disclosures made by both factions. " I was in charge of work of the Communist International in India, according to the assignment letters sent to me," Dange boasted.[4] He alleged that during " the sectarian adventurist period of 1948–50 . . .

[1] *New Age*, 8 Jan. 1978. [2] *The Statesman*, 5 Apr. 1978.
[3] *The Times of India*, 28 Nov. 1978.
[4] In his article entitled " Splitters' Arsenal of Falsehoods " in *New Age* (weekly organ of CPI), 24 May 1964.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

many good honest comrades were liquidated . . . on mere suspicion and whispers. . . ."

He mentioned two leading figures, Ravi Narain Reddy and S. G. Patkar, whose lives were in danger because their loyalty was suspect and who survived only because they left their dens in time. "The suspicion and orders to deal with the 'suspect' went about in the Party, in the underground dens, just on the mere pleasure of the General Secretary [5] or his favourite assistants."

On the other hand, Dange's contemporary, Muzaffar Ahmad, charged that "Dange commenced his political career as an agent of the British Government in India," that he was "very much hand in glove with Sir Victor Sassoon, the well-known mill-owner of Bombay" and that while "Dange did not believe in internationalism . . . he did not have, nor has now any aversion to pocketing money from international sources." [6]

The episode of the Dange letters has two facets, their use and content. The first relates to their publication and impact on the Communist Party of India; the second to their content, authenticity and implications.

ON 7 March 1964 *Current*, a Bombay weekly known for its anti-Communist views, published the following document:

C/o. The Superintendent,
District Jail,
Sitapur (U.P. of A.O.)

From
Shripat Amrit Dange,
(4 years R.I. under sec. 121A I.P.C.
In the Bolshevik Conspiracy Case of Cawnpore)

To
His Excellency the Governor General in Council.

Your Excellency,

I am one of the four in the Bolshevik Conspiracy case of Cawnpore. I beg to put forward for your Excellency's consideration a prayer for the remission of my sentence for following reasons:

In submitting my prayer I have to refer to certain facts, which your Excellency may not be cognisant of; but Your Excellency can verify their truth by referring to Col. C. Kaye, Director, Central Intelligence Bureau, or to the persons mentioned hereinafter.

When the above referred case was proceeding in the lower Court Mr. Ross Alstron, the learned Counsel for prosecution happened to have a side talk with me, during the course of which he remarked, Government is not very particular about the punishment of the

[5] Then B. T. Ranadive.

[6] Muzaffar Ahmad, *Myself and the Communist Party of India 1920–1929* (National Book Agency P. Ltd., Calcutta, 1970), p. 320. The autobiography elaborates the charges levelled in his articles in 1964 and published in the pamphlet *S. A. Dange and the National Archives* (Vanguard Publishers, Calcutta, 1964).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

individual accused. The case is instituted only to prove to a doubting public the truth of Government's statement, made from time to time as to the existence of Bolshevik Conspiracy in India. I think the learned Counsel is not likely to have misrepresented Your Excellency's Government's policy, as he was in too close a touch with Government's officials to have mistaken Government's intentions. As the position of Your Excellency has been vindicated by the verdict of the Court, Your Excellency may not mind remitting my sentence and granting my prayer.

I might also refer to another incident. Exactly one year back, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, of Bombay, Mr. Stewart, was having a conversation with me, in his office regarding my relations with M. N. Roy and an anticipated visit to me of certain persons from abroad. During the course of the conversation the Honourable officer let drop a hint in the following words, the full import of which I failed to catch at that moment. Mr. Stewart said, " you hold an exceptionally influential position in certain circles here and abroad. Government would be glad if this position would be of some use to them." I think I still hold that position. Rather it has been enhanced by the prosecution. If Your Excellency is pleased to think that I should use that position for the good of Your Excellency's Government and the country, I should be glad to do so, if I am given the opportunity by Your Excellency granting my prayer for release.

I am given the punishment of four years' rigorous imprisonment in order that those years may bring a salutory change in my attitude towards the King Emperor's sovereignty in India, I beg to inform Your Excellency that those years are unnecessary, as I have never been positively disloyal towards His Majesty in my writings or speeches nor do I intend to be so in future.

Hoping this respectful undertaking will satisfy and move Your Excellency to grant my prayer and awaiting anxiously a reply.

I beg to remain,
Your Excellency's Most
Obedient Servant,
Shripat Amrit Dange.

Written this day 28th July, 1924.
Endorsement No. 1048, dated 31.7.1924.
Forwarded in original to I.G. of Prisons U.P. for disposal.

Sd/ W. P. Cook
Col. I.M.S.
Superintendent of Jail.

Seal of I.G. Prisons
13070 Dated 1.8.1924.

The immediate impact of the publication of this letter and the journal's reference to similar letters was not unlike that of the discovery of a spouse's letters to a lover. Profession of loyalty to the British Crown could, perhaps, be explained away as a ritual. Not so, the offer of services to the Crown in return for a release from prison. The more

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

damning the contents of the letter, the greater the stakes in the issue as to its authenticity.

The Secretariat of the National Council of the CPI adopted a very foolish course. It issued a statement on 13 March, branding the letters as " forgeries " without even the pretence of a verification in the National Archives. It said

> The CURRENT says that the alleged letters were found by some research scholars who went to the National Archives of the Government of India. On enquiry, the Secretariat has found that typed copies of these letters are being surreptitiously circulated by some people, obviously with a view to attack the character of the Chairman of the Communist Party of India, spread vile slanders against him in order to disrupt the Communist Party and the mass movement led by it.[7]

It likened the letter published by *Current* to the famous Zinoviev letter published, incidentally, in the very year in which Dange's letter purported to have been written. " The real truth is that no such letters were ever written." The statement was issued after consultation with Dange and probably as drafted by him.[8]

Dange's opponents in the Party readily admitted later that copies of the documents had reached them three months before *Current* published them, but they did not raise the matter in the Central Executive Committee in January 1964 because they did not think it would be " correct and prudent " to do so " without ascertaining the authenticity of this material."

IT took them three months and publication in *Current* to take the obvious steps of going to the Archives. On 16 March M. Basavapunniah together with P. Ramamurti and " another non-Party MP " visited the National Archives, and " obtained permission for research into the history of the Communist movement during the period from 1921 to 1933, as the records are available only up to that year." [9]

They went again on 17 and 19 March and were stunned by what they saw and read. There were four letters in all written in Dange's own handwriting and signed by him, one together with another accused in the Cawnpore Case, Nalini Das Gupta. Three were in File No. 421 of 1924 and the other in File No. 278 of 1925. There was, in fact, a volume of correspondence, reports of the then Bombay, U.P. and Central Governments during the years 1922–27 dealing with the political and personal assessment of Dange. All this material, including the letters, had been

[7] *Dange Unmasked* (New Delhi, 1964), p. 21, a useful compilation of documents published by the left faction of the CPI later organized as the Communist Party of India (Marxist).

[8] *New Age*, 24 May 1964.

[9] *Dange Unmasked*, p. 30. Basavapunniah's letter to National Council Members, 25 Mar. 1964.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

part of the Government records with proper index files printed in the Government Press, Simla, for the period 1922–27.[10]

Emboldened by the discovery, R. Umanath MP wrote to the Party's Central Executive Committee on 20 March documenting the charge that the letters " under no stretch of imagination could be said to be forged or planted. They are genuine and original and in Com. Dange's own handwriting."

As well as the three letters already known, he found a fourth letter, also by Dange, appealing for mercy after the rejection of his appeal by the High Court. What is more, he found " cross references to this mercy petition of Com. Dange in various other correspondence and different files." [11]

Basavapunniah also wrote to members of the National Council on 25 March, giving the results of his research and complaining that no meeting either of the executive or the Council had been called though it was over a fortnight since the letters had been published. To force their hands, he held a press conference the very next day with P. Ramamurti, thus making public the rift in the Party.[12]

The Secretariat was undeterred, however. On 1 April it returned to the attack, this time directed more explicitly at the critics within the Party. It announced that the National Council would meet on 10 April " to deal with this grave inner-Party situation." Two days later it dubbed a meeting of some of the Party members, which was then being held in New Delhi, as " a conference to set up a new rival Communist Party." [13]

Both factions began preparing for a show-down. On 6 April nine members of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) including A. K. Gopalan, P. Sundarayya and Jyoti Basu, now Chief Minister of West Bengal, replied to the Secretariat's charges and, in doing so, levelled yet one more charge against Dange. It had come to light that Dange had bought shares to the value of Rs.30,000, under an assumed name, S. Amrat, in the company which owned the pro-CPI daily *Patriot*.

> It is not known what funds were used for this investment. As is known, the *Patriot* is used against the so-called Left. Equally worthy of note is the fact that the Central Executive Committee of the Party, some years back, had directed that no member of the Party should have anything to do with the *Link*, a sister paper run by the same people who publish the *Patriot*.[14]

The greatest shock came when Muzaffar Ahmad, Dange's co-accused in the Cawnpore trial, went to the Home Ministry to inspect the letters, along with other members of the Left group. The file had by now been removed to the Home Ministry from the Archives in view of the rush of

[10] Ibid. pp. ii and 31.
[11] Ibid. p. 17.
[12] Ibid. p. 32.
[13] Ibid. p. 28.
[14] Ibid. p. 40.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

" research scholars." MPs and a few others were, however, allowed to inspect the file.[15]

Ahmad pronounced his verdict: " From my 42 years' acquaintance with Shripat Dange's handwriting I am declaring with full responsibility that the letters written by him from Sitapur District Jail are in his own handwriting." He fortified this conclusion by adding:

> I found some of my letters in the file. Most of them were written from Rae Bareli District Jail. They are either on the subject of better treatment or on the subject of my transfer to the Alipore Central Jail, Calcutta. These letters are surely in my handwriting and not forged or planted by anybody.[16]

EVENTS moved swiftly to a finale. The CEC met on 9 April with the following agenda:

> (1) Resolution on the disruptive and anti-Party activities of certain leading Party members;
> (2) Consideration of the alleged " Dange Letters ";
> (3) Tasks of the mass movement.

The Leftists questioned the priorities of the items and demanded that Chairman Dange relinquish the chair while his conduct was being discussed. Receiving no satisfaction on either demand, they walked out. They were 12 in all, including Bhupesh Gupta, who, however, did not follow the others when they left the CPI to form the CPI (M). The CEC proceeded to recommend to the National Council the expulsion of seven of them.

The drama was repeated in the National Council. On 10 April the Council adjourned for informal talks which, however, failed to evolve any compromise formula. The Leftists revealed that:

> Almost all the secretariat members in private had admitted that the letters were genuine, but tried to find excuses for Dange that they were forty years old, etc. But they could not take this stand openly because that would do immense harm to their prestige and also jeopardise their political line whose leader was Dange. It was in defence of their revisionist line that they wanted to cover up such a serious matter as the Dange letters. . . . That is why they rejected all reasonable demands for a joint commission to probe the letters, the proposal for taking legal action against the *Current*, etc.[17]

The result was a walk-out by 32 members of the Council.[18]

After the walk-out, Dange declined to preside when the letters were being discussed. The Council adopted, on 15 April, a resolution holding

[15] The Left Communists bitterly complained of the restriction, while begging of the Government to preserve the documents.

[16] For Ahmad's Note, dated 15 Apr. 1964, see ibid. p. 13.

[17] " Fight Against Revisionism ": Political-Organizational Report adopted at the Seventh Congress of the CPI 31 Oct.-7 Nov. 1964, Calcutta. The Leftists still styled themselves the CPI—the real thing.

[18] See *Dange Unmasked*, p. 45 for the texts of their statements of 11 Apr.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that " not even a prima facie case has been made out that the letters are genuine." All the same, " in order to make a more extensive examination " of the material it appointed a committee consisting of S. V. Ghate, G. Adhikari, C. Rajeswara Rao, Bhupesh Gupta, Achuta Menon, Sohan Singh Josh and Hiren Mukherjee.

The 32 who had walked out were suspended from Party membership by the Council. Even so, it is significant that the issue of *New Age* which published the Council resolutions also published the full text of the statement of the 32.[19] The details of the procedures of splitting a Communist Party need not detain us.[20] The Left Communists met at a Convention in Tenali, Kerala in July and decided to hold the Seventh Party Congress in October at Calcutta.

The Right Communists, on the other hand, held the Seventh Party Congress at Bombay in December. Among the very many resolutions it adopted was one endorsing the National Council's resolution on the findings of the seven-member Committee it had set up to examine the Dange letters.

The Committee was divided. Both the majority and the minority reports were remarkably awkward in their reasoning. The majority consisted of Ghate, Adhikari, Rajeswara Rao, Achuta Menon and Hiren Mukherjee. Their verdict about the letters was: " their genuineness appears doubtful but unfortunately they cannot be proved false." After considering Dange's record they opined, " very likely they are forgeries prepared for purposes of long-term political use against Communism in India " and concluded that " the letters are not likely to be genuine. We, therefore, accept Dange's denial that he has not written them."

The minority report, signed by Bhupesh Gupta and Sohan Singh Josh, poured cold water on the theory of forgery by the British intelligence. " They were unlikely to have done so on the basis of a calculation that young Dange of 24 would some day turn out to be a seasoned revolutionary and communist leader when this well-prepared and well-preserved time bomb should be exploded to blow him up."

Their conclusion was as queer as that of the majority—" It does not stand proved that any of the four ' Dange Letters ' is forged. The denial of Com. Dange that he ever wrote these ' Letters ' has not been substantiated or sustained even to the minimum extent necessary." But they would not pronounce them genuine, either.

> If, on the strength of the evidence, we do not adjudge the letters forged, neither are we prepared to declare that they are genuine mainly in view of Com. Dange's denial. We would not like to condemn Com. Dange without being one hundred per cent certain about the genuineness of these letters and without satisfying ourselves that there does not exist an iota of doubt about their genuineness. We are fully conscious that this approach of ours may not be

[19] *New Age*, 19 Apr. 1964.

[20] See Mohan Ram's *Indian Communism: Split Within A Split* (Vikas, New Delhi, 1969) for a detailed but pro-CPI (M) account.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> tenable in jurisprudence or in a court of law. But then we are not a law court, nor is the issue before us a civil or criminal suit.[21]

The Reports were presented to the delegates at midnight "through an ingenious method which avoided the leaders being exposed to immediate reaction from the rank and file." [22] The Congress dutifully endorsed the Council resolution which accepted that the letters "are not genuine." [23]

Thus was the curtain rung down on a murky episode. But not quite. For Hiren Mukherjee MP appended to the majority report, which he had signed, a separate note referring to the doubts expressed by the authors of the minority report. His note, as illogical as both reports, sought to bridge the gulf between them.

> I find myself unable entirely to disregard their hesitation. Besides, during the investigation, we got to know of certain things in regard to the functioning of the Party leadership at the highest level which, to say the least, are harmful to the cause we all hold dear. We did not thoroughly examine them, for it was beyond our terms of reference, but left, as it were, a bad taste in the mouth. Further, certain actions on the part of Comrade Dange and some of his friends during this period implied belittlement, which I feel was unwarranted, of the political and moral seriousness of the charges which we were investigating and which had, by shaking the Party to its roots, helped the disruptive forces arrayed against our movement. I am, therefore, of the opinion that in view of this situation the National Council should take upon itself to ask Comrade Dange to step down from the Chairmanship of the party and not to offer himself, during the ensuing Party Congress, for election either as Chairman or as General Secretary.

THE reports, therefore, do not solve the riddle of the letters. Their logic reveals only the tortuous working of a communist party. However, in the debate which followed the publication, enough material has come to light to provide ground for fairly definite conclusions.

A most remarkable contribution appeared in the pro-CPI weekly *Mainstream* in the issue of 11 April 1964 in time for the National Council meeting. It appeared under the pseudonym "Ferishta." He cited a discrepancy on which Dange also relied much to prove that the letters were forgeries.

> In the letter dated May 24, 1924 (asking for his transfer from Cawnpore to Yerawada jail) the signature is spelt correctly as Dange does: "Shripad Amrit Dange." But in the letter dated July 28, 1924 (in which Dange offers his service to the British Government), the signature is spelt as "Shripat Amrit Dange." The difference between Shripad and Shripat is a serious one, because in Marathi, Shripad is a Brahmin name, while Shripat is non-Brahmin. It is like

21 *National Marxist*, Mar.-Apr. 1965 for the text of the conclusions of both Reports.
22 *The Statesman* (New Delhi) 21 Dec. 1964.
23 *New Age*, 3 Jan. 1965.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> the difference in Bengali betwen " Maitra " (Brahmin) and " Mitra " (non-Brahmin).

This drew from Basavapunniah a withering retort:

> Dange as late as in 1962 clandestinely purchased shares for Rs.30,000 in the company owning " Patriot " and got his name hidden under the pseudonym of " S. Amrit." When caught red-handed he offers silly explanations. Is it surprising that he is capable of resorting to any trick that suits his purpose? [24]

There was another explanation. The prosecution's complaint against him cited the case as " King Emperor vs. Shripat Amrit Dange." In his statement before the Sessions Judge, too, Dange gave his name as Shripat.[25]

Inconsistently with his argument challenging the genuineness of the letters, " Ferishta " gave an explanation which assumed their genuineness and which might well represent the truth. Dange was scheduled to go to the Fifth Congress of the Comintern in 1924 due to be held in June 1924. The Cawnpore case had upset his plans. It was

> quite plausible that Dange might have been anxious to come out of prison trying to hoodwink the British authorities with such a daring letter. And the British, astute as they were in handling such cases, and looking at Dange's record, refused to be taken in by the ruse and rejected even such a tempting offer by an ace Communist.

Dange himself was none too consistent in propounding his case. In one and the same article he wrote " what is being shown around as my letters are a forgery made by British Intelligence for their sinister purpose . . ." only to proceed to ask: " But do the Archives contain only what the British left behind? Can they not be added by those in charge? "

A high official of the Archives had visited the Chinese embassy and was reprimanded by the Government for it. " Did he receive anything at the reception as to (sic) help him in his research at the Archives? " Dange asked. He also made a veiled reference to " Ferishta's " explanation without repudiating it explicitly.[26]

IF such inconsistencies cast doubt on Dange's credibility, the circumstantial evidence and the notings on the files destroy it completely.

In June 1922 Dange attracted the attention of Lt.-Col. Cecil Kaye, Director of the Intelligence Bureau of the Home Department of the Government of India, when he read a review of Dange's book *Gandhi v. Lenin* in *The Bombay Chronicle*.[27]

On 7 February 1923, Kaye made this comment in a note:

[24] *Dange Unmasked*, p. iv.
[25] Muzaffar Ahmad, p. 385.
[26] "Splitter's Arsenal of Falsehoods " *New Age*, 17 and 24 May 1964.
[27] Sir Cecil Kaye, *Communism In India* (Editions Indian, Calcutta, 1971), p. 17.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Dange seems to be losing heart, as a conspirator—his paper the "Socialist" has been more moderate lately and I have seen correspondence showing that the Communists in Lahore and Calcutta are complaining that he has failed them. Roy does not know him personally; only by reputation, chiefly of Dange's own making—my own information is that Dange is not the stuff of which revolutionaries are made.[28]

The Government of India was preparing to prosecute the leading Communist. Lawyers were being consulted and the advice of Provincial Governments was also being sought.

Montgomerie, Bombay's Home Secretary, wrote to Crerar, his counterpart in New Delhi, on 16 July 1923, counselling against Dange's prosecution.

> It would be more politic to continue to keep a close watch on Dange and his activities. *He is our most fruitful source of information as to Bolshevist activities and he is not himself at present a particularly prominent Bolshevist.* He has had failure in the propaganda efforts, he has been in bad health and has been shouldered out of his leading position by Singaravelu of Madras. *If he remains quiescent, he will provide us regular and useful information.* If he becomes more dangerous and develops a more practical propaganda of sedition, it will probably be possible to prosecute him under Section 121–A, Indian Penal Code.[29] [My italics]

Kaye advised that the Government of Bombay's views should be accepted. His contempt for Dange was unbounded. "He is personally, a mere worm: and this does support the belief that he is not worth powder and shot," Kaye wrote on 27 July. He added,

> Even the most insignificant insects, however, are often dangerous foci of infection and I think that a perusal of Dange's letter to Roy, which is reproduced in my Current weekly report (now being printed) will show that he is decidedly infectious. The letter unmistakably acknowledges assistance, either in kind or money, from Roy, and exposes the intention of the writer to continue to work in furtherance of Roy's programme though Dange shies at the "illegal" part—a defection which he covers in fine phrases, but which is, in fact, a confession of personal cowardice. I think that a severe official talking to, by someone in authority—not a police authority—would probably frighten Dange effectively; he is quite obviously very nervous already.[30]

Later, he modified his advice to suggest that "the warning proposed to be administered to Dange" should be given only after a case in Madras was over.

Montgomerie went on pressing his view that Dange not be prosecuted. He wrote on 25 January 1924,

[28] Home Department File No. 261 of 1924 quoted in *Dange Unmasked*, p. 8.
[29] Muzaffar Ahmad, p. 344.
[30] *Dange Unmasked*, p. 9.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> The Government of Bombay have no objection to the inclusion of Dange among the accused provided there is a watertight case against him. They do not think that it would be advisable to prosecute him merely to show up the conspiracy. They still think as indicated in my D.O. letter No. S.D. 1243 dated the 16th July 1923, that he is more useful to us than dangerous. *I am particularly hopeful that if he is left alone, something further may come up in the negotiations referred to in the letter from the Commissioner of Police, Bombay No. D. 1125, dated 3rd Nov. last, a copy of which was endorsed direct to the Director of Intelligence Bureau.* Would you let me know your views again before you definitely decide to take action [against] him? [31]

But Kaye minuted on 31 January 1924:

> I think there is a strong case against Dange; and, in any event, it would be impossible to leave his name out; it would necessarily figure conspicuously in the trial and the fact that he himself was not included would certainly lead to the presumption that this was done deliberately, with an ulterior purpose.[32]

The upshot was that Dange was prosecuted on a charge of sedition in the Cawnpore Communist Conspiracy Case together with Muzaffar Ahmad, Shaukat Usmani, and Nalani Gupta, the co-signatory to one of the Dange letters.

In the pre-trial proceedings in the Magistrate's Court, Dange made a statement, on 28 March 1924, which astonished his colleagues. He said:

> I started to spread the doctrine of socialism even before Mr M. N. Roy was heard in India to be working on behalf of the Communist International. I wrote a book and started a paper. The book and the paper were sent to the press in Europe as well as in India. That perhaps attracted the attention of M. N. Roy and the Communist International. When the sessions of the Communist International were being held in 1922, an individual was sent to me. He met me in Bombay. He represented himself to be coming to me under a mandate from the Communist International. He did not show me any document from the Communist International and asked me if I could attend a session of the Communist International. Ashleigh was the name of the gentleman. In one of the exhibits he is referred to as Nandlal. I asked him about the intentions and policy of M. N. Roy and the Communist International, and *when I was given to understand that it meant the breaking away of India from the British Empire I told him that I could not join the Communist International or attend its sessions.* After that as I was given the address of M. N. Roy by Ashleigh I addressed him on the subject. Meanwhile I was going on with my work of socialist propaganda. As it was a necessity for me as an editor to have complete knowledge of the European movement, I maintained connections with Roy in order to get the required information. When

[31] *Dange Unmasked*, p. 10.
[32] Ibid. p. 11.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reuter telegraphed Roy's programme to India, *I disapproved of his programme through my paper*. As regards the visit of Ashleigh and my connections with Roy I issued a statement in the vernacular press on 5 July 1923 stating the facts as they were. I am not a member of the conspiracy to deprive the King Emperor of his sovereignty of British India by a violent revolution. Neither have I assisted the furtherance of any such conspiracy, and if it be within the powers of this Court—I do not know the law—I beg to be acquitted or discharged.

This statement is available in the newspapers of the day.[33]

The trial proper began on 22 April before one of the worst Sessions Judges in the country, H. E. Holme, who had acquired notoriety for his savage sentences in the Chauri Chaura Case. The accused were found guilty and each was sentenced to four years' rigorous imprisonment.

THERE now began the series of the Dange letters. The first was written on 24 May 1924, just four days after conviction, and pleaded for a transfer to Bombay on grounds of health and to facilitate contact with the family.[34] The letter read thus:

Cawnpore Distr. Jail
24th May, 1924

To
The District Magistrate,
Cawnpore,
Submitted
for orders.

Sir,

I, Shripad Amrit Dange, hereby beg to put before you the following petition for favourable consideration. I have been sentenced by Session Judge Cawnpore to four years' rigorous imprisonment. I do not belong to United Provinces and have been brought here, under warrant, from Bombay. I wish to be returned to the Bombay Presidency for following reasons.

The climate of this province is not suited to my health. This province is too hot for me now and will be too cold later on—such is not the case in Bombay or Poona City, where I have passed the greater part of my life.

I do not know the language of this province and it causes me much inconvenience in my conduct towards officials, high and low. It is difficult for me to make myself understood, for example, to the warders or convict overseers appointed to be with me. And moreover, it is some consolation to hear one's own language spoken about to hear " Suffolk people talking Suffolk."

My family relations and my friends are in Bombay. The Jail rules allow interview at fixed period. But, if I am kept in this

[33] *The Times of India*, 31 Mar. 1924.
[34] Ibid. p. 1.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

province, myself will not get the advantage nor my family relations will be able to take advantage of this rule, as this place is too far away and my relations, being not rich, cannot afford to spend much money on the journey every time.

They are also trying to file an appeal on my behalf and want to make arrangement under my instructions, from Bombay. If you would kindly transfer me from here to the Poona Central Jail (Yarrowada Jail) or Bombay they can facilitate arrangements of Appeal by interviewing me, with the permission of the authorities very easily without loss of much time and money, to which they will be put by my being far away from their place. Taking these things into consideration, will you be pleased to concede to my request and oblige.

Yours Obedient Servant,
Shripad Amrit Dange

On 7 July came another signed by both Dange and Nalini Gupta:

> We the undersigned, beg to inform you that we are willing to give an undertaking to Government not to commit any more offences, for which we are at present convicted and we shall be thankful to Government if they will deign to consider our request favourably and release us as soon as possible, as we are undergoing suffering which we cannot sustain. We shall be personally thankful to you if you will arrange with Government for our petition being granted." [35]

That very day, the four accused were being transferred to different jails. Muzaffar Ahmad holds that the letter was written and signed by Dange for himself and on behalf of Gupta.

Next came the petition of 28 July to the Viceroy, reproduced at the beginning of this article, in which Dange offered to use his " position for the good of Your Excellency's Government and the country."

Dange was informed on 21 October that his petition would not be considered till the disposal of his appeal by the High Court. The appeal was dismissed on 10 November. Dange sent a reminder to the Viceroy on 16 November.[36] It reads:

From
Shripat Amrit Dange, Esqr.
Distr. Jail,
Sitapur (U.P.).

To
His Excellency,
The Governor-General-in-Council.

Your Excellency,

Pending my appeal before the Hon. High Court, Your Excellency's Government were not prepared to take into consideration my petition, dated 26th July, 1924, re. remission of my sentence, in

[35] Ibid. p. 2.
[36] Ibid. p. 7.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

what is known as the Bolshevik Conspiracy Case of Cawnpore. The decision of the Government was conveyed to me in their communication No. 5718/VI—1376D/Nainital 11–10–24 forwarded with the endorsement No. 22594/E 37 of 24 D/21–10–24, of the Inspector General of Police, U.P.

My appeal having now been dismissed, I beg to bring the same petition to Your Excellency's notice for consideration and await favour.

I beg to remain,
Your Obdt. Servant,
Shripat Amrit Dange

16th November 1924.

Thus ended the last of the four letters.

WHAT lends authenticity to the letters is that they are fully corroborated by the cross reference to them in official correspondence. These could not have been forged too.

Thus File 278/1925 Poll. contains a note dated 20 January 1925, by H. D. Hodge, Additional Deputy Secretary Government of India, who recalls all the three petitions by Dange praying for release including the one "hinting at a willingness on his part to act as an agent for Government." The note suggested that the views of the Director of the Intelligence Bureau be invited and remarked "it may possibly be considered politic to consider the appeals." [37]

David Petrie, who had succeeded Cecil Kaye as Director, recommended on 28 January 1925 rejection of the petition. On 13 February Cerar, the Home Secretary, expressed his agreement with Petrie and the petition was rejected.

In the light of this documentation, which was available to the public, the reaction of the CPI's seven-man committee was as strange as was that of the leadership generally. One cannot help suspecting that they cynically accepted "Ferishta's" explanation of a ruse by Dange to hoodwink the British authorities, but had not the courage to say so openly. Dange himself did not back up "Ferishta" but his innuendoes about his role as a Comintern functionary seemed enough for the Party leaders who wanted to support him anyway in the situation in which they found themselves.

As we have seen, the CPI (M) perceived this:

> Almost all the secretariat members in private had admitted that the letters were genuine, but tried to find excuses for Dange that they were forty years old, etc. But they could not take this stand openly because that would do immense harm to their prestige and also jeopardise their political line whose leader was Dange. It was in defence of their revisionist line that they wanted to cover up such a serious matter as the Dange letters.

[37] *Dange Unmasked*, p. 11.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is unlikely that the leaders of the Left Communist faction, who formed the CPI (M), would have reacted differently were it not for their political differences with the Dange group. But conditioned as they were in the atmosphere of 1964, the abject letters gave a genuine shock to them and more so to the rank and file. There was deep revulsion against the personality of Dange and it continued to influence them until Dange's hold on the CPI weakened after the lifting of the Emergency and his line of support to it was rejected as a major error at the Bhatinda Congress in April 1978.

Dange presided over the CPI's National Council when it met in New Delhi from 23 to 25 September 1979. In his press briefings, the Party's General Secretary, C. Rajeswara Rao, made little secret of the fact that Dange still adhered to his pro-Mrs Gandhi line. The National Council, however, decisively rejected Dange's approach and strongly criticized Mrs Gandhi.[38] In spite of such criticism and notwithstanding his past, when Dange's 80th birthday came (on 10 October 1979), it was duly celebrated by the Communist Party of India. But soon he was censured again for congratulating H. N. Bahuguna, when this former Minister in the Janata Government switched over to Mrs Gandhi. Shortly afterwards (on 26 November 1979), facing the possibility of expulsion, Dange resigned from his position and from the Central Executive Committee of the Party of which he was one of the founders, then Secretary and, for the last 17 years, Chairman.

[38] *New Age*, 30 Sept. 1979.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lenin and the Cheka: the Real Lenin

Michael Heller

THE debate about Lenin goes on. In the case of Stalin, everything is clear: he was a tyrant, a villain. Even those in the Soviet Union who talk of the need for a "return to Stalin" do not dispute this appraisal of him.

They are merely talking of the need for tyranny, villainy, individual power and a strong personality. The debate about Lenin, however, goes on. Who was he? The mythical Father of the Revolution and of the post-revolutionary State? Omniscient, all-seeing and all-powerful, a sort of God? A kind-natured man who loved children and animals? Or a blood-stained monster, the forerunner of Stalin? Was there a little of all of these in him? In what proportion? All these questions continue to occupy historians and writers, for it is now quite clear that without Lenin there would have been no October Revolution. Consequently, understanding Lenin means understanding, in a certain sense, the October Revolution and thus, also in a certain sense, understanding the Soviet Union, which today casts its shadow over the entire globe.

An anthology of documents entitled *Lenin and the VCheKa*, published in Moscow in 1975, provides new material for us to continue the debate about Lenin. Stalinists, anti-Stalinists, Trotskyites and Maoists have turned to Lenin—and still do—to legitimize their claims to the truth and to power. Now it is the KGB who have turned to Lenin in search of legitimization. The chairman of the editorial board of *Lenin and the VCheKa* is S. K. Tsvigun, deputy chairman of the KGB. The editorial board includes historians from the Soviet "organs" and also "practical workers." The aim of the anthology is to present Lenin as the patron saint of the VCheKa and thus of all its subsequent transformations: OGPU, the NKVD and the KGB.

The vast majority of the 532 documents which go to make up the anthology has already been published either in the *Collected Works* of Lenin or in the anthology *From the History of the VCheKa* (1958) [*Iz Istorii VChK*]. The fresh material reveals nothing new, but supplements what is already known with new details. As Catherine wrote to Voltaire: "It is easy to give general rules. But the details?"

V. I. Lenin and the VCheKa is filled with details which enable us to interpret, often in a new light, many apparently well-known "general rules" and theses. Although published in Moscow, it can be seen as a sequel to Solzhenitsyn's book. We have had *Lenin in Zurich*. Now we have *Lenin in Petrograd* and *Lenin in Moscow*. *V. I. Lenin and the VCheKa* is an account of the activities of the former Zurich émigré after he became leader of Russia.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE retention of power by the Bolsheviks after the October coup has been explained as a miracle, as chance, as a result of the inexorable laws of history or the genius of Lenin. In his science-fiction novel *The Man From Outside,* the American writer Jack Williamson tells of a stranger who arrives from space and meets a young man of short stature with a large forehead and keen eyes. The encounter takes place at the end of the 19th century in remote Siberia. The stranger from space, a representative of a civilization which has far outstripped that on earth, communicates to his interlocutor certain principles of the art of war and revolution. Thus was the young Vladimir Ulyanov instructed in things that were not yet known to man. On the basis of the anthology *V. I. Lenin and the VCheKa* we can say with some certainty that amongst the most important factors which determined the Bolshevik victory were Lenin's genial discoveries in the matter of the use of a secret political police and of terror in order to retain power.

These were discoveries of Lenin's, for there were no special instructions in Marx on the need to set up an all-powerful secret political police after the victory of the proletarian revolution, nor did the programme of the Social-Democratic party have anything to say on the subject. Of course, political police and terror were not an original discovery of Lenin's. He himself indicated the main source of his inspiration when, pondering over whom to appoint as head of the struggle to combat counter-revolution, he said: we need a Foucquier-Tinville. The French Revolution was the mirror in which the leaders of the October Revolution looked at themselves. However, the terror and political police of the French Revolution were Lenin's model only in the first stages. Very soon he came to the conclusion that he would have to go far further and to seize power with the aid of terror and the police on a far wider and more intensive scale. The documents in *V. I. Lenin and the VCheKa* show that before embarking on that path the chairman of the Sovnarkom and leader of the Bolshevik Party had first of all to overcome a certain amount of hesitation on the part of his comrades. We know how indignant Lenin was when, at Kamenev's suggestion, the second congress of Soviets on 25 October 1917 abolished the death penalty. Trotsky recalls Lenin angrily repeating: "What stupidity, what stupidity. . . . What do they think—that they can make a revolution without firing squads?" Evidently that is exactly what some of them did think. Lenin began to wage a determined fight against these views. "We have not yet come to real terror, because we are stronger than them," he asserted on 24 January 1918. "We have the Soviets; the nationalization of the banks and confiscation of property will be enough for us to force them into submission." There are reasons to think that already at that time Lenin no longer believed that "nationalization of the banks and confiscation of property" would be "enough." The lines I have just quoted were written one month after the setting up of the All-Russian Extra-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (VCheKa). Lenin already knew that "we have not yet come to real terror," knew that he would have to come to it. The documents in the anthology take us to the "real terror." "The VCheKa is letting all citizens know that until now the Commission has been generous. . . ." This was on 23 February 1918. "Our authority is too soft," Lenin wrote in his thesis *Ob Ocherednykh Zadachakh Sovetskoi Vlasti* (On the Immediate Tasks of Soviet Power).[1] This was at the end of April/beginning of May. At the beginning of July, Lenin telegraphed a member of the VCheKa, V. Panyushkin, who was engaged in suppressing the resistance of Tula peasants unwilling to hand over grain to the food-confiscation detachments: "I ask you to act firmly, having first strictly calculated and weighed your strength, for once you have begun you must carry it through to the end." The chairman of the Sovnarkom urged: "Inform me promptly how much grain has been collected, how many wagon-loads dispatched, how many speculators and kulaks arrested." On 26 June Lenin wrote a letter to Zinoviev expressing his anger at the fact that the Petrograd Bolshevik leaders had restrained the "mass terror" with which "the workers had wanted to respond to the murder of Volodarsky." Lenin ordered: "It is necessary to encourage the energy and mass-character of the terror against counter-revolutionaries. . . ."

In his biography of Lenin written in 1924 Trotsky says that "Lenin made use of every opportunity to instil the idea of inevitable terror." According to Trotsky, Lenin would exclaim a dozen times each day: "This is dictatorship? It is semolina!" adding: "The Russian is too kind. He is incapable of taking decisive measures of revolutionary terror. Nevertheless it is absolutely essential to try. . . ." Lenin tried. In the first weeks after the revolution, as if groping, and encountering some resistance on the part of his comrades-in-arms, Lenin sought ways of organizing terror. The VCheKa, which was created on 7 (20) December 1917 had at first the right "only of preliminary investigation." However, after only a few days the functions of the VCheKa, which was established under the Sovnarkom, the Council of People's Commissars, began to be expanded. They continued to do so until the VCheKa gained the right to conduct an investigation, arrest, try and carry out sentence. It is enough to compare two documents published in the anthology for the first time: the decree on the establishment of the VCheKa, and the decree passed on 31 January 1918. The former explains that "the Commission is divided into departments: (1) information, (2) organizational (to organize the fight against counter-revolution throughout

[1] No historian yet has drawn attention to the fact that, in his celebrated article which marked the beginning of a new stage in the revolution, the leader of that revolution quotes word for word (subconsciously, one must suppose) Ivan the Terrible. During an argument with Metropolitan Filipp, the Tsar banged his staff on the ground and threatened him: "I have been too soft with you, but now I'll have you howling!" See R. G. Skrynnikov, *Ivan Groznyi* (Moscow, 1975), p. 137.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russia and also to organize branch departments), and (3) department of combat." The second decree recommends the establishment of an additional "provocation sub-department." An editorial footnote explains that this sub-department was to "put an end to provocations by counter-revolutionary elements which had penetrated organs of Soviet power." As we know, however, provocation was to become an important aspect of the VCheKa's activities. In her memoirs, Angelica Balabanova recalls a conversation with Lenin: "Comrade Balabanova, when will you begin to understand life?" Lenin reproached the secretary of the Comintern Executive Committee, who had just returned from a trip to the Ukraine. "*Provocateurs*? If I only could, I would put *provocateurs* in Kornilov's army."

A fair amount has been written about the scale of the VCheKa's activities even during the first months after the October coup. A historian of the VCheKa, D. L. Golinkov, states: "Extraordinary commissions were set up in all regions, districts and cities, in transport and in the Red Army."[2] The anthology *V. I. Lenin and the VCheKa* is valuable in that it includes a large number of documents indicative of the decisive role played by Lenin in shaping the practical and theoretical bases of the Cheka's activity. The VCheKa was established "under the Sovnarkom." Lenin, the chairman of the Sovnarkom, was formally head of the VCheKa and made extensive use of his formal power.

THE abundance of documentation testifying to the concern Lenin displayed in teaching as yet inexperienced Chekists the principles of search, investigation and prison matters is of considerable interest. The portrait that emerges from the pages of the anthology is of Lenin the practical man, Lenin the technician of the science of policing. In his notes to Dzerzhinsky, Peters and Unshlikht, in his letters to VCheKa executives, in his telegrams, it is practical orders that Lenin gives: searches are to be conducted at night (p. 108); during searches "special measures must be taken to prevent papers being destroyed, escapes made, documents concealed," etc. (p. 38); arrests are not to be made immediately but only after the victim has been "followed and tracked down" (p. 249). In 1921, by which time the Cheka had already had considerable experience of "practical work," Lenin found it necessary notwithstanding to issue detailed instructions on how to guard valuables: "protection and surveillance are to be perfected (special enclosures; wooden fences; cupboards or containers for disguise; random searches; systems of double or triple spot checks according to all the rules of the art of *criminal investigation* [underlined by Lenin] and so on and so forth)."[3] What is particularly striking is the pleasure with which, in May 1921, two months after Kronstadt, when the threat of a terrible

[2] *Krakh vrazheskogo podpolya* (Moscow, 1971), p. 156.
[3] Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 52, pp. 222–23.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

famine sweeping Russia was already apparent, Lenin was lecturing his alumni on the subtleties of "the art of criminal investigation."

From the very first day of the Cheka's existence, Lenin gave the Chekists lessons in the policing business, emphasizing the importance of technical details: M. A. Aldanov, in his book *Sovremenniki* [Contemporaries], recalls the first post-October months: "At that time many of the residents of Petersburg tried to spend their nights at home—for some reason, arrests were always made at night." Today we can say why it was that arrests were made at night: it was because this was Lenin's order. In a note (dated 30 August 1918) to Feliks Dzerzhinsky, we read: "you may regard it as useful to make arrests in the quarter indicated *at night* [underlined by Lenin]. . . ."[1]

Reading the documents in *Lenin and the VCheKa*, one cannot help coming to the conclusion that the leader of the Soviet state was constantly preoccupied with the matter of improving the work of the VCheKa. A correspondence with Dzerzhinsky published in the anthology for the first time is extremely eloquent. At a conference of the Defence Council on 18 June 1919, Lenin wrote to the Cheka chairman: ". . . Are mass arrests being prepared in Moscow? After Petersburg it is absolutely essential to introduce them *everywhere* and *repeatedly* [underlined by Lenin]. What *actually* happened about the magnet for arms detection?" Dzerzhinsky replied that everything was in order as far as preparations for searches went, the Chekists were "working zealously"; but "the magnet is a poor method of detection. We have tried it. We intend to use it to lead people to surrender their arms voluntarily out of fear that the magnet will find everything." This reply did not, however, satisfy Lenin, whose desire to have the Cheka fitted out with the most up-to-date equipment was too strong. On 26 June the Defence Council passed a decree: "That the VCheKa be charged to find two comrades of sufficient intelligence and suitable for the purpose of using a magnetic instrument for the detection of concealed weapons, and offer them a large prize for the successful application of the above-mentioned instrument."

Equipment for conducting searches. Equipment for weapon detection. Surveillance equipment. Lenin to Dzerzhinsky: "The newspaper *Narod* has *close* contacts with Right S.R.'s. *Without closing it down,* they must be *traced and followed* [all underlinings are Lenin's]."

For Lenin, nothing in the work of the VCheKa was too trivial: he followed every detail of its activities, trained, coached, praised and scolded his Chekists, sharpening his chief weapon in the struggle to preserve the Soviet regime. While devoting a great deal of attention to questions of the technique of "the art of criminal investigation," Lenin, not unnaturally, gave even more of his attention to the targets of the application of this technique, the people whom the Cheka shadowed, arrested, put away in camps and executed by firing squad.

[1] *Leninskii Sbornik*, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 114.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOR many years the myth of Lenin the just and kind man, the merciful Father, lived on. At the sixth congress of Soviet writers in July 1976 A. Chakovsky called for the exposure of the myth of the "nice, kind" Lenin and for the portrayal of the leader of the Soviet state as stern and pitiless towards his enemies.

The first "portraits" of Lenin were exactly in line with the demands Chakovsky is making today. On 10 (23) November 1917 Maxim Gorky wrote of Lenin: ". . . a talented man, he possesses all the qualities of a 'leader,' and also the necessary lack of morality and the sheer lordly, pitiless attitude to the life of the popular masses."[5]

Evgeny Zamyatin painted the first artistic portrait of Lenin: the Benefactor, ruthless dictator of the Sole State, the happy state of the future depicted in his novel *We*, is Lenin's double. At almost the same time Ilya Ehrenburg, in his *Extraordinary Adventures of Julio Jurenito*, devoted a whole chapter to the "Kremlin Communist," whom he called "The Grand Inquisitor out of the legend."[6] Ehrenburg's Lenin is a fanatic who believes that he is leading people to happiness, convinced that if people do not wish to go voluntarily towards happiness they must be made to be happy.

It was during the last years of Lenin's life and immediately after his death that the myth arose of the "kind," "philanthropic," "soft-hearted" leader, compelled only by force of circumstances sometimes to act sternly. The chief creators of this portrait were professional humanists, in the first instance repentant Gorky, and A. Lunacharsky. If we compare the "humanitarian" portraits of Lenin we find one detail occurring throughout: his smile. Gorky, reminiscing about the peasant poet Ivan Volny, a member of the S.R. Party, tells how Lenin "once, smiling, showed me a telegram: 'They have arrested me again, tell them to release me.' Signed: Ivan Volny."[7] Lenin shows Gorky the telegram from Volny, arrested by the Cheka, "smiling."

Lunacharsky recalls how, in 1918, Gorky complained about arrests and searches among the Petrograd intelligentsia. Gorky reminded Lenin that these were the same people "who once did us all a service—your comrades and even you personally, Vladimir Ilyich; they hid us in their apartments . . ." Lenin gave a smile and answered:

> Yes, they are fine, good people, but that is precisely why they must be searched. That is precisely why we sometimes—reluctantly—have to arrest them. You see, they are fine and good people, their sympathies are always with the oppressed, they are always against persecution. But what do they see happening before their eyes now? The persecutors are our own Cheka; the oppressed are the Cadets and S.R.'s who are fleeing from it. Obviously, their duty, as they understand it, calls upon them to become their allies against

[5] M. Gorky, *Nesvoevremennye Mysli* (Paris, 1971), p. 112.
[6] This chapter, Chap. 27 in the original edition, was expunged by the censor from the 1962 Moscow edition.
[7] M. Gorky, *Collected Works* in 30 volumes, Vol. 17, p. 35.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> us. We, for our part, must capture active counter-revolutionaries and render them harmless. The rest is clear.

"And Vladimir Ilyich burst out into utterly good-natured laughter." [8] Again, here is Lenin talking of searches, arrests, of "rendering people harmless"—and "giving a smile," laughing with "utterly good-natured laughter." This tendency to depict Lenin as a gentle, lovable joker, "reluctantly" dealing out punishment like a kind father to his foolish and disobedient children, clearing the way to universal happiness, was best expressed by Lunacharsky:

> His anger too is extraordinarily gentle. In spite of the fact that tens or even possibly hundreds of people have actually perished as a result of a threatening word from him, he is always master of his anger, and it takes an almost light-hearted form. It is like thunder, playfully and friskily rumbling in a blue sky.[9]

An important part in creating the myth of the "kind" Lenin was played by the publication in ones and twos, over the decades, of his letters, telegrams and notes to the Cheka inquiring about the fate of arrested persons whose complaints had reached the Chairman of the Sovnarkom. Soon after his death, Maria Ilyichna Ulyanova, speaking at a memorial gathering, recounted the touching tale of a man who was condemned to death by firing squad in 1919 and then pardoned at Lenin's request. "Tell me," asked Maria Ulyanova, "where in the world would you find a head of state who paid so much attention to a man who was a complete stranger and totally unknown to him?" [10] Ulyanova quite correctly noted the "singularity" of the head of state. She might have added—of the state itself. Jules Michelet tells of a similar episode in his *Histoire de France*. A doctor was sitting in the salon of a lady-in-waiting at the court of Louis. Suddenly the King came into the salon and then immediately left again. At the sight of the monarch, the doctor gave a start and grew pale. "What is the matter with you?" the lady enquired. "Were you frightened?" "Of course," the doctor replied. "*There* is a man who can order my head to be chopped off." "For pity's sake!" rejoined the lady. "The King is such a kind man." Michelet sees in this anecdote the cause of the French Revolution, which overthrew a regime in which the sole guarantee that a man's head would not be chopped off was the King's kindness.

M. Ulyanova and all those who have since extolled Lenin's "kindness" have unconsciously confirmed that they were speaking of a country in which the only hope for justice lay in the "kindness" of the head of state.

The "kind" Lenin of hagiographic literature who, as Gorky put it later in his life, felt "an almost womanly affection towards people,"

[8] A. V. Lunacharsky, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 438–9.
[9] A. V. Lunacharsky, *Revolyutsionnye Siluety*, p. 13.
[10] *Pravda*, 8 Feb. 1924.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has been represented as a leader who only interfered with the activities of the Cheka if the need arose to "correct a mistake."

In Ehrenburg's novel, Julio Jurenito pays a visit to the Kremlin and asks the Communist the following question: "How can you tolerate the Left S.R.'s who speak at meetings, the idealists who—albeit quietly, in their homes—continue to curse historical materialism, and finally, the millions of people who still believe not in the victory of Communism but in things like the healing powers of the prelate Panteleimon?" He receives the reply: "That, again, is not in my line. For explanations, apply to Comrade — . . ." "The Kremlin dreamer," as we know, read *Julio Jurenito* with considerable pleasure; evidently he regarded its portrayal of him as a felicitous one.

THE anthology *Lenin and the VCheKa* reveals another Lenin. Of particular interest is the inclusion of material never before gathered together: complaints made to Lenin about the Cheka and its activities; letters from Lenin to Cheka leaders—his reactions to those complaints; and the replies of Cheka leaders and local Chekas to Lenin. This is the first time we have been able to gain a comparatively detailed idea about Lenin's role in shaping the Cheka, and in controlling the police and the terror.

The complaints demonstrate the monstrous scale of the activities of the Extraordinary Commissions, which interfered in all spheres of life and enjoyed unlimited power: the entire country was in the hands of the Chekas. A large part of the documents in the anthology are telegrams, notes and letters from Lenin regarding complaints. One is immediately struck by how many of them there are—and doubtless these represent only a very small part of the total. At first sight one can see no rhyme or reason in the close attention which the head of state, during the worst years of the civil war, when the Soviet regime was on the brink of destruction, devoted to enquiring into not only the reasons for the arrest of General Staff employees or eminent scientists, but also the reason why three *poods* of flour and other produce were confiscated from a Soviet clerk, one Danilov in Yaroslavl (p. 158), why a bicycle was confiscated from a chemist named Rabkin in Mogilev (p. 189) (the Sovnarkom Chairman sent two telegrams in order to ascertain the fate of the bicycle), or the reason for the arrest of a Petrograd dressmaker, Zavadskaya (p. 253). Twice Lenin telegraphed to Tsarytsin, having learned that 17-year-old Valentina Pershikova had been arrested because she had "scribbled on a portrait of V. I. Lenin." His instruction: "No arrest to be made for mutilation of portrait." Demanding "Release Valentina Pershikova at once," Lenin nevertheless adds: "If she is a counter-revolutionary, keep an eye on her" (pp. 166, 167).

One's first impression is that here is the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, in what was the most difficult time for the Soviet

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

regime, and still he does not forget about ordinary people, even the most humble of them, and strives to rectify each and every injustice. This impression soon disappears when we turn our attention to the letters, telegrams and notes in which Lenin does not request an explanation of the reasons for an arrest, but demands the arrest or shooting of whomsoever he regards as guilty. First of all, Lenin's epistolary style undergoes a total transformation. After receiving a complaint from the wife of a Vyatka teacher, Lubnin, who had been beaten up and arrested, Lenin enquires: "would it not be possible to release Lubnin if he is not a counter-revolutionary?" (p. 105); petitioned by the children of a former people's judge, Mikhailov, a sick man arrested for having made "entries of anti-Soviet content" in his diary, Lenin appeals to the Vologda VCheKa (which had arrested Mikhailov) to give its "decision": may the ill Mikhailov be released? (p. 147); after the arrest of one of Russia's most eminent hydroelectric designers, Professor Graftio, Lenin asks Dzerzhinsky: "does it not seem possible to release him? In the opinion of comrade Krzhizhanovsky this would be desirable, since Graftio is a specialist of the first order" (p. 440). When requesting the investigation of a complaint (Lenin always sent complaints about Cheka activities to the Chekas themselves) the Chairman of the Sovnarkom is extremely tactful, never thrusting forward his own opinion and always prepared to accept the Chekists' explanation.

Lenin's directives of punitive, as opposed to charitable intent have quite a different ring. A telegram to Penza on 10 August 1918: "It is essential to crush the kulaks' uprising with the greatest energy, speed and mercilessness, confiscating all the property of the rebelling kulaks and all their grain" (p. 103). A note to A. Shlyapnikov in Astrakhan on 12 December 1918: "Exert all your powers to capture and shoot Astrakhan speculators and grafters. This scum must be dealt with in a way that everyone will remember *for years*" [underlined by Lenin] (p. 132). An instruction to the VCheKa dated 25 January 1919: "The VCheKa is instructed to take urgent and ruthless measures in the fight against bandits" (p. 142). A note to E. Sklyansky, 8 June 1919: "We must increase the capture of hostages from the bourgeoisie and from officers' families, in view of the growing number of cases of treason. Arrange with Dzerzhinsky. . . . It would be a disgrace to hesitate and not shoot for failure to report" (p. 216). In response to a petition from the Russian Physico-Chemical Society for the release of one of the most outstanding Russian chemists, Professor Tikhvinsky, Lenin drafts a resolution: "Tikhvinsky was not arrested 'accidentally': chemistry and counter-revolution are not mutually exclusive" (p. 502). This was written after Professor Tikhvinsky had already been shot, as though Lenin was satisfied that the Russian Revolution too had killed its Lavoisier.

Comparison of the tone and vocabulary of Lenin's responses to complaints by arrested persons or their families, and his directives of a

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

punitive character leads us to the conclusion that the Sovnarkom Chairman's correspondence with the VCheKa about the fate of arrestees had nothing at all to do with "charity." Lenin was using this correspondence as a means of controlling the activities of the all-powerful VCheKa.

It was a marvellous discovery. Having created a monstrous machine of terror, Lenin had found a simple and effective means of control. It was usually of no importance to him—and this is what makes the anthology and its newly revealed material so interesting—that the Chekists turned down his requests. On 12 August 1919, Lenin "*asks for the release*" [a formula he used very rarely!], of members of the families of Kronstadt officers arrested together with "active revolutionaries." When the list of arrestees was returned to him Lenin made this note on it: "The VCheKa finds it impossible to release these people" and put his decision: "For the archive" (p. 244). When he received a letter from a kinswoman of the arrested lawyer Dobrovolsky, a member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party who had not engaged in any political activity since 1907 and was a sick man, Lenin enquired about his case of the Petrograd Cheka and was told in reply: "Dobrovolsky should be kept in custody and not released." He answered the kinswoman of the arrested Dobrovolsky (soon himself to be shot): "I fear he is a hostage, and in that case there is very little that can be done" (p. 150, 151).

Lenin hardly ever insists; he is satisfied with the answer he receives from the Cheka. Even when he learned that the Chairman of the Board of Novgorod Cooperatives, A. Bulatov, had been arrested for having sent a complaint to him, Lenin first expressed his annoyance in a threatening telegram: "I warn you, for that [i.e. for arresting people who complain to Lenin, M. H.] I shall arrest the Chairmen of the provincial Executive Committee and the Cheka, as well as the members of the Executive Committee, and I shall press for their execution," but he is subsequently fully satisfied with the Cheka's report that "Bulatov has been arrested not for making his complaint" (p. 207). The fate of arrestees is a matter of indifference to Lenin; what is important to him is that the Cheka Chairmen in Novgorod and Kostroma, in Vyazma and Ryazan should be made aware, just as they should in Moscow and Petrograd, that Lenin knows about everything. Knows about the arrest of 180 scientists, engineers and technicians in Petrograd in June 1921 (p. 468), and about the "confiscation" of a bicycle in Zhlobin (p. 206), about the search at Anna Tolstaya's home in Kaluga and the arrest of the famous inventor A. Shorin in Nizhny Novgorod (p. 337).

THE method of control Lenin had devised would have been inadequate if it had been a matter of control over the observance of the law. It was perfectly adequate for regulating the intensity of the terror. For

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it was terror that Lenin regarded as the only means of holding on to power.

In the summer of 1917, working on *The State and Revolution,* Lenin dreamed of a miracle: he wrote: "The day after the proletarian revolution, the state will begin to wither away." After a few weeks had passed since the October Revolution, Lenin realized that without coercion, without violence and without terror the Soviet regime would not hold on to power. Not only that; he came to the conclusion that dictatorship by a single individual was essential. This might be called Lenin's "March" discovery, because, by strange coincidence, he reiterated the same idea on three occasions, in three Marches in succession. In March 1918 he explained the necessity for dictatorship by an individual from the standpoint of the needs of a modern economy:

> On the significance of precisely individual dictatorial power from the viewpoint of the specific tasks of the present moment, it must be said that any large-scale machine industry—i.e. precisely the material, industrial source and foundation of socialism—demands the strictest and most absolute unity of will. . . . But how can absolute unity of will be assured? By the subordination of the will of thousands to the will of one man. This subordination may, if the participants in a common task are *ideally conscientious and disciplined* [Lenin's underlining], resemble the gentler direction of a conductor. It may also assume the harsher forms of dictatorship. . . . But, one way or another, unquestioning subordination to a single will is essential.

In March 1919 in a speech in memory of Ya. Sverdlov, Lenin once more explained the need for individual dictatorship, but this time for political, not economic reasons: "*In an epoch of harsh struggle* [Lenin's underlining], when implementing a workers' dictatorship, one must promote the principle of individual authority, the moral authority of a single man to whose decisions all submit without lengthy discussions." And again, a year later, Lenin presents his idea, as a universal law: "To argue against the necessity for centralized power, dictatorship and unity of will . . . becomes impossible."

Reaching the conclusion that individual dictatorship is essential, Lenin created the instrument of this dictatorship, the Cheka. He said himself: "The Cheka directly implements the dictatorship of the proletariat and in this respect its role is incalculably important" (p. 118). As we examine the documents in *Lenin and the VCheKa,* we see how the Extraordinary Commissions became the magic means whereby the Chairman of the Sovnarkom was able to solve any problem by bypassing the official power structure. Lenin's decision on a report that snowdrifts were holding up rail traffic: "Enquire of Dzerzhinsky what has been done" (p. 178); his decision on a report that strikes were taking place at Tula factories: "Call Dzerzhinsky and ask him to speed up his trip" (p. 179); on a re-examination for Moscow medical workers:

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"To be handed over exclusively to the VCheKa Special Section" (p. 196); in connexion with the fuel crisis on 10 November 1918, the Moscow Cheka was charged with the important task of watching for "the heating of any churches or other establishments of worship whatsoever, and, if any such heating be discovered, bringing it to a stop immediately . . ." (p. 287). Lenin set up Special Cheka Sections in the army, for he trusted the Extraordinary Commissions more than the Red Army. He charged the Cheka with checking Russian prisoners of war returning from Germany (evidently remembering how easily he himself had slipped into Russia) (p. 214), with the control of "literature being brought in from abroad" and with the supervision of publishing-houses. The extent of the VCheKa's power in the country as a whole is demonstrated by, among other things, documents published here for the first time concerning the arrest on 8 July 1919 of the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Republic, I. Vatsetis, who a year earlier, on 6 July 1918, had saved Lenin and the power of the Bolsheviks during the action by the Left S.R.'s. The footnote to document No. 214 (pp. 236–7) says: "During the course of the preliminary investigation, Vatsetis's participation in a White Guard organization was not established." One must suppose that no such organization existed among Vatsetis's staff, for all the persons arrested were released or amnestied. Nevertheless, a memorandum from the Special Section of the VCheKa was enough to have the Commander-in-Chief arrested.

Lenin also charged the Cheka with attending to his own personal needs. The anthology includes an account rendered to "Vladimir Ilyich from the economic section of the Moscow Cheka." For the purchase of a pair of boots, a suit, braces and a belt the economic section of the Moscow Cheka asked of "Vladimir Ilyich" (an affectionate, familiar form of address) the sum of 1,417 rubles 75 kopecks. True to his principle of controlling every aspect of Cheka activity, Lenin checked the bill even on this occasion and found it an under-estimate: "Herewith remitting 2,000 rubles, I request and categorically demand that this account, which is clearly an under-estimate, be amended" (p. 235). The real market prices of July 1919 would not, of course, have allowed Lenin to purchase boots, a suit, braces and a belt even for 2,000 rubles. But the Sovnarkom Chairman was demonstrating yet again that his was an "unwinking eye." In May 1922, he drew the attention of Dzerzhinsky, by now Chairman of the GPU, to "exaggerations in expenditure on my garage, which has, it would seem, been placed under special GPU supervision." Dzerzhinsky replied that "a reduction is intolerable," since the garage had only six vehicles altogether (p. 568).

On the first anniversary of the establishment of the VCheKa, the organ of "direct justice" received a wonderful present: the Party Central Committee came to the decision that the VCheKa was infallible. Published for the first time in the anthology is a part of the record of the proceedings of a session of the Bolshevik Central Committee Bureau

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on 19 December 1918. The Chairman of the People's Commissariat for Justice in the VCheKa, M. Kozlovsky, accused the Extraordinary Commissions of abusing their powers, or, as an annotation to the record of the Central Committee meeting puts it, made "false allegations about illegal repressions supposedly carried out by the VCheKa." Dzerzhinsky complained to Lenin and "the Party Central Committee resolved that malicious criticism of Soviet institutions can find no place in the pages of the Party and Soviet press, as it has in certain articles [11] on the activities of the VCheKa, whose work is performed under specially difficult conditions" (p. 133). The infallibility of the Cheka became a law of State life. From his truest comrades and "most distinguished Chekists" Lenin received, in the Summer of 1919, information that "in the Ukraine the Chekas have brought a multitude of evils" (p. 212). A note written by him to the Chairman of the All-Ukrainian Cheka, M. Latsis, contains no reproaches, only the delicate recommendation to "check personnel more strictly." On 6 December 1919 Lenin not only declared that "both the terror and the Chekas are absolutely indispensable, but asserted that "we have the Chekas splendidly organized" (pp. 300, 301). From Lenin's point of view the Chekas were indeed "splendidly organized" and working wonderfully well, in spite of the fact that they "brought a multitude of evils." Addressing a gathering of Chekists at a "rally-concert" on 7 November 1918, Lenin stressed the "difficult task of the Cheka" and derided those who "pick upon individual mistakes of the Chekas, sob and fuss over them." Lenin swept the problem of "mistakes" aside by declaring: "We learn from our mistakes." What was important was something quite different: "determination, speed, and, most of all, loyalty" (p. 118). In his speech to the seventh congress of Soviets the Chairman of the Sovnarkom summed up two years of activity by the Extraordinary Commissions: he was content.

Lenin demanded one thing alone of the Extraordinary Commissions: loyalty. Loyalty to the Revolution, but at the same time loyalty to the Leader of the Revolution and Leader of the Party. It was the VCheKa and not the Party which directly implemented the dictatorship and enabled the Bolsheviks to retain power. The Party became a supporting reservoir of personnel for the Extraordinary Commissions. Published for the first time in the anthology is the plan devised by Ya. Hanetski, an old friend of Lenin's from his Cracow days, to merge the Party and the Cheka and to subordinate the Party to the Cheka.

Hanetski suggested:

> Establishing the closest possible links between Party organizations and Extraordinary Commissions . . . binding all Party members in responsible posts to report to the Extraordinary Commissions all information reaching them either privately or officially which might

[11] On 8 October 1918 *Pravda* published an article by M. Olminsky criticizing "illegal actions taken by the VCheKa" calling for the restriction of its rights.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> be of interest in the struggle to combat counter-revolution and espionage. Not confining their assistance to this, they should actively aid the Extraordinary Commissions by participating in trials . . . , being present at interrogations and so on. (p. 281).

Lenin made this note on Hanetski's letter: "Comrade Hanetski! Have you talked to Dzerzhinsky about this? Telephone me. Yours, Lenin." Documents confirming official acceptance of Hanetski's proposals have not (so far, at least!) been published, but Lenin's famous declaration that "a good Communist is also at the same time a good Chekist" (p. 363) undoubtedly echoed them.

Lenin's policy of mass, merciless terror against the entire population of the country, carried out by an all-powerful instrument standing quite outside any laws, true only to an abstract idea and its concrete embodiment—the Leader—yielded results. The horror inspired by the Cheka's activities was the most important factor in the victory of the Bolshevik Party. "Two syllables with a terrifying emotional charge for any person who lived through the years of revolution, two syllables which came even before 'Mama,' for babies in their cradles were threatened with them like some bogyman, and which accompanied their victims even after death, to the cesspit, two simple little syllables which it is given to no-one to forget . . ." [12]—this is how Ehrenburg recalled the time of revolution and civil war. The two fearful syllables were, of course, CHE-KA.

THE Cheka practised mass terror. However, the force of the blow aimed at particular strata of the population varied, depending on the changing situation and changes in the political line. The highest intensity of the terror remained a constant, and its target was the intelligentsia. From the very first day of the revolution, Lenin saw the intelligentsia as his chief enemy, that very force which would not "submit without lengthy discussions" to the "personal authority of one man" and one party. For Lenin there were no innocent people among the intelligentsia. Either they were against Soviet power, in which case the need to fight against them was self-evident, or they were neutral, but their characteristic humanity and kindness made them sympathize with the persecuted, in which case the need to fight them was no less urgent. Lenin attempted to explain this to the only man with whose authority he was obliged to reckon—Gorky. On 15 November 1919 Lenin replied to a letter from Gorky on the subject of the mass arrests in Petrograd:

> . . . On the whole, the arrest of Cadets (and Cadet sympathizers) from among the public was a necessary and correct measure. . . . What makes you speak your disloyal and angry words? The fact that a few dozen (or even hundreds) of Cadet gentlemen and their

[12] I. Ehrenburg, *Rvach*, Collected Works in 9 Volumes, Vol. 2, p. 79 (Moscow, 1964).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> sympathizers will spend a few days in prison *to forestall* conspiracies such as the surrender of Krasnaya Gorka, conspiracies which threaten the lives of *tens* of thousands of workers and peasants [Lenin's underlinings] . . .[13]

Three days later, Lenin repeated his argument almost word for word in a letter to M. Andreeva:

> . . . One cannot do otherwise than arrest *all* the Cadet public and their sympathizers in order to forestall conspiracies. They are all, all of them capable of aiding the conspirators. It is criminal not to arrest them. It is better that tens or hundreds of intellectuals should sit in jail for a *a few days or weeks* than that *ten thousand people* should be slaughtered.[14]

A crucial discovery of Lenin's in the sphere of terror was the word *okolokadetskaya*, the "Cadet sympathizing public." This word allowed him to include the whole of the Russian intelligentsia in the ranks of the accused. In his letter to M. Andreeva the leader of the revolution openly admits that "one cannot do otherwise than arrest" the intelligentsia, "it is criminal not to arrest them," for they are "capable" of aiding conspirators, that is, they are dangerous to Lenin—potentially.

The history of terror against the intelligentsia is better known (though still very little) than the history of the terror aimed against peasants and workers. Many chapters of Volume I of *The Gulag Archipelago* are devoted to the "Lenin years" of the Soviet regime. As a rule, however, the evidence of victims is trusted less than the evidence of the executioners. The victims' evidence is usually accused of being "unobjective." The documents in the anthology *Lenin and the VCheKa* are the evidence of the hangmen. These documents are a veritable martyrology of the Russian intelligentsia. The list of arrested and shot includes teachers, cooperative members, physicians, engineers, scientists, writers and priests.

A study of the correspondence connected with some of the arrestees—scientists well known in academic circles, people who had kept influential acquaintances among the communist leaders (the regime was still very young and had not yet created its own special caste)—enables us to say, first and foremost, that the accusations made against them were usually invented by Chekists. We can be sure that this also applied to all other arrested persons whose fate is not reflected in Lenin's correspondence with the VCheKa. The Cheka first made arrests and only then "investigated the matter," often at Lenin's insistence. As a result, the arrests of the Rector of the Petrograd Polytechnic Institute, Professor Osadchii (arrested three times), of the chief engineer on the site of the Volkhov electric power station, Professor Graftio, of the builders of the River Svir hydroelectric power station and the managers

[13] Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 51, p. 48.
[14] Ibid. p. 52.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the slate industry, and so on and so forth, were found to be utterly groundless.

When Lenin insisted on investigation, on verifying accusations, he did so as a rule, "in the interests of the cause." When he received a request for the release of the geologists who were studying sapropelite,[15] he wrote to the deputy Cheka Chairman Unshlikht: "Please order a check. It looks very much as if we shall have to let the scientists go. Sapropelite is a thing we need for the economy" (p. 500). The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars would have preferred not to let scientists go free. He devised new ways of using them without releasing them from custody, in the first instance the "sharashka." On 17 December 1919 Lenin signed a decree issued by the Sovnarkom making provisions for specialists to go out "to their place of work without an escort, with the obligation to return to their place of imprisonment immediately after finishing work" (p. 313). A note on Lenin's correspondence concerning the arrest of the deputy Chairman of Glavslants, engineer B. Tsvantsiger, says: "Tsvantsiger was allowed to work for Glavslants while serving his term" (p. 527). Lenin also used the hostage system widely applied by the Soviet regime. At his insistence, the son of an eminent Russian power engineer, R. Klasson, was forbidden to travel abroad when his father was sent on a mission to order machinery (p. 558). Often, when recommending the release of certain persons, Lenin insisted on obtaining several "guarantees" so that the guarantors "can be punished for a flight" (p. 255).

An analysis of the documents in the anthology enables us to draw yet another conclusion: that repressions against the intelligentsia increased after the end of the civil war. Victory over the White armies did not reassure Lenin. On the contrary: it was just as if he only then saw the instability of Soviet power, lacking the support of most of the population. The intelligentsia was viewed as a force which could bring leadership to the discontent of workers and peasants. The blow was struck at the intelligentsia as such: at members of socialist parties and the "socialist-sympathizing public," at former members of the Cadet Party and at the "Cadet-sympathizing public." Lenin wrote "confidentially" to G. Krzhizhanovsky to explain the mass arrests among scientists in Petrograd at the beginning of June 1921: "A new conspiracy has been discovered in Petersburg. The intelligentsia had a hand in it. There are professors very near to Osadchii [at that time Pyotr Osadchii was deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission, M. H.]. For that reason we are *right* to carry out all those searches of his friends too [underlined by Lenin]. Caution!!!" When he received the list of arrested persons, Lenin noted on it that it was the fifth time that Professor P. Shchurkevich of the Electrotechnical Institute had been arrested, and the third time for Professor B. Vorobyov of the Polytechnic Institute. Those arrested for the first time included the renowned

[15] Sapropelite is a valuable raw mineral which forms on the bottom of reservoirs.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

linguist, Professor Shcherba, the well-known jurist Professor Martynov, and others. From notes made by Lenin on the list it transpires that the VCheKa was then issuing its agents with warrants marked "arrest at own discretion": the Chekist would, at his own "discretion," enter the name of the person arrested (p. 465). The system of "discretionary" charges and arrests was also made wide use of by Lenin personally. The "Lorman case" is an eloquent illustration of this. In the summer of 1921, M. Lorman, a representative of the Central Committee of the Polish Bund, came to Moscow for talks with the Comintern Executive Committee. He was admitted to the Comintern Congress as a delegate with a consultative vote. Letters he sent abroad were intercepted by the VCheKa, which concluded from them that the Bund delegate, "like his organization, is an opponent of the policy of the Soviet government with regard to certain opposition parties in Russia." When summoned to appear before a special commission, Lorman did not deny his views. The commission recommended his deportation. Lenin opposed this: "In my opinion he should be not deported but *arrested*. These malicious Mensheviks, of whom Lorman is clearly one, must not be allowed to get away with such things" (p. 490). Lorman was arrested by the Special Section of the VCheKa on a charge of "anti-Soviet agitation and provocation." It can therefore be said that Lenin was the instigator of the policy of arresting foreign socialists and communists while they were on Soviet territory, if their views diverged from the "general line," a policy continued by Stalin with great success.

THE anthology of documents ends with a letter from Lenin to Dzerzhinsky, written on 19 May 1922, six days before his first brain haemorrhage. In the letter, Lenin ordered the VCheKa Chairman to make careful preparations for "the deportation abroad of writers and professors who are helping counter-revolution." Lenin asked for a whole series of preparatory measures to be taken: the examination of all non-communist publications, "the collection of systematic information about the political record, the work and literary activity of professors and writers" (p. 556). In his usual "discretionary" manner of accusation, Lenin even pointed to the first of the "guilty":

> . . . the Petrograd journal *Ekonomist*, published by the 11th section of the Russian Technical Society. In my opinion it is manifestly a White Guard centre. On the cover of No. 3 . . . is printed a list of contributors. They are, I think, almost all perfectly legitimate candidates for deportation abroad. All of them are blatant counter-revolutionaries, accomplices of the Entente, an organization of its lackeys and spies and corrupters of student youth. Things must be arranged in such a way that these "military spies" are caught—and caught regularly and systematically and deported abroad (p. 567).

A fitter and more logical conclusion to the anthology than this letter to Dzerzhinsky could not have been found. This letter is Lenin's true

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

testament. After the end of the civil war, after the transition to "liberal" policies and to NEP, Lenin continued to regard the intelligentsia as a terrible enemy which had somehow or other to be done away with. As always, it was the VCheKa whom Lenin entrusted with the task. Shortly before his letter to Dzerzhinsky, Lenin declared at the ninth congress of Soviets: "Without such an institution [i.e. the Cheka, M. H.], workers' power cannot exist as long as there exist exploiters in this world . . ." (p. 544). Consequently, the Chekas existed, exist, and will continue to exist. Workers' power cannot exist without them. This is the essence of Lenin's testament.

The direct descendants of the Chekists, the employees of the KGB, who compiled this anthology, insist that the father of the Soviet secret police, the father of the terror was not Stalin at all but Lenin. While not denying their kinship with Stalin, they claim priority for Lenin. The documents they have collected are an eloquent vindication of their claim.

Translated by Hilary Sternberg

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lenin's Reported Destruction of the Cheka Archive

George H. Leggett

AN indication exists that Lenin may have had the Vecheka's[1] archive—or at any rate a substantial part of it—destroyed, so that the record of Chekist actions in implementing, and of his own considerable role in encouraging, the Red Terror should not go down to posterity. In 1959 the distinguished émigré historian and archivist Boris Nicolaevsky, in a review[2] of the Soviet volume of documents on the Vecheka, *Iz istorii VChK, 1917–1921*,[3] disclosed a story which he had heard from a very well-informed man, long since dead, whose identity Nicolaevsky preferred not to reveal for good reasons of his own. Nicolaevsky himself died in 1966. The story went as follows.

In order to counteract the bad publicity to which the Vecheka was subjected by its critics—not least in Party circles—its Chairman, Felix Dzerzhinsky, decided to publish a series of accounts of Vecheka activity, intended to restore the good name of that organization by demonstrating that the Red Terror had been essential and that it alone had saved the revolution. Accordingly, Volume I of *Krasnaya kniga VChK*[4] (The Red Book of the Vecheka) was published in late 1920, covering the Boris Savinkov conspiracy of 1918, the assassination of the German Ambassador, Count Mirbach, by the Left Socialist Revolutionaries (LSRs) on 6 July 1918 and the associated LSR Rising, and the Anarchist bomb attack of 25 September 1919 on a Moscow Party Committee assembly. Volumes II, III and maybe IV of the Red Book, documenting the main counter-revolutionary conspiracies of 1919, went to the printer in Moscow, and other cities followed suit: Petrograd published its own "Red Book," containing an account of the Tagantsev conspiracy uncovered in mid-1921 (this volume was edited by Yakov Agranov, the Chekist responsible for investigating the case); Kharkov set about publishing Volume I of Dukelskii's survey of Cheka operations in the Ukraine during 1920.[5] Various other cities were apparently likewise preparing to publish their own "Red Books."

[1] The terms Vecheka and Cheka are used here interchangeably; more precisely Vecheka (i.e. All-Russian Cheka) denotes the central headquarters or overall organization of the political police in the RSFSR, whilst Cheka indicates a subsidiary agency thereof. The Vecheka existed from 7 (20) Dec. 1917 to 6 Feb. 1922.

[2] B. Nikolaevskii (Nicolaevsky), "Iz istorii mashiny sovetskogo terrora," in *Sotsialisticheskii vestnik*, New York, 1959, No. 8–9 (732–33), pp. 167–72.

[3] *Iz istorii Vserossiiskoi Chrezvychainoi komissii, 1917–1921 gg.: Sbornik dokumentov*, ed., G. A. Belov et al. (Moscow, 1958), hereafter *Iz istorii VChK*.

[4] *Krasnaya kniga VChK*, Vol. I, ed., P. Makintsyan (Moscow, 1920).

[5] S. S. Dukelskii, *ChK-GPU*, Part I (Kharkov, 1923). A typed copy exists in the B. I. Nicolaevsky Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lenin put a stop to this Chekist literary activity, which threatened to disturb his post-Kronstadt tactic of playing down the Cheka and replacing it by a political police stripped of judicial and punitive powers; in the context of the New Economic Policy, proclaimed in March 1921, the Cheka had to be publicly sacrificed, even if its basic functions continued to be practised, albeit more discreetly, under a refurbished management. By November 1921 a new Vecheka statute was in process of formulation, and on 6 February 1922 the Vecheka was abolished by decree and replaced by the harmless-sounding State Political Administration, whose initial letters—GPU—did not yet spell terror and repression.

So, on Lenin's instruction, the "Red Book" programme went into reverse. Volume I of *Krasnaya kniga VChK* was withdrawn from circulation by government order,[6] and has since become a bibliographical rarity[7]; Volume II, ready for publication, did not leave the printer,[8] whilst Volume III remained in the galley-proof stage. The Petrograd "Red Book," already published, achieved a minimal circulation. Volume I of Dukelskii's book (the introduction to which was signed as late as 20 February 1923) was stopped at the printers, and just a very few copies—distributed privately by the author to prominent officials—survived. Volume II, already written, did not go to the printer.

Lenin went further: he decided to destroy the Vecheka's archive. Soviet historians were aghast, and formed a delegation (only partially composed of Chekist historians) to plead with Lenin that documentation of the "heroic period" of the dictatorship's fight for existence should be spared for history. Lenin interrupted, saying with great emphasis: "Let history judge us by our other deeds." (Nicolaevsky's informant vouched for the accurate rendering of Lenin's interjection.) Dzerzhinsky thereupon put Lenin's order into effect, doing so with such thoroughness that virtually nothing was left of the Vecheka archive, not even documents which, like *Krasnaya kniga VChK*, Vol. I, had already been published.

SUCH destruction of a key archive seemed so unlikely that, despite his faith in his informant's knowledgeability and sincerity, Nicolaevsky had doubts as regards the accuracy of his account. However the publication in 1958 of *Iz istorii VChK* went far to confirm the story. For this collection of 349 documents (281 of them dating from the Vecheka

[6] Its withdrawal is confirmed in the Anarchist publication *Goneniya na Anarkhizm v Sovetskoi Rossii*, ed., A. Gorelik et al. (Berlin, 1922), p. 25.

[7] A rare example survives in the B. I. Nicolaevsky Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford.

[8] There are references to Vol. II in (i) Vera Vladimirova, *God sluzhby "sotsialistov" kapitalistam: ocherki po istorii kontr-revolyustii v 1918 godu* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1927), p. 129, footnote (she quotes from Ya. Agranov's article in Vol. II, entitled "A Survey of the Activity of Counter-revolutionary Organizations during the period 1918–1919"), and in (ii) M. Pokrovskii's article "VChK-GPU," in *Izvestiya*, 18 Dec. 1927, mentioning that Vol. II of *Krasnaya kniga VChK* did not go on sale.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

period), drawn from a variety of official archives, did not include the Vecheka archive as a source. Even the 10 Vecheka circulars figuring there were derived not, as one would expect, from the Vecheka archive, but from five different archival holdings. Since *Iz istorii VChK* was an official publication, it seemed most unlikely, argued Nicolaevsky, that the historians who produced it would have been denied access to the Vecheka archive, had this existed: *ergo*, it no longer existed.

Nicolaevsky's evidence and argument, summarized above, make out a persuasive proposition, however extraordinary the idea that a political police organization should destroy its own documents, most of them irreplaceable, at a time when these were in no danger of falling into the wrong hands. A security service without its records finds itself playing blind-man's buff. That an attempt was made after Lenin's death to reconstitute, or at least to top up, the record of the Vecheka's past history, emerges from Dzerzhinsky's appeal, written on 13 March 1925, to Old Chekists, asking them to contribute accounts of the Vecheka's notable activities, including those occurring on the political and economic fronts. Dzerzhinsky wrote:

> In the future historians will turn to our archives, but these will of course contain absolutely inadequate material as by far the greater part of it consists of evidence against individuals brought to justice, and consequently very often casts a one-sided light both on individual actions of the Vecheka-OGPU and on events in the history of the revolution. Meanwhile the ranks of the Old Chekists are dispersing more and more, and they take with them the most valuable material in the form of recollections concerning individual happenings which have often not been recorded in writing.[9]

Dzerzhinsky's appeal for material, indicating as it did a serious gap in Vecheka records, is strikingly consistent with Nicolaevsky's thesis of archival destruction; however it does not offer conclusive proof, since it is also consistent with the simpler explanation that Dzerzhinsky was merely intent on topping up an unimpaired Vecheka archive by drawing on the memories of some of the main actors in the history of these events before they vanished from the scene. Nevertheless, Dzerzhinsky's letter is significant in establishing that whilst the Vecheka's records, as at 1925, did contain plentiful case histories of its individual hapless clients (Lenin could hardly have expected the Vecheka to dispense with these essential files),[10] they were lacking, from a future historian's point of view, in more generalized accounts, such as might perhaps afford a wider survey of Vecheka policies and activities, and of course of the Red Terror. It was precisely such documentation, of a more comprehensive character, that Lenin would have wished to deny to historians.

[9] Dzerzhinskii, "Pis'mo k starym Chekistam," in *Osoboe zadanie*, ed., S. N. Lyalin et al. (Moscow, 1968), pp. 7–8.

[10] The survival of Cheka interrogation reports—a vital constituent of security case histories—is attested to by Dzerzhinsky's biographer, N. Zubov: see his *F. E. Dzerzhinskii: biografiya* (Moscow, 1971, 3rd ed.), p. 287.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Another pointer to the destruction of the Vecheka archive is the existence of a " Collection of documents on the history of the Vecheka " in the Central State Archive of the October Revolution and of Socialist Construction of the USSR,[11] from which Collection at least two of the ten Vecheka circulars referred to by Nicolaevsky were drawn.[12] If the original Vecheka archive had survived intact, there would presumably have been no need to build up such a separate Collection.

Assuming that the Vecheka archive was indeed destroyed on Lenin's order, that order could have been issued no earlier than mid- to late-1921, since it followed the publication of the Petrograd " Red Book " which covered the Tagantsev conspiracy, crushed in June 1921 [13] and brought to a conclusion by the execution, in the last days of August 1921, of 61 of its " active participants," among them the renowned Acmeist poet Nikolai Gumilev, ex-husband of Anna Akhmatova [14]; nor, in all probability, would the order have been issued later than 26 May 1922 (Lenin's first stroke, followed by convalescence at Gorki until 2 October 1922), or, at the very latest, than mid-December 1922 (Lenin's second stroke, which rendered him unfit for further regular work, followed by a totally disabling third stroke in March 1923). This period of highest probability, September 1921–May 1922, arrived at on chronological evidence, coincides with the most likely period from the standpoint of logic, namely between mid- to late-1921 [15] and February 1922, during which time Lenin was preoccupied with the reform or abolition of the Vecheka and with the ostensible replacement of rule of terror by rule of revolutionary legality.

The late date of the ban on Dukelskii's book—stopped at the printers in 1923—does not fit readily into the time-table outlined above. If Lenin's embargo was applied before 26 May 1922, or even before mid-December 1922, then why did Dukelskii's volume go to the printer still later, as indicated by Dukelskii's signature to his introduction, dated 20 February 1923? [16] Conceivably this delayed reaction to Lenin's embargo might have been due to Dukelskii's book being an Ukrainian publication, and therefore theoretically not directly affected by an injunction issued by the GPU of the Russian Soviet Republic; it was not until July 1923 that the Constitution of the USSR was adopted, establishing a unified OGPU whose writ ran throughout the USSR, and it was only

[11] *Kollektsiya dokumentov po istorii VChK* in *Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Oktyabrskoi Revolyutsii i Sotsialisticheskogo Stroitelstva SSSR* (*TsGAOR*).

[12] *Iz istorii VChK*, Document No. 113, pp. 137–8, Document No. 313, pp. 423–5.

[13] *Iz istorii VChK*, p. 486.

[14] (Petrograd) *Pravda*, No. 181, 1 Sept. 1921.

[15] It was in May 1921 that officially inspired press discussion concerning " revolutionary legality " started in the columns of *Izvestiya*, unanimously advocating the observance of legal norms and the ending of extra-judicial practices on the part of the Cheka—see D. L. Golinkov, *Krakh vrazheskogo podpolya: iz istorii borby s kontrrevolyutsiei v Sovetskoi Rossii v 1917–1924 gg.* (Moscow, 1971), p. 295.

[16] Another Ukrainian book (albeit a slight and superficial one) on the political police, which was actually published in Kharkov in 1923, was A. L. Malitskii, *Cheka i GPU*, 50 pp.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in mid-November 1923 that the OGPU's centralized functions and powers were defined by decree. On the other hand the previously prevailing principle of Soviet republican independence had in fact been a transparent fiction, as is illustrated by the decision taken at the Vecheka Presidium's session on 30 August 1920, prescribing that all Vecheka instructions should be copied immediately to the Chekas of the Ukraine, upon which they were strictly binding.[17]

It is perhaps singular that corroboration of Lenin's reported holocaust of Chekist books and archives has not reached the outside world from any other source. Trotsky, for instance, might reasonably have been expected to know of it; maybe however he, as an ardent advocate and practitioner of terror, preferred to keep silent about Lenin's sudden access of squeamishness on the subject. Not for nothing was Trotsky the author of *The Defence of Terrorism*,[18] published in Petrograd in 1920, and of a pamphlet entitled *Hue and Cry over Kronstadt*, an unashamed apologia for the brutal suppression of the Kronstadt mutiny, superintended by him in 1921.[19] There appear to have been no defectors of any calibre from the Cheka, OGPU or NKVD, whose service reached back to Moscow headquarters at the time of Lenin's interdiction; the near-exception was Agabekov, but he, after a brief spell at the Lubyanka in a junior capacity up to December 1921 (perhaps too early to be relevant), served mainly abroad during the ensuing decade.[20] So confirmation of Nicolaevsky's story would not necessarily have come from that particular quarter.

Nicolaevsky's personal integrity and professional standing were of the highest: during his long years of exile he proved to be one of the shrewdest, best informed and most respected historians and commentators on the Soviet scene. Boris Nicolaevsky was a life-long Social Democrat, prominent in the Menshevik Party—of whose central committee he became a member in 1920.[21] He was also a professional archivist; from 1919 to early 1921 he directed the Historical Archive of the Russian Revolution in Moscow,[22] and travelled widely collecting historical material. Arrested in February 1921 because of his political activities, he stayed in prison until January 1922 when, together with other leading

[17] P. P. Bachinskii (ed.), *Na zashchite revolyutsii: Iz istorii Vseukrainskoi Chrezvychainoi komissii 1917-1922 gg., Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Kiev, 1971), p. 181.

[18] Leon Trotsky, *The Defence of Terrorism (Terrorism and Communism). A Reply to Karl Kautsky* (London 1921).

[19] Lev Trotsky, *Hue and Cry over Kronstadt*, a Socialist League pamphlet (London, 1938).

[20] G. S. Agabekov, *GPU: zapiski chekista* (Berlin, 1930), pp. 43, 47.

[21] Ladis K. Kristof, " Boris I. Nicolaevsky, 1887–1966 " in *The Russian Review*, Vol. XXV, No. 3, July 1966, pp. 324–6. For a more extensive biographical account and appreciation of Nicolaevsky see " Foreword " by Alexander Rabinowitch, " B. I. Nicolaevsky: The Formative Years " by Ladis K. D. Kristof and " Boris Nicolaevsky: The American Years " by Philip E. Mosely in *Revolution and Politics in Russia: Essays in Memory of B. I. Nicolaevsky*, ed., Alexander and Janet Rabinowitch with Ladis K. D. Kristof (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1972).

[22] Bertram D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution* (Pelican edition, Harmondsworth, 1966), p. 599.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mensheviks, he was expelled from Russia.[23] However banishment did not sever his links with the Soviet archival administration; having settled in Berlin, he became, in 1924, foreign representative of the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow,[24] with whose director, David Borisovich Ryazanov (Goldenbakh), he maintained close contact until the latter's expulsion from Party and post in 1931.[25] Transferring to France in 1933, after Hitler's advent to power, Nicolaevsky directed the Paris branch of the Amsterdam International Institute of Social History. Eventually, in 1940, he moved to the United States, where he devoted much of his time to political writing.[26] During Bukharin's visit to Western Europe from February to April 1936, in order to negotiate the purchase for the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute (as it was now styled) of certain Marxist archives which were in Nicolaevsky's keeping, the two men held long confidential conversations, a significant part of which Nicolaevsky recorded in the guise of the celebrated essay "Letter from an Old Bolshevik." Bukharin, incidentally, brought Nicolaevsky personal greetings from Rykov, whose sister was married to Nicolaevsky's brother.[27] Thus Nicolaevsky's standing and access were of the best; during the 1920s and 1930s, whilst in Berlin and Paris, he had contact with a number of well placed and communicative visitors from the Soviet Union. As one important Bolshevik confided to Nicolaevsky upon arriving abroad:

> Back there we have forgotten to be frank. Only when one goes abroad and speaks with someone like you, about whom one knows everything from our secret archives and upon whom one can also rely, then one can speak frankly.[28]

Even without knowing the identity of Nicolaevsky's informant in the matter of the Cheka archive, we can therefore accept that he would have been a dependable witness, in a position of access to the information reported by him; he may indeed have been present—perhaps as one of the interested historians—at Lenin's interview with the historians' delegation, since he was able to vouch for the accuracy of the remark credited to Lenin on that occasion. Certainly, the banning of the Cheka books can be taken as fact, as we know from independent sources about the withdrawal of Volume I of *Krasnaya kniga VChK* and the suppression of its second volume, and the same applies to Dukelskii's book. The reported destruction of the Vecheka archive is a more difficult question, since Nicolaevsky's revelation was, after all, based on unverified testimony from an undisclosed source: clearly Nicolaevsky himself had his reservations (as he admitted in his article) as to the genuineness of this extraordinary episode, and only reported it many

[23] Kristof, op. cit. p. 326.
[24] Boris Nicolaevsky and Otto Maenchen-Helfen, *Karl Marx: man and fighter* (Pelican edition, Harmondsworth, 1976), prefatory biographical note.
[25] Kristof, op. cit. p. 327, *Who Was Who in the USSR* (Metuchen, New Jersey, 1972), p. 488.
[26] Nicolaevsky and Maenchen-Helfen, op. cit.
[27] B. Nicolaevsky, *Power and the Soviet Elite* (New York, Washington and London, 1965), pp. 3–5 et seq.
[28] Ibid. p. 7.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

years, probably several decades, after hearing the story. Nevertheless his reasoning, based on the consistent evidence provided in 1958 by the volume of Vecheka documents, *Iz istorii VChK*, is logical and convincing, and none of the many historical and documentary publications on the subject of the Vecheka which have appeared over the past 20 years have contradicted his skilful deduction (and who better qualified to make it than Nicolaevsky, the professional archivist and historian) about the curious absence of the Vecheka archive.

IF the report transmitted to us by Boris Nicolaevsky turns out to be true, as well it may, then how ironical that Lenin should have been at such pains to sweep the terrible Cheka and all its literary works and archives under the carpet (admittedly for reasons of temporary expediency), whereas in striking contrast the post-Stalin regime has, since the mid-1950s, systematically pursued a propaganda campaign, glorifying the Cheka and stressing its Leninist roots, a campaign culminating in the sanctification of its founder, Felix Dzerzhinsky, whose birth centenary fell in 1977. Significantly two recent volumes, the one a collection of documents on the theme *Lenin and the Vecheka*,[29] and the other a biography of Dzerzhinsky[30] were both published by Politizdat under the acknowledged editorial supervision of S. K. Tsvigun, First Deputy Chairman of the KGB.[31] The practical object of the exercise is, of course, to rehabilitate and legitimize the political police—tainted as it is with Stalin's monstrous terror—by tracing its descent from the immaculate Lenin and the apotheosized Cheka, and by investing it with the authority of the Party. The point is made in the introduction to *Lenin and the Vecheka*:

> Evolved under the direct influence of V. I. Lenin, the basic principles of the Soviet organs of state security, as well as the glorious Chekist traditions, having passed the test of over half a century, have not lost their application even at the present time.[32]

And so Lenin's practice of terror, and the Cheka's ruthless extermination of all opposition to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, are invoked today to justify, by implication, the authoritarian suppression of political dissent and the disregard of civil rights granted under the Soviet constitution.

[29] *V. I. Lenin i VChK: Sbornik dokumentov (1917-1922 gg.)*, ed., S. K. Tsvigun et al. (Moscow, 1975).

[30] *Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinskii: Biografiya*, ed., S. K. Tsvigun et al. (Moscow, 1977).

[31] By a Supreme Soviet Presidium decree of 27 September 1977, Semen Kuzmich Tsvigun, First Deputy Chairman of the KGB, was created Hero of Socialist Labour and awarded the Order of Lenin on his 60th birthday in recognition of his services to the security of the state—see *Izvestiya*, 28 Sept. 1977, p. 1.

[32] *V. I. Lenin i VChK*, op. cit. p. 9. Cf., in the introduction to *F. E. Dzerzhinskii: Biografiya* (Tsvigun), p. 5, the even more fulsome reference to " the glorious Chekist traditions " being " the life-giving source of the successful activity of the state security organs in our own time," and the quotation of Brezhnev's approving words concerning Dzerzhinsky's sterling work in the Vecheka and OGPU.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Views and Reviews

Ex-cultural Change

Editor's note: Moscow's Second International Book Fair which opened on 4 September 1979 was marred by the usual incidents accompanying western "cultural cooperation" with the Soviet authorities: the banning of "undesirable" books from the stands and the refusal to issue visas to "undesirable" publishers.

The Fair's chairman, Boris Stukalin, justified such practices with the standard arguments that the banned books "promoted war," or were "pornographic." He said at the press conference that "every honest man in the world" knew that the highest affirmation of freedom was to oppose the "propagandizing of fascism."

The following documents, "obtained" by the former Moscow correspondent, Alfred Friendly, Jr., provide some insight into Soviet-American "cultural cooperation" in the field of publishing.

In 1971 the University of Chicago Press invited two noted Soviet historians to contribute to its series "The United States in the World: Foreign Perspectives." Completed in 1976, with an epilogue added in 1978, the volume—its authors report in their Preface—"was reviewed by the Academic Council of the History Department of the University of Moscow and approved for publication." The "many critical comments" which the authors say "were expressed" in the course of that review have not found their way to the West. However, it has been possible to reconstruct a number of Soviet documents apparently related to the work as it was in progress. Reproduced below, they purport to be internal memoranda of the Chief Administration for the Preservation of State Secrets in the Press, usually known as Glavlit.* Survey *cannot vouch for the authenticity of these censors' notes. What is striking, however, is that the passages given in them in quotation actually appear verbatim in the published work.*

7/71
TO: NVS and NNY
FROM: E, 2nd Deputy Counsellor, Agitprop Dept.

As you know, the Secretariat has approved your request for permission to respond positively to the invitation from Chicago, an institution whose ties to the Rockefeller interests are well known. Your request for an amendment to your scholarly plan for the next five-year period has also

* Nikolai V. Sivachev and Nikolai N. Yakovlev, *Russia and the United States*, translated by Olga Adler Titelbaum (University of Chicago Press, $12.95).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been given positive consideration. I have been instructed to be of assistance to you in fulfilling this assignment in conformity with the interests of the Party and the workers' state. I do not need to remind you that there can be no coexistence in the ideological struggle and that the Secretariat expects the highest degree of vigilance precisely in the area of cultural "cooperation." For that reason, given the author's notorious anti-Soviet blatherings, your request for access to George Kennan's work, *Siberia and the Exile System*, is denied.

I will be available to consider other requests in September, after the close of the ideological workers' conference in Crimea. I am sorry you did not receive authorization to attend it as well, but I believe there are still openings on the friendship delegation to Kirghizia.

3/73
TO: NVS
FROM: E

I have received the draft of your first chapter. It lacks decisive class orientation, and if this fault is not corrected at the start, it will infect the whole work. The fact that you are writing for American liberals should not cause you to try to write like them. When there are too many contradictory facts, it is up to you to cut through them with a clear Marxist-Leninist perspective that will show how, from the beginning, the Americans have always distorted the good intentions of our great people.

Thus, there is no point in dwelling on the two years the Francis Dana mission spent from 1781 to 1783 trying to see Catherine II. Obviously the Americans should have "been more insistent," a phrase you should use, in seeking recognition. But it is important that you stress what did not happen, perhaps by writing: "The Russian government did not even dream of intervention in Boston or Philadelphia under some pretext such as the protection of the wares of Russian merchants in Alaska." The correct and principled approach of the Russian people to the American Revolutionary bourgeois state makes an instructive contrast to the hysterics in the USA after 1917. Hammer that instruction home.

The entire section on anti-tsarist sentiment in the USA from 1887 to 1917 must be rewritten to remove the woolly-headed humanitarianism you have contracted from too much reading of American propaganda sources. It should be clear that it was the imperialist, expansionist designs of American financiers, especially the influential Zionists, that raised the hullabaloo over prisons and exiles and the treatment of Jews. In summing up the campaign in 1911 to abrogate the 1832 trade agreement, point out: "The issue was the use of humanistic slogans in the imperialist struggle, in which the Zionists took an active part with great profit to themselves, thereby making the first major contribution to deterioration of Russian-American relations." This point will be given added clarity if you simply omit mention both of the 1903 Kishinev

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

so-called "pogrom" and of President Taft's efforts to negotiate the issue of passports for American Jews with the St Petersburg clique.

How old is this George Kennan of yours? If he was writing in 1887, he must be over a hundred by now. Would the University of Chicago permit one of our geriatric experts to examine him?

9/73
TO: NVS and NNY
FROM: E

I can understand your impatience to send some of your manuscript to Chicago, but in light of the great progress made in the relaxation of international tensions, especially the two meetings at the highest level this year and last, the Secretariat has found it appropriate to review its instructions to scientific workers on the understanding of US-Soviet ties. As is well known, the improvement in relations is due to the unswerving peace policy of the Soviet Union and the final coming to terms of the bourgeois states with the new correlation of forces that policy has brought about. By using the following excerpts from the instructions, you will be able to present your discussion of events before the Great Patriotic War in the correct light:

> (in reference to 1922) The Soviet state found the optimal form of solving its national and international problems. The Bolshevik party, having emerged as the initiator in the creation of the Communist International, helped all the revolutionary forces of the bourgeois world to work out the correct programmatic and theoretical arrangements. In doing this, the Soviet government and the Bolshevik party did not engage in the instigation of revolutions, nor permit any interference in the affairs of other nations.
>
> (in reference to 1933) Recognition became inevitable, first of all, because the USSR, as a result of successful socialist construction, had become a strong nation, the main support of peace in the world.
>
> (in reference to the "personality cult") All this was used by bourgeois propaganda in the struggle against socialism and the Soviet system. Distorting the nature and essence of the personality cult, the enemies of socialism strenuously propagandized the false thesis that the personality cult is a natural outcome of the socialist system. However, the most important fact about Soviet society in the thirties was not the historically accidental phenomenon of the Stalin personality cult but the successful construction of socialism; the superiority of socialism over capitalism had been proven, and the peace-loving nature of the Soviet state, the bastion of social progress, antifascism and peace, had been demonstrated.
>
> (in reference to 1939) Today the whole world knows that the Anglo-French-Soviet conference in Moscow failed because the Western participants were hardened Munichites, for whom the trip to the eastern capital was a by-product of their secret desire to encourage Hitler toward a policy of eastward expansion. To stop the plans of the aggressors and of those who were conniving with

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

them, Moscow agreed to the proposal of the German government to conclude a non-aggression pact, which was signed on 23 August 1939. This wrecked both the immediate plans of the Axis powers and the anti-Soviet calculations of the Munichites. This is precisely why the Munichites and like-minded historians ever since have tried so hard to make this action of the Soviet government appear as a betrayal.

You will note from these excerpts that the standard view of American motives has not been altered greatly by the Secretariat's re-evaluation of the means by which that view is to be presented. My earlier instructions stand. The Senate defeat of the Versailles Treaty can be termed a "historical trifle" and the claims of American politicians for the importance of isolationist feeling can be dismissed as "greatly exaggerated."

By the way, it will be simpler all around to remove reference to George Kennan's presence in the US Embassy in Moscow in the 1930s. Given his phobias, it is surprising that we permitted him to stay so long, but given his longevity, it is confusing to find him in the role of adviser, not ambassador.

8/74
TO: NVS and NNY
FROM: L (title illegible in original)

E's reassignment in accordance with his own wishes to the Kalmyk archives has necessitated my review of all the projects the internal émigré D, allotted to him and others before D's treacherous desertion of the collective for Israel. Inasmuch as the biography of Comrade Brezhnev for Simon and Schuster has understandable priority in this section, it will be some time before I can devote full attention to your endeavour. Having unmasked D's unreliability, we are subjecting all the work he supervised to the necessary reconsideration in the light of the new objective circumstances. Those, especially the machinations of the enemies of détente under the cover of "Watergate," require a more stringently Marxist-Leninist approach to the period of wartime collaboration than your previous drafts have achieved.

You have properly assessed the glorious contribution of our heroic Red Army to the defeat of the Japanese militarists, but you show a tendency to misrepresent the role of atomic weapons in hastening the inevitable outcome. The correct formulation to use is: "The use of the atomic weapon was of no military significance; it had a different purpose —to demonstrate it, and to try to intimidate the Soviet Union. That is how American atomic blackmail had its start."

You also betray a continuing tendency to sacrifice clarity to the profusion of trivial historic detail. A single reference to "the Polish question" will suffice without dwelling on the maze of interpretations given in the West to Stalin's intentions in regard to the provocative Warsaw uprising etc. The same approach to Czechoslovakia—to avoid

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

confusion by omitting to mention it—will promote clearer concepts of events in 1948 and 1968.

Since it would be harmful to your standing among us for some of your material to fall into immature, improperly oriented hands, you will appreciate the necessity of turning all your notes and copies of earlier drafts over to my assistant. You may of course continue to consult them here, but you must bring to an end your arrangement with the typist, Yu., whose cousin has been seen in the company of Sakharov.

10/76
TO: L
FROM: A (unidentified, but apparently a much higher official)

Release the Sivachev-Yakovlev manuscript. Enough time has been wasted on it considering that no one in the United States, except some impecunious reviewer, is likely ever to read it. Besides, if we don't get it into print soon, the Americans are likely to insist that we reciprocate by printing one of their propagandists in Russian as a good faith gesture under the Helsinki Agreement.

This order is not meant to imply any censure for your commendable conscientiousness in overseeing this project. I don't know how you manage to put up with these fuzzy intellectuals, but I admire your patience and keen eyes. Catching that mistake on Cuba—imagine their forgetting to note that the "test of strength" there was one "that Washington had attempted"!—was crucial and the interpretation you gave to the episode ("The efforts of the USSR in the matter of ensuring international peace were crowned with success.") was masterfully concise.

Do not worry about your defence of your candidate's dissertation. Professors Yakovlev and Sivachev have spoken to their colleagues on the examining committee about the high quality of your work. Besides, with a title like "George Kennan: A Class Enemy Sees the Light," how can you miss?

How the Soviet Union is Misunderstood

Michael Heller

DOCTOR SPOCK'S method has become familiar over the years, but although I would not wish in any way to dispute his claim to originality I must nevertheless point out that the basic idea contained in his theory was expressed by the heroine of one of Hans Christian Andersen's fairy tales. She, the leader of a robber band, said that unless children were thoroughly spoilt, they would never make good robbers. The first to apply Doctor Spock's method to his relations with the Soviet Union was the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George. We must, he said,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

suffocate the Bolsheviks with kindness. This idea has taken root not only in the minds of many western political figures, but also in the minds of many western intellectuals writing about the Soviet Union. What they fear most of all is to be accused of "anti-communism." The American journalist George Popov, Moscow correspondent for a number of European and American newspapers, was arrested in 1922 and imprisoned in the Lubyanka. When he was released, he wrote a book, where he states, "One of the most significant political achievements of the Moscow despots is to have brainwashed world public opinion in such a way that when anyone dares to mention any of the Soviet government's shortcomings, even though they are patently irrefutable, he is immediately labelled an 'anti-communist' and accused of lack of objectivity."

*How the Soviet Union is Governed** is a classic example of Doctor Spock's method applied to historical study. The cover itself raises certain questions, to which the text provides no answers. The title rings a bell; a book by Professor Merle Fainsod has a similar title. And on the cover of the book with a different name, the late Merle Fainsod's name also appears, after the name of Jerry F. Hough. But the reader soon realizes that this book has nothing to do with Merle Fainsod. It has not only been written without him (chunks of the earlier text are given as quotations) but against him. This is a strange procedure at the best of times, but in works of scholarship it is extremely rare. Spengler has discussed the phenomenon of pseudo-morphosis: mineral crystals are dispersed in a stratum of rock. Cracks and fissures appear Water then penetrates the rock and washes out the mineral. During volcanic activity, lava enters the empty moulds and crystallizes as it cools. This is how false crystals with an internal structure different from their external structure are formed. This would be of interest only to mineralogists had attempts not been made to pass off the false crystals as true ones.

JERRY F. HOUGH does not phrase the title of his book as a question. Not "How is the Soviet Union Governed?" but positively and categorically, "How the Soviet Union is Governed." Jerry F. Hough knows how it is governed and explains this to his readers.

There are two parts to the book—one historical and one political. Just the title of the last chapter of Part 1—"The Return to Normalcy"—is enough to give an understanding of the author's approach to his subject. The question could of course be asked, what is meant by *return* to normalcy? Return to Lenin? To Stalin? The conclusion has to be drawn that Jerry F. Hough chooses this title because in his opinion, the Soviet Union is governed normally.

How did the Soviet Union reach normalcy? With certain difficulties, as Jerry F. Hough admits. When discussing these difficulties, the author tries to be as "objective" as possible, i.e. tries to avoid, God forbid, offending the Soviet government. One example is enough: the discussion of collectivization. After having illustrated the decline in the number of cattle and pigs for the years 1928, 1930 and 1933 by providing specific figures, Jerry F. Hough goes on to say, "The human costs of collectiviza-

* Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London, 1979).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion were *also* extremely high." (My italics, M.H.) Here he gives no figures. He writes, " Many [?!] peasants died during the formation of the kolkhozes, and others were sent to camps or to exile in Siberia or the north where a number [?!] failed to survive." What would one think of a history of Nazi Germany, with figures for the value of gold fillings and human hair from the concentration camps, followed by " a number of prisoners failed to survive "? At the time of collectivization no fewer perished than did in Hitler's camps; straightforward honesty demands that a historian should mention this. Moreover, the socialist genocide preceded the Nazi genocide. Jerry F. Hough tries to play down the number of victims. " Soviet historians have now concluded that nearly 300,000 families were exiled to distant regions during the collectivization drive," he writes (p. 152). There is nothing more official than the *Istoriya SSSR*, and even here (vol. VIII, p. 551) the figure of 320,000 kulak families is mentioned. Jerry F. Hough does not accept Frank Lorimer's figure of 4·5–5·5 million for collectivization victims, suggesting instead the figure of 3·5 million. He is not impressed by figures given by western scholars and regrets the lack of Soviet statistics. Not long ago in France a literary historian doing research on the Nazi genocide came to the conclusion that the Nazis had not gassed the Jews, as he had found no official documents to this effect. For some Soviet specialists too, evidence from the murderers is more convincing than evidence from the victims.

According to Jerry F. Hough, during the period of collectivization Stalin made a series of concessions and compromises: the concession in 1930, when he wrote the article " Dizzy with success," the concession in 1932 when the " non-communist Gorky . . . rose to a predominant position," and " the communist Academy steadily lost in power vis-à-vis the more traditional Academy of Sciences," the concession in 1933, when he signed (together with Molotov) the secret circular " ordering an end to mass deportation " (p. 164). This period of Soviet history has been thoroughly covered and there is no need to repeat again here that collectivization continued after Stalin's article, that the " non-communist Gorky " did more to emasculate Russian culture than the most zealous fanatics such as Averbakh or Bezymenskii, that in science, power did not transfer from the Communist Academy to the Academy of Sciences, but to the science section of the Communist Party, that the secret circular of 1933 did not order " an end to mass deportation " at all. For confirmation of this, one only has to look at the text of this circular, given both in English and in Russian in Merle Fainsod's book *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule*. The circular recommended " taking the pressure off prisons " by accelerating court procedures and sending prisoners off to the camps with greater dispatch. It is interesting that Jerry F. Hough does not give the figures for prisoners (although they could not be more official!) mentioned in the circular. This figure—800,000—gives an idea of the terror raging at the time of collectivization. This figure, which shortly was to seem derisory, can be compared with the number of prisoners in 1912—183,864—the highest figure for prisoners ever reached under the tsars.

This approach to collectivization as a series of retreats by Stalin and his desire not to dwell on the human costs, is explained by Jerry F.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hough's proposition that " something like collectivization " was necessary because " a half-century later the Soviet Union was one of the two acknowledged superpowers " and won the Second World War (p. 155). The logic of this conclusion is astonishing. To extend it, one could say that Hitler's crime was not that he killed six million Jews, not that he started a war which cost 50 million lives, but that he lost the war.

Despite the clarity of his perceptions, Jerry F. Hough does sometimes express surprise. Noting that in 1936–38 the Great Terror reached its climax, he adds, " Paradoxically, just two months after the Central Committee had approved a new constitution and at the same time that the press was engaged in extensive public discussion about its guarantees of individual freedom, the first of the great public trials took place in August 1936 " (p. 173). In his profound analysis of the Soviet system, Leszek Kolakowski came to the conclusion that what seems " paradoxical " to some is in fact the essence of the Stalinist government. Under Lenin, writes Leszek Kolakowski, terror was still called terror, bureaucracy—bureaucracy, anti-Bolshevik peasant uprisings—anti-Bolshevik peasant uprisings. Under Stalin, the Party no longer made any mistakes, the Soviet government was ideal, and the love of the people for the government was boundless. Under Stalin, the all-embracing lie became the basis of the system (*Main Currents of Marxism* vol. II, p. 527). It is quite obvious that Jerry F. Hough cannot accept this point of view, as his whole book is based on the conviction that Soviet statistics are genuine, that statements by Soviet officials are genuine. The American historian is totally immersed in the world of Soviet statistics: he analyses them, he bases conclusions on them, he builds his understanding of the Soviet system on them. This is what historians do when they study Britain, France, the USA. This is what Jerry F. Hough does when he studies the Soviet Union, not wanting to acknowledge that this government is special, unique. The late Merle Fainsod, whose name graces the cover of the book, studied the Soviet Union as a totalitarian government. His pupil, having rejected the " totalitarian model " (but retaining his professor's name on the cover) is looking for a new model. Despite his efforts, certain figures in Soviet statistics cannot be explained.

Jerry F. Hough presents the reader with a great variety of labels, which could—and for many western scholars do—replace the totalitarian model: " modern participatory state," " administered society," " monist system," etc. The author himself, as far as can be judged from his vague conclusion, is inclined to accept a model with the resounding name of " institutional pluralism " (p. 526).

According to Jerry F. Hough, the Soviet system reached " pluralism " even under Stalin. For example, " Zhdanovshchina," the American historian claims, was followed by a " partial relaxation in the literary realm " (p. 183). Apparently this " relaxation " is expressed in the fact that Akhmatova and Zoshchenko were not shot nor even arrested, but merely deprived of the right to work and condemned to be " unpersons." He sees the nomination of the future " liberal," A. M. Rumyantsev, as head of the science department of the Central Committee, as another sign of " relaxation." It is quite clear that after Stalin's death " revitalization " gained rapid momentum. The number of " liberals "

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

increased. But there had been plenty of them before. As everyone remembers, the American ambassador in Moscow, Joseph Davies, notorious for his endless stupidity, was very sorry for the "liberal Stalin" who was not given free rein by the "conservatives in the Politburo." Everyone also remembers that in December 1938 the bloodstained tyrant Ezhov was replaced by the liberal Beria.

The new liberals in the post-Stalin period, therefore, have a certain tradition to maintain. Jerry F. Hough describes several present-day liberals from the Politburo. Some of their biographical data could have been extended, however. For instance, M. Suslov not only participated in "the deportation of unreliable elements" in 1944 in Lithuania, but he also participated in the deportation of "unreliable elements" during the war in the Northern Caucasus. But this, of course, is by the way.

The most important point about Brezhnev's accession to power is apparently that afterwards everything returned to "normalcy." Jerry F. Hough disagrees with "some western observers" who think that after Khrushchev's fall "repression intensified," that "neo-Stalinism was developing." What repressions could there possibly be, if "great emphasis [is] placed by the KGB on its educational role" (p. 281). A discussion on the extent of repression would take up too much space but I think that one should not forget that from as early as December 1917, when the Cheka was founded, these Soviet "organs" aimed to fulfil an educational, civilizing role. As is well known, Soviet camps are still called educational.

Jerry F. Hough considers that censorship in the Soviet Union is not too dreadful; it is, if such an expression can be used, "censorship with a human face." "The reader of the specialized literature on international relations has access to lively debates about the nature of political systems in different parts of the world and in different countries." It is possible to "appeal for basic change in the political system" as long as this is properly expressed (p. 291); the principle of secrecy is "the principle of cabinet secrecy that is typical for a parliamentary system," merely carried to an extreme (p. 292). Jerry F. Hough admits limitations on information about the past and the present, stating, erroneously, that "Khrushchev is mentioned even less frequently than his predecessor" (p. 292). In fact, Khrushchev is not mentioned at all, whereas references to Stalin are increasingly frequent. But if we disregard certain specific gaps, then, on the whole, there is lively discussion on political questions in practically all areas. With a semantic virtuosity worthy of Soviet ideologists themselves, Jerry F. Hough presents his thoughts in an extremely ambiguous form: "Thus, to say that vigorous policy debates now take place in virtually every policy area in the Soviet Union and that these debates have involved carefully phrased criticism of the fundamentals of the system is not to say that policy debates are freely conducted in all Soviet arenas" (p. 293).

THE reader seeking an answer to the question "How is the Soviet Union governed?" will indeed find it in Jerry F. Hough's book: the Soviet Union is governed normally, like any other western state. But Jerry F. Hough is not as naive as one may have thought; he knows that this criticism will be made and anticipates it: "The careless reader,"

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he writes " may incorrectly think that . . . the Soviet political system is being treated as identical with systems in the West " (p. 529).

Alas, even the most careful reader can reach no other conclusion. And how could it be otherwise when this is the argument the author develops? There is no repression—the fact that people like Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn are not imprisoned " indicates that far-reaching dissent may be tolerated before legal proceedings are begun " (p. 282). Just as in the West. " If the dissident abandons his political activity, he generally is permitted to resume a normal life " (p. 282). The evidence of dissidents who say that their lives are broken for ever, even if they relinquish their activity, is not taken into account by Jerry F. Hough. Perhaps with a certain degree of surprise, he stresses that " contemporary Soviet ideology freely acknowledges diversity of interests within Soviet society " (p. 536).

Moreover, " the network of institutions to which a citizen can complain or appeal is extremely large—larger than in a western country . . ." (p. 316). He does acknowledge that in the relationship between the Soviet government and the Soviet citizen, the government restricts the individual to a greater extent than in the West, but then he goes on to say that in all modern states the balance of power between the government and the individual is usually weighted in favour of the government. And in the Soviet Union the masses do, according to Jerry F. Hough, take an active part in the governing of their country; the numbers of deputies in councils, the numbers of trade union members, the numbers of Party members, are constantly increasing. And in this case, there are detailed statistics to substantiate his claim.

The American historian does not understand the most important peculiarity of the Soviet system, which does not lie just in the intensity of repression. Stalinist terror was useful in creating a socialist totalitarian state, but nowadays, repression on a smaller scale and the memory of the terror suffice. The essential attribute of the Soviet system is, with the presence of repression and the absence of freedom, the subordination of all activity in the country—economic, cultural, social—of all its citizens to the interests of the state, its total, limitless power over its citizens, in short, the nationalization of the individual.

In fact, everything which Jerry F. Hough wanted to say about the Soviet Union he says on page 263: " the Brezhnev era would be best understood if we ascribed to the General Secretary the type of motivations that we attribute to most politicians in the West." If, writes Jerry F. Hough, " Brezhnev's actions and policies are examined in the light of the hypothetical requirements of ' electoral ' policies vis-à-vis the Central Committee, it is striking how many can be explained in those terms." In his time, Stalin told Roosevelt that unless the American president agreed to give him two extra votes in the UN, the General Secretary would experience serious difficulties with his Ukrainian and Belorussian voters. The American president understood this argument only too well. He gave in to his colleague.

President Roosevelt based his policy on Doctor Spock's method. " If I grant him [Stalin] everything within my power, demanding nothing in return," he explained to William Bullit, " he will, *noblesse oblige*,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cease to contemplate aggression and agree to work with me to create a democratic and peaceful world."

William Bullit objected that the method of *noblesse oblige* might work with the Duke of Norfolk, but not with a Caucasian bandit. Maybe it will work better with an engineer from Dnepropetrovsk.

Parents who bring up their children according to Doctor Spock's method naturally desire only the best for their children, but in the depths of their hearts they firmly expect their children to love them. With the Soviet Union, things are a bit more complicated. As long ago as 1934, Ilf and Petrov produced a formula to describe the personal relationship between the Soviet government and the citizen, a formula which, unfortunately, does not appear in Jerry F. Hough's book: loving the Soviet government means nothing, unless it loves you. And as we know, it loves only those who are the most deserving. But, as Alexander Zinoviev says, the people it certainly does not love are those who understand it. It is to be expected that it will love Jerry F. Hough's book *How the Soviet Union is Governed.*

Reformation Manquée

Duncan Wilson

THIS very interesting book * contains a series of 10 interview-essays. In spite of the title, which suggests a tour including China and Yugoslavia, it is mainly devoted to the "Prague Spring" and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Four of the co-authors are Czechs, who were closely connected with the Czech reform movement and are now in exile, Eduard Goldstücker, Antonin Liehm, Zdenek Mlynar and Ota Sik. Manuel Azcárate of the Spanish Communist Party discusses the effect of events in Czechoslovakia on the Eurocommunist movement. Jacob Beam (US Ambassador in Prague at the time), Claiborne Pell (a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) and Eugene Rostow (Undersecretary of State in 1968) give American views. The book ends with contributions from Vladimir Maksimov (editor of the Moscow periodical *Oktyabr* till 1967 and now, in exile, editor of *Kontinent*) and Hugh Seton-Watson; skilfully stimulated or provoked by George Urban, they discuss (among other things) the Russian national character, Russian and other types of nationalism, and the Soviet form of Russian imperialism, thus putting the events of 1968 in a wider perspective.

For anyone with a grasp of the crucial events in Soviet-East European relations since 1945 this is a fascinating book and a very easy read. There is no obvious consecutive thread of argument between

* *Communist Reformation: Nationalism, internationalism and change in the world Communist movement*, ed. G. R. Urban (pp. 335, Maurice Temple Smith, London, 1979, £9·50).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the various interviews, but for the reviewer, as well as the reader, it is a case of putting in his thumb and pulling out a plum. Of the Czech contributions, the first—the interview with Goldstücker—is the most substantial. In 1968 Goldstücker was President of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union and Pro-Rector of the Charles University at Prague. His credentials as a reforming communist were the best possible. The need to believe had enabled him to accept the Soviet show trials of 1937; he regarded the Prague coup of 1948 as inevitable; the show trials of 1949–51 in Eastern Europe opened his eyes, but not completely; his faith in some form of communism survived a long imprisonment from the end of 1951, during which he learned that Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* much exaggerated the intelligence of the normal communist secret policeman (there are fascinating details about his subsequent meetings, as a free man, with his own Gestapo-trained Czech interpreter). On emerging from prison, he was still ready to devote himself to " rectifying the horrible deformation " of the Czech CP (the confidence of those who were not imprisoned had been more rapidly eroded by events, though, among the contributors to this book, Mlynar did not lose his faith completely till the early 1970s). Goldstücker thought that it would be possible to pursue a reformist course while preserving a leading role for the CP. The Czech reformers (this is Liehm's point) were well aware of the dangers of going as far as the Hungarians in 1956; but they thought that the Soviet leaders still took de-Stalinisation seriously and would understand what the Czech reformists were trying to do.

Perhaps the Soviet leaders understood only too well what Brezhnev described (to Mlynar) as an " irresponsible decision to experiment with socialism." According to Sik, the Czech reform movement was led not by dissatisfied consumers, but by intellectuals, who had always played an important part in the development of Czech national independence; Liehm says that they carried the workers with them by decentralization (Workers' Councils), and a key element of reform became the need to circumscribe the role of the state and to develop away from state socialism. Above all, the reform attempts involved a degree of freedom of expression which the Russians could never tolerate at home or elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

The experiment had little chance of success since the Dubcek regime contained too many conservative communists (according to Mlynar). In any case they missed their best chance (Sik says) by failing to convene in April 1968 the 14th Party Congress which might conceivably have evolved a reform programme agreed by all the Czech leaders and rather less offensive to the Russians. But even if the attempt at reform was foredoomed, it was still worth making (concludes Goldstücker).

Could the western powers have helped? The answer that emerges from the American contributors is—probably not. The Czechs did not ask for help beforehand, enthusiastic American reporting of the " Prague Spring " embarrassed them, and bilateral Czech/US relations were embittered by Czech supplies to the Vietcong (recollects Beam). The Administration did not appreciate until too late the probability of Russian intervention (Eugene Rostow is very bitter about the excessive optimism of Bohlen and other professional sovietologists); the Americans wanted to leave Brandt the freest possible hand for his developing

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ostpolitik and thought this might be jeopardized by displaying too much anxiety over Czechoslovakia; and they were specifically concerned about warning the Soviet leaders off Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, though Brezhnev was almost certainly being disingenuous in telling Mlynar in August 1968 that he had had specific assurance of non-intervention from President Johnson, the Russians had probably underestimated the strength of American public reaction; they assumed that, with the Democratic Congress looming, Johnson would wish to proceed with his plans for a personal visit to Moscow, even after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

HOW would the Soviet regime have survived the success of a Czech reformist movement in 1968, and what would be the effects now and after Brezhnev's disappearance from the scene of similar movements in Eastern Europe? Goldstücker thinks that in 1968 Brezhnev had the strength to contain any infection that might have spread from a successful Czech reform, and could probably still do so. In Mlynar's view, Stalinism is being slowly deflated throughout Eastern Europe by the demands of a consumer society, but in the Soviet Union there is still no constituency for reformed communism—Maximov is scornful about the sort of suppositions which underlie such a judgment. There is no ground, he thinks, for the western assumption that the average Russian is more content with autocratic rule than others: there is an autocrat and a democrat at war within each individual mind, and if the West persists in treating Russians as second-class human beings, they will reap a bitter harvest from such prejudice and racialism. It is a pity that he could not debate this point directly with Seton-Watson (who is gloomy enough in all conscience about *English* lack of national culture and *British* loss of national morale). For him there is something missing " from the Russian political and psychological mechanism . . . to connect their . . . brilliant capacity to analyse their situation with the will to change it." His only comfort is the reflection that the Soviet/Russian Empire is probably not exempt " from one of the great laws of history . . . the Law of Colonial Ingratitude." On the Soviet Union of today or yesterday Goldstücker (quoting Efim Etkind) should have the last word. After Kafka was " rehabilitated " in 1968, anonymous translations began again to circulate in the Soviet Union. These had little effect in raising the prestige of Czech culture; they were regarded not as classical fiction but as contemporary memoirs of the Soviet scene.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Letters to the Editor

Dear Sir,

In *Survey*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (103) I have found the translation of a tape-recorded account of my "trial" in the Institute of Linguistics, in Moscow, in March 1976. I did not know that you had published it, and that is why it is only now that I am sending you my belated thanks.

However, I feel that two remarks are not out of place in this connection.

The whole procedure was tape-recorded by myself with the help of a Japanese mini-recorder that I had hidden in my briefcase which I put on the table of the Scientific Council. The tape was then smuggled out of the country thanks to an American correspondent (I think it was Robert Toth of the *Los Angeles Times*: I never contacted him personally; the whole thing was done through an intermediary person, Tatyana Khodorovich, presently in Paris). Afterwards it was broadcast several times, in particular by the BBC. While still in Moscow, I heard from many friends that they had listened to the broadcast and were fascinated by it. What you have printed is 100 per cent accurate. Curiously enough, during the Shcharansky trial, Shcharansky was charged with passing a tape with top secret information to Mr Toth. Need I mention that this famous tape was mine? (See the accounts of interrogations to which Mr Toth himself had been submitted and which were published in the *Los Angeles Times* and elsewhere.)

After my expulsion from the Institute I tried to find a job. I wrote two letters to the President of the Academy of Sciences, Professor Alexandrov, explaining to him my precarious situation and asking for his intervention. An answer from him never came.

Although I had some money saved and earned my living out of French and English lessons, the police started harassing me and accused me of "social parasitism" since I did not work for the state. Even after I applied for an exit visa—to Israel—they continued their pressure, especially after the house search in the flat of Professor Orlov, where some *samizdat* documents written by me had been found. On 13 May 1976, for instance, I was summoned to a police station for interrogation. So I did not see any other solution but to leave, which I did. ("Parasitism" can cost you three years in jail or internal exile—and I happen to hate solitary confinement.)

Now I live in Montreal (since 14 September 1977) and teach linguistics as a full professor at the University of Montreal. Only after these two years am I beginning to understand fully what a hell life in the Soviet Union is: you need a basis for comparison to realize what's going on around you. It is the first time in my long life (I was born in 1932)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that I have had an opportunity to work in my science freely, publish everything I produce, travel abroad to meet colleagues, etc.

Yours,

I. Mel'cuk

Montreal, 1 October 1979

Max Hayward Fellowship Appeal

Sir,

Your readers who are familiar with the name of Max Hayward, as one of the foremost students of Soviet literature and culture, will also know, from the obituary which appeared in *Survey* (No. 106), that Max died in March 1979 at the age of 54 after a short illness.

May we, through your journal, let them know that St Antony's College, Oxford, where he was a Fellow for 25 years, is soon to launch an Appeal to raise funds for a Max Hayward Fellowship in Russian Literature.

We are at present compiling a list of Max's friends, colleagues and former pupils, to whom we shall be sending the Appeal leaflet. In order to ensure that nobody is overlooked, we would like to ask all those who wish to be included in the list to send their names and addresses to one of the undersigned.

Yours faithfully,

Raymond Carr
Richard Kindersley
Harry Shukman
Harry Willetts

Appeal Committee for the
Max Hayward Fellowship
in Russian Literature,
St Antony's College,
Oxford OX2 6JF.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Our Contributors

HANNES ADOMEIT is a member of staff at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Munich. Recent publications include, with Robert Boardman, *Foreign Policy Making in Communist Countries* (1979) and *The Soviet Union and Western Europe* (1979).

MIKHAIL AGURSKY is Senior Lecturer at the Soviet and East European Research Centre of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Prior to his emigration from the Soviet Union, Dr Agursky worked at the Institute of Control Problems (IPU) at the USSR Academy of Sciences, the civilian Machine-tool Research Institute (ENIMS) and the military-industrial Research Institute for Machine-building Technology (NIITM). He has contributed to Alexander Solzhenitsyn (ed.), *From Under the Rubble* (1975) and Morton Kaplan (ed.), *Many Faces of Communism* (1978).

JOHN BUSHNELL is Assistant Professor of History at Carnegie-Mellon University. He lived in the Soviet Union for four years, 1972–76, as an exchange student and translator.

BETSY GIDWITZ is a Soviet specialist in the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her book on the politics of international civil aviation is in preparation.

JOHN GLAD teaches Russian literature as an Associate Professor at the University of Maryland. He is guest editor of *Modern Poetry in Translation*, has edited and translated Nikolai Klyuev's poems and other modern Russian poetry.

ALFRED FRIENDLY, Jr., former Moscow correspondent of *Newsweek*, has translated many Russian documents into English and knows a forgery when he writes one.

MICHAEL HELLER is *Maître-Assistant* at the Sorbonne. He is the author of *Le Monde Concentrationnaire et la Littérature Soviétique* and other works. He has contributed numerous articles to *Survey*.

A. M. KAPCIA is Senior Lecturer in Spanish and Latin American Studies at the Polytechnic of Wolverhampton. He wrote his doctoral thesis on "Changes and Developments in Cuban literature since the 1959 Revolution."

GEORGE H. LEGGETT is a retired civil servant. His history of the Vecheka is to be published by Oxford University Press.

G. D. LOESCHER is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and International Studies at the University of Notre Dame and a Visiting Fellow at the London School of Economics & Political Science (1978–79). He recently co-edited *Human Rights and American Foreign Policy* (1979).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A. G. NOORANI practises as an advocate in Bombay. He contributes regularly to the leading daily, *Indian Express*, and to the weeklies, *Opinion* and *Sunday*. He is the author of *Brezhnev's Plan for Asian Security* (1975), *Aspects of India's Foreign Policy* (1970) and *India's Nuclear Diplomacy* (forthcoming).

KAREN ERICKSON ÖRVIK is a specialist in the history and politics of Finnish foreign policy who has taught at the University of Oslo, Queen's University (Ontario) and St Lawrence University (New York).

KONSTANTYN SAWCZUK is Professor of History at Saint Peter's College, New Jersey. His book *Ukraine in the United Nations Organization, A Study in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1944–1950* was published in 1975.

SIR DUNCAN WILSON is the Master of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. He has been Chargé d'Affaires in Peking (1957–59), Ambassador in Belgrade (1964–68) and Ambassador in Moscow (1968–71). He is the author of *The Life and Times of Vuk Karadžić* (1970) and *Tito's Yugoslavia*, shortly to be published by Cambridge University Press.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE E COMMERCIALI

International Review of Economics and Business

Vol. XXVI . JULY 1979 N. 7

Inflation and Unemployment: No Feasible Conjunctural Control of a Structural Disequilibrium — JEAN PAUL FITOUSSI

Black Work or Economic Isolation? — GIULIO CAPODAGLIO

Homo Ludens: The Play Theory of Advertising — WILLIAM STEPHENSON

" External " Corporate Financing and Income Distribution — FERRUCCIO BRESOLIN

Creeping Restrictionism and External Economic Controls — JOZEF SWIDROWSKI

Tax Mix and Effective Demand: Some Reflections on a Debate — MASSIMO MATTEUZZI

Tax Evasion: Sanctions also for the Government and the Legislature — VINCENZO FILOSA

Book reviews

Articles published in English, Italian and French. Summaries in English and Italian. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS is a monthly, published since 1954 under the auspices of Bocconi University, Milan. Editorial and administrative offices: Via Teuliè 1, 20136 Milano (Italy). Annual subscription: Italian Liras 36,000. Back issues available.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CENTRO DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

Revista Relaciones Internacionales

VOL. VI ENERO-MARZO 1978—NUEVA EPOCA NÚM. 20

SUMARIO

PRESENTACÍON:

ARTÍCULOS:

Irene Zea Prado.—Introducción al problema de los indocumentados.
Rosa María Romo y Ma. de Lourdes Urbina.—La política exterior de México y los Estados Unidos frente al problema de los trabajadores migratorios.
Manuel Millor Mauri.—Un enfoque interno de la problemática de los trabajadores migratorios mexicanos.
Luis F. González Souza.—Bracerismo vs. Derechos Humanos: un complejo natural de contradicciones necesariamente reflejado en la política exterior de los Estados Unidos.

NOTAS Y COMENTARIOS:

Stanley R. Ross.—México y los Estados Unidos patrocinan un programa de estudio de sus problemas fronterizos.
Ma. de Lourdes Urbina y Javier Rodríguez Piña.—La Migración de trabajadores mexicanos a Estados Unidos. Referencia bibliográfica.

DOCUMENTOS:

Medidas para mejorar la situación y garantizar el respeto de los derechos humanos y la dignidad de todos los trabajadores migratorios. Resolución aprobada por la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas, el 16 de diciembre de 1977.

CRONOLOGÍAS:

Cronología de los principales acontecimientos de la política exterior de México del 1º de octubre al 31 de diciembre de 1977.
Cronología de los principales acontecimientos de la política internacional de América Latina del 1º de octubre al 31 de diciembre de 1977.

Indice temático de la Revista 1973–1977.

Toda correspondencia relativa a la venta o suscripción de Relaciones Internacionales debe ser dirigida a Servi-Libros, Apartado Postal 25–328, México 13 D.F. Tel.: 530 26 06.

Precio de la Revista: Número suelto: $ 25.00 M.N.
Suscripción anual: $100.00 M.N.
Suscripción anual correo aéreo: $130.00 M.N.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ce numéro spécial de 208 pages contient des documents politiques, historiques et littéraires exceptionnels

CONTREPOINT

ÉTÉ 1979

Boris Souvarine
Derniers entretiens avec Babel

Kostas Papaioannou	Lénine au pouvoir (II)
Istvàn Kemény	Les pauvres en Hongrie
Jean Boissel	Les ananas de Bratislava
Emmanuel Ransford	Idéologies et dénatalité
Giovanni Allegra	Le baroque face à l'histoire
Ricardo Paseyro	Le mythe Neruda

Contrepointes
Pierre de Boisdeffre, Jeanyves Guérin, Jean Plumyène, Louis de Villefosse.

Chroniques:
Livres, cinéma, théâtre, peinture, etc.
Trente numéros de Contrepoint: index et table des matières

ABONNEMENTS	France	Étranger
• Particuliers	100 F	120 F
• Institutions	120 F	140 F
• Le numéro	30 F	40 F

CONTREPOINT, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE,

4, rue Cassette, 75006 Paris – C.C.P. Paris 2.605-96
Directeur: Olivier Noc – Rédacteur en chef: Ricardo Paseyro
Tél. 222.11.46

No. 30

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

The leading international journal for the study of twentieth century China

Issues contain

Articles Book Reviews Comments
Research Notes Visitors' Reports from China
Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation

Issue No. 79 (September)

MAO TSE-TUNG, CH'EN PO-TA AND THE "SINIFICATION OF MARXISM," 1936–38 — *Raymond F. Wylie*

THE ROAD TO URUMCHI: APPROVED INSTITUTIONS IN SEARCH OF ATTAINABLE GOALS DURING PRE-1968 RUSTICATION FROM SHANGHAI — *Lynn T. White III*

BETWEEN GENERATIONS: ACTIVIST CHINESE YOUTHS IN PURSUIT OF A POLITICAL ROLE IN THE *SAN-FAN* AND IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION — *David M. Raddock*

Research Notes

HOW THE "INSCRUTABLES" NEGOTIATE WITH THE "INSCRUTABLES": CHINESE NEGOTIATING TACTICS *VIS-À-VIS* THE JAPANESE — *Kazuo Ogura*

"FASCISM" AND MODERN CHINA — *Maria Hsia Chang*

Methodological Note

PRESS ACCOUNTS AND THE STUDY OF CHINESE SOCIETY — *Andrew G. Walder*

Report from China

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINESE SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1977–79 — *George Braybrooke*

Review Article

CHOU EN-LAI AND THE BIOGRAPHIC STUDY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM — *Thomas W. Robinson*

Editorial Office:
School of Oriental and African Studies
Malet Street, London WC1E 7HP

For subscriptions write to:
Publications (*The China Quarterly*)
School of Oriental and African Studies
Malet Street, London WC1E 7HP

Subscription rates:
£10 or U.S.$20.00 a year, post free
Full-time students £5 or U.S.$10
Individual copies £2.50 or U.S.$5

Printed in Great Britain by The Eastern Press Ltd., London and Reading

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED